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SUMMARY
The starting point of the thesis is the contention of Nurkse (19MO 
that exchange rates in the 1930's were unstable and subject to de­
stabilising speculation. This view has been widely accepted and the 
few studies that have examined the issue since tend to be obscure 
and limited in scope. The principal objective of the present study 
is to provide a thorough (mainly econometric) test of the counter­
hypothesis that exchange rates were, in fact, determined by "economic 
fundamentals" (particularly relative prices, incomes and interest rate 
differentials) in this period. Consequently, a model of exchange rate 
determination is developed and applied to the currencies of Britain,
America, Canada, France, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, both bi­
laterally and multilaterally.
The calculation of multilateral (or effective) exchange rates 
for the 1930's was considered a useful exercise in itself since they did 
not appear to be available. It seemed, therefore, desirable to digress 
and examine the methodology of their construction and to consider some 
general implications of referring to multilateral (instead of bilateral) 
exchange rates in the 1930's, before using them to test the central 
hypothesis multilaterally.
The main conclusion of the thesis is that, to a large extent, 
exchange rates were indeed determined by "economic fundamentals" and 
were not distorted by persistent destabilising speculation (the Nurkse 
view), although the latter was important occasionally. The evidence was 
stronger for bilateral than multilateral rates; however, this probably 
reflects the limited nature of the tests involving the latter. Finally, 
where there was sufficient information for an adequate test, official 
intervention was also found to be important and, more generally, it was 
argued that any instability wa6 probably due more to government intervention 
than to destabilising speculation.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
(I)
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the consequent 
widespread adoption of floating exchange rates in the 1970's has 
created a revival of interest in earlier periods during which exchange 
rates were not fixed. Of particular interest in this context is the 
1930's; not only is this the most recent historical episode of general­
ised floating but it has been put forward as a classic example of all
(1)the dangers inherent in floating exchange rates and this inter­
pretation played an important role in the debate over international 
monetary arrangements to be established after the second world war, 
which ultimately produced the Bretton Woods adjustable peg system.
It is therefore somewhat surprising that no systematic, quantitative 
study of the fluctuations of the major currencies in this period exists,
although studies of individual exchange rates are now beginning to
(2)emerge.
The condemnation of floating exchange rates which contributed 
most to the accepted wisdom that has prevailed throughout much of the 
post-World War II period originated in the work of Nurkse (19M+) and 
this is the starting point of the present study. Basing his conclusions 
on little more than casual empiricism Nurkse gave three reasons why 
floating rates were to be avoided:
"In the first place, they create an element of risk which tends to discourage international trade.....Secondly, as a 
means of adjusting the balance of payments, exchange fluc­tuations involve constant shifts of labour and other resources between production for the home market and production for export.
Such shifts may be costly and disturbing; they tend to 
create frictional unemployment, and are obviously wasteful 
if the exchange-market conditions that call for them are 
temporary......Thirdly•••^any^«**considerable or continuous
movement of the exchange rate is liable to generate antici­
pations of a further movement in the same direction, thus 
giving rise to speculative capital transfers of a dis- 
equilibriating kind...." (3)
Particular stress is placed on the third argument which is reiterated 
at various stages in Nurkse's study, most explicitly:
"If currencies are left free to fluctuate, 'speculation'...
...is likely to play havoc with exchange rates...."(4)
In support of this contention Nurkse draws on the experience 
of floating in the inter-war period. However, it is very noticeable 
that his most convincing examples of destabilising speculation relate 
largely to the 1920's - particularly the French franc in 1922-26 - and 
that his examples for the 1930's are very limited (confined to one page) 
and are rather questionable. In fact they are really assertions rather 
than evidence. He simply states that:
"After the breakdown of exchange stability in the 'thirties, 
whenever exchanges were left to their own fate, such 
^disequilibriating capital^ movements....played an important 
part..." (5)
and gives three examples:
"...the American dollar in 1933* the French franc at certain times during 1937 and the pound sterling in the first few 
months after September 1931"» (6)
Whether these examples can justifiably be used to provide evidence 
of destabilising speculation under floating exchange rates is debatable. 
In all three cases the currencies concerned had just left the gold 
standard, and it is not unreasonable to argue, that such instability 
of exchange rates as did occur, can more correctly be attributed to the
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misguided attempts to fix the exchange rate in the immediately 
preceding period and are therefore more properly interpreted as 
examples of the disadvantages of fixed exchange rates. Nurkse's 
view, that the presence of destabilising speculation in the 1930's 
illustrates a major drawback of floating exchange rates, would thus 
appear to rest on rather flimsy evidence find would seem to be more 
an assertion than an empirically supported conclusion.
This point has been taken up by Aliber (1976) who argues that 
during times of (price) instability, such as the 1930's, fixed exchange 
rates cannot function. Consequently, instability in the 1930's pre-
(7)eluded the use of fixed exchange rates and made floating inevitable.
The implicit conclusion of Nurkse - that fixed rates would have worked 
better - is therefore incorrect and the 1930's cannot be held up as an 
example of a period in which this is true (although this point of view 
does not exactly conflict with Nurkse's argument about destabilising 
speculation but rather modifies it to state that floating exchange rates 
were made more unstable than they could have been by such speculation).
The present study attempts to take the argument one step further 
by examining the hypothesis that not only does the experience of the 
1930's provide little support for fixed exchange rates (Aliber's point) 
but it does not even provide particularly good evidence that floating 
rates tend to be unstable. This hypothesis is to be tested by specifying 
a model of exchange rate determination which contains two sets of variables 
"economic fundamentals" (such as relative prices), which might plausibly 
be expected to cause exchange rates to change; however, such changes do 
not imply disequilibria but simply movements from old to new equilibria; 
and "non-economic" or perhaps better, "speculative" variables which 
seek to allow for destabilising speculation of the Nurkse variety. To
the extent that the former group of variables are significant and 
the latter are not, then this provides support for the hypothesis 
that exchange rates were not subject to violent fluctuations caused 
by destabilising speculation in the 1930's but such changes that did 
occur were simply movements to new equilibria (justified by changes 
in the "fundamental" economic variables which determined exchange 
rates).
(II)
At this stage something needs to be said about exactly what is 
meant by exchange rate "equilibrium" and the associated concept of 
exchange rate "stability". In common with many others, Nurkse often 
seems to implicitly define stability as "lack of movement"; indeed, he 
addresses himself to "the question of fluctuating versus stable exchanges 
However, whether stability and lack of variation amount to the same 
thing is debatable. The dilemma is succinctly summed up by Viner:
"...one economist's 'stability' may be another one's 
'rigidity' and....one economist's 'instability' may be 
another one's 'flexibility'...." (9)
In fact a floating exchange rate which changes gradually according to 
the underlying trend may be construed as more "stable" than a fixed 
rate with periodic, discontinuous (and comparatively large) changes 
to new fixed levels.
This is because an exchange rate can only really be stable if it 
clears the market and equates supply and demand for foreign currency 
because only then will there be no pressure on the exchange rate to
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change; the exchange rate that does this is the equilibrium rate 
and, in fact, any attempt to peg the rate (excepting a fortuitous 
accident) must lead to disequilibrium. Indeed this is the explicit 
(as opposed to the seemingly implicit) definition adopted by Nurkse:
"...the equilibrium rate of exchange...is the rate which, 
over a certain period, maintains the balance of payments 
in equilibrium without any net change in the international 
currency reserve". (10)
This is also the position adopted here. Such a definition would make 
the exchange rate a function of the variables that influence demand 
and supply for foreign currency and insofar as these variables change 
then the equilibrium exchange rate must change also. These variables 
are the "economic fundamentals" referred to earlier and are specified 
in detail in chapter four. Consequently, the equilibrium exchange 
rate is seen as constantly changing as these "economic fundamentals" 
change and, to the extent that exchange rates were determined by these 
variables in the 1930's (which is the hypothesis tested in the present 
study), then exchange rates were "stable". The concept of exchange 
rate equilibrium receives further attention in the next chapter.
However, even if Friedman's dictum - that "stability is not 
rigidity" - were accepted, there would still be some (presumably 
including Nurkse) who would argue that floating exchange rates still 
change more than they ought to (for example, in the 1930's) and are 
consequently "unstable" (by whatever definition) because of destabilising 
speculation. The present study also addresses itself to this question.
A theoretical debate has raged over this matter for some years beginning 
with Friedman's well-known contention that speculation can only be de- 
stabilising if speculators, on the average, lost money. The sub­
sequent contributions mainly consisted of attempts to devise examples
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in which speculation could be both destabilising and profitable 
and the debate was summarized by Sohmen (1969) who concluded that
(-Ilf)destabilising speculation was unlikely to be profitable. How­
ever, the lack of convincing theoretical examples of destabilising 
and profitable speculation is not in itself conclusive and, perhaps 
Baumol's position is the most reasonable:
"I believe...that the effects of profitable speculation 
on stability is in part an empirical question and that 
attempts to settle it by a priori arguments must somewhere 
resort to fallacy”. (15)
This is very much the view adopted here and attempts to explicitly 
model destabilising (or otherwise) speculation are discussed in chapter 
four.
(13 )
Moreover, this position is reinforced by recognition of an 
important implicit assumption underlying the above debate (including 
lYiedman's initial contribution) which is that speculators, or at least 
the majority of them, are successful in that they make a profit. How­
ever, it may well be that speculators sometimes make mistakes, and 
whilst this cannot go on indefinitely (unless there is a continuous 
supply of new, inept speculators), it may still go on long enough to 
exert a destabilising influence on exchange rates; this is especially 
true in periods of uncertainty, during which speculators may be as 
uncertain a6 everyone else. Indeed Sohmen uses this explanation as a 
justification of the interpretation of the 1930's as a period of de­
stabilising speculation:
"It should not be too surprising that speculators • antici­
pations should often have turned out to be incorrect under the chaotic conditions of the depression years when even policymakers frequently had no idea what to do next". (16)
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The empirical tests to be undertaken in the present 6tudy 
should shed some light on this contention.
(Ill)
The main objective of the thesis is therefore, having defined 
stability, to test the hypothesis that exchange rates were stable in 
the 1930's whilst, at the same time, testing for the presence of 
destabilising speculation (in an explicit rather than implicit way). 
Since stability has been defined in terms of dependency of the exchange 
rate on "economic fundamentals", an attempt is made to identify the 
latter and develop a simple model of exchange rate determination.
What eventually emerges is basically an extended purchasing power 
parity hypothesis. An additional point of interest relates to the 
fact that the 1930's saw the establishment of exchange intervention 
funds to "manage" exchange rates, first of all in Britain, but later 
in many other countries; since it is obviously necessary to include 
official intervention in the model, then an examination of this de­
velopment is a lesser objective of the study.
The rest of thi6 section is devoted to two surveys, the first of 
which (Ch. 2) examines various theories of exchange rate determination, 
concentrating on the purchasing power parity hypothesis, whilst the 
second (Ch. 3) looks at the relevant empirical evidence; this involves 
examining comparable studies - that is, those which use similar method­
ology - and also some rather dissimilar approaches, giving particular 
attention to those relating to earlier periods of floating (notably 
the inter-war period and the Canadian float in the 1950's)» On the
basis of these surveys, a model of exchange rate determination 
is developed in chapter four, the opening chapter in Section II, 
which concentrates on bi-lateral exchange rates. The model is then 
tested for a variety of bi-lateral rates involving the three major 
world currencies at that time - the pound, dollar and (French) franc - 
and four "minor" currencies - those of Canada, Belgium, Switzerland 
and Holland and some preliminary conclusions are drawn (Chs. 5-8).
Section III approaches exchange rate stability in the 1930*6 
from a hitherto unexplored angle by applying the concept of multi­
lateral or effective exchange rates (developed in the 1970's). This 
involves examining the methodology of effective rates (Ch. 9); effective 
rates are then calculated for the seven currencies included in the 
study and some general observations are made about their behaviour 
compared to the more conventional bi-lateral rates (Ch. 10); finally, 
a crude test of purchasing power parity is then carried out which 
requires the calculation of comparable multilateral prices indices 
(Ch. 11). Section IV draws together the two main threads of the 
thesis and attempts to come to some conclusions about the stability 
of both bi-lateral and multilateral exchange rates in the 1930's.
Some tentative conclusions are also suggested relating to official 
intervention in the 1930's, the "pure" purchasing power parity 
hypothesis and the role of speculative influences on exchange rates 
(and consequent destabilising speculation) in this period.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
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Thomas (1973a) (1973b), and Tsiang (1959)»
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15« Baumol (1959), P» 302.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PURCHASING POWER PARITY HYPOTHESIS AND 
OTHER THEORIES OF EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION
The purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis represents one 
of the oldest theories of exchange rate determination; its develop­
ment, at least in modern times is normally attributed to Cassel 
(1918, 1922). The model developed and tested in the present study 
is very much in the spirit of this hypothesis (if it does not quite 
follow the letter) and, as already indicated, it can (in many ways) 
be considered as an extended version of the PPP hypothesis. This 
choice of the PPP hypothesis as the starting point would seem to be 
justified on the grounds that few theorists (of whatever persuasion) 
would completely discount the potential role of relative prices.
It is probably quite true that ’’under the skin of any international
economist lies a deep-seated belief in some variant of the PPP theory
(1)of the exchange rate". Nevertheless some attention must be paid 
to the development of new theories of exchange rate determination as 
well as the readoption of old ones that has accompanied the revival 
of interest in the subject associated with the recent widespread 
adoption of floating exchange rates.
As a consequence of this, it soon becomes very clear that an 
eclectic approach to exchange rate determination is likely to be most 
productive and so an attempt is made below to incorporate elements of 
newer (and older) theories into the model to be tested here. Therefore, 
a brief survey of the theory of PPP is followed by a survey of alter­
native approaches, highlighting those aspects that might usefully be
added to extend the PPP hypothesis. The problems relating to 
testing PPP are then discussed in detail on the grounds that, just 
as a simple PPP test would have to deal with these problems, so will 
an extended version*
It should be pointed out that the objectives of much of the 
more recent work and those of the present study are rather different.
The former are usually concerned with either predicting the future 
course of exchange rates or explaining recent exchange rate movements 
which have,to some extent, been rather more erratic than might have 
been expected in the light of the debate over fixed and floating 
exchange rates in the 1950's and 1960's. In connection with this 
second aim it should be remembered that the 1970's environment is some­
what different to that of the 1930*6. The degree of complexity of the 
international financial and commodity markets has much increased and 
various elements - the eurocurrency market being one of the most striking 
examples - simply did not exist in the 1930's. Nor were there so many 
important agents operating in the 1930's - clearly there was no OPEC 
and the role of Japan (and the yen) was minimal.
A similar comparison has been made by Frenkel (1980b) who compares 
the 1970's to the 1920's and much of what he says is equally applicable 
to a comparison between the 1970's and 1930's. In particular, he high­
lights a number of important developments in the post-World War 2 period: 
the greater integration of world capital markets, the greater role of 
"real" shocks and their effects on expectations, changes in tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers to trade, the development of exchange rate 
management and, of course the creation of the International Monetary 
Fund. These differences may justify a simpler approach for the 1930's. 
Furthermore, returning to the objective of the present study, this too
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is rather simpler and in its starkest terms mainly relates to an 
examination and test of the hypothesis that movements in exchange 
rates were determined rather more by changes in "fundamental economic 
variables" (and therefore did not represent disequilibrium but move­
ments from old equilibria to new ones) than is commonly supposed.
(I)
The theory of PPP has a long and distinguished history dating
(2)at least as far back as Picardo and Wheatley. Interest in more
modern times has been generated largely by the work of Cassel 
(1918,1922)^^ in the inter-war period, who produced a more system­
atic version of the theory and introduced some numerical content, and 
its more recent exponents have included Yeager (1958,1976) and Thygesen 
(1978). Nor has the theory been short of critics both in the times of 
Cassel^^ and in more recent y e a r s . I n  fact the debate over the 
validity of the PPP has been one of the most long-standing controver­
sies in economics. The fact that there are a variety of different 
versions of the theory (and various extended versions like that de­
veloped here) has fuelled the controversy and led to some confusion 
over what exactly a particular author is rejecting or accepting. 
Moreover, there are those who would agree that prices and exchange 
rates move together over time but who, instead of accepting the PPP 
interpretation - that changes in prices lead to changes in exchange 
rates - would either argue in favour of what might be called "reverse 
causality" (exchange rate changes lead to price changes)^^ or simply 
that prices and exchange rates are both endogenous and are affected in
(7)the same way by a variety of (exogenous) other variables.
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The basic premise of the PPP hypothesis is perhaps best stated 
by CasBel himself:
"....the rate of exchange between two countries is primarily 
determined by the quotient between the internal purchasing 
power against goods of the money of each country...At every 
moment the real parity between two countries is represented 
by this quotient...I propose to call this parity the "purchasing 
power parity'.'.. " (8)
This is the theory at its simplest and some elaboration is required:
"The propositions of PPP theory are (1) that the short run 
equilibrium exchange rate is a function of the long run 
exchange rate in the sense that the former variable tends to approach the latter and (2) that the PPP is either the 
long-run equilibrium exchange rate or the principal determin­
ant of it". (9)
Thus, exchange rates (both long and short run) are conceived as being 
ultimately determined by relative prices in some sense.
There are essentially two versions of PPP - or perhaps better 
"two approaches to implementing its exchange rate-calculation aspect". 
The "absolute" version (equation 1.1) suggests that the PPP between 
two countries is simply the ratio of their price levels at any given 
time, with the price level measured as an index with the same basket 
of goods and services (and consequently the same weights) for each 
country. The "relative" (or "comparative") version (equation 1.2) 
asserts that the current PPP can be calculated by comparing current 
price levels with those prevailing in some base period when the exchange 
rate was at an equilibrium level: this involves simply multiplying the 
base period exchange rate by the ratio of the two countries' price 
indices which obviously have to have the same base year as the exchange 
rate, and their method of construction should not have changed, but 
they do not have to have the same weights. Thus :
(10)
PPP(Ab.)t = p£ / P^ (1.1)
PPP(Rel.). = (F^  / P?). Rt t t o (1.2)
where PPP(Ab. = absolute PPP in period t (in units of A currency
per B currency).
PPP(Rel. )^  = relative PPP in period t (in units of A currency 
per B currency)
Rq = actual base period of exchange rate (A currency
per B currency)
pf^ ®^  = an index of country A's (B's) prices in period t
In principle, there is no strong case for preferring the absolute 
to the relative version or vice-versa; the main difference occurs in 
practice where relative PPP has one big advantage, namely that direct 
comparison of purchasing powers requires the use of the same index in 
both countries containing the same standard assortment of goods and 
services (which must be representative in both countries) with the 
same weights. Clearly the construction of such indices is quite a 
task in itself. Relative PPP, on the other hand, simply involves 
looking at the degree of change in the separate (and not necessarily 
similarly constructed) national price indices. This is not to say 
that the relative version of PPP is without problems - indeed, in side­
stepping one problem it creates others such as the choice of base period 
and so on. However such problems are more easily overcome (or at least 
their effects minimized) and will be discussed in a later section. 
Moreover, the fact remains that relative PPP has been favoured em­
pirically (and the present study is no exception) and therefore inso­
far as we are talking about a particular version, it is relative PPP
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that is implicitly being discussed. However, in actual fact, this
is not especially important since although some of the criticisms
to be discussed can be more forcefully applied to one or other of
the versions, in general, any argument which undermines use of
absolute price levels as the major determinant of exchange rates
will also undermine the use of changes in absolute price levels (that is
relative PPP).
The main mechanism by which changes in relative prices are 
transmitted to exchange rates i6 commodity arbitrage. This is des­
cribed by Yeager:
"Suppose....that prevailing exchange rates unmistakably 
undervalue the British pound in relation to the purchasing 
powers of the pound and of foreign currencies. Foreigners - say Americans - will offer dollars for pounds to buy British 
goods at bargain prices. Britons will offer relatively few 
pounds for dollars to buy American goods at their apparently 
high prices. Unmatched attempts to sell dollars and buy pounds will bid the exchange rate toward the equilibrium 
level. The converse analysis applied if the pound is over­
valued." (11)
The fact that this arbitrage is not instantaneous due to various 
lags and market imperfections is why PPP tends to be a longer run 
phenomenon although expectations and consequent stabilising speculation 
may help push rates towards their PPP level even in the short run.
This is what might be called the "naive" PPP theory. There is 
nothing logically wrong with it although acceptance of it rather depends 
on whether or not the existence of long run commodity arbitrage is also 
accepted. There is conflicting evidence on this: convincing evidence 
that this "law of one price" does not hold is provided by Kravi6 and 
Lipsey (1978) for a variety of countries and by Richardson (1978) in 
the Canada-U.S. case; on the other hand, a critical review of such
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studies and some conflicting evidence iB provided by Genberg (1978) 
thereby suggesting that commodity arbitrage may be effective after 
all. Moreover, there i6 an inherent logic in Yeager's argument that 
commodity arbitrage must begin to work within certain limits: to 
show this he uses Heckscher's concept of ''commodity points" which 
are similar to gold points under the gold standard (although they 
may be wider):
"Just as gold-standard exchanges fluctuate within the gold 
points, so paper exchanges fluctuate within 'commodity points'. 
Just as the spread of upper and lower gold points from mint 
par depends on the costs of shipping gold, so the spread of 
upper and lower commodity points from 'price parity' (as 
Heckscher called it) depends on the costs of and other 
obstacles to shipping commodities". (12)
Now, whilst the work of Kravis and Lipsey (1978) and the other
critics may be interpreted to suggest that the "other obstacles" are
quite substantial so that these so-called commodity points are quite
wide, they must surely exist and so PPP will hold, albeit within
fairly wide limits, and this is really all that the naive version of
PPP is suggesting. Moreover many economists, in criticising "naive"
PPP, have really been attacking what Holmes (1967) has called the
"dogma" of PPP - that the relative prices-exchange rate relationship
is a rigid and exact one. This is really an exercise in setting up
a straw man. Cassel's theory was certainly not the "dogma" nor even
the "naive" version; even he realised the "naive" version was naive,
and consequently allowed for a variety of other factors which could
distort exchange rates so that they did not approach their PPP levels
(13)even in the long run.
The first of these and, in the context of the 1930's, perhaps 
an important one were tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions
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about which Cassel is quite explicit:
"...^lthough^...restriction of trade will not cause the 
rate of exchange to move from this purchasing power parity 
as long as they strike the trade in both directions equally.... 
if the trade between the two countries is hampered more severely 
in one direction than in the other the rate of exchange will 
deviate from its purchasing power parity". (14)
Furthermore Cassel recognised that not all trade restrictions were 
artificial:
"The restrictions of which we have to take account in this 
connection may be of various k i n d s . . . ...may.. .take
the form of artificial hindrances or natural difficulties 
hampering transport for the country A to the country B 
more seriously them the transport in the opposite direction. 
The result will be some undervaluation of the money of A in 
that of B". (15)
These two factors - artificial trade restrictions and transport costs 
could cause an exchange rate to deviate from its PPP even in the long 
run if they were a permanent feature of trade between two countries.
There are also a number of other factors which can create 
short run deviations from PPPt most of which were recognised by 
Cassel, although his contention that their effect is a short run one
(16 )has been criticised. Two of these factors relate to people's
views about the further course of exchange rates and presumably, if 
such views were correct, would tend to push exchange rates towards 
their long run PPP whilst creating a divergence from short run PPP. 
The first of these concerns inflationary expectations:
"A depreciation of a currency is often merely an expression for discounting an expected fall in the currency's internal 
purchasing power. The world sees that the process of 
inflation is continually going on.....The international valuation of the currency will, then, generally show a 
tendency to anticipate events... " (17)
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The Becond, closely linked, is speculation:
"The value of a currency may also be depressed below the 
purchasing power parity by speculations in exchange". (18)
Although potentially stabilising, inflationary expectations and,
especially, speculation can lead to large deviations from PPP if
they get eut of hand and Cassel believes that this indeed did happen
(19)in the case of the German mark in the early 1920's.
Officer (1976a) also lists three other factors which Cassel 
recognised as potential causes of short run deviations from PPP.
Ctae of these was long term capital movements:
"The third group ¿ o f factors creating divergence from PPJ^ 
contains those disturbances that may be caused by inter­
national movements of capital. When....¿^ arious conditions 
are fulfilled^ ....and when no capital movements in either 
direction take place, the rate of exchange must stand at the equilibrium level represented by the Purchasing Power Parity 
and cannot show more than small and quite temporary deviations 
from this level". (20)
"A closer study of the dollar in pounds sterling during the 
period 1919-2  ^shows that the origin of the deviations of 
the actual rates of exchange from the purchasing power 
parity is to be found essentially in international movements 
of capital". (21)
Thus Cassel explicitly recognised that a long term capital outflow 
could depress a country's currency below its PPP level and a capital 
inflow push it above its PPP level.
Cassel also recognised that government intervention could cause 
a divergence from PPP although he did not construe the intervention 
as a means of deliberately influencing the course of the exchange rate 
but rather a6 a means of obtaining foreign exchange:
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"By far the most important of the depreciating factors 
now under discussion, however, is the practice of selling 
at any price a country's exchange in other countries in 
order to procure funds in their money.....The case of 
Germany offers the best means of studying the whole 
problem. ....When the central Government.. ,/yia.e/, ... in 
dire need of foreign means of payment, and it did not 
seem possible to procure it in any other way, the country 
was beguilded into thus getting money on its currency". (22)
A final factor creating a divergence from PPP listed by Officer (1976a) 
concerns real changes in the economy (from the base period) as in­
dicated by changes in relative prices within a country leading to a 
divergence between the exchange rate and relative PPP as measured by 
a general price index. In particular Cassel seemed to be concerned
(23)about changes in the relative prices of traded and non-traded goods.
His answer to the problem (in the context of equilibrium exchange rates 
for the post-World War 1 period) appeared to be either a hope that 
these real changes would reverse themselves and trade would return 
to its pre-World War 1 pattern or, failing this, a continuous study 
of these real changes and then allowance for them (assuming they could 
be adequately explained by known factors).
Thus there are a number of factors which can cause deviations 
from PPP (especially in the short run). The first two of those dis­
cussed above - trade restrictions and transport costs - can be ignored 
in principle, as far as relative PPP calculations are concerned, if they 
remain at the same level in both the current period and the base period. 
Unfortunately, in practice, whilst this may be true for the latter in 
the 1930's, it is certainly not true of the former and more will be 
said about trade restrictions in Chapter four below. The opposite 
is true of real changes in the economy of the type discussed above 
and international capital movements which, though valid in principle, 
can probably be largely dismissed in practice for the 1930's: the
timespan between the base period and the period for which the 
model is being tested is possibly sufficiently small to make signif­
icant real changes unlikely whilst international long term capital 
movements were muted because of increased uncertainty due to political 
tension in Europe, war in the Far East and the increase in defaulting 
on foreign bonds which occured in the 1930's and, in any case, the 
growth of exchange controls made the transfer of both capital and 
interest payments very difficult in some parts of the world.
Three other factors have been mentioned. The first of these, 
inflationary expectations, would act to push the short run exchange 
rate towards its long run PPP equilibrium and would tend to suggest 
a central role for current prices in the determination of short run 
exchange rates; the role of inflationary expectations is hence not 
only accepted but plays an important part in the model tested here. 
Similarly, the roles of government intervention and (private) specu­
lation in causing the exchange rate to deviate from its PPP path are 
recognised as being potentially very important and are explicitly 
incorporated into the model developed in Chapter four. As far as 
the PPP hypothesis is concerned, this addition of variables raises 
the question of when the theory of PPP ceases to be and transforms 
itself into something else. Some theories start from the opposite 
extreme and do not include or emphasise prices in particular and then 
work back towards the PPP hypothesis. It is to these alternative 
approaches which we now turn.
(II)
There are many non-price factors which influence exchange rates,
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some of which are by no means rational - for (an extreme) example, 
the role of the Invergordon "mutiny" in Britain's leaving the gold 
standard in 1931 - and it is quite clear that at certain times the 
course of a particular exchange rate has been largely determined by 
such factors in the short run. A good historical example of this is 
provided by the French franc in the 192^ -26 period and at the 
present time the fact that eight European currencies are committed 
to remaining within the European Monetary System must have some 
independent influence on their exchange rates. A whole list of non­
price variables that may cause deviations from PPP has already been 
presented in the previous section and this was not exhaustive. The 
objective here is to re-examine some of these variables and to briefly 
consider any further potential non-price, influences along with any 
cohesive alternative (to PPP) theories of exchange rate determination.
An examination of such non-price influences is provided by 
Schadler (1977) who posed the question as to why exchange rates had 
been so erratic in the first four years following the widespread 
adoption of floating exchange rates in the 1970's. Four possible 
(and not mutually exclusive) explanations for this were suggested: 
destabilising speculation, different speeds of adjustment (suggested 
by the asset market approach to exchange rate determination), uncer­
tainty and risk, and government intervention. The first of these 
(speculation) plays an important role in the model developed here: 
stabilising speculation would push the exchange rate towards its 
long run PPP level and consequently its existence would support the 
use of only a short lag on prices (or, put another way, a role for 
current or very recent price levels in determining the current exchange 
rate) whilst destabilising speculation is explicitly incorporated in
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the form of dummy variables. The role of government intervention 
will also be modelled and indeed testing for its significance is an 
important subsidiary issue.
Uncertainty and risk (caused by instability of the world
economy in general) may influence exchange rates through two potential
avenues: "via the variability of fundamental determinants of the
exchange rate. . .¿^iind/« • »also via the uncertainty about exchange rate
(25)expectations that such variability generates". Clearly funda­
mental variables are directly included here and the second avenue - 
changes in exchange rate expectations - will, to a large extent, be 
picked up by the dummy variables to be included (discussed in later 
chapters). Schadler's finsil possible explanation relates to the asset 
market approach which will be discussed shortly. The study by Schadler 
(1977) typifies much recent work which approaches movements of exchange 
rates in terms of trying to explain "overshooting" - that is deviations 
from some equilibrium exchange rate path which is often, implicitly 
or explicitly, derived from PPP.
Two popular, though incomplete, approaches to the short run
behaviour of exchange rates are the interest rate parity theory (or
forward exchange theory) and what might be termed the "speculative
run view". The latter is based on "the view that exchange rates move
in speculative runs, perhaps touched off by a change in (or a revision
of expectations about) fundamental economic conditions, but thereafter
(26 )reflecting a self-sustaining speculative mentality". In a sense,
this is merely an updated version of destabilising speculation and its
(27)validity has been questioned; nevertheless, it does stress the
role of expectations in exchange rate determination, particularly in 
the 1970*6, and,to that extent, is very much in tune with the asset
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market approach (discussed below). (2 8)
The interest rate parity theorum has some historical pedigree,
dating back to the period in which Cassel was developing the PPP
(29)hypothesis; it suggests that the spot exchange rate is "explained" 
by the forward exchange rate and interest rates. In principle, since 
it is basically a pure arbitrage condition, interest rate parity 
should hold at all times but empirical evidence has indicated the 
existence of deviations in practice. However, a number of explana­
tions have been put forward, most plausibly the effect of trans­
action costs and the fact that different securities in different 
countries (and hence the rates of interest) are not comparable 
because they are associated with different degrees of risk; the
possibility of exchange controls has been suggested in the latter 
(31 )context. ^
This- would seem a particularly relevant consideration in the
1930's - for example, it was widely expected that extensive exchange
controls would be adopted in France after the election of a Socialist
government in 1936 - and, consequently, would indicate that the interest
rate parity theorum is an inappropriate framework in which to examine
exchange rate determination in the 1930's. Furthermore, its validity
as a general theory of exchange rate determination has been questioned
on the grounds that all three variables involved are really endogenous
and, in fact, spot exchange rates are actually determined by a set of
exogenous variables which also determine forward exchange rates and 
(32)interest rates.
Another, potentially more complete approach to exchange rate 
determination i6 the traditional balance of payments view which suggests
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that exchange rates vary so as to ensure equilibrium in the currency 
market. While most economists would accept that this is generally 
true, it would not be widely supported as a useful approach in its 
naive sense, in which it implies that exchange rates depend on the 
current (or trade) account position. Even though some relationship 
between the exchange rate and the current balance no doubt exists, 
the capital account cannot be so blatantly neglected. This view of 
exchange rate determination is behind the underlying payments dis- 
equilibria approach to calculating the equilibrium exchange rate 
which it defines as that which is compatible with "a desirable and 
sustainable balance-of-payments position". This is more sophisticated,
in that, for calculating the gap between the future equilibrium balance 
of payments position and exchange rate and the actual, it advocates 
a complete world trade model to project their future paths; consequently 
it seeks to correlate the exchange rate not simply with the current 
account but with the variables that determine the current account.
The balance of payments approach is intuitively very appealing and
while the model to be presented here has been referred to as an ex-
»tended PPP hypothesis it is sufficiently eclectic to be approached by 
this alternative route; indeed it can be presented in such a way as 
to appear to use the balance of payments view as its starting point 
with the PPP hypothesis incorporated within this.
The final (and most important) alternative approach to exchange 
rate determination to be considered, is the asset demand or asset 
market theory. Facilitated by developments in the analysis of port­
folio balance, this approach emerged a6 a result of the Canadian
experience of floating exchange rates in the 1950's when it became 
clear that prices were not the major determinant of exchange rates in
that particular case:
"The Cassellian view of the primacy of price changes rests 
on the assumption that demands for currencies are largely 
derived from current trade, and that holdings of foreign financial assets are motivated mainly by the purchasing 
power they yield over goods produced in the foreign country.
In the Canadian balance of payments, however, capital trans­
actions - especially with the United States - dominate and these 
financial and direct investment flows are transparently sens­
itive to changes in profit opportunities arising out of 
international differences in interest rates and trends in 
unit costs". (35)
More explicitly:
"The asset-market theory.....focusses on the equilibrating 
role of the exchange rate in balancing the foreign demand 
for domestically issued financial assets and the domestic 
demand for foreign financial assets.....the relative demands 
for domestic and foreign assets by private market participants 
depend on the expected relative yield on these assets. The 
expected relative yield in turn depends on the interest rate 
differential.....and on the expected change in the value of 
the spot rate...." (36)
There are two important differences between the asset market 
approach and a more traditional (relative price-based) view of 
exchange rate determination: firstly, the former sets exchange rate 
determination in the markets for stocks of assets, whilst the latter 
assumes that exchange rates are determined in the market for flows of 
funds (to buy goods and services); and secondly, the asset approach 
views exchange rates as the price of national monies and exchange 
rates as being determined by stock adjustments of people's holdings 
of different monies, whilst the traditional theory considers the 
exchange rate as the price of national output and consequently it is 
the relative prices of goods and services which determine the exchange 
rate. Despite these differences, however, it may well be correct to 
assert that the two theories are "tailored to different and extreme 
market conditions": the traditional theory is most suitable where
currencies are held mainly for transactionary motives such as those 
of small open economies like Belgium and the Netherlands while an 
asset theory clearly applies where currencies are held for purely 
precautionary reasons which would seem to apply to many holders of 
Swiss francs in recent times, for example. Of course, in many (if 
not most) cases currencies will be held for both transactionary and 
precautionary motives and so some synthesis is required.
In fact, proponents of the asset market approach generally 
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there is only one asset 
(money) and refer to "the monetary view (or more generally an asset
(-zQ )view) of exchange rate determination". The monetary approach
has been summarized as follows: "First....exchange rates are best
thought of as relative prices of different national monies....and
are determined primarily by the conditions for equilibrium between
the demands for the stocks of various national monies and the stocks
of these monies available to be held. Second....exchange rates are
strongly influenced by asset holders' expectations of the future
(39)behaviour of asset prices". Thus the monetary approach would
see the major determinants of exchange rates as national money supplies
and expectations about the future level of the exchange rate (which
are closely related to expectations about the future course of money
supplies); the importance of expectations, in particular, is very
strongly stressed by the "monetarists" and has been used to explain
the erratic movements of exchange rates in the 1970's. A role would
(1*0 )also be given in a monetary model to changes in real income.
However, the monetary approach has been criticised for taking 
too narrow a view of what constitutes "financial assets":
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"••••.there is hardly any theoretical presumption that 
shifts in the market for money are 'more important'
(for the exchange rate and/or the balance of payments) 
than shifts in the markets for interest-bearing financial assets. Bnpirical evidence in recent years suggests, in 
fact, that portfolio shifts have often taken place between earning assets.....rather than just money. Thus 
there is hardly any reason to turn an 'asset theory' into 
a .’monetary theory'...." (41)
An important implication of such criticism is that more general
asset market theories should be preferred which would indicate a
substantial role for interest rates. This criticism, combined with
the fact that the model developed here contains some variables in-
(lf2)eluded in asset market models - real income, interest rates and, 
most important, speculative or expectations variables - perhaps 
constitutes a good enough reason for not adopting an explicit monetary 
approach in the present Study.
In any case the monetary approach incorporates the PPP concept 
in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, it actually accepts the 
relationsip embodied in the PPP hypothesis, but interprets it as an 
equilibrium relationship between two endogenous variables with no 
causality implied; it is a "shortcut" with both variables principally 
determined by variations in money supplies. Secondly, it should be 
observed that acceptance of the primacy of the asset market theory 
in the determination of exchange rates in the short r u n is not nec­
essarily incompatible with acceptance of PPP in the long run:
"As to the evolution of the exchange rate in the longer 
run, however, the asset-market view is fully consistent 
with the traditional view that it is essentially determined by the purchasing power of the currency in the goods markets. 
The long-run adjustment comes through arbitrage in the goods 
markets and, as already noted, through the influence of long- 
run expectations. Deviations of the exchange rate from its 
PPP value will be self-correcting in the long run..." (**3)
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However, in the present study, it is the short run that is
important but even here, although "...explicit price effects....
(V t )are sometimes dispensed with altogether", this is apparently
not true at other times since it is sometimes argued that "...one
aspect of the return to foreign currency holding is the purchasing
power it currently affords over goods produced in the issuing 
(1*5)country..." which would seem to imply some role for relative 
prices.
Furthermore, in the context of the model used here (developed 
in chapter four), there is a direct point of contact with the monetary/ 
asset approach (and possibly the PPP hypothesis) in that expectations 
are specifically included both here and in monetary models. This would 
seem important:
"The central insight obtained from this.. .¿^ iionetary/asset/... 
approach is the recognition that expectations concerning 
future exchange rates are among the prime determinants of 
current exchange rates". (^ 6)
The relationship with PPP comes from recognising the fact that 
expectations of exchange rate changes may be related to expectations 
about future levels of inflation (although a "monetarist" would pre­
sumably deny this by arguing that, since money supplies determine prices, 
it is expectations about future money supplies that determine exchange 
rate expectations) and/or to a belief that PPP holds in the long run. 
Moreover, a common proxy for the expected future exchange rate in 
monetary models - the forward market premium/discount - is also tried 
in the present study (in an adjusted form) for much the same purpose 
(although ultimately dummy variables are preferred).
In a sense, all this leads back to the question of when exactly
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the PPP hypothesis ceases to be and becomes something else. The 
three major "complete" approaches to exchange rate determination 
discussed above - the traditional balance of payments view, the PPP 
hypothesis and the asset market approach - would appear to have some 
similarities. All would seem to accept some relationship between 
relative prices and exchange rates (although the monetary approach 
would not see it as a causal one): the traditional view would stress 
commodity arbitrage, a Casselian PPP hypothesis would accept this but 
propose links between prices of traded and non-traded goods and hence 
between exchange rates and all prices or else propose that shifts 
in the relationship between prices of traded and non-traded goods 
were temporary, and a monetary approach, whilst also accepting 
commodity arbitrage, would view prices not as the price of output but 
as the price of money.
The final equation estimated here could be seen as being based 
on either of the first two models: a balance of payments view (which 
is how it is presented in chapter four) in which determinants of 
trade (and capital) flows determine a floating exchange rate or an 
extended PPP hypothesis, beginning with simple PPP, and then adding 
variables to take account of various other factors, both those 
identified by Cassel and by others. An explicit monetary approach 
will be rejected on the grounds that it is too narrow and also because 
it is based on a monetarist view of the world which may not have been 
valid in the 1930*6, ' whilst a more general asset market approach
is not pursued because a number of variables which would be included 
in such a model are incorporated in the extended PPP/balance of pay­
ments framework developed here anyway (most importantly expectations). 
Thus, in view of the central importance of the PPP hypothesis in this
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study, the rest of the chapter reviews the problems associated 
with it and suggests how they might be overcome.
(Ill)
The major theoretical objection to the PPP hypothesis is that
it may be subject to some kind of systematic bias. A potential
source of such bias arises from differences in countries’ internal
price ratios, that is the ratio of the prices of traded goods to
those of non-traded goods. Commodity arbitrage is based on
traded goods but PPP is calculated from a more general index which
includes non-traded goods. If internal price ratios differ between
countries then a PPP calculation (based on a general index) will make
the currency of a country with relatively lower priced non-traded
goods appear undervalued. An attempt to provide a rationale for
(i+9)such differences was undertaken by Hagen who argued that the 
internal price ratio is a function of per capita income. This was 
based on the observation that in low income countries cheap labour 
is readily available whilst non-traded goods are labour intensive; 
consequently, the lower per capita income, the lower the relative 
price of non-traded goods and therefore the higher the internal price 
ratio. Unfortunately, this plausible line of reasoning tends to break 
down when it is recognised that exports of many low income countries 
are, in fact, labour intensive — for example, textiles.
However, even if Hagen's argument is not accepted a plausible 
and widely accepted alternative rationale for differences in internal 
price ratios has been provided by Balassa (196*0 based on differences 
in productivity within and between countries. The argument runs as
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follows: productivity differences between countries tend to be 
higher in the traded goods sector than in the non-traded goods 
sector mainly because there is more scope amongst the type of commo­
dities that are traded — mainly manufacturing and agricultural goods - 
for productivity increases than amongst non-traded goods which are 
often labour-intensive services. Since wages are related to produc­
tivity then inter-country wage differentials in the traded goods 
sector will reflect productivity differentials with wages correspond-
(51)ingly high in high productivity countries.
According to commodity arbitrage the exchange rate will equate 
the prices of traded goods - the "law of one price" - but this does 
not apply to non-traded goods. If inter-country productivity 
differences between traded and non-traded goods were the same or, 
failing this, if prices of non-traded goods mainly reflected product­
ivity differences alone this would not matter, but the former is not 
the case and neither is the latter (for a number of reasons including 
the use of some traded goods as inputs for non-traded goods, competitive 
bidding for factors of production and, mainly, because of the tendency 
for wages to be equalised within countries). Consequently the prices 
of non-traded goods tend to be higher in high-productivity countries 
and there is a systematic bias in internal price ratios and so a bias 
in PPP:
"The greater are productivity differentials in the production 
of traded goods between two countries, the larger will be 
differences in wages and in the prices of services and, 
correspondingly, the greater will be the gap between pur­
chasing-power parity and the equilibrium exchange rate". (52)
If per capita income levels are taken as representative of productivity 
levels which does not seem unreasonable since a country is likely to
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have a higher per capita income precisely because of higher 
productivity - then the bias can be expressed as follows: the 
ratio of PPP to the exchange rate is an increasing function of 
income levels. Balassa then went on to provide an empirical veri­
fication of hi6 hypothesis.
Although Balassa's reasoning has become fairly widely accepted,
his results have been strongly criticised on both theoretical and
empirical grounds, principally by Officer (1971*»1976a,1976b). The
first theoretical criticism relates to the implicit assumption, made
by Balassa, that the impact of a given increase in productivity on the
(53)internal price ratio is the same for all countries. Specifically,
Officer suggests that if this impact is inversely related to levels
of productivity amongst countries then converging internal price
levels and diverging productivity levels are quite compatible
(although no good reason why such an inverse relationship should
actually exist is given). A second, more convincing, theoretical
criticism relates to the fact that Balassa ignores quality differences
(54 )in consumer services amongst countries.
Officer begins his empirical attack by arguing that tests of
the Balassa hypothesis have produced rather mixed results and an
examination of the evidence would seem to bear this out: Delahaut
and Kirschen^"^ and Balassa, himself, in a later article (1973)»
support his conclusion whilst Clague and Tanzi (1972) found the
Balassa hypothesis holds for OECD countries but not Latin American
(56)countries, and Grunwald and Salazar-Carrillo supported this latter 
conclusion; whilst failure of the Balassa hypothesis to hold for 
developing countries is not surprising, De Vries (1968) using a 
sample of sixty-two countries (including both developed and developing),
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found no support for the hypothesis either. In the light of this, 
Officer (1971*» 1976b) sets out to rigorously test the Balassa 
hypothesis. He begins by criticising the methodology of earlier 
studies (especially that of Balassa himself), in particular Balassa's 
use of only one variable - GNP per capita - to proxy productivity 
and also his use of the current exchange rate as an approximation for 
the equilibrium (PPP) rate; in addition, there are numerous other,
le6s important criticisms. Officer then tests the Balassa hypothesis 
(including re-running Balassa's original tests) using his improved 
methodology and finds no support for productivity bias in absolute 
PPP and virtually none for bias in relative PPP.
In the present context, the presence of productivity bias (if 
it does exist) would not seem likely to cause any problems conceptually 
as a suitable variable to allow for it can easily be incorporated into 
the eclectic approach adopted here. However, at the empirical level 
there are problems in that even the simplest proxy for productivity, 
and one much criticised by Officer, GNP per capita, is not available 
for the period under examination. In fact, national income is included 
(for other reasons) in the model and a proxy (based on employment data) 
has had to be found. Consequently, whilst productivity bias is allowed 
for in that a GNP proxy is one of the independent variables in the model 
it must be accepted that it is a poor proxy for productivity and com­
pletely lacks sophistication in this context.
A completely different, but probably more fundamental theoretical 
criticism of PPP (which cannot be sidestepped by simply adding another 
variable) should also be discussed before moving on to examine the 
practical problems of applying the hypothesis; this is, what might be 
called, the "reverse—causation” argument which states that exchange
rates determine prices rather than the other way round. If this 
is true then as Yeager notes:
"....the statistical evidence in apparent support of 
purchasing power parity loses force if exchange rates 
determine rather than reflect the price levels used in the calculations". (58)
In fact it is Yeager who provides the most extensive arguments in
defence of prices to exchange rates causation. His major argument
is very simple: if exchange rate changes lead to changes in the prices
of some goods then unless domestic money supply changes, other prices
must move in the opposite direction because in the absence of a
permissive monetary policy (or short run changes in velocity) the
overall price level cannot change. To support his argument Yeager
(59)invokes an adaptation of the quantity theory of money.
In practice a permissive money supply is quite possible but
then the fact that causation runs from exchange rates to prices is
"due not to inexorable linkages but to policy". Yeager then goes
on to attack the general presumption that devaluation and depreciation
must be inflationary: if devaluation (depreciation) simply replaces
trade controls which forced the balance of payments into equilibrium
(by artificially raising prices) then the net effect on the price
(61 )level is not necessarily inflationary. Some evidence to support
reverse causation is provided by Frenkel (1978) who argues that, 
insofar as there is any causation between the two variables, it runs 
from exchange rates. However, closer examination of his choice of 
price indices throws some doubt on this conclusion since two out of 
the three - wholesale prices and material prices - are heavily biased 
towards traded goods and thus composed chiefly of prices governed by 
exchange rates with the prices which undergo compensatory opposite
changes tending to be left out.
In fact« the relationship between devaluation (or depreciation) 
and inflation has been widely discussed in another context« namely 
the debate over the relative merits of fixed and floating exchange 
rates. The assertion that floating exchange rates (or more correctly
depreciating exchange rates) are inflationary has been expounded at
(62)great length by proponents of fixed exchange rate systems. What
is interesting, and perhaps very relevant with regard to the question 
as to whether prices determine exchange rates or vice versa, is the 
uni-directional nature of the argument. The logically converse argument, 
that just as depreciation causes prices to rise so appreciation causes 
prices to fall, whose acceptance is not critical for the fixed versus 
floating exchange rate debate, but is important as far as causation 
is concerned, attracts much less attention and support.
Nevertheless, there seems little doubt that causation between 
prices and exchange rates runs both ways to some extent, but the 
question as to which dominates may have different answers at different 
times. Whilst in present day Britain, trade unions can be relied on 
to make sure that any depreciation of the pound does influence prices, 
it is far from clear that this was true in Britain, North America and 
the gold bloc in the 1930*s; the sanctions of mass unemployment were 
probably much stronger then than they are now. Indeed there is some 
contemporary evidence which rejects the hypothesis that devaluation 
led to inflation. In addition, to the extent that trade was
subject to high levels of protection, the Yeager/Sohmen argument 
(discussed above) may come into play; certainly in one case (Belgium), 
the level of protection was reduced following devaluation in an attempt 
to discourage retaliation. In the light of all this, the view
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adopted in the present study, that causation ran from prices to 
exchange rates does not appear entirely unreasonable.
There is, however, a third view adopted by Frenkel (1978)
(and already referred to in the discussion of the asset market 
approach) who argues that there is no causation between prices and 
exchange rates, but, instead, interprets PPP as an equilibrium rela­
tionship between two endogenous variables. Frenkel then goes on to 
provide a theoretical argument to explain his findings that exchange 
rates appear to determine prices rather than vice versa (criticised 
above) in terms of differential speeds of adjustment: adjustment is 
faster in asset markets than in commodity markets and consequently 
exchange rates are influenced more quickly than prices by the third 
factors which determine them both, and therefore causality appears 
to run from exchange rates to prices.
If this is accepted then "reverse causality" is no longer a 
problem since money (supply), not prices, is the truly exogenous 
variable and this can be introduced to replace prices as the major 
independent variable in the exchange rate equation. Even if this were 
theoretically acceptable, and much of the argument presented here suggests 
that it is not, there are technical problems in terms of finding appro­
priate data for the 1930's. Data on currency in circulation and, in 
some cases, demand deposits, are available (in the League of Nations 
Monthly Bulletin) but their reliability and completeness as a measure 
of the "money supply" is dubious for many countries and both Hudgins 
(1973) and Oxmun (1976) obtained poor results when they made use of 
this data. Moreover, given the central role in the present study of 
the PPP hypothesis (which has been acceptable in some form to many
(page 36A follows)
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economists, for reasons already indicated), to exclude relative 
prices as a dependent variable rather defeats tbe object; indeed it 
actually prejudges the issue in favour of PPP since a starting point 
of the models of Frenkel and others is that PPP holds as an equilibrium 
relationship between two endogenous variables.
Ultimately, of course, the question of price-exchange rate
causality may well be an empirical one since there are logical and
theoretical bases for causation running both ways and what is important
is which variable is dominant (assuming that the endogeneity argument
is rejected along with the monetary approach). It would have been
possible, at this stage, to actually test for causality using the
methodology developed by Sims (1972) and Pierce (1977). Causality
testing is a relatively recent development in econometrics and much
of the empirical work has examined the relationship between money and 
(64A)income. However, there have also been several historical applications
of the methodology, by Brillembourg and Khan (1979), Eichengreen (1980), 
Hatton, Lyons and Satchell (1981) and Frenkel (1978), although only the 
latter is of direct relevance, since it specifically examines the exchange 
rate-price relationship in 1921-25. Unfortunately, Frenkel presents only 
his conclusions and not a detailed account of his tests (because the 
sub-section concerned only constitutes a small part of a much broader 
paper). Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that his results 
indicated that causation seemed to run from exchange rates to prices 
(although his choice of price indices can be and has been criticised 
above). This conclusion is discouraging (from the point of view of 
the present study) and more pessimism is generated by the empirical 
work of Major (1979) who examined the 1971-78 period and found no evidence 
of a causal relationship between prices and exchange rates.
(page 36B follows)
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However, whether or not conclusions based on these results 
can command any general acceptance is debateable since the extent 
to which any degree of confidence can be placed in the "science" of 
causality testing is rather dubious. There is an initial problem of 
providing a suitable definition of causality in either a philosophical 
or operationally useful sense. The usual approach adopted is
that of Granger who defined causality in terms of predictability:
X "causes" Y if present Y can be better predicted by using past 
values of X than by not doing so (with all other available information, 
such as past values of X, also taken into account in either case). More­
over, even if this is accepted, and it may not be, then the statistical
tests for "Granger causality" have, in their turn, also been controversial. 
The two types of test developed, by Sims (1972) and Pierce (1977) using 
regression and cross-correlation methods respectively, have beer, heavily 
criticised in terms of both their validity as tests of causality anc 
the difficulties involved in their implementation. Consequently,
scepticism about causality testing is widespread and it has not been 
adopted as a general practice.
Of course, it remains desirable in principle to test initially
for causality, particularly for the exchange rate-price relationship
examined here, but also more generally because of the force of the
(64E)argument that "correlation does not imply causation". However,
in eschewing the use of causality tests in the present study, it might 
be argued, at the one level, that such an approach is following (extremely) 
well trodden ground in empirical work and, at another (more fundamental) 
level, that the controversy surrounding such tests, along with the 
difficulties in definition, interpretation and implementation, mean 
that the results generated may well be so conditional (in definitional
(page 36C follows)
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and technical senses) as to be worthless or may quite likely be simply 
inconclusive. As one study observes:
"It has, in fact, become a common feature of causality
testing that no causality is found". (64F)
Consequently, since evidence of causation would be generated by a 
dubious methodology and lack of such evidence may indicate more about 
this methodology itself rather than causality, it seems probable that 
causality testing can be rejected without undue concern.
In any case, the specific question of the direction of causation 
between exchange rates and prices loses some importance in the present 
study to the extent that the hypothesis being tested is whether exchange 
rates were determined by "economic fundamentals" in the 1930's, only 
one of which was relative prices. Furthermore, even if there is really 
an equilibrium rather than a causal relationship between relative prices 
and exchange rates (as the monetary approach argues), provided that 
there is some correlation between the two then this would indicate 
that this equilibrium "held" in the 1930's and hence indirectly suggest 
that exchange rates (and relative prices) were not subject to erratic 
movements but were determined by the
continued over/
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exogenous economic variables. Such a conclusion would be sufficient 
to question the hypothesis that exchange rates were determined by 
erratic speculative forces in the 1930's (which is principally 
what is being examined).
Finally, whilst it is true that in most cases depreciation and 
rising prices occurred more or less simultaneously in the 1930's, the 
former can arguably be better viewed as permitting the latter rather 
than causing them. Specifically, if a policy of deflation was 
required to maintain the gold standard parities in the gold bloc 
countries, then it follows that if prices had not been held back the 
gold bloc exchange rates could not have been maintained and would have 
been depreciated; hence price levels determined exchange rates. Once 
the decision to abandon the gold standard was taken in these countries 
prices were allowed to rise. However, it was not the depreciations 
that cause prices to rise but rather the upward pressure on prices 
(in the sense of pressure against further deflation) that forced the 
exchange rates to be devalued and depreciate.
(IV)
Having considered the theoretical problems associated with PPP 
it is now necessary to examine the major empirical problems involved 
in testing the hypothesis. In fact these are not exactly the same 
for the two versions of the hypothesis: use of relative PPP avoids 
some of the problems of the absolute version but creates some new 
difficulties of its own. As the present study (like most others) 
tests the relative version, the problems peculiar to absolute PPP 
can be dealt with fairly briefly. The first of these involves various
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index number problems. In practice these are usually minimized by 
using a Fisher ideal index but, in fact, as far as relative PPP is 
concerned, such problems are not relevant since it is changes in 
prices that are being considered and therefore there is no reason 
why using indices with different goods and different weights for 
different countries should lead to problems provided the method of 
constructing the index does not change in the period under considera­
tion.
The two other problems which are normally associated with absolute 
PPP, although when expressed in terms of changes are equally applicable 
to relative PPP, involve distortions created by transport costs and 
trade controls. These have already been discussed in theoretical 
terms and are well known: if transport costs are higher in one direc­
tion than another or a country has higher tariffs than others then 
this would create deviations from PPP. In an empirical situation, 
such deviations would have to be allowed for. However, to the extent 
that these two variables remain at the same level as they were in the 
base period, they can be ignored in tests of relative PPP in much the 
same way as index number problems but, on the other hand, if they do 
change then they will cause distortions. In a test of relative PPP 
over a period of only eight years, the assumption that deviations 
caused by changes in transport costs can be ignored, does not seem 
too objectionable, especially as their importance even in tests of absolute 
PPP is likely to be minimal (except in extreme cases). Unfortu­
nately, this is not true of trade controls which certainly did change, 
in fact, dramatically so. The empirical implications of this (and
attempts to deal with it) are taken up in chapter four below
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Thus, with one notable exception, the problems associated 
with absolute PPP can be ignored in the present study. However, 
this 6till leaves one major problem associated with both versions 
of PPP - the choice of price index - and another, associated solely 
with relative PPP, namely the choice of base period, which obviously 
do have to be considered in some detail.
Taking the latter problem first, the base period should be one 
in which the exchange rate i6 at its long run equilibrium - that is 
when absolute PPP holds:
"Using a base period for which this was not the case can cause serious problems of interpretation in empirical 
studies. A finding that the change in the exchange rate 
between two periods was only a fraction of the relative 
change in the price levels of two countries could constitute 
positive evidence of a dynamic movement towards purchasing 
power parity if the base period exchange rate was not equal 
to its PPP equivalent. On the other hand, if the results showed the exchange rate offsetting perfectly movements in the price levels we might wrongly infer that PPP was being 
maintained when in fact slow adjustments were keeping the 
exchange rate away from its PPP path". (66)
It is also preferable for the base period to be fairly close to 
the current period; how close is "fairly" is, of course, a matter 
of judgement but the greater the time span between base and current 
period the more likely are trade restrictions, transport costs, 
productivity levels and any other potential sources of bias to have 
changed. (Yeager talks of the "attenuated meaningfulness of price
(67)level comparisons over long spans of time". J)
This may provide the source of the first major problem in that 
these two criteria - an equilibrium and recent base period - may conflict 
the most recent period in which the exchange rate was at an equilibrium 
level may be some time past. This means that in taking a rather distant
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base period the PPP calculation becomes prey to all the various 
biases mentioned above. This is Yeager's "ancient history" argument:
"What may have happened in the years since the base 
period is hardly more than ancient history with respect 
to forces currently determining the exchange rate". (68)
Nevertheless, it remains relatively easy to define conceptually 
what a base period should be. However, actually choosing one em­
pirically is a rather different matter. In a sense, the ability to 
choose correctly a base period actually precludes the need for relative 
PPP in that a correct choice implies that we know how to recognise 
whether actual and equilibrium exchange rates are diverging so why 
bother to calculate PPP to work out something we already know? Of 
course, in reality, the closest we are likely to be able to get to 
identifying an equilibrium base period is an approximation where the 
actual and equilibrium exchange rates did not diverge too much. Given 
this, three possible approaches could be suggested as practical methods 
of selecting a base period for empirical work: first, several different 
base periods could be tried and a kind of sensitivity analysis could 
be applied to see if this made much difference to the results but this 
is rather messy and in any case we still need criteria for deciding 
which periods qualify as potential bases; also, if we find that the 
different bases all generate similar results does this mean that they 
are all suitable base periods or that they are all unsuitable?
A second method is suggested by Officer who is highly critical 
of the arbitrary way in which most researchers choose their base period:
"...the rationale of selecting a period in which the exchange 
rate is in long rim equilibrium is generally ignored. In particular, no researcher has used balance of payments data (or apparently any quantitative data) to determine an optimal 
base period". (69)
The possibility is taken up and discussed by Artus:
"Such an identification ^ of an appropriate base period/7 
cam possibly be made by looking at the current balance.
If the current balance was at a 'satisfactory' level 
given the relative cyclical position of the country, the 
existence of other temporary factors, and account being 
taken of possible lagged effects of past relative price 
changes which are still in the pipeline, then, perhaps, the 
actual rate was close to the ^ equilibrivi^ rate". (70)
This is conceptually a very appealing approach and is further dis­
cussed below.
A third method of choosing the base period has been suggested 
by Genberg:
"By making the assumption, admittedly not unobjectionable, 
that PPP holds on the average during the particular sample 
period, I could let a constant term determine the appropriate 
oase period". (71)
This is superficially appealing in that the base period is indeed a 
period rather them a single year or (at best) a few years; by, in a 
sense, relying on the law of averages, this method also has the 
advantage of avoiding the possibility of being completely wrong, 
inherent when a base year is chosen arbitrarily. Unfortunately, as 
Genberg himself points out, this method is "not unobjectionable" 
especially if the period under consideration is a fairly turbulent 
one or contains a large sub-period clearly characterised by dis­
equilibrium exchange rates. However, this remains an empirically 
easy approach, although the Officer balance of payments method is 
perhaps the most appealing.
Unfortunately, the latter may be difficult to apply in practice. 
Even adopting Artus' (1978) suggestion and concentrating solely on the 
current account, there is an immediate practical problem relating to
whether or not the base year, for the pound-dollar exchange rate, 
for example, should be chosen with reference to current account 
dealings between Britain and the U.S.A. only. If it is, then power­
ful third country influences which may have pulled the pound-dollar 
rate away from its equilibrium (PPP) value are ignored; if it is not, 
and the complete current account of each country is examined, then it 
may be that the years in which the British current account was 
"satisfactory" (and which therefore qualify as suitable base periods) 
do not coincide with those suggested by examining the U.S. current 
account.
There is also, in the context of the present study which adopts 
an extended PPP (or total balance of payments) approach, a more funda­
mental criticism which also applies to Artus' suggestion, referred to 
above (that the equilibrium period can be defined with reference to a 
"satisfactory" current account). This relates to the contention that 
the equilibrium exchange rate should not be calculated solely with 
reference to relative prices alone (or the current account only) but 
to all the "fundamental" economic variables that determine exchange 
rates (or the balance of payments as a whole). Use of the current 
account only may be acceptable if a pure PPP hypothesis is to be 
tested but, in an extended version, equilibrium not only depends on 
relative prices but also relative incomes and, if the capital account 
is incorporated, interest rate differentials and various other variables.
Thus, the contention that a particular period is unacceptable 
as a base period because the exchange rate was not at its equilibrium 
level in terms of relative prices, is inappropriate in an extended 
PPP approach if such deviation was justified by the levels of the 
variables used to "extend" the PPP hypothesis. Consequently, the widely
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held belief that the pound was overvalued in the late 1920's may 
not necessarily preclude the use of this period as a base in the 
present study, as in total balance of payments terms (allowing for 
the influences of non-price, "fundamental" economic variables) the 
pound may, in fact, have been in equilibrium.
An examination of the British balance of payments in the 
(73 )1927-30 period, during which the pound was allegedly overvalued 
bears this out. The large trade deficit (over £350m. each year) may 
seem to reflect overvaluation in simple PPP terms but the current 
account, as a whole, was in surplus (over £100m. except for 1930) 
presumably thereby reflecting undervaluation. However, if a total 
balance of payments view were taken then this would involve looking 
at the capital account also. The net position on current plus capital 
account is reflected in gold movements, which were never more than 
£15.2m., indicating approximate equilibrium in all four years. A 
basic balance approach would involve treating short term capital as 
accommodating and concentrating on the current account plus long term 
capital only which would indicate a balance of payments position of 
-£35.9m. in 1928, +£12.Om. in 1929 and -£11.6m. in 1930. (Data on 
short term capital was not available for 1927)» This would suggest 
that either 1929 or 1930 are most suitable as base years for extended 
PPP calculations against the pound, although in the light of the 
arguments in the previous paragraph, this is only really true for 
the pound's effective exchange rate and not its bi-lateral rates.
Furthermore, the contention that the British balance of payments
(72)
was in equilibrium ha6, in fact, been strongly made elsewhere:
"If....balance-of-payments equilibrium were the sole
criterion of the equilibrium rate of exchange, theremight be little justification for regarding the pound
sterling in the years 1925-30 as overvalued. For there
was little sign of disequilibrium in the British balanceof payments. The Bank of England's gold reserve remained,
on balance, practically constant during those six years..." (74)
Moreover, the same author goes on:
"If we apply our definition of the equilibrium rate literally, 
the pound cannot be said to have been overvalued. The British 
balance of payments was kept in equilibrium, however, only at 
the cost of depressed conditions at home compared with conditions 
in the outside world". (75)
Thus although the pound may have been overvalued in a "pure" PPP 
sense, if allowance is made for other economic fundamentals, particu­
larly relative incomes, it is possible to argue that the pound was at
(76 )an equilibrium level in a total balance of payments sense.
Additional and perhaps more useful evidence (since it applies
to five of the seven currencies in the present study and not just the
pound) is provided by Gaillot (1970). He attempts to calculate whether
PPP held over a very long period (1900-04 to 1963-67) for the exchange
rates of seven currencies against the dollar and examines a number of
intermediate periods, including 1927-31, in which he finds that the
actual exchange rates of the U.K., Canada, France and Switzerland
(77)were all within six per cent of their PPP rates.
Thus, there is reason to believe that the pound, and possibly 
some of the other currencies in the study, were in equilibrium in a 
total balance of payments sense in the late 1920's. Furthermore, 
identifying a base period in this way does not preclude the simul­
taneous adoption of Genberg's approach of including a constant. The 
The implied assumption of PPP holding on average in the 1930's may be 
a heroic one but is not totally without foundation as, for example.
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contemporary calculations of simple PPP of the major currencies
identified periods of both over and undervaluation of the pound 
(78 )and the dollar. ' In addition using two methods of determining 
the base year - and equilibrium balance of payments approach and 
inclusion of a constant term - make it more acceptable to adopt a 
common approach to all the exchange rates examined (which is what is 
actually done), thereby avoiding the conceptually correct, but em­
pirically messy, possibility of having to use different base periods 
for different bi-lateral exchange rates.
A more general problem, which applies equally to both absolute 
and relative PPP, relates to the choice of type of price index and 
many studies would seem to adopt a haphazard approach to this, often 
not discussing it at all. A variety of indices have been used - whole­
sale prices, cost of living indices, export prices, unit factor costs, 
wages, the GNP deflator and several others. There are two stages in 
the choice of index decision: firstly, the question as to whether the 
index should be biased towards traded goods, non-traded goods or be 
simply a general index and secondly, having chosen the type of index, 
what are the advantages and disadvantages of the available indices of 
that type?
If PPP is construed as being based solely on commodity arbitrage
(79)then it has been argued that there is no reason why the "law of 
one price" should apply to non-traded goods - indeed there is a good 
reason why it should not in the form of the productivity bias argument - 
and consequently an index based on the prices of traded goods is what 
is required. This line of argument could be used to justify the wide­
spread use of wholesale price indices in empirical work (although lack 
of available alternatives may be a much more important reason for this).
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However, reliance on indices based only on the prices of traded 
goods may have its pitfalls; in particular, the short run price of 
exports may be set more with current competitiveness in mind than 
overall domestic cost and price levels, and so their reliability as 
indicators or PPP and therefore equilibrium exchange rates may be 
very limited.
More fundamentally, even if the "law of one price" does hold 
for tradeables, PPP based on a traded good prices index is simply a 
truism. As Haberler notes:
"...equality of international prices....is a necessary 
but clearly not a sufficient condition for international 
equilibrium. Even if there exists a large and prolonged 
deficit in a country's balance of payments and hence its 
currency is seriously overvalued, prices of internationally 
traded goods will not, or at least need not, show any devia­
tion from purchasing power par". (80)
Verification of PPP based solely on price indices of traded goods is 
therefore spurious and this was very quickly realised by Keynes who 
used this argument to attack the British return to gold in 1925 at 
the old parity which, insofar as it was based on any rational economic 
argument, stemmed from a PPP calculation based on wholesale price indices 
(which are heavily weighted with traded goods).
If one rejects commodity arbitrage as the principal mechanism 
linking prices to exchange rates or, perhaps better, accept its role 
as far as traded goods are concerned but dismisses the fact that the 
law of one price holds as self-evident and therefore trivial, and 
instead emphasizes the role of equilibrium in asset markets then a 
more general price index is preferred. If this view is taken to its 
logical conclusion and it is argued that the law of one price is auto­
matic, then what is really required is an index of the prices of non-
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traded goods. Hie favourite choice is usually some index of wages (8 1)
An alternative rationale, more in keeping with the traditions 
of commodity-arbitrage PPP, is that in the absence of any biases in 
the internal price ratio (non-traded to traded goods) then a general 
price index is preferable since it avoids the criticism of spurious 
verification, allows emphasis to remain on commodity arbitrage and 
the asset market approach to be rejected and is much more in keeping 
with Cassel's own views since when he wrote about "the internal
purchasing power against goods„(82) he quite clearly meant all goods:
"Some people believe that Purchasing Power Parities should 
be calculated exclusively on price indices for such commodities as form the subject of trade between the two 
countries. This is a misrepresentation of the theory.... 
the whole theory of purchasing power parity essentially 
refers to the internal value of the currencies concerned, and variations in this value can be measured only by general 
index figures representing as far as possible the whole mass 
of commodities marketed in the country". (83)
Bnphasis on commodity arbitrage still remains at the centre, 
however, since an essential ingredient of Cassel's theory is that the 
prices of traded and non-traded goods are closely related by various 
links:
"Actually, the line between domestic and internationally 
traded goods is a fuzzy and shifting one. Various domestic and international goods and services are related in price, 
though not rigidly, by the fact that some are ingredients 
of others, by the use of common factors of production, and by direct or indirect substitutability in consumption". (84)
Thus, if we are to provide a genuine test of PPP - certainly of the 
version expounded by Cassel - then a general price index is to be 
preferred. In addition, such an index would also be preferred by 
exponents of the asset market theory of exchange rate determination 
and consequently, its acceptability to both PPP and asset market
theorists make it particularly appropriate for an eclectic approach 
of the kind adopted here.
Turning to the specific choice of index, it remains true that, 
in spite of all the above rhetoric, one of the most popular indices, 
albeit often due simply to availability, has been a wholesale price 
index which would normally be regarded as an index of traded goods 
prices; consequently, initially some examination of such indices 
must be made in passing if much of the empirical evidence is not to 
be ignored. Not surprisingly wholesale price indices (WPI's) often 
perform better than any others, although whether any weight can be 
given to the argument that if we are interested in simply predicting 
exchange rates, rather than testing the PPP hypothesis then WPI's are
/ O r  \better practical indicators due to their "higher explanatory power",' 
and that therefore their use is justified, rather depends on one's 
views about the direction of causality between prices and exchange 
rates.
Of the indices which contain mostly traded goods WPI's are per­
haps the least objectionable in that they do contain some non-traded 
goods. However, they are still heavily biased towards tradeables 
largely because they concentrate mainly on commodities; the tendency 
to spuriously support PPP is accentuated by the fact that they often 
give relatively large weights to primary products (which tend to obey 
the "law of one price") and omit altogether highly differentiated 
products (which do not). There are also statistical difficulties of 
comparability due to differences in coverage and weighting of national 
WPI's (although this is more a problem for absolute than relative PPP). 
Whether or not the OPTICA conclusion - that it is "legitimate, though 
not ideal, to consider WPI a useful candidate series for measuring PPP"^1
is acceptable is perhaps questionable. Finally, at least one
(fln\study has tried indices based completely on traded goods in 
the shape of indices of export prices which (not surprisingly) 
performed very well. However, this type of index provides such a 
biased test of PPP that these results can be taken as little more 
than the result of efficient commodity arbitrage.
The most popular of the more general indices have been consumer 
price indices (CPI’s) which,of course, are not subject to the con­
ceptual objections that plague WPI's although they can be criticised 
for lack of comprehensiveness; in 1970 private consumption represented 
less than two-thirds of GDP in most major developed countries. Never­
theless, as far as testing the PPP hypothesis is concerned CPI’s are 
without equal in practical terms since they are widely available and 
not especially biased towards traded goods. Moreover, criticism of 
their lack of comprehensiveness is, to some extent, a red herring 
since all the available indices sire subject to statistical short­
comings of one sort or another and it is rather too easy for a supporter 
of a particular index to begin justifying his choice by pointing out 
the statistical weaknesses of the alternatives.
However, the index that is most widely recognised as being the 
"best" of the general price indices for PPP purposes is the GNP or 
preferably GDP price deflator:
"Of the three ^ 5?PI, CPI and GDP deflato^ the GDP implicit deflator has the strongest claim to represent 
a general measure of a country’s price level. It is based on a conceptual framework that assigns an appro­priate weight to each good, whatever the classification 
chosen — as for example, between tradeables and non- 
tradeables". (88)
•'..•the GDP deflator....is, in the view of some observers, 
the most suitable in measuring PPP, because it is the most broadly based". (89)
"Cassel does not directly identify the kind of general 
price level that would be optimal in computing PPP, 
but the most logical interpretation would be a price measure of a country's GDP". (90)
In addition the scope of implicit deflators is likely to be very 
similar since they are usually based on a common accounting framework 
(the UN System of National Accounts). The major difficulty associated 
with the GDP deflator is a practical one in the form of its lack of 
availability. Even in more recent times it is often only available 
on an annual basis in some countries which may preclude the use of 
this rather promising indicator of general price trends. It is for 
this reason - especially for pre-World War 2 periods - that CPI's 
are usually the least objectionable of the available general price 
indices.
An alternative method of testing PPP is not to use price indices 
per se but to use indices of costs because they give a much better 
indication of the true underlying level of prices for two main 
reasons :
"Arguments in favour of cost over price parity theories.... 
are outlined as follows. (1) Costs of production are less 
subject to adjustment to exchange rate changes than are prices of traded goods. (2) Costs exclude the volatile 
component of profits and so sure more likely than product prices to represent long-run prices (for absolute parity) 
and to reflect permanent rather than temporary changes in prices upon inflation or deflation (for relative parity)". (91)
However, as Officer goes on to point out, it should be noted that such
arguments "do not justify a cost parity as such, only its superiority
in certain respects over a price parity"(92) and so all the theoretical
"...the GDP deflator....is, in the view of some observers, 
the most suitable in measuring PPP, because it is the most 
broadly based". (89)
"Cassel does not directly identify the kind of general 
price level that would be optimal in computing PPP, 
but the most logical interpretation would be a price 
measure of a country's GDP". (90)
In addition the scope of implicit deflators is likely to be very 
similar since they are usually based on a common accounting framework 
(the UN System of National Accounts). The major difficulty associated 
with the GDP deflator is a practical one in the form of its lack of 
availability. Even in more recent times it is often only available 
on an annual basis in some countries which may preclude the use of 
this rather promising indicator of general price trends. It is for 
this reason - especially for pre-World War 2 periods - that CPI's 
are usually the least objectionable of the available general price 
indices.
An alternative method of testing PPP is not to use price indices 
per se but to use indices of costs because they give a much better 
indication of the true underlying level of prices for two main 
reasons:
"Arguments in favour of cost over price parity theories.... 
are outlined as follows.(1) Costs of production are less 
subject to adjustment to exchange rate changes than are 
prices of traded goods. (2) Costs exclude the volatile component of profits and so are more likely than product 
prices to represent long-run prices (for absolute parity) and to reflect permanent rather than temporary changes in 
prices upon inflation or deflation (for relative parity)". (91)
However, as Officer goes on to point out, it should be noted that such 
arguments "do not justify a cost parity as such, only its superiority 
in certain respects over a price (92)parity" and so all the theoretical
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criticisms applying to price parities apply with equal force to 
cost parities. Indeed Houthakker has presented a cost parity theory
which reduces to a price parity theory although this has been strongly
(93)criticised on theoretical and other grounds. However, there is
one factor in favour of the cost parity approach in that the reverse- 
causation argument - that exchange rates determine prices - loses 
much of its force when applied to cost levels instead of price levels.
Nevertheless, while it has advantages, the cost parity approach 
could be viewed rather negatively as having all the disadvantages of 
the price parity approach plus one or two others. In particular the 
"cost level" is a vague and ambiguous concept and to make it opera­
tional even at a theoretical level several problems have to be dealt 
with: for example, a firm’s costs vary with its level of output which 
means that an appropriate output level has to be chosen at which to 
measure costs and furthermore costs may not even reflect long run 
prices if there is an element of oligopoly or monopoly in an industry; 
at a more practical level the specific firms and industries to be 
included in the cost index have to be chosen and in addition allowance 
must be made for differences in long run productivity growth across
* . (9*0countries.
Finally, there is the problem of availability of data. The 
only factor price that is readily available is that of labour and 
consequently prices of intermediate inputs, capital services and 
raw materials have to be excluded. Frenkel (1978) does try an index 
of material prices with some success but this can be criticised on 
exactly the same lines - it excludes everything else; moreover, since 
raw materials often consist of primary products which are not differen­
tiated then they are very likely to obey "the law of one price" and
hence provide a biased test of PPP. In any case, reliable indices 
of labour costs are not always widely available:
"The use of unit labour costs (ULC) would appear to.... 
¿be an appropriate choice^... .But again there are 
statistical...causes for unease; in particular the 
quality of the available statistics is suspect. Indirect 
labour costs such as pay-roll taxes and unemployment insurance are largely excluded; for two EC ¿European 
Community countries ULC data do not exist at all, while for four other EC-countries they are not published 
nationally". (95)
Thus use of cost parity either to represent or provide an alternative 
for price parity must ultimately be rejected in most cases simply due 
to lack of data.
With regard to the present study data deficiencies mean that 
use of cost indices is simply not possible (with one exception) 
and consequently use must be made of whatever price indices can be 
found. In practice GDP deflators are obviously not available either 
for the 1930's, but fortunately WPI*s and CPI's usually are, which 
at least allows the study to try both a traded good biased index, 
based on WPI's, thereby providing comparability with many other 
studies, and a more general index, which provides a much better 
test of PPP (although, of course, the study is concerned with rather 
more than this).
(V)
This completes the survey of PPP and the problems associated 
with its application. Its widespread acceptance and application make 
it a useful starting point for any theory of exchange rate determina­
tion. However, its implicit concentration on the current account make
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it necessary to examine other theories and various elements of 
these can be usefully drafted on to produce an extended PPP 
hypothesis which adopts an eclectic (and more acceptable) view of 
exchange rate determination. The theoretical and practical problems 
associated with PPP are substantial but not completely insurmountable. 
Having surveyed the theoretical suspects of exchange rate determination, 
the next chapter examines some of the empirical work concentrating 
especially on studies which adopt some farm of PPP approach and (or) 
deal with past periods of floating exchange rates (particularly the 
inter-war period) •
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CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EXCHANGE RATE 
DETERMINATION
(I)
The widespread adoption of floating exchange rates in the 
1970's has led to a growth of interest in the performance of floating 
rates and has consequently generated a large number of empirical 
studies. Clearly it is not possible to survey all the literature 
nor is it necessarily desirable to do so since in many cases the objec­
tives differ to those of the present study - for example, an author 
may be seeking to provide evidence to support or discredit a particular 
theoretical approach - or the period being examined may not be partic­
ularly relevant in the context of the 1930's. In connection with the 
latter point, an observation made by Yeager (1969) is perhaps in­
structive:
..we must beware of excessive generalization about the lessons of historical experience with fluctuating exchanges. 
Superficially similar experiences may be fundamentally 
different, even though in way6 usually unappreciated and requiring detailed, episodic study. When tempted to draw 
lessons from experience we should make sure we understand 
just what the experience was of". (1)
The present study does not seek to test any particular theory in 
the normal sense - it is not concerned with providing support (or lack 
of it) for a pure PPP hypothesis or an asset market (or monetary) 
approach, but instead it attempts to be eclectic because the focus of 
interest is really on two rather basic (or even crude) and connected 
questions. Firstly, to what extent were exchange rates "stable" in
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the 1930's in the sense of being determined by "economic fundamentals" 
and secondly, to what extent were they "unstable" in that they 
deviated from the equilibrium path indicated by these "economic fund­
amentals"; this second question involves the question of the importance 
of destabilising speculation. Consequently the studies to be examined 
will be those that address themselves to these problems.
Returning to the question of the relevance of the performance 
of exchange rates during different historical periods, there are 
basically four periods in which exchange rates have floated and hence 
which have provided data for examining the determinants and stability 
of floating exchange rates: firstly, there are a few studies of the 
pre-World War 1 years although these are obviously hampered by data 
deficiencies; secondly, the inter-war years (particularly the early 
1920's) have attracted some interest; a third period is the 1950's 
during which the Canadian dollar was floating (arguably providing the 
only example of floating during a "normal" period); finally, the 
adoption of floating rates in the 1970's has obviously led to a large 
number of studies which examine the current period.
It is conventional to talk in terms of drawing from historical 
experience to shed light on contemporary events. In the present context 
it is rather the other way round in that part of what follows involves 
examining contemporary experience with a view to deciding whether this 
can shed any light on events in the 1930's. However, mindful of 
Yeager's comments (above), it is proposed to only briefly survey the 
experiences of the 1970's, the 1950's and the pre-191^  period and 
concentrate mainly on the empirical evidence relating to the inter- 
war period.
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(II)
In this section the empirical evidence relating to the pre- 
World War 1 period, the 1950's and the 1970's will be briefly dis­
cussed. Empirical studies of the nineteenth century experience of 
floating exchange rates are scant although such periods did exist, 
despite the widespread portrayal of this century as the heyday of the 
gold standard (and fixed exchange rates). The two main episodes which 
have been examined are the American "greenback" period (1861-79) during 
which the U.S.A. was effectively on an inconvertible paper standard 
with a floating exchange rate - the "gold dollar" remained at par but 
the greenback price of gold fluctuated - and the floats of the currencies 
of Austria-Hungary and Russia (1879-91)»
The latter were examined by Yeager (1969). A PPP calculation 
suggested that the (Austrian) guilden was strongly related to relative 
prices and although it was occasionally subject to non-economic factors
(2)(including "a weak psychological connection....with the price of silver" 
and fears of war), it was, on balance, remarkably stable (arguably more 
so them the Canadian dollar in the 1950's). An important reason for 
this was arbitrage in international securities.There is no 
suitable price index for Russia amd so a PPP calculation is ruled 
out but it is clear that the ruble fluctuated much more than the 
guilden. However, according to Yeager, this was due to "the ruble's
greater sensitivity....to the psychological magnification of real in-
Ck) ,fluences" including mistrust of official Russian policy (fear of
inflation) and the greater likelihood of Russiem involvement in wars
and he concludes that "...the foregoing points suggest...^ that^ .••the
instability of the ruble does not necessarily show that destabilising
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speculation ordinarily prevailed in the foreign exchange market".
There are (at least) two relevant studies of the American 
"greenback" period, one relating to the whole period and the other 
to a specific incident (the gold crisis of 1869), which is often 
cited as an example of destabilising speculation. The former study 
forms chapter two of Friedman and Schwartz (196?) and deals with wider 
issues, but in the present context, the examination of the PPP rela­
tionship in the 1861-79 period and the discussion of deviations from 
PPP is instructive (pp.61-78). Basically their data suggest that the 
greenback dollar broadly followed its PPP path throughout the period 
but was (approximately) 20 per cent undervalued in the 1861-64 period 
and 10 per cent overvalued in 1865-71 although it was very close to 
its PPP level in 1873-79»
Nevertheless, these discrepancies do not necessarily furnish 
evidence of destabilising speculation. In the 1861-64 period specu­
lation (a capital inflow) limited the depreciation and, as after the 
Civil War the exchange rate did appreciate, "the speculators were 
ultimately correct and their speculation in retrospect was 'stabilising'".^^ 
Moreover, although Friedman and Schwartz do not go this far, the con­
tinued capital inflow in 1865-71, which caused the greenback to be 
worth more than its PPP value, could also be interpreted as "stabilising" 
speculation to the extent that, because the greenback was appreciating 
(in PPP terms), the capital inflow could be construed as speculators 
speeding up the adjustment process.
Wimmer (1975) examined the gold crisis of 18695 this involved 
an attempt to artificially lower the value of the greenback which 
ultimately backfired and led to the original "Black Friday", (24th Sept.,
(5)
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1869)» a day in which the value of the greenback fluctuated widely.
Winuner criticises the traditional view that this provides a good
example of the "evil consequences" of floating exchange rates, and
argues that such interpretations are due to "inadequate economic
(7)analysis and lack of empirical examination". Indeed, he goes 
much further and claims that the opposite is true. Forcing the price 
of the greenback away from its equilibrium level was only made possible, 
in fact, by very large purchases of gold dollars and "required the
(8)strong suspicion among private speculators of government complicity".
Furthermore, once the "mistake" was realised, "the market returned to
(9)its previous price and stability with amazing speed". Thus, this
is more an example of stabilising rather than destabilising speculation.
Turning to the 1950's the float of the Canadian dollar is 
widely documented and is well-known as a good example of how a floating 
exchange rate can be stable and quite free of destabilising speculation. 
It is particularly instructive in that it is the only example of floating 
which cannot be said to have taken place against a backdrop of uncer­
tainty and international disorder. The conclusion that the Canadian 
exchange rate was stable is all the stronger because it is reached by 
different authors via different routes. Khomberg (1960) (196*0 uses 
a full scale model and ultimately concludes:
"The model presented in this paper confirms the view that 
in an otherwise stable economic environment unrestricted capital movements need not be feared as a source of in­
stability". (11)
Others estimate a single equation to show that capital flowed in
when the dollar depreciated and out when it appreciated thereby 
(1? )stabilising it. Two other points are of interest: firstly, the
importance of interest rates in determining the Canadian exchange
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rate - these will be included in the model here - and secondly,
the fact that it was private short term capital that stabilised
the exchange rate not official intervention which was of secondary
( 1^)importance, although it did tend to stabilise the rate (until 
1961).
(13)
Thus the Canadian dollar in the 1950's provides a good example 
of a floating but stable exchange rate which was not subject to de­
stabilising speculation. Before leaving the Canadian dollar an obvious 
question must be dealt with: if the Canadian float was so successful 
then why was it abandoned in 1961? The answer would seem to lie in 
the monetary policy of the Canadian government. In late i960 the 
government engineered a depreciation in an attempt to reduce unem­
ployment and the main reason why the floating rate was abandoned was 
because this depreciation got out of control. Basically it was not 
floating the exchange rate that caused the problems but the Canadian 
government's monetary policy and its attempt to manipulate the exchange 
rate:
"The speculation and crises and alternation of heavy 
gains and losses of external reserves....in the 11 months 
before adoption of the new fixed parity occurred under a regime of officially manipulated flexible rates, not of 
free rates". (15)
It is interesting to note that Tsiang in his study of exchange rates 
in the early 1920’s comes to essentially the same conclusion about the 
franc:
"Thus the instability of the French frame from 1923 to 1926 was the result of an extremely elastic money supply, which would have caused great instability in the economy 
whether the exchange rate was freely fluctuating or 
controlled". (16)
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Consequently, the ultimate return of the Canadian dollar to a 
fixed value did not reflect failure of the float but rather the 
government's inept monetary policy*
Before briefly examining the 1970's, reference should be 
made to two other relevant episodes which have been documented to 
a lesser extent than those discussed so far. Ford (1958), in a study 
mainly concerned with balance of payments adjustment, does not appear 
to have considered that the Argentinian peso was subject to destabilising 
speculation in the 1885-190u period and in a detailed study of the 
Peruvian float (1950-5*0 Tsiang concludes:
"From...^ ¡9507» •-to the end of 1952....the exchange rate 
...was remarkably stable...In 1953, however the...rate 
depreciated by 28 per cent.. .¿^ but7. ••Exchange rate stability 
was restored in 195**»»»»»" (17)
Thus the Peruvian exchange rate appears to have been stable in four 
of its five year float and, in fact, its depreciation in 1953 does 
not appear to have been associated with speculative factors either:
"Such evidence as is available....indicates that, on the 
whole, speculative capital movements during 1953 were on 
balance not destabilising". (18)
The general conclusion with regard to the 1970's would seem to
be that exchange rate movements have been rather more erratic than
might have been expected, particularly in the light of the large volume
of academic support for their adoption. This was the conclusion reached
(19)by a study of the first two years of the 1970's float and subsequent 
events have tended to reinforce this view. Whether this constitutes 
evidence of an inherent tendency to "instability" is perhaps debate- 
able. That the float began from a position of disequilibrium is 
axiomatic; it constitutes one of the main reasons why the fixed exchange
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rate system that preceded it collapsed. Proponents of fixed exchange 
rates would nevertheless interpret this as history repeating itself 
and floating rates being proved "unstable" once again but an al­
ternative view of how history has repeated itself is put forward 
by Yeager who argues that the criticisms of the performance of 
floating rates "are further examples of something drearily familiar 
in monetary history: floating exchange rates, left on the scene after 
fixed rates have broken down, are routinely blamed for the economic 
disorders that had caused the breakdown and to which the fixed rates 
had themselves contributed.
Furthermore, there have been a number of important shocks to 
the economic system, particularly the oil price increases and, in the 
British context, the impact of North Sea oil. Much can be made of 
these factors:
"floating exchange rates functioned in an environment in which fixed rates had broken down and could not have 
been soon restored. The world oil situation brought what has been called 'the biggest international financial crisis 
since the 1930's'and the largest structural shift in inter­
national payments since the German reparation problem after 
World War 1". (21)
The 1970's is also clearly not a period of freely floating rates. 
Widespread official intervention (and temporary pegging), the remnants 
of Bretton Woods and the existence of one-way speculative options in the 
European "snake" have added to the difficulties. To some extent, there­
fore one is justified in concluding that floating rates could not have 
been expected to be "stable" in the 1970's.
However, one can go rather further than this, and argue that, 
in spite of wide fluctuations, exchange rates have shown some tendency 
to be influenced by "economic fundamentals". In particular high inflation
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countries have tended to have weak currencies (Britain, Italy) 
while low inflation economies have tended to have strong ones 
(Germany, Switzerland); in addition, the role of interest rates as 
an important influence has been apparent, most recently in the context 
of the strong U.S. dollar in 1981. More formally, a simple monthly 
model of the pound-dollar exchange rate estimated for the September,
1975 to June, 1980 period found that British and American (consumer) 
prices and the interest rate differential were significant determinants 
of the exchange rate and, in fact, predicted a depreciation of the
(22 )pound in 1981 (although not to the extent that actually occurred).
Other studies, which have examined PPP in the post-war period and have 
extended as far as 1975» have also produced some support for the 
hypothesis that exchange rates and prices are related (although the 
purposes of these studies has not been to examine stability of exchange 
rateS).(«>
Finally, a certain amount of empirical work on the 1970's has
gone into exploring the so-called monetary approach to the exchange
rate (which cam be seen as an asset market approach in which the main
asset is money). To the extent that these studies are principally
concerned with providing evidence to support the monetary approach,
they are of less interest in the present context. However, given that
they explicitly use the PPP hypothesis as one of their "building blocks"
and that the exchange rate is expressed as a function of relative money
(25)supplies, interest rate differentials and levels of real income, 
the apparent success of these models in empirical tests can be con­
strued to some extent, as providing further evidence of the importance 
of "economic fundamentals" in exchange rate determination. Monetary 
models also give an important role to expectations which are
( 2*0
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incorporated in the model developed here (in the form of dummy 
variables).
(Ill)
The bulk of the evidence relating to periods other than the 
inter-war years can be interpreted as broadly supporting the hypothesis 
that floating exchange rates are, to a large extent, determined by 
"economic fundamentals". However, one must be wary of excessive 
generalisation and obviously the empirical studies relating specifi­
cally to the inter-war years are of most interest. There are a sub­
stantial number of studies of exchange rates in the 1920's and rather 
less of the experience of the 1930's. The classic reference for the
period is Nurkse (19^ *0. However, whether or not this can really be
(26 )called an "empirical" study is debateable. Its conclusions about
the performance of floating rates would seem to be based on casual 
observations and are perhaps better described as assertions. In fact, 
it is precisely the lack of a sound empirical basis in Nurkse's book 
which provided the starting point of the present study.
Fortunately, a number of authors have examined the period more 
thoroughly. The studies can be discussed in terms of the two main 
strands which they tend to highlight (and are of primary interest in 
the present context): firstly, the importance of "economic fundamentals" 
in exchange rate determination and, in particular, the validity of the 
PPP hypothesis; and secondly, the evidence of destabilising speculation 
(or lack of it). With regard to the former, the debate over the merits 
of the PPP hypothesis has carried on at both theoretical and empirical 
levels for years and has already been discussed in some detail (with
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particular reference to the theoretical aspects) in chapter two.
Stolper (19^ 8) was one of the first to examine an episode in the
(27)inter-war period and, using three different price indices to 
approximate the PPP of the pound against the dollar (1919-25)» he 
concludes that the exchange rate was principally determined by 
relative prices and any deviation from the PPP rate was usually 
due to differences in income levels. Tsiang (1959) also looks at 
the pound-dollar exchange in this period and in addition considers 
the (Norwegian) kroner-dollar and (French) franc-dollar exchanges. 
Ctaly in the case of the French franc does he find large and continual 
deviations from the PPP rate.
More recently, several versions of a simple econometric model, 
originally developed by Hodgson (1971) (1972), have been used by 
various authors'' to examine exchange rate fluctuations in the 
inter-war years. Its performance is especially relevant because 
the model used in the present study is basically an extended version 
of Hodgson's model. It hypothesises that exchange rate fluctuations 
are determined chiefly by "economic fundamentals", the most important 
of these being relative price levels (thereby incorporating the PPP 
doctrine). Other "fundamentals" of importance are relative income 
levels, relative money supplies (a cash balance effect), interest 
rate differentials and seasonal factors.
The simplest version of the basic model is given by Thomas 
(1973a): .
ER = f (P^ » Pg» i^ » ig» Yg) (3«1)
where ER = price of one unit of B currency in terms of A
currency
PA = price level index in A
PB = price level index in B
*a = "the" interest rate in A
1B = "the" interest rate in B
ya = the level of real income in A
yb = the level of real income in B
then estimates this in ratio form to reduce multicollinearity and
to increase degrees of freedom:
ER = b + b. + b_ i + b, + e (3.2)o I r c. r p r
where Pr = Pg/P^ » etc.
Finally, in the presence of serial correlation, he introduces 
seasonal dummies and a time trend into his final estimating equation 
which he then estimates for the exchange rates of six countries (Canada, 
France, Britain, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands) against the B.S. 
dollar. In all six cases the relative price variable carried the 
correct sign (negative) and was highly significant; moreover one or 
more of the other variables were also significant thereby suggesting 
that exchange rates were indeed determined by "economic fundamentals" 
(especially relative prices) in this period.
Hodgson, himself (1971) (1972), came to much the same conclusion 
in his comprehensive analysis of the sterling-dollar exchange in the 
early 1920's. Only three detailed case studies of the 1930's experience 
have come to light: those by Ozmun (1976) on the pound-franc exchange, 
Hudgins (1973) on the pound-dollar exchange and Ridpath (1975) on the
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Canadian dollar - U.S. dollar and Canadian dollar - pound exchanges.
A priori one would expect some difficulty in applying this model to 
the 1930's partly because there was a greater tendency to "manage" 
the exchanges in this period but mainly because the existence of
tariffs, quotas and other trade controls would tend to render the
(29)PPP hypothesis inapplicable. However, despite the fact that
official intervention (especially British) was found to have played an 
important role, Hudgins, Ridpath and Ozmun all concluded that "economic 
fundamentals" were still the major underlying determinants of the 
exchange rate. In particular, relative prices were very important 
which lends more support to the PPP hypothesis, and relative income 
levels were significant although relative money supplies and interest 
rate differentials did not show up very well.
A much shorter study of the 1930's by Whitaker and Hudgins (1976) 
also exists. This is basically a modified and extended version of the 
part of the earlier work by Hudgins dealing with the role of the British 
EEA which was found to have had a small but significant influence on 
the pound-dollar exchange. Nevertheless it also concludes that "much... 
of the variation in the rate can be accounted for by broad changes 
in economic conditions and policies bearing on foreign exchange 
markets"^^ However, it is worth noting that although relative 
incomes and (marginally) interest rates influenced the exchange rate, 
relative prices were found to be insignificant.
Finally, some exponents of the monetary approach to the exchange 
rate have also used the early 1920’s as a testing ground, although the 
number of studies is small and they are mainly concerned with providing 
support for their theory rather than examining the question of exchange 
rate stability. Clement and Frenkel (1980) looked at the pound-dollar
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exchange rate in the 1921-25 period and Frenkel (1976) examined the 
German exchange rate during the 1923 hyperinflation. Both studies 
found some support for the monetary approach and so, to some extent, 
can be interpreted as suggesting that exchange rates were determined 
by "economic fundamentals".
Thus there is quite a lot of evidence to support the use of an 
extended PPP hypothesis as an appropriate framework for examining 
exchange rates in the inter-war period. Moreover, in a paper testing 
distributed lag variants of the hypothesis for fourteen currencies 
against the American dollar in the early 1920’s, Hodgson and Phelps 
(1975) found that, in eleven cases, over ninety per cent of the monthly 
variation in exchange rates was explained by lagged price level move­
ments. Although they made no attempt to disentangle the effects of 
speculation from those of ordinary trade-induced adjustments of 
exchange rates to price level movements they are implicitly suggesting 
that speculation was probably stabilising (and speeded up the adjust­
ment process). However, many people would dispute this contention 
that foreign exchange speculation was mainly stabilising in the 
inter-war period; indeed, the argument that the adoption of flexible 
exchange rates would generally lead to great instability due to de­
stabilising speculation is one of the main pillars of the case against 
flexible rates.
There are a variety of definitional and measurement problems 
involved in dealing with speculation in the foreign exchanges and 
these are discussed at length in chapter four. In the present section, 
the main concerns are the results and conclusions of the studies of 
speculation. Perhaps the most extensive of these is provided by
Aliber (1962) who looks at five exchange rates in the early 1920's:
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the pound, the French franc, the Belgian franc, the Dutch guilder 
and the Swiss franc (against the U.S. dollar, the U.S. dollar, 
the French franc, the pound and the O.S. dollar, respectively). His 
conclusions are rather gloomy, the principal one being that specu­
lation was incapable of keeping fluctuations small in the early 1920's; 
speculators as a group (especially in the forward market) showed little 
flexibility and hence did little to dampen exchange rate movements 
caused by political crises and temporary economic dislocations. He 
bases his observations on speculation on an examination of changes 
in the differential between spot and forward exchange rates (which is 
a proxy for changes in speculative expectations and hence speculation 
itself) and he backs these up by evidence derived from comparing 
actual exchange rates to PPP rates.
He quotes the French cases as a very good example of destabilising
speculation eventually providing its own justification, and the Belgian
experience as "an interesting example of the difficulty of maintaining
(31)economic independence in a system of flexible exchange rates", 
the implication being that it was a bad experience since the Belgian 
franc was dragged along in the wake of the French franc because of 
the close relationship between the two economies and the strong expec­
tations that the two currencies should, and eventually would, exchange 
on a one-to-one basis. Moreover, although both the Netherlands and 
Switzerland avoided the circle of (unstable) depreciating currencies 
and rising prices and eventually returned to their pre-war parities, 
their economies were very similar to those of France and Belgium in 
some ways and, had it not been for extensive intervention in the 
exchange market by the authorities and (more important) strong 
expectations of a return to the pre-war parity with sterling on the
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part of the speculators, they would probably have succumbed to 
cumulative destabilising speculation in much the saune way as the 
French and Belgiaun francs. Nor was the pound free from speculation; 
though most speculative pressure was upward and could not be described 
as destabilising, it could not be said to be stabilising either, and 
in fact ultimately led to the pound returning to the gold standard 
at too high a level.
Aliber's conclusions were the most strongly critical of flexible 
exchange rate systems of all the empirical work surveyed. While there is 
fairly general agreement that the French franc suffered from de­
stabilising speculation in the early 1920's (see below), nowhere 
(other than in Nurkse (19 *^0 » of course) is general condemnation of 
flexible rates and the implication that destabilising speculation 
either occurred or nearly occurred in most cases expressed except in 
Aliber's work. Not surprisingly he has been strongly criticised,
notably by Pippenger (1975) on two counts: firstly, Pippenger argues
(52)that his choice of price indices and method of calculating changes 
in price levels and exchange rates is such as to exaggerate fluctations 
and hence the degree of instability; secondly, Aliber implicitly assumes 
that the only reason for a discount or a premium in the forward market 
(adjusted for interest rate differentials) is speculation; Pippenger 
disagrees and argues that various other factors may cause this.^^ 
Several other criticisms also come to mind: Aliber does not use 
rigorous econometric methods like Hodgson and others; also he uses 
deviations from the PPP rate as back up evidence ignoring the fact 
that such deviations may be caused by non-speculative variables such 
as changes in relative income levels. Finally, Aliber only really 
provides evidence of destabilising speculation in the case of France
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and Belgium (which is arguably a special case because of the close 
relationship between the French and Belgian francs and the expecta­
tion that they should exchange on a one-to-one basis); consequently, 
his ensuing generalisations are based more on hypothesis than fact.
Thomas (1973a) (1973b) also considers the possibility of de­
stabilising speculation in the early 1920's. He conducts two tests
(3*0for the currencies of twelve countries against the U.S. dollar 
from January 1920 to June 192*+. He defines destabilising speculation 
as occurring if speculators cause the magnitude of exchange rate 
fluctuations to exceed that which would exist in the absence of 
speculation. His first test assumes that deviations of the actual 
exchange rate from the PPP rate were caused by speculation. Thus if 
speculation causes the exchange rate to change by more than is indicated 
by changes in relative prices then it is destabilising in the sense 
defined above. It would therefore be possible to test equation (3*3) 
to see if 6  ^is greater than unity.
Log ER = Log pr + e-] (3.3)
(where the variables are as defined above)
However, this test is open to criticism as it ignores the effect of 
other non-speculative variables and may therefore bias downwards 
and so equation (3.*+) is estimated to see if above unity.
Log ER = a2 + B2 log pr + Log ir + 6  ^log Yr + (3.*+)
Only the French franc-dollar exchange rate provided a or ?2 above 
unity.
The second test involves the use of an adaptive expectations model.
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Given the importance of relative price levels, a plausible equation 
showing exchange rate determination is given below:
the deviation between the currently observed price ratio and that which 
had been expected in the previous period:
The greater the value of 3, the more sensitive is the expectations 
adjustment process; thus if 3 is substantially greater than zero then 
an exogeneous increase in the price ratio induces a large upward
He therefore derives a method of estimating the value of 3 and finds 
only two countries (France and Italy) where 3 is substantially greater 
than zero and as both of these experienced high, sustained inflation 
in the period in question this is arguably not surprising.
Tsiang (1959) simply looks at deviations of the actual exchange 
rate from the PPP rate for the pound (1919-25)1 the Norwegian kroner 
(1919-26) and the French franc (1919-26), all against the dollar. In 
the case of the pound he finds the two rates move very closely together 
from 1922 onwards; in the period 1919-21 he finds three sharp twists 
in the actual rate only one of which attributes to speculation. These 
three sharp movements also occur in the Norwegian and (more severely)
£ (3.5)
where P^. = the current ratio of price indices of the two
countries
P E speculators' current notion of the "expected" or 
"normal" price ratiot
Suppose that P^  is revised during each time period on the basis of
P_t
E (3-6)
revision of the "expected" price ratio (and hence increases speculation).
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in the French rates and he attributes them to similar factors.
From 1922 onwards, however, in both the latter cases, the actual 
rate tends to deviate progressively more from the PPP thus indicating 
(on the assumption that all such deviations are due to speculation) 
the presence of destabilising speculation. In Norway this progressive 
deviation was arrested by a vigorous tight money policy but in France 
an extremely elastic money supply with rigid interest rates allowed 
it to continue. Thus Tsiang puts the blame for the French situation 
from 1924 to 1926 on government policy (and also political instability) 
and argues that there would have been difficulties even under fixed 
exchange rates.
Stolper (19^ 8), as reported above, has argued that deviations of 
the actual exchange rate of the pound in the early 1920's from its 
PPP rate were due not to speculation but to differences in relative 
income levels. In fact, he is quite explicit about the (lack of a) 
role for speculation:
"As far as speculative movements of funds are concerned it 
must be stated categorically that except for one period in 1924 they cannot be considered to have played a major 
part in the determination of the actual rate". (35)
Grissa (1967), in an extensive study of speculation in the early 
1920's, comes to a similar conclusion:
"The experience of the frame and pound, therefore, rather support Friedman's hypothesis that given the stability of the underlying economic conditions, flexible exchange rates 
would tend to be stable". (36)
His basic conclusions are that the pound was "stable" (and not subject 
to destabilising speculation) from 1921 to 1925 and the franc was 
"stable" from 1921 to 192*f but not from 192^  to 1926; however, this
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instability was due to government policy rather than speculation.
It would seem that there is now substantial evidence to suggest 
that, at least in the 192^ -26 period, the French franc was subject 
to destabilising speculation. However, the argument that destabil­
ising speculation affected any other countries in the inter-war years 
receives virtually no support at all, and furthermore, whether or not 
the case of the French franc is in any way indicative of the general 
pattern that might be expected when exchange rates are floating is 
highly contentious. It seems that it was largely the expansive 
monetary policy of the French government which caused the problems 
rather than any inherent tendency for destabilising speculation to 
occur during periods of floating exchange rates (the apparent lack 
of destabilising speculation in other currencies also supports this 
hypothesis) and at least one author, (Tsiang, 1959), is of the opinion 
that similar difficulties would have occurred even if the French 
exchange rate had been fixed.
An interesting final comment on the French franc in the early 
1920's is provided by Eichengreen (1980), who uses a modified monetary 
approach to explicitly examine the assertion that the franc was subject 
to destabilising speculation. He generates a counterfactual exchange 
rate, based on non-speculative determinants of the franc-pound exchange 
rate, and compares it to the actual rate. He found that speculation 
could be considered both stabilising and destabilising: stabilising, 
in the sense that over the entire period speculation decreased the 
variance of the exchange rate, but destabilising, in that speculation 
may have increased the variability of the exchange rate around its
trend
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Finally, in the same (monetary) vein, it is worth quoting 
the views of an exponent of the monetarist approach to exchange 
rate determination, which are contained in an article which examines 
past periods of floating exchange rates (in much the same way as this 
chapter has attempted to do):
"Furthermore, our own data and the opinion of most other economists writing about these periods, with the exception 
of Nurkse (19^ *0, seem to agree about the conclusion that there is very little evidence of inherent instability and destabilising speculation, except for Germany under hyper­
inflation and possibly Russia in the nineteenth century and 
France in the 1920's. In the latter two cases available information indicates that a lack of control of the money 
supply was probably the main reason behind this". (37)
The brief survey of the importance of destabilising speculation in 
periods of floating exchange rates contained in the present chapter 
would suggest a similar conclusion.
(IV)
There is a great problem of interpretation in looking at past 
periods of floating exchange rates with a view to using this evidence 
as a basis for theorising about particular sub-periods. In particular, 
different conditions may render any particular episode inappropriate 
as a basis for examining another and it may well be that every 
experience should be treated as being unique. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that, in spite of the differences between particular "floats", 
much of the evidence, and indeed most of the econometric evidence, 
suggests that floating rates were normally not subject to destabilising 
speculation but were generally "stable" in the sense of being deter­
mined by "economic fundamentals". In fact, in the inter-war years, 
the only alleged occurrence of destabilising speculation whose existence
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would receive widespread support, is the experience of the French 
franc from 192*+ to 1926, and even then most authors would be inclined 
to blame the instability of the franc on government monetary policy, 
rather than any inherent tendency towards destabilising speculation.
This conclusion and the theoretical survey (presented in 
chapter two above) would suggest that it is not unreasonable to 
hypothesise that exchange rates are determined by "economic funda­
mentals", most especially relative prices but also relative incomes 
and interest rate differentials. The most under-researched period 
(and the one therefore most subject to assertion rather than con­
clusions based on empirical evidence) is the 1930's. Consequently, 
the following section (Chs. -^8) attempts to develop and test a 
model of exchange rate determination based primarily on the assumption 
that exchange rates were largely determined by "economic fundamentals", 
even in the 1930's, arguably the most turbulent period of floating 
exchange rates with the exception of the 1970's.
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4
CHAPTER k
A MODEL OF EXCHANGE RATE 
DETERMINATION
(I)
The starting point of the model to be developed below is the
PPP hypothesis which, in its least dogmatic form, states that relative
prices are the major determinant of exchange rates. This is normally
postulated as a long run theory and, as such, it is fairly widely
accepted in some general sense. However, the role of prices in short
run exchange rate determination is less widely acknowledged and requires
some discussion. In the first place, to the extent that the short run
(1)exchange rate is a function of the long run exchange rate an in­
direct role for prices in the determination of the former clearly 
exists. A related point is that if the relationship between prices 
and exchange rates is primarily a long run one then the latter can 
presumably be taken to be a function of lagged values of the former, 
one of which (in a monthly model) is that of the previous month and 
so even according to a long run version of the PPP hypothesis relative 
prices in the immediate past would have some role to play in the 
determination of the current exchange rate.
In any case, an eclectic view of exchange rate determination
allows recourse to other theoretical frameworks which may suggest a
short lag on prices is most appropriate. A balance of payments
approach (which is further developed below) would indicate a very
short lag on prices as, in buying and selling, people are reacting
(2)to current or very recent price levels. A wide version of the
-  8 k  -
4
asset market approach may also suggest a short lag on prices as 
people adjust their portfolios in accordance with a number of 
variables including (presumably) all current (or very recent) prices.
A final, possible, theoretical reason for a short lag on prices relates 
to the role of stabilising speculation. If the traditional long run 
PPP relationship between prices and exchange rates is recognised 
then any change in current prices (probably after a small lag) will 
have an immediate impact on exchange rates as (stabilising) 
speculators behave in such a way as to push the exchange rate towards 
its (new) long run PPP equilibrium.
Turning to the empirical evidence, the majority of the studies 
of the inter-war period (discussed in the previous chapters) found a 
strong relationship between exchange rates and either current prices 
or prices lagged one month. This would strongly suggest the use 
of a similar lag in the present study. However, such evidence is 
rather negative in that it does not actually test for any lag structure. 
Fortunately more positive evidence is available: in the first place, 
some of the above studies do, in fact, try a variety of lags - for 
example, Hodgson (1971) tries lags of up to four months and eventually 
selects a one month lag on the grounds that it gives the best fit. 
Secondly there is one fairly extensive study (of fourteen exchange 
rates) of the early 1920's which explicitly tested the hypothesis that 
exchange rates were determined by lagged prices and came to the following 
conclusions:
"The lag weights....suggest that the peak effect of price 
levels on exchange rates occurred within the initial month... 
for six countries, and in the first month following the 
initial disturbance for five countries, and in the second 
month following the initial disturbance in the case of one 
country". (4)
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"In all fourteen cases the major impact of price level
movement occurred within the first three months". (5)
This clearly supports a very short lag on prices. That study 
used a Koyck lag; in the course of the present study an Almon- 
type lag was applied to the pound-dollar exchange rate in the 1930's 
(not presented in the thesis but further discussed below) and, although 
the results were not particularly good they also suggested that the 
major impact of prices was in the first few months. Thus there is 
sufficient theoretical and empirical foundation to merit the use of 
a very short lag on the relative price variable.
The question now arises as to what variables should be used to 
"extend" this PPP hypothesis. The preceding two chapters would 
suggest a number of other "economic fundamentals" which might 
plausibly be hypothesised to have had a role in exchange rate deter­
mination, on theoretical or empirical grounds (or more usually both). 
These would include relative income levels, interest rate differentials 
and probably some variable to reflect seasonal factors. In addition 
official intervention in the foreign exchange market was found to be 
important and must clearly be incorporated. Finally, the inclusion 
of a trend variable would seem to be appropriate. However, this is 
all very unsystematic and ad hoc, although in principle, would appear 
to test the relatively simple hypothesis - that exchange rates were 
largely determined by "economic fundamentals" - quite adequately. 
Nevertheless, a much more satisfactory theoretical framework can be 
provided by an alternative route, namely the balance of payments view 
of exchange rate determination. A model explicitly along these lines 
was developed and tested by Hodgson (1971) (1972) and used by Hudgins 
(1973), Ozmun (1976), Ridpath (1975) and Thomas (1973a). It is this
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model which underlies the one used here and it can be viewed as 
incorporating the PPP hypothesis as one of its main arguments. The 
main modification is that the present version explicitly allows for 
third country effects and is therefore more complete.
(II)
The Hodgson model is couched in terms of supply and demand 
for the currency in question (pounds). A two country model is used 
(U.K. and U.S.A.) and three sources of currency transactions are 
recognised corresponding to the current, capital and official transac­
tions accounts of the balance of payments. Thus the first source of 
supply of and demand for pounds is derived from trade in goods and 
services. The demand function is effectively a British export 
function - foreigners demand pounds to buy British goods and services; 
similarly the supply function is a British import function. The main 
explanatory variables are therefore relative price and (real) income 
levels; a trend variable is also included to reflect changes in tastes 
and seasonal variables are added. Thus current account currency flows 
are represented as follows:
II
>
f  ^P UK* Y US’ T ’ Z ^
(4.1)
TV  = f  ( p us* Y UK’ T ’ Z ^ (4.2)
Twhere = demand for pounds
s T  - supply of pounds
P a price index
Y real income
T a trend variable
Z seasonal variables
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Subscripts "UK" and "US" indicate British and American variables 
respectively.
Currency transactkjns will also be generated by "trade" in 
assets and their second source is therefore capital flows. Interest 
rate differentials may be important here and Hodgson (1971)» Hudgins 
(1973)» Ridpath (1975) and Ozmun (1976) also postulate a cash balance 
effect: for example, a rise in the supply of cash balances in Britain 
(not matched by an increase in demand) will tend to increase the 
demand of British residents for foreign currency as they increase 
their holdings of alternative assets, including foreign assets, in 
an attempt to re-establish their portfolio balance. Hodgson (1971) 
also included variables to represent "fears of capital loss" and 
"prospects for capital gain" while Ozmun included a similar variable 
to represent "psychological forces", and this procedure will also 
be followed here. The two structural equations generated are thus:
II
« % f ^US ■ 1UK * ’ s )
II
« , 
w
f ^US ” 1UK 1 ^  ’ s ) (k.k)
where i = the interest rate
M the money supply
S a variable reflecting "speculative" factors
Finally there is the government sector consisting mainly of 
official intervention in the foreign exchange market (by central 
banks or by exchange intervention funds):
°£ = f (IUK 1 IUS) (^ .5)
S£ = f ^UK * IUS^ (*♦.6)
where I official intervention
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Equating supply and demand to give equilibrium, introducing 
the exchange rate (R) to convert variables from dollars to pounds 
where necessary and solving for the exchange rate gives:
R = f *PUK* PUS* YUK’ YUS’ MUK’ ^ S ’ xUS " XUK’ IUK’ IUS’ T,Z,S^
Hodgson, Hudgins and Ozmun all go on to estimate linear approximations 
of this function.
Before extending the model to include third country effects 
three modifications to this two-country version would seem appropriate. 
Firstly, and most important, the inclusion of a money supply variable 
is rather questionable. It seems highly likely that the money supply 
is correlated with price levels, income levels and possibly interest 
rates also; consequently its inclusion will lead to multicollinearity. 
Moreover, not only does a money supply variable create technical 
difficulties, but the inclusion of both money supply and price 
variables would be theoretically incongruous to some, particularly 
those who espouse the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. 
It is also interesting to note that whilst Hodgson and Hudgins both 
include relative money supplies in their theses (1971) (1973)» both 
exclude it in the published versions of their work.^^ In view of 
all this, it seems prudent to drop the money supply variables in 
the present study.
A second modification relates to the role of invisibles in the 
trade sector; this is important conceptually and in many cases (such 
as Britain) empirically as well. The problem is that whilst it is 
clear that the demand for goods is determined largely by prices and 
levels of income it is not immediately obvious why this should be 
true of the demand for services} therefore some discussion of the
demand for currency for the purpose of "buying" and "selling" 
invisibles seems appropriate. In fact there turns out to be no 
need for additional variables.
The three major components of invisible trade for the 
countries in the study were shipping receipts and payments, in­
terest and dividends from overseas investment and to foreign owners 
of domestic investments and tourist receipts and payments. Although 
it is possible to put forward specific variables which determine the 
supply of and demand for invisibles - relative costs of shipping 
freight and so on - it is impossible to collect any suitable data and 
in any case unnecessary since all three types of invisible flow are 
likely to be correlated with income levels which are already in­
cluded in the model: earnings from overseas investments can be 
divided into two main components - dividends from equity investments 
and incomes from fixed interest bonds - both of which are likely to 
rise during prosperity (and fall during recessions), the former 
because of high (low) profits, the latter because of disappearance 
(appearance) of defaults; shipping receipts are related to traffic 
carried which depends on the volume of trade which in turn depends 
on the level of prosperity (real income); the relationship between 
tourist receipts and expenditures with income levels is obvious. In 
fact, in the case of Britain, Chang (1951) found such a relationship 
between invisibles and income for the 192^ -38 period (annual data)
when he regressed the volume of shipping services, interest and
(7)"other" receipts on income.
Thus, in the trade (or current account) sector of the model, 
supply of and demand for currency due to flows of invisibles can be 
viewed as largely determined by the income variables. A third (and
final) modification to the two country model involves the intro­
duction of a trend variable in the capital account (as well as the 
current account) section. This is to reflect the possibility of 
a gradual capital flight from Europe to America in particular, 
due to increasing fears of war which may be important for European 
currency-dollar exchange rates. In practice this requires no new 
variable but simply introduces an alternative interpretation of the 
trend variable (war scare). Another possible interpretation of the 
trend variable which could be mentioned at this point, is that it may 
proxy relative productivity growth which may have been greater in 
some countries than others.
A major criticism of the simple model described above (even
incorporating the modifications) is that it excludes the effects of
third countries. In the context of the market for pounds demand will
emanate not only from America but also from other ("third") countries;
thus the pound-dollar exchange rate could be influenced, for example,
by the relative demand for pounds and dollars in France. Such
possibilities were excluded by Hodgson and others mainly on the grounds
of simplicity: in order to keep the number of explanatory variables
down to a reasonable level, weighted averages of prices and incomes
of third countries would have to be calculated which would "involve
an extensive research project in itself...¿and s o7...a second best
/ o \...procedure appears warranted". While some solace may be drawn
from Stolper's contention that events on the continent had little
(9)effect on the pound-dollar exchange rate in the 1920's, there is 
no justification for simply assuming this was also true of the 1930's; 
indeed the presence of serial correlation in Hudgin's estimates of 
the pound-dollar exchange rate in the 1930's could be interpreted
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as indicating the existence of omitted variables, some of which 
could be third country variables.
Moreover, an easy way of avoiding the dilemma of too many 
countries would seem to be to use just a single country as a proxy 
for the rest of the world, and in a world currency market dominated, 
as it was between the wars, by three major currencies - the pound, 
franc and dollar - the choice of an appropriate, representative 
third country is not too difficult. Once this problem of obtaining 
satisfactory data is overcome, the case for explicitly including 
third country effects on the grounds of its conceptual importance 
becomes overwhelming. There are also good econometric reasons for 
this: if the included and omitted (third country) explanatory variables 
are correlated then the estimators of the constant term and the co­
efficients on the included variables will be biased and inconsistent 
and, more importantly, if they are not (which should be the case if 
multicollinearity is to be avoided when they are included) then 
although the estimates will be unbiased, their variance will contain 
an upward bias possibly leading to rejection of significant variables.
With all this in mind an extended version of the model is presented 
below using the pound-dollar exchange rate as an example. The struc­
tural equations are very similar to those for the two-country version 
except that the money supply variables have been dropped and there 
are now two sources of demand for each currency and three markets: 
the pound, the dollar and the ROW's (rest of the world's) currency.
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(I) Market for Pounds
£DUS = f PUK’ PUS’ yus,1us"1uk* iuk* '^US' s’ z’ (4.8)
£DW = f ( ER , Pyjç , Py 1 YW’ 1W-1UK* IUK’ IW’ S’ Z’ (4.9)
£SUS = f (R* P^i pusi yuk’ 1us“1uk’ IUK’ ’^US’ s’ z> (4.10)
£SW = f (ER, PyK, Py, YUK’ ^W^UK’ IUK’ IW’ S’ Z’ T) (4.11)
£DUS + £DW = £SUS + £SW (4.12)
(II) Market for Dollars
ÎfD™ = f (R, Pyg, PDK, 1US-1UK’ IUK* IUS’ S’ Z’ (4.13)
*DW = f (EER, Pyg, Py, Yy, Sf^-us’ Ius’ IW’ S’Z,T) (4.14)
= f R^» Pus’ PUK’ Yus’ 1US“1UK* IUK’ IUS’ S,Z,T^ (4.15)
*sw = f (EER, Pyg, Py, Yyg 1W_1US’ ’^US’ IW’ S’Z’T^ (4.16)
Id™ + $DW = *SUK + $SV (4.17)
(III) Market for R W s  currency
wduk = f E^R* PUS’ Pw’ YUK’ iV"xUK* IUK’ IW’ S,Z,T^ (4.18)
WDUS = f (EER, Pyg, Py, Yyg, I yg , Iy, S, Z, T) (4.19)
vs™ = f (ER, PyK, Py, Yy, ^ K ’ ^  Z * ^ (4.20)
wsus = f (EER, Pyg, Py, Yy Ìy~Ìyg, I yg , Iy, S, Z, T) (4.21)
wduk * WDUS = VSUK ♦ WSUS (4.22)
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where :
Endogenous variables
OS£D = demand for pounds by USA
£DW = " " " by ROW
|DUK = " " dollars by UK
$DW = " " " by ROW
WDU^  = " " ROW'S currency by UK
WDUS = " " " " by USA
£SUS = supply of pounds (by UK) to USA
£SW = " " " " " to ROW
$SUS = " " dollars (by USA) to UK
$SW = " " " " " to RCW
WS^ K = " " RCW's currency (by ROW) to UK
WSUS = » » » •• " •' to US
R = pound-dollar exchange rate
ER = effective exchange rate of UK (against ROW)
EER » " » of US " "
Exogenous variables
P*
Y*
Ç -ÿ
I*
s
z
T
(P*
= an index of prices 
= an index of real income 
* = an interest rate differential
= official exchange rate intervention 
= a variable reflecting "speculative" factors 
= seasonal variables 
= a trend variable 
= ^ttv» Pjtc » Pw. *ic.)
Subscripts UK, US and W refer to British, American and RCW variables
respectively
Solving for R would give the partially reduced form:
R f (P*, Y\ ¿T-i/'% I*, ER, EER, S, Z, T) (4.23)
The presence of endogenous, explanatory variables would make OLSQ 
(ordinary least squares) estimators of this equation inconsistent
but fortunately, this is not true of the fully reduced form:
R = f (P\ Y*, ¿J-i7*, I*. S,Z,T) (4.24)
There is still an identification problem but this is not crucial as 
it is not necessary to derive the structural coefficients (from the 
reduced form coefficients) to test the hypotheses that represent the 
focus of the study. Consequently the empirical chapters will con­
centrate on OLSQ estimates of equation (4.24).
A further question relates to whether or not equation (4.2*0 
should be assumed to be linear or log-linear. A priori, there is no 
particular reason for preferring one to the other. In fact it may be 
preferable to try both and let the data decide the most appropriate 
form. Certainly, it would be interesting to use a log-linear form as 
this would provide information about elasticities. This would be 
especially useful in connection with relative prices, as the long 
run PPP hypothesis would predict a price elasticity of unity and 
presumably, therefore, the logarithm of relative prices in the model 
developed here, would be expected to have a coefficient no greater 
than unity. Indeed, the value of price elasticities of exchange 
rates has been used by one author as a test for destabilising spec­
ulation in that a coefficient greater than unity could be interpreted 
as implying that the exchange rate was "overshooting".^Unfortunately 
the fact that some of the variables take negative values precludes
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any log-linear form from being tested (since the logarithm of a 
negative quantity is not defined).
One final modification to equation (^ .2*0 is required. This 
involves converting it to ratio form for two reasons: firstly, and 
least important, to increase the degrees of freedom, and secondly, 
to shift this BOP view of exchange rates closer towards a relative 
PPP hypothesis. Thus, the study will provide OLSQ estimates of a 
linear approximation of equation (A.2*f) in ratio form, that is, for 
the pound-dollar exchange rate :
R = a0 + B1 (pus/pUK) + B2 PW + *YUS^ YUK^
k  Y w + ß5 ^1US~1UK^ + ß6 ^1W“1UK^
7 ( V
+•H1
ß8 i u k  + 9 IUS + ß 10 Iw
11 S ß 12 Z +  T +  e (if.25)
At this point in an attempt to stress the eclectic nature of 
this balance of payments/extended PPP model, it is interesting to note 
its similarities (and differences) with the monetary approach, especially 
as adopting the latter was explicitly rejected in chapter two. A 
typical monetary model is to be found in Frenkel (1980):
R = f  (M, M*, Y , Y*, tt )
where R 
M 
M* 
Y 
Y*
the exchange rate 
domestic money supply 
foreign money supply 
domestic real income
(*+.26)
IT
foreign real income 
a variable to proxy expectations
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Substituting prices for money supplies (especially cost of living
indices), which in an empirical sense would presumably not be
entirely unobjectionable to monetarists, produces an equation not
too dissimilar to (4.25), especially as a speculative/expectations
variable is not only included in the latter but in some regressions
is actually based on the forward exchange rate which is the indicator
(12)of expectations favoured by Frenkel. Furthermore, a more general
asset approach would presumably also incorporate interest rates in 
some form creating even greater similarities.
However, there are important differences, most notably a
monetary model would suggest the opposite sign for the real income 
(13)variables and also, in certain circumstances, for the interest
(14)rate variables; in fact, this observation may be useful, to the 
extent that it may indicate that "wrongly signed" incomes and interest 
rates should be interpreted not as a failure of "economic fundamentals" 
to show up "correctly" in the regressions but rather as supporting a 
monetary view of exchange rate determination (which still precludes 
Nurkse's hypothesis of unstable exchange rates in the 1930's). In 
any case, the very fact that a number of the independent variables 
in equation (4.25) would also be included in a monetary model (albeit 
with different expected signs) would further support the use of the 
model developed here as a simple test of the Nurkse hypothesis (which 
is primarily what is intended).
A final area of interest in specifying the actual structure of 
the model is the length of lags. This has already been discussed 
in connection with relative prices above (Section I) and it is not 
proposed to engage in an extended discussion here. Clearly several 
variables should be unlagged: official intervention is obviously on
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a day to day (or even hour to hour) basis and therefore the inter­
vention dummies should not carry a lag.
In addition a short lag on most of the other variables seems 
appropriate both on theoretical grounds:
"It is generally accepted that in the short run dis­turbances in income levels, capital flows and seasonal factors have a significant effect on exchange rates". (15)
and empirical grounds: Hodgson (1971)» Hudgins (1973) and Ozmun (1976)
all experiment to some extent and all conclude that short (one month)
lags give the best results "in terms of producing the lowest error-
(16)variance in the fit". Hudgins also tried a Koyck lag but dis­
continued it because "the estimated coefficient of the lagged exchange 
rate implied either an unstable adjustment mechanism or one implying
an implausibly long lag in adjusting the exchange rate to the other 
(17)variables."
Relating specifically to prices, further reference can be made
to the experiments involving the fitting of Almon lags' to estimates
of the pound-dollar exchange rate in the 1930's (undertaken in the
present study). The drawbacks and limitations of this approach are 
(19 )well known but, in the present context, a more important point 
is that the results of the Almon lag experiments suggested that a 
short lag on prices was more appropriate anyway. Furthermore, intro­
ducing additional lagged price terms did not significantly improve 
the performance of the model (in terms of increasing the value of 
the coefficient of determination). Finally, whether a detailed 
specification of the lag structure is necessary (especially in view 
of the evidence indicating the primary importance of short run effects) 
in order to test the relatively simple hypothesis presented here -
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basically whether or not exchange rates were determined, to any 
significant extent, by "economic fundamentals" - is dubious. Con­
sequently, it was decided to use a one period (month) lag for the 
price and income variables and current values of all the other 
variables.
Having described the model and decided on the form of estimation 
and lag structure, something needs to be said about the expected signs 
of the independent variables. In fact, this will vary according to 
whether or not the exchange rate is expressed in foreign currency 
per unit of domestic currency or vice versa. In other cases it will 
depend on how the variable is constructed: for example, whether the 
pound-dollar official intervention dummy is positive (negative) or 
negative (positive) when the pound (dollar) is being supported will 
determine its expected sign. Therefore, the expected signs of par­
ticular variables will be made clear where the empirical results are 
presented. The only general point that can be made at this stage is 
that the relative price and relative income variables will always be 
constructed so as to have expected negative signs.
Finally, it should be observed that as far as estimation of 
this model is concerned, there is one equation too many in the sense 
that if, in a three currency model, two exchange rates are estimated 
then the third, has also been implicitly estimated (via cross-rates); 
the third set of estimates is therefore redundant. There are still, 
however, a number of good reasons for estimating the third leg of 
an exchange rate triangle. In the first place it would seem better 
to directly test whether the model "works" for any given exchange 
rate rather than rely on an indirect test using cross-rates. In 
addition, such a test allows direct observation of the signs and size
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of coefficients of the independent variables which determine the 
third exchange rate; this is extremely useful as it avoids having 
to attempt to work out these coefficients from the regressions of 
the other two. It may be argued that "correct" signs of variables 
in these other two regressions implies "correct" signs for the third 
exchange rate but, not only may ambiguities arise when only some of 
the variables were correctly signed but also, in some cases - par­
ticularly exchange fund dummies and speculative dummies - the actual 
size of the coefficient is important. It would seem, therefore, that 
if the hypotheses developed here are to be tested thoroughly then it 
is desirable to estimate all exchange rates directly.
Another factor that would reinforce this conclusion even more, 
is the possibility of disorderly cross-rates, which would imply that 
the coefficients of the independent variables and the predicted 
exchange rate derived indirectly through a cross-rate (based on re­
gressions of the other two exchange rates) would be different to those 
derived from a direct regression of the third exchange rate (since 
the dependent variables - the implied cross-rate and the direct rate - 
would be dif ferent). This would create problems of interpretation
because, although the predicted cross-rate can be adjusted by examining 
the difference between the actual direct and actual cross-rates, it is 
difficult to envisage how a similar adjustment could be applied to the 
size and signs of coefficients. This would not matter if the sole 
intention were to test the hypothesis that the model presented here 
largely explained exchange rate movements in the 1930's but it is 
not; hypotheses concerning individual variables are to be examined 
and reliance on estimates via cross-rates would create problems. It 
might, however, be useful to compare predicted cross-rates with predicted
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direct rates, at least for the major (pound-dollar-franc) exchange 
triangle. These should, especially after adjustment for differences 
between actual direct and actual cross-rates, be fairly similar and, 
if they are not, then this would suggest some inconsistency that 
required explanation.
(Ill)
The provision of empirical counterparts for the variables in 
the model involves a variety of difficulties. Most obviously, there 
are problems involved in the choice of the price indices to be used 
as a measure of PPP which have already been discussed in Chapter 2.
A further constraint may now be added in the context of the 1930's 
relating to the actual availability of data. The theoretical possi­
bilities are very much narrowed down because of this: clearly GNP 
deflators are excluded because they do not even exist on an annual 
basis for the 1930's in many cases and this also applies to cost 
indices. The most readily available type of price indices are of 
wholesale prices although they are arguably the least suitable. How­
ever, availability has made wholesale price indices the most popular 
(21 )choice and for that reason alone, it seems prudent to estimate a 
version of the model using wholesale prices, if only for comparability 
with other studies. Fortunately, cost-of-living indices are available 
for all the countries to which the model is to be applied although 
these are possibly less reliable.  ^ It has also been possible to 
find wage indices for the U.S.A. and U.K. and so a relative wage version 
of the model can be estimated for the pound-dollar exchange rate. To 
summarize, two versions of the model will be estimated, one using 
wholesale price indices, one using cost-of-living indices and for
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the pound-dollar equation (only) a third version using relative 
wages will be tried.
There are further problems involved in obtaining a variable 
for real income since there is no data as such for most countries 
or, if it does exist, it is not available on a monthly basis. Lack 
of actual data does, in fact, solve one problem, in that the decision 
as to which price index has to be used to deflate the income data 
(since the required variable is real income) is avoided. However, it 
creates another since a proxy has to be used and there are several 
available.
The three major potential proxies are employment, unemployment 
(23)and production indices which are all directly abservable, but an 
alternative (indirect) approach is to use monetary data, and this is 
explored first. It was done for New Zealand in the 1870-1918 period 
by Hawke (1975) and the method is quite simple: obtain money supply 
data, invoke Fisher's equation (MV = PT), adjust the money supply data 
for changes in V and what is left is an approximation for national 
income. However, in the present context, there are two problems: 
firstly, potential multicollinearity between the money supply and 
other variables, which has already been discussed above, and secondly, 
obtaining reliable (or, in some cases, any) estimates of V. Consequently, 
in the light of these difficulties, the limited number of countries to 
which the method could be applied and the availability of alternative 
proxies, this approach was not pursued.
This reduces the number of available proxies but a choice still
has to be made and there are at least four ways of approaching this:
( 2*0the most simple is to use the same proxies as earlier studies;
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however, this is rather evasive and may simply involve repeating 
earlier mistakes. Three other avenues would seem rather more satis­
factory: firstly, examine the annual national income data that is 
available and compare it to the annual values of the proxies to see 
which of them most closely approximates it; secondly compare the 
available proxies to see if they differ very much because it they 
do not then the choice is not an important one; finally, all the 
proxies could be tried and the data could "decide" in the sense that 
the proxy that gave the "best" results could be used.
All three avenues were explored to some extent. An index of
(25)Feinstein's annual estimates of British GNP were compared to the 
annual values of the British income proxies. Although this is poten­
tially misleading in that correlation on an annual basis does not 
necessarily imply correlation on a monthly basis, it was clear that 
the British employment based proxy most closely approximated Feinstein's 
GNP estimates, although all three indices had the same trend (upward) 
throughout the 1930's, and so the unemployment based proxy cannot be 
entirely dismissed. Indeed, a comparison of all the available indices 
for each country in the study (except Switzerland where only unemploy­
ment data was available on a monthly basis) showed that, broadly 
speaking, in all cases the indices exhibited the same trend and the 
main difference was that the employment and (especially) production 
based proxies tended to exhibit wider movements.
The "empirical" approach of experimenting with different proxies 
was adopted in some preliminary estimates of the pound-dollar exchange 
rate (with France proxying the rest of the world). In fact, there was 
little to choose between the performance of the different proxies 
(although this is not perhaps entirely surprising given the similarity
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of trends). However, in the American case the employment index 
gave slightly "better" results (in terms of higher t-statistics) 
whilst the production index was marginally the "best" proxy for 
French income. Ultimately, the problem can be avoided by trying all 
possible combinations but this is rather open-ended and would involve 
a large number of computations. To avoid this it was decided, on the 
basis of the above evidence, to choose the income proxy in the following 
order of precedence: employment indices, production indices and indices 
based on unemployment data. However, alternatives will be tried on 
occasion, especially when the chosen proxies are insignificant.
A third "economic fundamental" in the model - interest rate
differentials - involves a similar problem of choice to the income
proxies in that data for a number of interest rates are available.
The question is which of these is most important in determining inter-
(26)national capital flows. The choice would be easier for the 1920's
since (according to Einzig) before 1931 most funds engaged in interest
(27)arbitrage were mainly invested in bills thereby making the discount 
rate differential an obvious choice. Unfortunately, after 1931» the 
discount rate differential declined in importance in this respect 
and a number of interest rates became influential in the 1930's. In 
fact, there were several "interest parities" relating to different 
types of interest rate and it would be desirable to take some sort 
of weighted average. The whole issue is further complicated by the 
existence (in some countries) of negotiable interest rates and by the 
fact that the interest rate differential has to reach a certain size -
(28)half a per cent according to Keynes - before arbitrage becomes 
profitable; hence strictly speaking, any differential less than +_ 
should be treated as zero. The difficulty in finding a representative
A
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interest rate may account for the poor results obtained by Hudgins 
(1973) and Qzmun (1976) in the only other comparable studies of the 
1930's.
An alternative reason for this, which is arguably of some 
importance, is that interest rate differentials may have had little 
influence on international capital movements, given the low interest 
rates of the 1930's and the political turbulence and uncertainty of 
the period. It seems likely that the major concern of holders of 
capital may have been safety. This is stressed by Drummond:
"In such an environment, there was naturally more interest 
in protecting capital - in prospects for exchange rates and 
freedom to use and transfer funds - than in relative interest 
rates". (29)
For this reason, the speculative dummy variables (discussed below), 
which (mainly) reflect possible sources of socio-political influence 
on the confidence of holders of capital, are more likely to show up 
in the estimates, since they seem more likely to have determined in­
ternational capital flows than interest rate differentials in the 
period. Returning to the choice of interest rates, which now begins 
to appear less important, the difficulties of producing a weighted 
average (and impossibility of providing any rationale for choosing 
the weights) suggested the continuation of the practice of earlier 
studies and monthly averages of the discount rates for three months' 
prime bills, which are readily available for all the countries in 
the study (except Canada), were used.
The modelling of official intervention in the foreign exchange 
market is difficult because such intervention had to be secret in 
order to be effective and so there is no data. However, various 
observers, who knew the market, were able to deduce when intervention
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was taking place and this was reported in some contemporary 
sources, though only in a subjective manner. Hie practice of 
Hudgins (1973) and Ozmun (1976) was therefore followed and dummy 
variables were constructed. This is clearly a highly subjective 
exercise and the construction of these variables is discussed, at 
length, in an appendix to this chapter along with the highly con­
troversial issue of competitive depreciation. Neverthless, one 
possibility that needs to be discussed at this stage is that such 
variables may be endogenous.
Essentially intervention depends on the deviation between 
the actual exchange rate and what the exchange funds think it ought
rpto be (R-). The endogeneity (or otherwise) of the intervention dummies
Ttherefore depends on what determines R : if the funds really did follow
their official aim of not preventing genuine trends and simply smoothed
T . . .out "undue fluctuations" then R depended on the variables that determined
the exchange rate which are obviously included in the model and so the
intervention dummies would be endogenous; however, if intervention
(and hence R ) were determined independently then it would be exogenous.
It has been claimed in many sources that the Eritish authorities
deliberately held down the pound at various times in the 1930's,
and the activities of other exchange funds also seem to suggest that
they did rather more than simply smooth out "undue fluctuations"
(3Din this period. Consequently, it does not seem unreasonable to
assume that official intervention can be treated as being exogenous ( 31A)
The performance of seasonal variables in the three previous 
studies of the 1930's has shed some doubt on their importance: Hudgins 
(1973) Ridpath (1975) and Ozmun (1976) all found that they did not show 
up very well. Hudgins argues that the absence of seasonal patterns
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would be expected "if arbitrage were working to exploit the profit- 
making opportunities that such patterns would offer", J although 
one might ask why this did not happen in the early 1920's since 
Hodgson (1971) (1972), like Hudgins dealing with the pound-dollar 
exchange rate, found that all his seasonal dummies were significant. 
Perhaps a more likely possibility is that the EEA (Exchange Equilisation 
Account) would smooth out seasonal (and therefore temporary) fluctua­
tions in the exchange rate (since this was its stated aim) although 
such activities would be likely to show up in the official interven­
tion dummies.
In fact, there are good reasons for expecting some kind of
seasonal effect: in the pound-dollar exchange rate, the tendency for
the pound to weaken in autumn due to a demand for dollars to finance
purchases of American wheat, cotton, tobacco and other primary products,
and then to stengthen in the spring once this is over, is well-known
and these "usual" seasonal variations are referred to periodically
in contemporary sources.^ 3 )  However, there is some evidence that
such effects were weak in the mid-nineteen thirties (193 -^36), due
to the decline of America as a wheat exporter and a build up of stocks
(34)of primary products in Europe during the depression, although there 
is conflicting evidence on this with, for example, the "Economist" 
suggesting why seasonal effects are less important and then using
(35)them as an explanation of movements of the pound in the same month.
On balance, it seems likely that there is sufficient evidence 
of seasonal effects to make the inclusion of appropriate variables 
necessary. Furthermore, thi6 does not just apply to the pound-dollar 
exchange rate 6ince the demand for dollars to buy American primary 
products in autumn came from Europe generally, not just Britain, and
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applied not only to American dollars but also Canadian dollars 
(given the importance of wheat in the Canadian economy). Finally, 
a totally different reason for expecting seasonal fluctuations in 
exchange rates relates to the importance of tourism for some countries 
this would affect some currencies (such as the Swiss franc) more than 
others.
It remains to be decided exactly how seasonal effects are to 
be incorporated into the model. The conventional method is to use 
dummy variables and this should involve, in a monthly model, eleven 
such variables. For some reason (possibly to increase degrees of 
freedom) Hudgins (1973) Ridpath (1975) and Ozmun (1976) use quarterly 
dummies to test for seasonal effects, even though they are testing 
monthly models. This may account for the insignificance of their 
variables - if one month is significant but the other two are not, 
then the variable as a whole may not show up. Moreover how does 
one choose which three months constitute a quarter?
Nevertheless, the practice of using eleven dummy variables 
would waste degrees of freedom and, partly for this reason, a rather 
unconventional method of measuring potential seasonal influences is 
used here involving sine and cosine waves. This is based on the 
assumption that seasonal patterns were fairly regular and, in the 
first instance, values of six sine and six cosine waves were derived 
each with a different frequency. Thus, one sine wave peaks (and 
troughs) once in twelve months (A1), another twice (A2) and so on 
up to six times (A6) and the same for cosine waves (B1...6). On 
the basis of the expectation that the lower frequencies are most 
likely to be significant (since one would not expect seasonal patterns 
to peak more than two or three times per year) and a few preliminary
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estimates which seemed to bear this out, it wa6 decided, mindful
(36 )of degrees of freedom, to only include A1, 2, 3 and B1, 2, 3»
The rest of the world variables to be included will be based
on a proxy country which involves a further choice. The need for
including such variables seems fairly obvious; the importance of
"foreign exchange triangles" (such as the pound-franc-dollar rela-
(37)tionship) is stressed by Brown (I9*t0). The construction of weighted 
averages of all the "world" variables would involve an extensive 
exercise in itself and the reliability of the ensuing variables would 
be constrained by the availability (and reliability) of data especially 
for some of the more obscure countries. Such an exercise was there­
for eschewed (although a limited version of the world "price" variable 
will be constructed for a related but different purpose in chapter 
eleven).
In fact the choice of proxy country is not difficult. The 
major "foreign exchange triangle" was obviously the pound-franc-dollar 
triangle and so the proxy for the ROW for the pound-dollar, pound-franc 
and franc-dollar exchange rates must obviously be France, America and 
Britain respectively. Another triangle is formed by the Canadian 
dollar, DS dollar and pound; therefore for the Canadian dollar-pound 
and the Canadian-US dollar exchange rates, America and Britain will 
proxy the ROW. The choice for the minor gold bloc countries (Belgium, 
Holland and Switzerland) is less easy since there are two suitable 
proxies for each exchange rate against a major currency: for example, 
for the belga-pound exchange rate either France or America would seem 
possible. In fact, it is likely that the path of the belga (guilder, 
and Swiss franc) against each of the major currencies, was largely 
governed by the pound-dollar-franc triangle (and therefore the
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movement of the underlying determinants of the exchange rates 
within this triangle), and so it may be appropriate to include both 
potential proxy countries.
It may seem that ROW variables (prices and incomes) should 
carry the same sign but in fact this is not the case because they 
influence the exchange rate in a number of different ways. For example, 
the effect of an increase in ROW prices on the pound-dollar exchange 
rate will be through three channels: US demand for pounds, UK demand 
for dollars and ROW demand for both pounds and dollars; or, put another 
way, Americans, Britons and consumers from the ROW will all switch 
from ROW goods to some combination of British and American goods. 
Changes in world income will have a less complex influence, presum­
ably affecting only ROW demand patterns, although the relative effect 
on demand for British compared to American goods would be similarly 
unclear. This variety of avenues through which ROW prices and incomes 
affect a given exchange rate should, by itself, be sufficient to 
ensure that signs of the two variables may not be the same. However, 
once full allowance is made for differences in price and income elas­
ticities, differences in tastes and the possible existence of money 
illusion, it becomes obvious that nothing whatsoever can be said 
about the expected signs of ROW variables and there is certainly no 
reason to believe that the signs of different ROW variables should 
be related in any particular way.
A final ("economic fundamental") variable included in the model 
is a linear trend. This is something of a residual variable in that 
it seeks to capture omitted influences. The usual rationale for its 
inclusion is that it reflects changes in tastes. However, it may 
indicate the presence of at least two other influences: firstly,
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different rates of productivity growth and secondly, increasing 
fears of war in Europe (and consequent capital flight). A problem 
may arise with the trend variable in that it may be correlated with 
other variables. Fortunately, this is minimized by the use of 
variables in ratio form and by the existence of the 1937-38 
recession (and the general uneveness of recovery) which means that 
the price and income levels of the third countries proxying the ROW 
did not exhibit a steady trend.
An important influence on trade flows in the 1930's (and hence 
on demand for and supply of currencies and consequently on exchange 
rates), which is excluded from the model, was the high degree of 
protection practiced by many countries. This varied from country 
to country with some (such as Belgium) less inclined to pursue it 
than others. The likelihood that tariffs will undermine the PPP 
relationship is well documented and even conceded by the proponents 
of the PPP hypothesis (including Cassel); indeed, it has already been 
discussed in chapter two. If the level of protection had remained 
approximately the same throughout the 1930's as in the base year, 
then this would be less of a problem but this i6 not the case.
At the empirical level it might be possible to proxy the level 
of protection with the amount of customs revenue collected. Un­
fortunately, this method suffers from two major drawbacks: most 
obviously, the lack of adequate data for some countries and, most 
importantly, the conceptual criticism that this is only a partial 
measure of protection, since it does not allow for quotas or exchange 
controls. In the case of one country (Canada) there are fairly clear 
turning points in its commercial policy and this enables the construc­
tion of (rather crude) dummy variables to approximate the effects of
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protection on Canadian exchange rates. In all other cases, however, 
no variable to allow for protection is included.
Therefore one is forced to make two implicit assumptions 
which are, in the case of the pound-dollar exchange rate for example, 
as follows: firstly, net bi-lateral trade controls between the two 
countries in question (Britain and America) cancelled each other 
out; secondly, trade controls in the rest of the world, though having 
a large effect absolutely, had a negligible or equal effect on the 
markets for pounds and dollars (which implies that protection in 
third countries affected imports from Britain and America roughly 
equally). Whilst the former assumption is possibly not unreasonable, 
given that much protection was retaliatory and the removal of tariffs
(•zg)was largely based on bi-lateral agreements, the latter is question­
able for the same reasons (especially since the ROW is actually rep­
resented by an individual country).
(IV)
The final problem that remains to be dealt with is how to 
model speculation or, put another way, how to quantify the variable 
•S' in the capital account section of the structural equations. Since 
stabilising speculation will tend to be picked up (to some extent) by 
the other variables, in that adjustment to changes in prices, incomes 
and other variables would be made more rapid by such speculation, this 
is mainly an exercise for testing for destabilising speculation. The 
quantification difficulties are discussed below but initially there 
is a problem of definition. Thomas has provided three definitions:
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"Destabilising speculation.../Is7...a situation in which 
speculators. .»/Ï7... cause the exchange rate to diverge from some equilibrium rate over time.../or (2_J7... in fluence 
the behaviour of the equilibrium exchange rate.../or (3_)7.•• 
cause the amplitude of exchange rate movements to exceed that which would exist in the absence of speculation". (39)
An identical trio are given by Aliber:
"...one is that speculators cause the range of movements in 
the spot rate to be larger but without any impact on the 
equilibrium rate; the second is that speculators cause the 
actual rate to diverge from the equilibrium rate; and the third is that speculators influence the path of the equilibrium 
rate". (^ 0)
Aliber's first and second (Thomas' third and first) definitions 
are usually the definitions used in empirical tests. In fact, in periods 
of floating exchange rates when the actual rate was free to change with 
the equilibrium rate these two definitions would seem to amount to the 
same thing: an excessive exchange rate movement is, presumably,one 
which causes the floating exchange rate to diverge from its equil­
ibrium path. Aliber's third (Thomas' second) definition takes account 
of the possibility that speculation-induced exchange rate movements 
may influence internal price levels (for example) and therefore the 
behaviour of the exchange rate; this approach is not explored here 
as it would require a much more extensive model.
A wide variety of methods of testing for destabilising speculation 
have been employed, all of which have drawbacks of one kind or another. 
The basic problem 6tems from the fact that data on 6hort term capital 
flows is simply not available for many earlier periods or if it is, 
it is not especially reliable as it is often based on an estimate 
derived from residuals. Given this lack of data there are two 
possibilities: the most obvious i6 to devise a proxy of 6ome kind, 
the less obvious (if disarmingly simple), is to ignore it, look at
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deviations from the predicted exchange rate (on the basis of the 
variables chosen to determine the equilibrium rate) and attribute 
these to speculation.
The latter method has been explored by Stolper (l9*+8), Tsiang 
(1959) and Hudgins (1973)» It has the advantage of avoiding any criticism 
of the choice of variable to proxy destabilising speculation because 
no variable is used. Its major drawback is that it implicitly assumes 
that there are no omitted variables and that all the deviations are 
due to speculation. This may be a particularly dangerous inference 
to make in the present context as trade controls (with one exception) 
are not modelled and therefore must also be a prime candidate for the 
omitted variables which account for unexplained exchange rate move­
ments. It also requires subjective judgement on how large deviations 
have to be in order to be considered. Studies which look at the 
difference between actual and PPP exchange rates are particularly 
prone to the accusation that the residuals are not necessarily due 
to destabilising speculation. The Tsiang (1959) and Stolper (19^ 8) 
studies come into this category (although the latter does consider 
other possible reasons for the residuals). Hudgins' (1973) study is 
more acceptable in that he includes more variables to determine the 
equilibrium exchange rate but the problem remains.
Another approach that does not involve including specific 
variables for speculative activities might also be discussed at this 
point. This involves using a log-linear form and looking at the 
elasticity of exchange rates with respect to prices and, on the 
assumption that PPP implies that this should be equal to unity, if 
it is greater than unity then this implies "overshooting" due to de­
stabilising speculation. This is the first approach of Thomas (1973b)
-  1 1 1 * _
but the poBBibility of using it here is excluded by the existence 
of variables with negative values which precludes the adoption of a 
log-linear form.
Attempts to proxy speculation are usually based on forward
market data or some attempt to model speculators' expectations or
resort to dummy variables. Aliber's (1962) (1970) approach is to use
forward market data adjusted for changes in the money market interest
(4 1 )rate differential; this assumes that the forward market is dom­
inated by speculators. If the forward rate is at a discount then 
speculators are judged to be bearish, if at a premium then they are 
bullish. If the adjusted forward discount (premium) is increasing 
as the spot currency is depreciating (appreciating) then this provides 
evidence of destabilising speculation. A related method is that of 
Stein (1965) who regressed the forward premium on the uncovered 
interest rate differential and then used the residuals as his 
"speculative variable". This is basically a more sophisticated 
version of Aliber's variable and, in the present context, seems un­
necessarily complex.
Another method of deriving a speculative variable is to base 
it on some hypothesis about the behaviour of speculators. Assuming 
that speculators base their behaviour on trends in the exchange rate, 
recent changes in the exchange rate could be used in this context: if 
speculators were operating in a stabilising manner they would view 
any change in the exchange rate as temporary, expect it to return to 
its previous level and react accordingly; if speculation were de­
stabilising then presumably any change in the exchange rate would be 
amplified by their behaviour. This is the approach adopted by Mellish 
and Hawkins (1968) in their study of the 1950's Canadian float. A
similar, though more complex, approach is adopted by Arndt (1968), 
who assumes that speculative capital flows are a function of the 
difference between the actual exchange rate and the "expected 
normal rate" where the latter is determined by the deviation of the 
actual current rate from the previous "normal rate". A variation on 
this is the second method used by Thomas (1973b) who bases speculators' 
behaviour not on divergences between actual and expected rates but 
between actual and expected price levels (where prices determine 
exchange rates).
The problem with either ignoring speculation and looking at res­
iduals or introducing a proxy for speculation of the kind discussed 
above is that such methods involve "blanket" measures which could 
potentially take in much more than just speculation. For this reason, 
the method of Hodgson (1971) (1972) and Ozmun (1976) is, to some extent, 
preferable. This involves attempting to identify events which are non- 
quantifiable (or "non-economic" in the sense of not due to "economic 
fundamentals") but may have influenced exchange rates, and then using 
dummy variables to test for the presence of speculation (in the form 
of short term capital flows) which may have occurred because of these 
events. To the extent that such capital flows are "non-economic funda­
mental" they are destabilising, and significance of these dummy variables 
can be taken as evidence of destabilising speculation. The main dis­
advantage of this approach is its subjectivity, both in deciding 
which events merit the inclusion of dummy variables and in assigning 
values to these dummies to reflect the intensity of influence of a 
particular event (which may change during the period it is effective).
On the other hand, this method is not a "blanket" measure but, instead, 
provides a test for the effect of specific events on the exchange rate,
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if a somewhat unsatisfactory one.
The various methods of incorporating speculative factors 
into the model, reviewed above, all have drawbacks of one kind or 
another and consequently, it seems desirable to try several approaches. 
Two broad types of approach have been identified: methods engaging 
in a "blanket" measurement and those (in fact only one) seeking 
to test for the effect of specific potential influences. It seems 
reasonable to adopt one approach of each type. Of the latter type, 
the dummy variable approach is the only candidate and will therefore 
be used. In fact, this is really the favoured approach as relating 
speculation to potential causes identified a priori is intuitively 
appealing and seems more intellectually honest. In addition, it 
encompasses the possibility that speculation may have been destabilising 
some but not all of the time (which a "blanket" measure can not). The 
ready availability of forward data (at least for the pound) would 
suggest that the "blanket" measure should make use of this and the 
simpler approach of Aliber (1962) (1970) is preferred to that of 
Stein (1965)«
An additional reason for preferring the dummy variable to the 
"blanket" measure approach is that the "overshooting", implied by 
the significance of the latter, only indicates that speculation was 
destabilising insofar as speculators' expectations are incorrect (and, 
of course, to the extent that such variables measure only speculation.) 
This possibility is recognised by Aliber himself who describes this 
view as follows:
"...it is maintained that speculation should be considered stabilising in some cases in the inter-war years because speculators were only anticipating the weakness of the currencies resulting from non-speculative factors". (k2)
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This point is also taken up by Pippenger:
"When inflationary conditions are changing rapidly, any 
tendency for the foreign exchange market to respond more 
quickly than the capital market to inflationary pressure 
will...generate an adjusted discount". (*0)
Such speculation may be seen in terms of speculators simply being 
correct in their expectations and causing the exchange rate to adjust 
more quickly and possibly more often.
This problem does not apply to dummy variables to the extent 
that they are constructed on the basis of potential influences which 
should not rationally have caused any change in the exchange rate. 
However, if, as was sometimes the case, speculators were quite right 
to believe that a bout of political instability, for example, could 
lead to a change in the exchange rate, then significance of a dummy 
variable which reflects the consequent capital outflow is not really 
indicative of destabilising speculation either. In fact, in the 1930's, 
it may have been very often the case that speculators were correct and 
so significance of any of the speculative variables included here 
cannot properly be interpreted as evidence that the foreign exchanges 
were bedevilled by destabilising speculation but only as evidence that 
speculation occurred. Nevertheless, to the extent that they can be 
constructed to reflect "irrational" influences on speculators' expec­
tations, dummy variables will provide the best test for destabilising 
speculation.
However, in view of these ambiguities it may be instructive to 
be more precise about the exact nature of the dummy variables used here, 
lhey have been referred to as "non-economic" in the above discussion 
which is, to a large extent, a misnomer in that the influences being
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picked up are in some senses "economic". Most commonly, a "non­
economic" dummy represents the economic actions stemming from expec­
tations of the economic consequences of a political (and in that 
sense "non-economic") event, such as fears of inflation due to the 
election of a new government, or occasionally even an economic event, 
such as deliberate reflation by the government. Thus, more properly 
speaking, these dummies are not really "non-economic", or even 
"speculative", but they are rather "non-economic fundamental" and 
represent the economic consequences of people's expectations about 
the (economic) implications for exchange rates of various incidents, 
events and attitudes, economic or otherwise; clearly, such expectations 
need not necessarily be fulfilled for the actions of those who hold 
them to influence the exchange rate (and consequently for the dummy 
variables to be significant).
Nevertheless these dummies do reflect destabilising speculation 
to the extent that such expectations are "incorrect" or, perhaps better, 
imply a different level of the exchange rate to that believed to be 
the "correct" level by the government. Given that in many cases one 
or both of these situations (particularly the latter in the case of 
the gold bloc) is applicable, then the dummy variables used here 
will be picking up destabilising speculation and will, therefore, 
be called "speculative" dummies. At the same time though, it should 
be remembered that when "speculators" were "correct" or, more generally, 
when neither of these two conditions applies, and this is probably the 
case for at least some of the dummies, then the significance of a 
speculative dummy is not necessarily indicative of the presence of 
destabilising speculation.
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Consequently, each case has to be examined individually and, 
in general, significance of the "speculative dummies" only implies, 
in the first instance, that exchange rates were being determined by 
influences other than "economic fundamentals". Therefore, to treat 
significance of these variables as indicative of destabilising 
speculation (and therefore supportive of the Nurkse hypothesis of 
unstable exchange rates in the 1930's) implies a rather severe test 
of the hypothesis (of stable exchange rates in the 1930's) being put 
forward in the present study.
Finally, in spite of the explicit inclusion of speculative 
variables, this does not preclude the implicit use of another method, 
discussed above, which is to examine the residuals: any deviations 
from the exchange rate predicted by the model could be due to spec­
ulation, although (as has been pointed out) it is dangerous to pursue 
this too far, as they could be caused by other omitted variables 
(such as the influence of trade controls). This completes the 
examination of the model and the derivation of empirical counter­
parts for the independent variables.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER k 
OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE INTERVENTION
An important secondary aspect of the study relates to the 
role of official intervention in the foreign exchange markets in the 
1930's. An attempt to model this is both necessary, as it was (according 
to many sources) a potentially (and sometimes actually) important 
influence on exchange rate movements in this period, and desirable 
because the 1930's mark the establishment of the major official in­
tervention funds and their activities in these early years represent 
a source of some controversy. The first intervention fund was the 
British Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA) which began operations 
in 1932 and was soon followed by the establishment of American (193*0 
and Continental (1936) equivalents although intervention was under­
taken by the Central Banks of ail these countries in the period pre­
ceding the setting up of intervention funds, if on a more limited 
scale, and the intervention dummies constructed below do reflect 
such intervention (to the extent that evidence of its existence could 
be found).
It is not necessary here to engage in a detailed discussion of
the mechanics and activities of these exchange funds (although these
are briefly described further on): a good account of the British EEA
is to be found in Howson (1980) and the American and French funds are
described and compared to their British counterpart in Hudgins (1973)
and Ozmun (1976) respectively. There were important differences
between the three particularly in relation to sterilizing the effects
j . (1)of their dealings in foreign exchange on domestic credit conditions 
and to some extent in their objectives also: the EEA (ostensibly at
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least) had the objective of "checking undue fluctuations in the
(2)exchange rate" whilst the US fund sought "to stabilise the dollar 
and to maintain its value as a currency"^ ^ which seems to have 
meant maintaining the official dollar price of gold at ¿35 (per fine oz.) 
and the French fund initially aimed to hold the franc within the new 
legal limits following the devaluation in September, 1936 although 
this was modified at the end of June, 1937 b o  that French inter­
vention became discretionary with a similar objective to that of the 
EEA.
The most controversial aspect of exchange intervention in the 
1930's relates to the question of competitive depreciation or more 
exactly the contention that the EEA deliberately prevented the pound 
from appreciating in order to improve Britain's trading position. This 
was a widely held view at the time particularly in America where, for 
example, one contemporary observer referred to "the persistent and 
successful efforts....to depress sterling relative to other currencies 
which were characteristic of the operation of the Exchange Equilisation
(4)Account in its first year..." On the British side this was denied 
periodically, for example in the "Economist", which on one occasion 
provided some detail to "help to dispel the prevailing American belief 
that the British Exchange Equalisation Account was used to depress the 
pound against the dollar".On the basis of empirical testing of 
their models Hudgins (1973* pp. 220-1) and Ctemun (1976, pp. 29-31,
157* 161) come to a similar conclusion.
In fact the contention that exchange funds did not engage in 
competitive depreciation is probably too naive and the truth of the 
matter seems to have been rather more complex particularly in the 
case of the allegedly worst culprit, the EEA. Basically, internal
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British recovery (and consequently the cheap money policy) was given
precedence and there was to be no attempt to fix the exchange rate
of the pound - in fact throughout 1935 the Treasury deliberately
eschewed stabilisation largely for this reason though the desire
to avoid giving speculators a potential one way option was also given
some weight; indeed Britain was the least enthusiastic participant
in the 1936 Tripartite Agreement. Nevertheless, this policy cannot
really be construed as deliberate competitive depreciation especially
(7)as "to avoid antagonising Roosevelt" was one of its aims. Con­
sequently, whilst the policy may have involved what were, on the face 
of it, deliberate attempts to hold the pound down - in the mid-1930's 
the EEA often intervened heavily whenever the pound threatened to rise 
and in fact total reserves (not surprisingly) therefore doubled between 
December 1933 and December 1936 - it is better interpreted not as 
deliberate competitive depreciation but as giving priority to in­
ternal recovery and managing the exchange rate in such a way as to 
facilitate this or, perhaps better, it is "incidental" competitive 
depreciation.
Fortunately, for the purposes of this study, whether the funds 
were working against each other or not does not really matter except 
insofar as it makes it difficult to decide the sign to be given to 
the dummy variable when competitive intervention was taking place. 
However, even this is not a major problem as evidence of such 
occurences is virtually non-existent; indeed a much more frequent 
event is the existence of months in which a given fund operated in 
different directions on different occasions. This apparent lack of 
competitive intervention does not, nevertheless, really prove very 
much in the context of the debate on its existence and importance
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since during the period in which such activity was allegedly taking 
place (the early 1930's) only the British fund was active. However, 
as far as constructing a dummy variable is concerned there was no 
conflict between exchange funds in this period (as only the British 
were active) and so whether a fund was operating in a "competitive" 
sense or not is irrelevant; what is relevant is its effectiveness 
in influencing the course of the exchange rate.
The methods used for official intervention mainly consisted of 
buying and selling domestic currency, gold and foreign currency in 
the spot market. Recourse to the forward market was fairly rare, 
at least in the British case, due to the views of Governor Norman 
who "was almost obsessed by the fact that purely speculative transac­
tions are facilitated by the existence of forward markets. Accordingly 
the Bank was still in the middle 1930's avoiding any regular inter-
(g \vention in forward markets..." although on two occasions in the 
second half of the 1930's the EEA did engage heavily in forward 
transactions (in late 1936 and again late 1938) and kept a small 
amount of forward cover in francs in the 193^36 period to offset 
any potential exchange loss that would accompany a devaluation of 
the franc. In addition other avenues of official influence on exchange 
rates - government borrowing, controls on capital movements, interest 
rate policy, budgetary policy and so on - were either ignored, used 
for other purposes or ineffective in the British case, although used 
to a greater degree in other countries. Thus it seems that concentrating 
solely on intervention in the spot market (which is what is done here) 
will lead to the construction of variables representing official inter­
vention which are complete in principle, if potentially (as will be 
suggested below) incomplete in practice.
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The actual construction of dummy variables to represent 
exchange fund activity is difficult and some discussion of the 
problems involved is necessary both to show how they were overcome 
and, to the extent that they were not, to illustrate the consequent 
limitations of the variables constructed. Contemporary sources of 
data do not exist due to the secrecy of official operations in the 
foreign exchange market and the data based on official sources that 
has become available recently, provided most extensively by Howson 
(1980), is incomplete for the last two years covered in this study 
(1937-38) and in any case only refers to the activities of the British 
fund. Therefore, the only remaining method of including official 
intervention would seem to be to follow the approaches of Hudgins (1973) 
and Ozmun (1976) and to construct dummy variables based on observations 
of exchange fund activity found in any available sources; such an 
approach becomes justified due to lack of alternatives.
Since the completion of these two studies two further sources
of relevant information - Sayers (1976) and Howson (1980) - have been
published and consequently the dummy variables constructed here are
based on more information and are therefore potentially more reliable.
The main sources were the "Economist", "Lloyds Bank Review", Howson
(1980) and Sayers (1976); limited reference was also made to the
"Statist" and indirectly (through reference to Hudgins' dummy variable
which was partially based on this) the "Commercial and Financial 
(9)Chronicle". The major intervention dummies relate to the pound-
dollar, pound-franc and franc-dollar exchange rates though they were 
also constructed for the exchange rates involving "minor" currencies.
There are a number of problems involved in using this rather 
subjective method of incorporating exchange fund activity into the
model, most obviously that created by incomplete "data": it cannot 
be certain that all activity of the exchange funds is reported in 
the sources used. In the case of the EEA it is not unreasonable 
to assume that the information is fairly complete as Sayers and 
Howson have had access to official sources but the data on American, 
French and particularly Belgian, Dutch, Swiss and Canadian intervention 
is almost certainly deficient. The more reliance that has to be placed 
on contemporary sources such as the "Economist" and "Lloyds Bank Review" 
the more likely is something to be missed. Since evidence of "minor" 
currency intervention is almost totally dependent on such sources 
then the results produced provide only a limited test of the effect 
of official intervention on the exchange rates of these currencies 
(or, put another way, only provide a test of the importance of some 
of the intervention that actually took place) although to the extent 
that intervention by Canada and the smaller gold bloc countries may 
have been fairly limited, particularly before September 1936, this is 
perhaps not too important a problem.
Another problem relates to the qualitative nature of the in­
formation that actually is available. The problems can be broken 
down into two types: those relating to the period and those relating 
to the strength of intervention. In the first case how should inter­
vention that occurs "for a while" be interpreted - is a "while" a 
week or a month or even longer? In the second case words such as 
"heavy", "extensively", "intermittently", "slight" and so on have to 
be given a quantitative meaning. A related problem occurs when inter­
vention took place in both directions in the same month; a cancelling 
out cannot necessarily be assumed if intervention was "heavy" in one 
direction and "slight" in the other. A further aspect of this concerns
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intervention in the same direction in two months when it was 
"heavy" in one but "slight" in the other - does the observation 
for the former month carry a higher value (which was the method 
employed .by Hudgins and Ozmun)? To a certain extent such problems 
are more apparent than real since once the essentially subjective 
nature of these variables is accepted then a certain amount of dis­
cretion and good judgement can effectively minimize most of these 
difficulties. However, they inevitably remain and make the tests 
for the effect of exchange intervention only partial although in the 
wider context of the whole model this is less important since official 
intervention is only one variable among many (although an important 
subset of conclusions will relate to the effectiveness of this activity).
There is also the question of the ,rblack and whiteness" of exchange 
rate intervention in that the rationale underlying the construction of 
these dummy variables implies that the authorities were simply either 
supporting or depressing an exchange rate at any particular time. 
Unfortunately, it was not always quite as simple as this and exchange 
intervention was sometimes rather "grey" when,on occasion,the EEA 
adopted a policy of holding the pound at a certain rate, then letting 
it go when pressure built up to an uncomfortable degree, pegging at 
the new lower or higher rate for a period, then letting it go again 
and so on. The EEA did this in July, August and October 1932, July- 
October 1933, August 193*+ and again in June-September 1938^”*°^  and 
also the French did something rather similar in the August 1937-May 
1938 period when the franc engaged in what might be termed a "controlled" 
depreciation (which basically involved not letting the franc run away 
with itself but letting it run nevertheless). This is intervention 
in the "pure" sense of "smoothing out" a trend in the exchange rate
induced by market forces but in the present context might it not 
appear that official intervention was unsuccessful since attempts 
to hold the exchange rate were not working? The intervention dummy 
would presumably then be insignificant or even "wrongly" signed.
This problem is partly an unavoidable consequence of using 
time series analysis and arbitrarily cutting off each observation 
at the end of the month when official intervention might have been 
holding the exchange rate (and therefore "working") for a period 
of less than a month but then the exchange rate might have been let go 
in (for example) the last week. Of course, discretion and good judge­
ment can help here and specific examples of this behaviour can be 
allowed for, although perhaps they ought not to be since, to the 
extent that such activities held up a trend in the exchange rate 
induced by market forces, official intervention may still appear to 
be significant; holding a peg until pressure builds up is more powerful 
them, and not quite the same as, smoothing out a trend.
In fact, there is a fundamental problem in constructing these 
dummy variables in that perhaps there ought to be a distinction 
between two types of intervention: firstly, day to day (or week to 
week) smoothing which is very often the type of intervention reported 
in the "Economist"; and secondly, more major operations which may have 
involved bucking a trend or at least slowing it down which is the type 
of intervention reported by Howson (1980) and Sayers (1976). The 
latter is more likely to show up in exchange rate movements whereas 
the former may very well not do so. Consequently, there may be a 
case for two variants of exchange intervention dummy, one including 
only major operations and the other all reported operations with the 
first variant more likely to be significant.
-  1 3 1  -
Finally, successful exchange intervention may make speculative 
dummies insignificant since the influences they represent may have 
been rendered ineffective by such intervention. Alternatively, 
in cases where no evidence of intervention has been found but it 
did occur or particularly strong intervention occurred but the 
intervention dummy does not differentiate between "weak" and "strong" 
intervention, then if such intervention was successful the speculative 
dummy may carry the "wrong" sign and in fact be picking up unreported 
(or very strong) official intervention. This is a multicollinearity 
problem. To a certain extent this may also apply to the seasonal 
dummies although it seems unlikely that intervention was strong enough 
to offset this altogether especially in the light of the laxge number 
of contemporary references to seasonal influences.
With the difference between smoothing out and major operations 
very much in mind, two parallel versions of the three exchange fund 
activity dummies for the pound-dollar-franc triangle were constructed 
initially: the first of these was based on information contained in 
Howson (1980), Sayers (19?6) and Iloyds Bank Review and the second 
on the "Economist" (mainly, but not exclusively, on the foreign 
exchange column); not surprisingly the latter contained rather more 
months in which intervention was reported as occurring. A final stage 
involved examining the dummy variables constructed by Hudgins (1973) 
and Ozmun (1976) who engaged in a similar task although based cn less 
information. The Ozmun variable was based solely on the "Economist" 
and so its examination was merely an exercise in double checking but 
the Hudgins variable added some new information in that it was 
based not only on the "Economist" but also on the "Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle" (to which the present author did not have access)
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and so the second variant of the intervention dummy for the pound- 
dollar rate (based on the "Economist") was modified accordingly.
In fact reference to Hudgin's and Ozmun's variables was not
very helpful as they do not seem to be entirely reliable and each
of them contains apparent mistakes. This is less true of Hudgins'
although specific errors can be spotted; for example, in March 1933
the only relevant comment that could be found referred to Control
(11)offsetting a big demand for sterling by selling pounds which
implies a value of -1 in Hudginte dummy but in fact it carries a value
of +1 whilst in November 1938 a reference to official support for the
pound (in the "Economist") seems to have been missed. Furthermore,
Hudgins' "joint" intervention dummy is not constructed as he himself 
(12 )describes. A more fundamental criticism relates to the January
193*t to September 1936 period when Hudgins' dummy registers official
British intervention in the pound-dollar exchange for 19 of the 32
( 1 3 )months and yet the EEA was operating only in francs at this time.
The explanation of this would seem to be that Hudgins was assuming 
that,as the franc and dollar were both linked to gold,intervention 
in the pound-franc exchange would affect the pound-dollar exchange 
rate through arbitrage but then why does he not retain this assumption 
during other periods when the dollar and franc were both linked to 
gold (such as February 1937)? In any case, a preferable approach 
would seem to be to construct a separate pound-franc intervention 
dummy and to include that in the pound-dollar equation to test 
directly for significance of pound-franc intervention in the deter­
mination of the pound-dollar exchange rate (although this has the 
disadvantage of not separating out the periods in which such a 
relationship may have occurred - particularly 193^ -36 - from other
periods when it may not have, that is, those in which the dollar 
and franc were not both linked to gold).
As indicated above the Ozmun dummy variable for pound-franc 
intervention is based on no unavailable or unused source and so it 
was only examined to double-check. Unfortunately this proved con­
fusing as it contained many apparent errors. To give one example, 
in March 1933 the EEA bought frames (Ozmun, 1976, p. 33) and in March 
193** it sold francs (Ozmun, 1976, p. 3*0 so why, with no other 
activity reported in the "Economist" for these months, does Ozmun's 
EEA dummy carry the same sign (minus) in both these months? There 
are numerous other inconsistencies and ultimately it was decided to 
ignore Ozmun's dummy variable.
To summarize: two versions of the three main intervention dummies 
will be constructed, the first based on Sayers (1976), Howson (1980) 
and Lloyds Bank Review, the second based on the "Economist" with the 
pound-dollar variable modified slightly by reference to Hudgins (1973)* 
Two variables proper will then be used in the regressions: a "narrow" 
intervention dummy based on the first of the two versions and a "wide" 
intervention dummy based on both and therefore on all information that 
could be found. A further possible variation - involving the use of 
different values to represent different reported strengths of inter­
vention (as was done by Hudgins and Ozmun) - was rejected as being 
far too subjective. In the empirical tests the "wide" version will 
be preferred but in the cases where this performs badly the "narrow" 
version will be tried.
The exchange fund dummies for exchange rates involving the 
"minor" currencies contained few observations and were mainly derived
from information in the "Economist" although occasional reference 
to minor currency intervention was found elsewhere - for example, 
Lloyds Bank Review notes that the belga was being supported in May, 
1938. Finally variables reflecting the activities of individual 
exchange funds were not constructed but rather intervention in a 
particular exchange rate by all the relevant authorities formed the 
basis of the exchange intervention dummies; consequently, these are 
"joint" variables in that they measure, in the case of the pound- 
dollar rate for example, the combined activities of the EEA and the 
Américain Stabilisation Fund and therefore provide a test for the 
importance of official intervention in itself, rather than testing 
for the significance of the operations of individual countries' 
intervention funds. All the exchange intervention dummies are 
reproduced in Appendix I.
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX
1. See Ozmun (1976) pp. 26-7» Hudgins (1973) pp. 57-9» Economist 
26/12/36 p. 640 and 16/1/37 pp. 115-6.
2. Sayers (1976) p. 430.
3. Hudgins (1973) p. 52.
4. Comstock (1933) p. 620. For other expressions of this view, both contemporary and more recent, see n. 30 of Ch. 4.
5. Economist 3/3/34, p. 461. See also the Economist's "EEA 
Supplement" (5/5/34).
6. In fact, beating the speculators (and thereby discouraging destabilising speculation) was sometimes a major preoccupation 
of EEA policy. See Howson (1980) pp. 46-7 for examples of this.
7. Howson (1980) p. 22.
8. Sayers (1976) p. 470.
9. Two references in Clarke (1977) on p. 2 (Jan., Feb., March, 1933) and on p. 10 (June, 1936) were also noted; these backed up evidence 
in Lloyds Bank Review. Reference was also made to a series of 
contemporary articles by F.W. Paish in "Economica" (1935» 1936, 1937) but these were not very useful and, according to the Economist 
(16/12/35, P* 35), inaccurate anyway.
10. Howson (1980) p. 16, p. 22, p. 24 and Sayers (1976) p. 563 
respectively.
11. Economist 4/3/33* P* 446. This is supported by evidence contained 
in Lloyds Bank Review (April, 1933, P* 152) and Clarke (1977) P« 2.
12. According to Hudgins (1973, p. 232) this should carry a positive sign when the pound was being supported and the dollar depressed, and presumably a negative sign when the dollar was being supported 
and the pound depressed. In fact close examination of this variable(Hudgins, 1973» Table A21, p. 255) suggests that the opposite is true.
13. This does not mean to say that the American authorities did not occasionally intervene to influence the pound-dollar exchange 
rate in this period.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POUND-DOLLAR-FRANC TRIANGLE
( I )
The three most important currencies in the 1930's were the 
pound, the (US) dollar and the (French) franc. These were the curr­
encies most frequently used for trading purposes and also to which
(1 )other (minor) currencies tended to be pegged. It is therefore 
appropriate that the relationship between these three be examined 
first and, in fact, provide the main testing ground for the model.
Broadly speaking, the international monetary system in the first half 
of the 1930's can be described as comprising of five different groupings: 
the exchange control countries (to which the model developed here is 
obviously not applicable), the countries on a silver standard (such as 
Mexico and China which were peripheral and therefore of less interest) 
and the groups of countries attached to each of the three major currencies.
The most formally defined of these was the gold bloc which was 
officially formed in 1933 following the collapse of the London Conference 
when it became clear that an orderly return to fixed exchange rates was 
not to be forthcoming. Consequently, a number of countries (led by 
France) declared their intention to maintain their pre-1931 parities 
with gold and the gold bloc came into existence, Less formally defined, 
though considerably larger, was the sterling area, which included the 
Gnpire (except Canada) and some foreign countries (notably in Scandinavia) 
for whom Britain was the major trading partner. Finally, there was the 
dollar grouping which consisted of the dollar and a rather smaller 
number of satellite countries. Although this situation was modified
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somewhat following the Tripartite Agreement in 1936, the pound-dollar- 
franc triangle remained at the centre of the system.
The degree to which any of these currencies were freely floating 
is actually very limited: this was only true of the pound from September,
1931 to spring, 1932 (when the EEA was established), of the dollar 
from April, 1933 to January, 193^  (or more strictly October, 1933 if
the Roosevelt Administration's gold buying policy is taken into account), 
and of the franc from July, 1937 to early May, 1938 (though even then 
there was occasional official intervention by the French stabilisation 
fund). Moreover, if the EEA's activities are fully taken into account 
then managing the pound must inevitably have affected the franc and 
the dollar and so the latter two countries were never freely floating 
against the pound. Nevertheless, to the extent that official inter­
vention and any obvious period of under or over-valuation can be cap­
tured by dummy variables, the model developed in the preceding chapter 
can usefully be applied to all three "sides" of the triangle.
The three exchange rates are presented graphically in Figure 5*1 
for the period July, 1931 to December, 1938. As they are obviously 
interrelated an overview of their general movements is more easily 
presented in terms of what was happening in a given sub-period rather 
than by looking at the individual currencies. (A detailed account of 
the specific movements of each currency is provided in the next section). 
The first sub-period runs from September, 1931 to March, 1933 and began 
with Britain abandoning the gold standard. By the end of 1931 the pound 
had dropped by about a third of its gold standard value against both 
the franc and the dollar. There was a brief recovery in the spring of
1932 but the pound had dropped back to its December, 1931 level (or 
rather slightly below it) by the end of that year. The franc-dollar
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exchange rate was not especially affected by the pound's depre­
ciation in this period as the two currencies both remained on the 
gold standard and so their rate of exchange fluctuated only slightly 
around its par value.
The next sub-period runs from April, 1933 to January, 193*+! it 
begins with the US leaving the gold standard and ends with its return, 
the dollar having depreciated by some *+0 per cent. Obviously this 
affected both the pound-dollar and franc-dollar exchange rates and 
furthermore, ushered in a period during which the dollar was clearly 
undervalued. The pound-franc rate was, of course, little affected 
by the dollar depreciation and the pound remained at more or less the 
same (depreciated) level against the franc in this period. During the 
next two and a half years (February, 193*+ to September, 1936) the main 
focus of attention shifted to the franc which was still on the gold 
standard and subsequently had effectively appreciated against both 
the pound and the dollar. The depreciation of the pound in 1931 had 
caused some difficulty but the depreciation of the dollar in 1933~3*+ 
left the franc in a very vulnerable position and the French found 
themselves increasingly having to forego the possibility of domestic 
recovery and deflate the economy in order to maintain the value of 
the franc. The problems had obviously begun when Britain left gold 
in 1931 but this third sub-period witnessed the final deterioration 
and collapse of the French position as several other members of the 
gold bloc fell by the wayside and either devalued (Belgium) or imposed 
exchange controls (Italy). Meanwhile the pound-dollar rate fluctuated 
in the $**.80 to $5*10 range (approximately) and, in fact, continued to 
do so in the fourth (and final) sub-period - October, 1936 to December, 
1938 - until the pound depreciated somewhat against the dollar in the 
latter half of 1938.
139
.
In September, 1936, the Tripartite Agreement was announced 
which marked a return to co-operation and the end of unilateral 
exchange rate changes. By mutual consent, the franc was devalued 
but this action proved to be insufficient to restore even relative 
stability and consequently, although the co-operation continued, the 
depreciation of the franc also continued against both the pound and 
the dollar until mid-1938. In conclusion, it is clear that there was 
considerable fluctuation in all of the three major exchange rates in 
the 1933's and hence they are well suited to econometric analysis.
As indicated above, the next section looks at each currency (and 
country) individually and, on the basis of these examination, con­
structs dummy variables to take account of influences which would 
not be picked up by "economic fundamentals" but rather reflect 
speculative factors.
(II)
On September, 21st, 1931, Britain left the gold standard and
this marked the beginning of the end as far as the inter-war gold
standard was concerned. Whether Britain had adopted a wise course of
(2)action in returning to gold in the first place is highly dubious.
This particular episode in British monetary history and the reasons 
why Britain ultimately abandoned the gold standard are well documented 
and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the event was 
not entirely unexpected and did not cause the widespread panic that 
some had predicted. In the longer run it did contribute to the world­
wide collapse of the gold standard but in the short run the effects 
were rather milder: a number of countries (mainly in the Empire and
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Scandinavia) also left the gold standard, there was a run on the 
dollar (which was weathered) and a widespread switch on the Continent 
from a gold exchange to a gold bullion standard (which contributed to 
the pressure on the dollar).
The pound itself depreciated rapidly at the end of September 
but then more or less stabilised in October before falling sharply 
in November and early December. Although seasonal sales of pounds 
were a factor, the depreciation of the pound in November-December, 1931 
was arguably caused largely by temporary and speculative factors. These 
included speculative sales of pounds by people who had bought before 
the general election (thereby stabilising the pound in October) an­
ticipating a government victory and who now feared inflation, the 
liquidation of sterling balances in Amsterdam (in December) and a 
rush of imports to beat the (imminent) tariff. Thus, it seems fair 
to conclude that:
"«...on balance sterling fell during the closing months 
of 1931 under the pressure of non-recurrent forces, which 
by now ¿Jan., 1932/ should have largely spent themselves.
In these circumstances it is not unduly optimistic to look 
for a rally in sterling to its 'natural' level". (*t)
This is precisely what happened. The rising trend in the pound 
began, in fact, in late December and reached its peak with the "most 
sensational developments"^^ in early March. To some extent this 
reflected the lack of the normal demand for imports, many of which had 
been bought in the rush to beat the tariff. However, the major cause 
of this appreciation seems to have been a change in speculative 
sentiment:
It therefore appears that, due largely to speculative factors,
the pound was at an artificially low level in the December, 193*1 to
February, 1932 period and this marks the first British speculative
dummy. From April (1932) to the end of the year the pound became
much less erratic and depreciated gradually with no apparent major
(7)bout of speculation-induced variation.
In 1933 the foreign exchanges were dominated by events in
America and any tendency of the pound to depreciate (or appreciate)
due to "British" speculative influences is likely to be swamped (or
amplified) by movements in the dollar. However, during part of the
period immediately preceding the American devaluation (Jan.-Feb., 1933)»
the pound did show a tendency to appreciate due to a capital inflow
(8 )and was "very strong against all countries":
"There is little doubt that the main factor in the recent 
tendency of sterling to appreciate has been an influx of 
capital....." (9)
This period will constitute the second British speculative dummy. Tne
only other incident of interest was a tendency of the pound to weaken
against the Continental currencies in September but the Continent
itself seems to have believed that this was to some extent seasonal^
and, since the pound staged a recovery in both the middle and at the
( 1 1 )end of the month, no dummy variable appears justified.
Tne year 193** saw some disequilibrium with the pound overvalued 
against the dollar but undervalued against the franc but nevertheless:
"Taking the year as a whole.... the pound displayed marked
stability". (12)
However, in the middle of the year the pound appeared to deviate from
this stable trend. In May, a "fall in sterling against the dollar
(13)and to some extent against the French franc" was reported and 
this weakness continued through June and was "...to some extent
( 14)psychological". This was caused by a combination of temporary
factors (such as US profit taking on the London stock exchange) and
speculative influences induced, for example, by a warning of the
potential vulnerability of the pound in the form of a suggestion in
a B.I.S. report that the level of sterling balances held by foreigners
(15)in London had become as high as it had been in 1930. The weakness
recurred in August and, although it was partly seasonal, it was 
aggravated by speculative sales of pounds on the Continent associated 
with fears of a devaluation of the pound (to offset intensified American 
competition due to a further dollar devaluation thought to be likely).
In September, however, the pound appears to have recovered and indeed 
strengthened slightly in the last quarter of 1934. Consequently, a 
third British dummy will be constructed to cover the pound's weak­
ness in the May to August, 1934 period.
Sterling weakened again in the first three months of 1935 but 
this was largely a reflection of dollar strength associated with the 
impending gold clause judgement (and is therefore picked up by an 
American dummy). However, the origin of the weakness was partly 
British and so a British dummy variable may be appropriate as the 
pound's relationship against Continental currencies may have also 
been affected. This was especially true of March when the "deprecia­
tion of the pound....proceeded so rapidly....that it....attained the
(1 6 )status of 'front page news' ". The reasons for the weakness were
"of a psychological character.../yithf...foreign confidence in sterling
(17)receiving a sudden shock through a combination of circumstances"
including events on the Stock Exchange and rumours of an early 
general election. In view of all this, it seems prudent to con­
struct a fourth dummy variable for March, 1935« There was one further 
bout of (much less marked) sterling weakness in 1935 (Sept.-Oct.) but 
this was partly seasonal and partly due to nervousness in Europe 
generally caused by the Italy-Ethiopia dispute, and is therefore 
more appropriately viewed as dollar strength.
In 1936 attention in the foreign exchange market shifted to 
the gold bloc and disturbances emanated mainly from this source and 
will consequently be picked up by non-British dummies. This was also 
true of 1937 when the pound:
"preserved an even tenor, any possible consequences of the 
year's adverse trade balance being completely offset by 
international capital movements". (18)
More importantly, the reasons for these capital movements were 
external in origin and are therefore picked up elsewhere; they include 
a gold scare in the form of a rumour that the US buying price of gold 
was about to be lowered and a capital flight from France due to un­
certainties there. The major speculative influence on the pound in 
1938 occurred in the last quarter of the year and is (once again) 
better viewed as having an external origin:
"While it is natural to speak of the recent exchange 
movements as a depreciation of sterling it would be much 
more correct to describe the past fortnight as having 
witnessed an appreciation of the dollar. Such a 
description is justified, because the compelling force 
upon the exchanges has been the general flight of funds 
from Europe, rather than from England, to the United 
States". (19)
Thus there are no British speculative dummies for 1936, 1937 or 1938 
The British dummies are summarized in Table 5»1 below.
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TABLE 5.1 : BRITISH SPECULATIVE DUMMIES
VARIABLE PERIOD ON TENDENCY 
OF £
REASON
K1 Dec. 1931-Feb. 1932 weak Fears of inflation; rush of 
imports to beat the tariff.
K2 Jan.-Feb. 1933 strong Capital inflow.
K3 May-Aug. 193*+ weak Temporary factors; fears of 
inflation; reports of the 
pound's vulnerability.
K4 Mar. 1935 weak Loss of confidence in the 
pound (various reasons).
The Americans reacted quietly (though with some surprise) to 
Britain leaving gold; they took the view that Britain's position justi­
fied her action and consequently there was no great tendency to criticise. 
That is not to say that the British action did not have consequences for 
the dollar: on the fall of the pound, attention shifted to dollar and 
in October there was a large drain of gold from the US.(particularly 
to France), as numerous European currencies converted from a gold 
exchange to a gold bullion standard and consequently began to change 
devisen into gold at a great rate. There were also other reasons 
for the dollar to weaken including a loss of confidence in the American
banks - "It is true that in certain respects the American banking position
( 2 1 )has been causing misgivings" - and a belief that Hoover's new economic 
proposals, particularly the formation of the National Credit Corporation, 
"represent^ ed7 the administration of a mild dose of inflation". The 
outflow of gold (to Europe) continued until the end of the year but 
October was the month when the dollar seemed under the greatest pressure
and, to some extent, the outflow to Europe was being offset by an
inflow from Japan by November. Thus October, 1931 marks the first
(23)American speculative dummy.
The year 1932 was one of two halves for the dollar which tended 
towards weakness until mid-June and then recovered in the second half 
of the year. The beginning of the U.S. policy of credit expansion 
(Hoover's version) in January and the passing of the Glass-Steagle 
Act, which permitted a further expansion of Federal reserve credit, 
in February led to some misgivings about the dollar, but the real 
weakness seems to have developed in April-May after it had been 
revealed that the American budget was unbalanced. This appears to 
have led to a minor run on the dollar and therefore April-May, 1932 
marks the second American speculative dummy. The dollar then recovered 
in mid-June and maintained its position due to a combination of the 
balancing of the budget, low British interest rates (the cheap money 
policy) and seasonal demand for dollars - the latter two influences 
being picked up by other variables in the model - and also the fact 
that the process of running down her New York balances, which had 
been undertaken by France in the first half of the year, came to an 
end. This recovery was interrupted in October when Hoover revealed 
that the U.S. had come close to abandoning the gold standard in the 
spring but the consequent speculative movement of funds against the 
dollar was short-lived and recovery was swift.
The next five months cover the interregnum between Roosevelt's 
election and his taking office. This was a period of some uncertainty 
aggravated by the lack of co-operation between the President and President­
elect over the two major problems of the period — the war debt defaults 
and the banking failures - with the latter apparently causing the dollar
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to weaken in January-February 1933» Thus, there is a case for 
treating the whole period as one of expected dollar weakness although 
it may be argued that, given the extent of Roosevelt's electoral 
victory, a period of dollar strength in anticipation of hi6 eventually 
taking power might have occurred. Either way, a dummy variable for the 
November, 1932 to March, 1933 period is appropriate with the probability 
(though not certainty) of it being associated with dollar weakness.
On April 19th, 1933 the gold standard was formally suspended
in the U.S. In spite of the banking crises, the dollar was not forced
off gold, as the pound had been before it, but rather it was a conscious
(24)act of policy. A nine month period of depreciation then took place
until the dollar was restabilised in January, 193^ 5 the depreciation 
was a rather uneven affair and was particularly rapid in the period 
immediately following the suspension of the gold standard and again 
in the October-November (1933) period, but with a pause in the early 
autumn and even a slight recovery in December. The rapid depreciation 
of the dollar in the April-June period was undoubtedly related,to some 
extent, to rises in U.S. prices (particularly wholesale prices although 
the cost-of-living index also rose) and to the rise in employment indices 
(which proxy income). However, the tendencies encouraged by the movements 
of these indices were aggravated by capital movements: there was a flight 
of U.S. capital out of the country, a withdrawal of foreign capital 
invested in American securities, a widespread failure to repatriate 
the proceeds of American export sales and also an element of purely 
"speculative" capital outflow. This continued until the early autumn 
when the depreciation came to a temporary halt due partly to bears of 
dollars covering their position and also the beginning of seasonal 
purchases of dollars but mainly because of rumours of impending stabili­
sation of the dollar.
In fact 6uch rumours proved to be totally incorrect, since 
in late October Roosevelt announced a new policy of official gold 
purchases with the stated objective of depreciating the dollar and, 
for the next six weeks, deliberate government policy and a fresh 
flight of capital combined to cause a second phase of rapid dollar 
depreciation until it was stabilised at 59*06 per cent of its old 
value (in terms of gold) in January, 193*+. There was no rise in the 
American price indices or income proxies during this second phase of 
rapid depreciation which suggests that it was due wholly to "non­
economic fundamental" causes. Consequently, according to many
(25)sources, the dollar entered into a period during which it was
considerably undervalued which lasted (approximately) until the end
(26 )of 193*+. This undervaluation of the dollar overshadows any
tendency of the dollar to fluctuate (for speculative reasons) in 
193*+ although it should be pointed out that fears of inflation did 
cause the dollar to weaken slightly in three months - April, August 
and October. ' Thus it is clear that the whole of the April 1933 
to December 193*+ period was one of dollar undervaluation at least in 
part because of speculative factors, although this applies less to the 
first phase of rapid depreciation (April-June, 1933) than the second 
(November, 1933 to January, 193*0» Therefore it seems plausible to 
construct two dummy variables - Sk (April-October, 1933) and S5 
(November, 1933-December, 193*+) - to allow for the implication of 
thi6 which is that the degree of undervaluation may well have differed 
between the two sub-periods (being less for the first that the second).
In the next two years attention in the foreign exchange shifted 
to the gold bloc and therefore much of the speculative influence on 
the dollar i6 picked up elswhere. Nevertheless, there are two periods
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which would seem to merit an American speculative dummy. Firstly,
there was the uncertainty caused at the beginning of 1935 by the
(28)impending Gold Clause Judgement. Had the decision gone against
the government, there was a widespread feeling that the dollar would 
have been revalued (in terms of gold) and, consequently, speculative 
funds flowed into New York. On February 18th, the Supreme Court 
ruled narrowly (and controversially) in favour of the government and 
this removed any likelihood of revaluation. However, there was 
surprisingly no reaction against the dollar in the second half of 
the month:
"...contrary to previous expectations, there was no great 
rush to sell dollars..." (29)
"...there was comparatively little selling of dollars....
This suggests that there has been a genuine movement of funds from Europe to the United States..." (30)
(31)Indeed, according to one source, the tendency of the dollar to 
appreciate continued until April (encouraged by the belga devaluation 
in 1935) and consequently, the sixth American dummy runs from January 
to April, 1935.
There were then a series of months during which the dollar may 
have been affected by speculative capital flows caused by various 
"non-economic fundamental" events: the American silver purchases in 
July, the nervousness in Europe in autumn caused by the Italy-Ethiopia 
conflict, fears of inflation in January-February, 1936 stemming from 
the passing of the Veteran's Bonus Bill with the consequent emergence 
of a budget deficit and the tendency of the dollar to weaken against 
the pound in sympathy with the franc in mid-1936. However, none of 
these events seem to have exerted a strong enough effect to merit
a dummy variable or, in one case (the Italy-Ethiopia war), the 
influence is likely to be picked up elsewhere. In fact, other than 
the Gold Clause Judgement, the only incident that would seem to require 
a speculative dummy in the 1935-56 period is the large inflow of "hot
(32 )money" in October-November, 1936 which was of "a non-recurrent nature" 
and, to some extent, even this is more a gold bloc phenomenon than 
an American one.
In December, 1936 a programme of gold sterilization was intro­
duced to prevent further gold inflows from creating excess reserves 
and in January, 1937 the Federal Reserve Board raised reserve 
requirements. However, the gold inflow continued in the first 
three months of 1937 and reached its height with the gold scares of 
(particularly) April and late May/early June. These "gold scares" 
involved rumours of a cessation of gold purchases and a drop in the 
dollar price of gold (and hence a dollar appreciation). This would 
seem to suggest a dummy variable for the whole of the January-June,
1937 period to take account of dollar strength.
In late 1937, however, the tendency of the dollar reversed 
itself:
"This second 'gold scare' reversed itself into a ^ dollar scare' late in the same year, after the stock market and business activity had slumped in the United States 
and some fear had arisen that the dollar might be devalued against gold as an antirecession measure.
The speculative outflow of funds from the United States continued through the first half of 1938 and in the ten months up to July amounted to nearly 
1^ billion". (33)
This trend in the dollar was accelerated in April (1938) by Roosevelt's 
announcement of a new programme of "pump-priming" which was felt by
(3*0many to be "inflationary in character" and by early June:
^ 0  -
"The general feeling on the Continent is that Booneror later the dollar will once more be devalued. Early
in the week there were strong rumoure to this effect..." (35)
All this would suggest a further dummy variable for the October, 1937 
to July, 1938 period to reflect dollar weakness.
The last five months of 1938 marked a political crisis in 
Europe and a consequent flow of funds to America. It began in August 
when "a world-wide rush into dollars and gold"^ '^  ^was reported which 
extended into September and reached its peak in early October when it 
was observed that:
"It is no longer a question of the flight of hot money.
Instead balances which have been held in London for years 
are now migrating to New York". (37)
The nervousness in Europe (and capital outflow) was apparent throughout 
October even after the Munich Agreement and "continued at a slackened
/  - i g  \rate in November and December". Therefore a final American dummy
will be constructed for the August-Becember, 1938 period to reflect dollar 
strength. The American speculative dummies are summarized in Table 
5.2 below.
TABLE 5.2: AMERICAN SPECULATIVE DUMMIES
VARIABLE PERIOD ON TENDENCY OF DOLLAR
REASON
S1 Oct. 1931 weak Gold outflow (aftermath of pound's depreciation).
£2 Apr.-May 1932 weak Fears of inflation; unbalanced budget.
£3 Nov. 1932-Mar. 1933 weak Interregnum.
£^ Apr.-Oct. 1933 weak Undervaluation.
£5 Nov. 1933-Dec. 193^ weak Undervaluation.
S6 Jan.-Apr. 1935 strong Gold clause judgement.
£7 Oct.-Nov. 1936 strong Inflow of "hot money".
£8 Jan.-June 1937 strong "Gold scares".
£9 Oct. 1937-July 1938 weak "Dollar scare".
£10 Aug.-Dec. 1938 strong Political tension in Europe
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In many ways the experience of France in the 1930's contrasts
sharply with that of Britain and the U.S.A. The depression did not
reach France until fairly late but then lasted throughout the decade
until a kind of recovery was brought about by rearmament in 1938.
There was no cheap money policy or New Deal to facilitate recovery;
indeed, there was "unbelievable ignorance of economic questions in
(39)business as well as political circles" and consequently no-one 
(not even exporters) wanted devaluation and, in the face of an over­
valued currency for much of the period, the only alternative was 
deflation. This was pursued by a succession of governments and there 
were certainly plenty of these in France in the 1930's - nineteen 
different administrations in all in the September, 1931 to December,
1938 period. In fact political instability was a well-known feature 
of France at this time:
"A political wit once remarked that in France the Budget 
is always well on the way to being balanced, and that in 
the political sphere, France is generally in a state of 
crisis, with occasional lapses into stable government". (*f0)
One might therefore expect a large number of speculative dummies 
for France and this does rather turn out to be the case.
Examining events in more detail, the British devaluation in 
September, 1931, despite its longer run implications, does not seem 
to have had a dramatic effect on the franc; the U.S.A. was still on 
the gold standard, the French economy was still not feeling the full 
effects of the depression and, in any case, France 6till had ample 
gold reserves to deal with any run on the franc that might develop. 
Nevertheless, a shift towards deflationary policies was begun and, in 
the second half of 1932, Herriot's government continued the half-hearted 
attempt to institute budgetary equilibrium begun by the preceding
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Tardieu and Iaval administrations. However, Herriot 's slim and 
shifting majority proved insufficient and, in late 1932, his 
policies and his government were defeated. This marks the first 
of the French dummies (November-December, 1932) which is associated 
with franc weakness.
The difficulties continued into 1933 and, in the January 1933“ 
February, 193** period a succession of governments (five in all) tried 
and failed to impose fiscal cuts in an attempt to deflate the economy 
and maintain the position of the franc. The situation was clearly 
worsened by the depreciation of the dollar and matters came to a 
head in late 1933 when a contemporary article, entitled "The French 
Crisis", suggested:
"The present crisis in France has its origin in two distinct factors.....the Budget disequilibrium....and.... 
the....factor of group-politics". (^ 1)
Confidence was further undermined by an element of social unrest
(**2)which eventually led to riots. Thus it appears likely that the
franc may also have weakened because of "non-economic fundamental" 
influences in November-December, 1933 and the second French dummy 
covers thi6 period.
In March, 193**, Gaston Doumergue, the ex-President, came out 
of political retirement to form a "Cabinet of National Union" and 
the presence of a "strong man" had the desired effect. The budget
situation was improved, confidence returned and the franc strengthened 
The Doumergue government lasted until late October when it fell in an 
unsuccessful attempt to get further fiscal cuts and the whole period 
(March-October, 193*+) forms the third French dummy. In November, 
Flandin took office and, whilst he accepted deflation and a movement
(*+*♦)
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towards budgetary equilibrium, he did engage in a mild attempt 
at reflation in 6ome areas, lowering long term interest rates for 
example.
However, in 1935 outside events began to overtake France
once again and at the end of March of that year Belgium devalued.
(^ 5)This immediately put pressure on the rest of the gold bloc 
including a run on the franc which reached alarming proportions, 
encouraged by the Communist victories in the May municipal elections, 
and between May 20th and May 24th alone, the Bank of France lost 
1-J billion francs. At the end of May Flandin fell, to be replaced 
by Laval on June ?th after a new government under Buisson which only 
lasted a few days. The Laval administration initiated a policy of 6avage 
deflation and this constituted the last sustained attempt to solve 
French problems by "orthodox" means. It was done by a series of 
decree laws - 549 in all - that affected nearly every part of the 
French economy and administration. Unfortunately, Iaval was ultimately 
unsuccessful and there was no attempt to renew the powers of decree 
when they expired in October. The effect the Iaval deflation had on 
confidence and therefore the franc is debateable. There is evidence 
that it distilled confidence in that the French Central Bank was able 
to lower Bank Rate in August, 1935» but on the other hand, there are 
contemporary reports of a weak franc.
However, the franc certainly does appear to have weakened in 
the following month (November):
"The political situation in France is now causing some 
anxiety". (47)
"The franc....was seriously affected by new doubts 
concerning the general French financial outlook.Between October 25th and November 15th, the Banque de 
France lost Frs. 1,769 millions of gold...." (48)
To summarize, the franc would seem to require three speculative 
dummies for 1935s two of these to reflect weakness - April-May and 
November - due to the aftermath of the belga devaluation and political 
and financial uncertainties respectively and one, associated with the 
Iaval deflation (June- October) of uncertain sign.
In early 1936 the franc appears to have weakened again. The
January decrease in Bank Rate was soon proved to be premature and,
at the end of the month, "the French Governmental crisis....accentuated
(49)nervousness over the franc". The weakness continued through
February and March, aggravated by rumours of devaluation and the 
nervousness due to the German reoccupation of the Rhineland. A
seventh dummy will therefore cover the January-March, 1936 period. 
However, the real difficulties for the franc in 1936 came later in 
the year after the election of the Popular Front in late May which was 
to govern for nearly two years with ultimately little success.
The first Blum administration (June, 1936-June, 1937) in 
associated with the "Blum experiment" and has been split into three 
sub-periods. J In the first, June to September, 1936, business 
recovery and social reform were viewed as going hand in hand. 
Consequently, a number of reflationary measures were introduced in 
June including wage increases (the Matignon agreements) and the intro­
duction of a forty hour week "in principle". This new reflationary 
policy was not a success: confidence was not revived and, in fact, 
production fell,unemployment increased and there were intermittent 
flights from the franc throughout the whole period (despite a brief 
rally in July).^^
Following the Tripartite Agreement of September 26th, the franc
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wa6 devalued on October 1st and the Poincare franc with a fixed
gold content (65  ^mg.) was replaced by the Auriol "elastic franc"
franc, so called because it was fixed only within limits (43 mg.-
49 mg.); a stabilisation fund was also established. This marks
the beginning of the next sub-period (October, 1936-February, 1937)
which witnessed the general enforcement of the forty hour week and
a brief, uneven (and temporary) revival of the economy. As far as
the experience of the franc is concerned the period needs to be split
in half. From October to December, 1936 there is conflicted evidence:
on the one hand, there is some evidence that the capital outflow, if
not quite reversing itself, at least temporarily came to halt;^^ on
the other (and in much greater volume) there are reports that the
, (54)franc remained weak and the capital outflow continued.
This apparent continued weakness is not surprising. There were 
at least two good reasons for this: firstly, the government's attempt 
to penalise gold hoarders by forcing them to surrender it at the old 
parity or taxing them heavily discouraged any return of gold and, 
secondly, the inexact nature of the French devaluation - the "elastic" 
franc - created uncertainty about the precise level at which the franc 
would eventually settle, providing scope for further depreciation. 
According to one author:
"It is by no means unlikely that the system of an elastic franc....both encouraged speculation against the franc and 
discouraged the return of capital from abroad". (55)
In the first two months of 1937 it was, however, quite clear that 
the franc was predominantly weak. On January 29th, the newly 
established exchange stabilisation fund was forced to admit that it 
had run out of gold in its attempts to support the franc and, through­
out January and February, the French Finance Minister (Auriol) felt
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it necessary to wage a campaign against rumours of further 
devaluation.
The third sub-period (March-June, 1937) follows the announce­
ment by Blum on February 1^ th of a "pause" in social reform to allow 
present legislation to be "digested". This was another attempt to 
boost confidence and in fact some expenditure cuts were made. It 
effectively marked the end of the "Blum experiment". It may have 
had some beneficial effect but the dominant picture still seems to 
have been one of continued franc weakness due to the "confused 
political scene in France...¿and/, ..the vacillating attitude of 
the Government culminating in a crisis and the collapse of
the Blum government at the end of June. The "elastic" franc was 
abandoned and the currency was left free to find its own level. The 
whole period of the (first) Blum ministry seems to have been associated 
with rumour, uncertainty and consequently speculative influences 
generally and four dummy variables would seem appropriate: two of 
these (June-September, 1936 and January-February, 1937) are unam­
biguously associated with franc weakness and the other two (October- 
December, 1936 and March-June, 1937) are likely to be, although there 
were influences working in the opposite direction.
In July, 1937, the new Chautemps regime began by increasing 
taxes and restoring the 15% cut in tariffs imposed by Blum. However, 
these measures failed to restore confidence which still sagged, largely 
because the policies of the Blum government had not been successfully 
reversed - there was still a budget deficit and the forty hour week
was still in force. There is ample contemporary evidence to indicate
(57)that the franc remained weak in the July-October, 1937 period and 
what seems to have happened is that the June crisis had not been resolved 
but merely converted to a situation of low confidence and, therefore, this
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period - July-October, 1937 - marks the final French speculative 
dummy.
In fact, this weakness was such that the French President felt 
it necessary to call the Council of Ministers to his summer chateau 
at Rambouillet and to issue an official announcement - the Declaration 
of Rambouillet - to the effect that there was no technical or objective 
reason for the speculative attack on the franc but even so, the present 
government was still determined to solve the country's financial and 
economic problems without using exchange controls. This had an immediate 
beneficial effect on confidence and coupled with the stock market crash 
in New York a few weeks later led to a return of funds to France and a 
recovery of the franc in late October which also remained "steady in 
November and December".  ^ Finally in 1938 there were a number of factors 
which may have affected the franc briefly, but nothing of exclusively French 
origin that seems likely to have produced a sustained effect on confidence. 
The French speculative dummies are summarized in Table 5*3 below.
TABLE 5.3: FRENCH SPECULATIVE DUMMIES
VARIABLE PERIOD ON TENDENCY OF FRANC REASON
F1 Nov.-Dec. 1932 weak Defeat of Herriot government and its deflationary policies.
F2 Nov.-Dec. 1933 weak Budget deficit, difficulties of forming a government, social unrest.
F3 Mar.-Oct. 193*+ strong Doumergue ministry.
Fk Apr.-May 1935 weak Aftermath of belga devaluation.
F5 June-Oct. 1935 9 Laval deflation.
F6 Nov. 1935 weak Political and financial uncertainties.
F7 Jan.-Mar. 1936 weak Rumours of devaluation, nervousness due to German reoccupation of Rhineland
F8 June-Sept.1936 weak Beginnings of "Blum experiment".
F9 Oct.-Dec. 1936 ? Post-devaluation period.
F10 Jan.-Feb. 1937 weak Exhaustion of exchange fund reserves, rumours of devaluation.
F11 Mar.-June 1937 ? "Passive" phase of "Blum experiment".
F12 July-Oct. 1937 weak Aftermath of "Blum experiment".
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(III)
Estimation of the model proceeded as follows: two versions of 
each equation were normally estimated, one using cost-of-living 
indices, the other wholesale price indices; in the case of the 
pound-dollar exchange rate, the availability of appropriate data 
allowed the estimation of a third version using wage indices. The 
rest of the world was represented by France, the D.S.A. and Britain 
in the pound-dollar, pound-franc and franc-dollar exchange rates 
respectively. In the first instance employment indices are used to 
proxy income, the "wide” version of the official intervention dummies 
are used and the interest rates are monthly averages of market rates 
of discount for three month prime bills in the various centres.
Before any computations were undertaken the three sets of
speculative dummies were compared to see if there was any overlap
(which might explain insignificance in the initial estimates) or
direct correspondence (which would imply perfect multicollinearity
and therefore that certain variable(s) should be omitted). In fact
only one incidence of direct correspondance occurred: this was for
the franc-dollar estimates where S8 (January-June, 1937) corresponded
exactly to a combination of F10 (January-February, 1937) and F11
(March-June, 1937) and consequently S8 was omitted from the franc- 
(59)dollar estimates. Having done this, the procedure was then to
estimate each version of the different equations with all variables 
included; the second stage involved omitting the clearly insignificant 
variables (or more exactly those with a t-statistic less than unity); 
the third (and final) stage involved experimentation by replacing some 
of the insignificant proxy variables by alternative proxies (for example, 
unemployment instead of employment indices for income), omitting more
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insignificant variables^®) and ultimately "final" versions of 
each equation would emerge (which are presented below).
Before considering the performance of individual variables,
reference should be made to F-tests that were carried out for two
sub-groups: the "economic fundamentals" (prices, national incomes,
interest rate6, official intervention and seasonal variables) and the
speculative "non-economic fundamental" (dummy) variables. This seemed
an appropriate preliminary exercise to the extent that the central
hypothesis of the study relates to whether exchange rates were
determined by one or the other (or both) of these groups and, more
fundamentally, lack of significance of either or both groups would
have led to extensive modification of the subsequent estimates. In
fact, both groups of variables were clearly significant for all three
exchange rates. However, it may be worth noting that the F-statistics
(61 )were considerably higher for the "economic fundamentals" although
this may be unimportant, given that the speculative dummies probably 
only capture part of the total speculative effect.
The single most important exchange rate in the inter-war period 
was undoubtedly that between the pound and the dollar and this relation­
ship is therefore discussed fir6t. The first stage estimates produced 
results which were reasonably consistent with the general hypothesis 
with both "economic" and speculative variables generally significant 
(at various levels) and correctly signed, very high coefficients of 
correlation and Durbin-Watson statistics towards the top of the 
inconclusive range. There w s e  little to choose between the three 
different versions of the equation in terms of performance although 
the WP (wholesale prices) equation did have a slightly lower standard 
error of the regression than the COL (cost of living) and WG (wage indices)
versions
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The performances of individual variables were also satisfactory.
The relative income variable and pound-dollar ID (official intervention
dummy) were significant and correctly signed in all three versions
and the relative price variable in two (WP and WG) although the
U.K.-U.S. interest rate differential only in one (COL) and then
only at the 10$ level. In addition ROW (rest of the world) prices
and the pound-franc ID were significant (and negative). ROW income
and interest rate differentials were found to be insignificant.
Furthermore there was evidence of a seasonal effect: as expected
the seasonal variables with larger frequencies (A3 and B3) were not
significant but A1, A2 and B2 were. The trend variable was significant
and positive. All the speculative dummy variables were significant
in one or more equations (although a few were incorrectly signed)
(62)with the exception of K2, Kk and S7. The insignificance of the
latter is not altogether surprising as it represented an inflow of 
hot money into the D.S. in the October-November, 1936 period and 
was, to some extent, a gold bloc rather than American phenomenon.
The second stage estimates (not surprisingly) tended to support these 
initial observations with only one modification: ROW income was proxied 
by another variable (French production instead of French income) and 
became significant. The final versions of the pound-dollar equation 
are presented in Table 5«^ »
The importance of relative price and (especially) relative 
income effects of the kind predicted by the theory (a rise in D.K. 
prices or income leads to a depreciation of the pound) is clear. The 
insignificance of the COL ratio undermines this conclusion but, on 
the other hand, it also illustrates perfectly the necessity to test 
more than one type of price index. The U6e of WP's only by many other
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( 1 \TABLE 5.*+v THE POUND-DOLLAR FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP WAGE
Constant 7.1*+ (5.71) 7.65 (11.D 6.51 (11.5)
U.K. prices/U.S. prices -1.17 (0.89) -2.38 (3.58) -0.79 (2.*+0)(2)French prices -1.29 (5.5*0 -0.39 (1.53) -l.**6 (6.63)
U.K. income/U.S. income"^ -1.23 (*+.**7) -1.*+*+ (7.23) -0.60 (1.53)(1+ )French income 0.76 (1.31) 0.91 (1.77) 0.53 (0.99)
U.S.-U.K. interest rates -0.0*+ (0.8*+) 0.01 (0.3*+) -0.03 (0.69)
Pound-dollar ID(5) 0.05 (2.66) 0.05 (3.07) 0.0*+ (2.*+2)(5)Pound-franc ID y -0.0*+ (1.87) -0.03 (1.7*+) -0.03 (1.68)
Seasonal variables: A1 -0.06 (2.00) -0.08 (3.69) -0.05 (2.2*+)
A 2 -0.0*+ (2.30) -0.0*+ (2.58) -0.03 (1.86)
B2 0.08 (*+.12) 0.07 (*+.22) 0.07 (3.99)
Trend 0.02 (12.2) 0.02 (10.2) 0.01 (6.89)
Speculative dummies: K1 -0.*+3 (*+.70) -0.33 (3.79) -0.*+6 (5.38)
K3 -0.15 (1.93) -0.1*+ (2.03) -O.15 (1.99)
S2 0.12 (1.23) 0.16 (1.81) 0.07 (0.79)
S3 -0.22 (2.62) -O.15 (2.08) -O.28 (3.89)
s*+ 0.38 (*+.33) 0.*+2 (5.*+6) 0.35 (*+.3*+)
S5 0.7*+ ( 1*+. 8 ) 0.6*+ (13.2) 0.7*+ (15.7)
S6 0.20 (3.06) 0.11 (1.82) 0.17 (2.68)
S8 -0.18 (2.79) -O.15 (2.61) -O.15 (2.*t0)
S9 0.30 (3.86) 0.21 (3.15) 0.32 (*+.28)
S10 0.13 (1.18) -O.O6 (0.69) 0.10 (0.98)
R _ SQUARED 0.97 O.98 0.98
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.72 1.99 1.67
STANDARD ERROR OF THE 0.112 0.101 1.108REGRESSION
F - STATISTIC 118.5 1*+*+. 3 127.7
Notes: 1.
2.
3.
*♦.
5.
T-statistics in brackets.
No French wage index was available and so in the WG equation 
French prices were represented by the French COL index.
These are both employment indices.
Production index (The employment index was insignificant). 
These are the "wide" versions (see ch. *♦, appendix.)
- 162 -
studies has already been criticised as being at best incomplete 
and at worst actually misleading; in fact, had this procedure been 
used in the present study, one might have (wrongly) concluded that 
there was strong support for a relative price effect and been (quite 
rightly) subject to the criticism, that the bias of WP prices towards 
traded goods makes the correlation spurious. The use of only WP 
and COL versions would have strengthened this criticism. However, 
the inclusion of a wage version pre-empts it since the wage index 
contains even less traded goods than a COL index (none, to be precise). 
Consequently, it can be argued that the results in Table illustrate
that whether a price index based on traded goods (WP) or non-traded 
goods (WG) is used there is still evidence of a significant relative 
price effect (despite the insignificance of the COL ratio).
The U.K.-U.S. interest rate differential was insignificant.
This was not entirely surprising for at least three reasons: in the 
first place, a comparable study of the pound-dollar rate in the 1930's 
obtained similar disappointing results; secondly, only one interest
rate (discount rates for three month prime bills) is used to proxy 
"the interest rate" and this may be inappropriate; thirdly, and more 
fundamentally, it is possible that fears of exchange rate changes 
far outweighed the importance of changes in interest rates as an 
influence on the movement of short term capital.^  ^ However the 
pound-dollar ID was highly significant (at the or 2% level) and 
correctly signed in all three equations, indicating that the presence 
of official intervention in any particular month added or subtracted 
(depending on direction), on average, approximately five cents to the 
exchange rate.^"^
There is also evidence of a significant ROW effect particularly
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with reference to prices and official intervention. However, the 
ROW income variable did not perform very well: when proxied by 
French employment it was insignificant and though the use of a 
French production index produced better results, even this was only 
significant at low levels in two equations (2056 in the COL equation 
and 1056 in the WP equation) and remained insignificant in the other 
(WG). Thus, whilst it can be argued with some certainty that an 
increase (decrease) in ROW (French) prices is associated with a 
depreciation (appreciation) of the pound against the dollar, one 
can only tentatively conclude that an increase (decrease) in ROW 
(French) income was possibly associated with an appreciation 
(depreciation). ROW interest rates appear to have had no effect; 
this is not surprising given the insignificance of the U.K.-U.S. 
interest rate differential. The pound-franc intervention dummy 
carries an unexpected sign in that it implies attempts to support 
the pound against the franc caused it to weaken against the dollar.
This could suggest that the British authorities were successful in 
managing the pound-dollar but not the pound-franc exchange rate, 
which is not entirely implausible, but must wait until the performance 
of the same variable in the pound-franc estimates is considered before 
it can be examined more fully.
Three of the seasonal variables were significant and their 
combined effect is shown graphically in Fig.5*2(on the assumptions 
that A1 = -0.06, A2 =-0.0b and B2 = +0.07, which would seem to be 
reasonable compromise values based on their coefficients in the 
three different versions of the equation). The main expectation of 
seasonal movement in the pound-dollar rate is the well-known (and well 
documented) tendency for the pound to weaken in the auntumn and strengthen
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FIGURE 5.2
ESTIMATED SEASONAL VARIATION IN THE POUND-DOLLAR
the latter less so. There is also evidence of a strengthening of the 
pound in the summer although this could be construed as sterling 
strength (or at least tendency not to weaken, if full account is 
taken of April-May) in the whole of the February-August period, in 
which case the sterling autumnal weakness and spring (and summer) 
strength hypothesis can be interpreted as being strongly supported.
The trend variable is positive and significant. A gradually depreciating 
pound (against the dollar) reflecting growing fears of war in Europe would 
have implied a negative sign and so the trend presumably reflects higher 
productivity growth in Britain.
The speculative dummies perform very much as expected: they are 
mainly significant and, with two exceptions, carry the expected signs.
Two of the British variables are significant, K1 a n d K3, picking up
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the pound's artificial weakness at the turn of 1931 and the 
influence of the variety of factors which caused the pound to 
weaken in mid-193^  respectively. The variables that were insignifi­
cant in the first two stages were dropped from the final equations 
presented in Table but should nevertheless be discussed also.
Two of these were British variables but since both of these overlap 
with significant American dummies - K2 with S3 and K4 with S6 - and 
carry the same expected signs, then their effect is arguably being 
picked up elsewhere and hence their insignificance is easily explained.
Four of the nine U.S. dummies were significant and correctly 
signed in all three equations. S8 and S9 reflect the gold and dollar 
"scares" in the 1937-38 period and S4 and S5 the undervaluation of the 
dollar in 1933-3^5 this undervaluation was substantial (by approximately 
0^ cents in April-October, 1933 and 70 cents in November, 1933-December, 
193 +^) and, as anticipated, rather larger after the initiation of the 
American gold buying policy in late 1933* S2 is also significant 
(at the 10% level) in one and correctly signed in all three equations, 
suggesting that the expected speculation against the dollar may have 
occurred in August-May, 1932. There were two insignificant American 
dummies: the insignificance of S7 is not entirely surprising, as this 
represented an inflow of "hot money" which was more a gold bloc than 
American phenomenon. The other insignificant variable - S10 - was,
in fact, significant and correctly signed in the second stage estimates 
and its performance in the final equations was puzzling.
The two final American speculative dummies - S3 and S6 - were 
both significant but incorrectly signed. S6 is perhaps easier to 
explain. It covers the January-April, 1935 period when there was an 
inflow of capital into the U.S. suggesting a negative sign. However,
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it immediately follows the 1933-3** period in which the dollar 
was undervalued and a positive sign may therefore be construed a6 
evidence that the undervaluation continued into 1935» In fact, one 
can go even further since the much smaller coefficient of S6 (compared 
to S5) indicates that the extent of the undervaluation had decreased 
from approximately 70 cents to less than 20 cents; the reason for 
this rapid correction was presumably, in part, the capital inflow 
and paradoxically, therefore, in spite of its "wrong" sign, the 
performance of S6 may still be interpreted as providing evidence 
of a capital inflow in early 1937-
In the case of S3, which represents the interregnum between 
Roosevelt being elected and taking office, some doubt was expressed 
about the expected sign in the first place. On balance, dollar weakness 
seemed more likely but the possibility that Roosevelt's victory 
engendered confidence was put forward. On reflection, this is perhaps 
improbable if not impossible, and a more plausible explanation of S3's 
sign may be that it is reflecting official intervention supporting 
the dollar during a period of weakness (not picked up by the pound- 
dollar ID). Indeed, this may turn out to be a reasonable general 
explanation of wrongly signed dummy variables, although the size of 
the coefficient in this case (0.15-0.28) is considerably larger than 
the average size of an intervention indicated by the pound-dollar ID 
(0.05). In fact, the coefficients of the speculative dummy variables 
are generally much larger than that of the ID; this may suggest that 
the pound-dollar exchange rate was occasionally subject to very large 
speculative movements which were too big for the authorities to resist.
To summarize, the performance of the individual variables in the
three versions of the pound-dollar equation is very much in keeping
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with the expectations about each of them. In more general terms, 
the contents of Table 5«** would 6eem to confirm the view that, whilst 
the pound-dollar rate was subject to speculative interference on many 
occasions, it was still largely determined by rational economic 
influences and in that sense was not violently unstable.
The second most important exchange rate in the 1930's was 
probably the pound-franc rate and, in general, the application of the 
model to this relationship was also reasonably successful. In the 
first and second stage estimates of both versions (COL and WP) there 
was strong evidence of relative price and interest rate differential 
effects. The relative income variable was insignificant and so (as 
in the pound-dollar equations) the French employment index was replaced 
by a production index to proxy income and this new variable (the ratio 
of U.K. employment to French production) was significant though wrongly 
signed. RCW (American) prices and income were significant in the COL 
version and some seasonal variables, the trend and approximately half 
the speculative dummies also appeared to be important. The coefficient 
of correlation was high and Durbin-Watson statistic was in the middle 
of the indeterminate range. The third and final stage estimates are 
presented in Table
These final equations strongly support the hypothesis that bi­
lateral economic influences were major determinants of the exchange 
rate: the relative price variable is highly significant and the income 
ratio and French-U.K. interest rate differential are also significant 
in both versions. Unfortunately the income ratio carries the "wrong" 
sign (and was insignificant in the earlier estimates when a different 
French income proxy was used in the earlier estimates), which would 
imply that a rise in British (French) income led to a decrease in
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(1 )TABLE 5.5 : THE POUND-FRANC FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant 158.0 (10.1) 177.8 (15.7)
U.K. prices/French prices -I75.O (27.2) -119.1 (20.7)
U.S. prices 132.5 (4.89) 11.3 (0.33)(2 )U.K. income/French income 13-4 (2.08) 18.7 (2.63)
U.S. income -**5.5 (3.68) -9.07 (0.48)
French-U.K. interest rates -1.21 (2.12) -2.64 (4.52)
Seasonal variables: A1 -O.38 (0.52) -2.88 (3.62)
B1 3.19 (4.49) 1.93 (2.37)
B2 -1.23 (2.01) -0.78 (1.08)
Trend 0.70 (12.4) 0.74 (9.79)
Speculative dummies: K2 4.71 (1.63) O.83 (0.24)
F3 -9.42 (5.72) -8.78 (4.97)
F5 8.19 (3-57) 8.05 (3.10)
F6 11.4 (2.86) 9.91 (2.15)
F7 5.10 (1.96) 0.04 (0.01)
f8 -11.0 (4.65) -17.4 (6.09)
F9 1.34 (0.52) -9.30 (2.99)
F10 -8.82 (2.97) -16.9 (5.04)
F11 -15.7 (6.59) -13.7 (4.99)
R - SQUARED 0.99 0.99
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.38 1.34
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 3.64 4.19
F - STATISTIC 400.5 301.5
Notes : 1.
2.
3 .
T-statistics in 
U.K. employment 
U.S. employment
brackets.
index and French production index, 
index.
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demand for French (British) goods; such widespread existence of 
negative income effects would seem highly unlikely, although it is 
probably that only one of the two income variables i6 behaving like 
this and, had the variable been broken down with French and British 
income included separately in the regression, this might have been 
apparent.
Nevertheless, the implication still remains an odd one and the
most likely explanation would seem to be that the income effects on
the pound-franc exchange rate were being distorted by government
intervention (trade controls and exchange fund activity), even though
this does not seem to have occurred for the pound-dollar and franc-
dollar rates where the income ratios were significant and correctly
signed. l> Some solace may be drawn from Ozmun's study which, using
the same data for the same period, strangely obtained the opposite
results, finding significant and correctly signed income ratios whether
(68 )French employment or production indices were used although, to 
some extent, this only adds to the confusion.
The French-U.K. interest rate differential, on the other hand, 
is significant and correctly signed, the only bi-lateral interest 
rate to be so in the pound-dollar-franc triangle. This is not 
surprising as there are numerous contemporary reports of the authorities 
raising the discount rate during periods of franc w e a k n e s s an(j 
this result would indicate the success of such measures. However, 
this conflicts with Ozmun's study which found the same variable to be 
insignificant and incorrectly signed. He consequently suggested that:
"The discount rate was normally raised in response to depreciations of the franc and was therefore viewed by speculators as a signal that the franc was in trouble". (70)
170 -
This argument is not unattractive but the results in Table 5*5 
would appear to contradict it.
There is some evidence of a ROW effect in that ROW prices
and income are significant in the COL equations suggesting that a
r is e  in  RCW p ric e s  and a f a l l  in  RCW income were associated w ith a
franc de prec ia tio n  against the pound. The less  marked ROW e ffe c t
compared with the pound-dollar exchange rate may reflect the choice
o f the RCW p ro xy : conscious e f fo r ts  were avowedly made by France to
expand links with the rest of the gold bloc and so some account of
the gold bloc should possibly have been taken into considerations in
(71 )formulating the RCW proxies. ROW interest rates appeared to play
no role in determining the pound-franc rate (which was also the case 
for the pound-dollar rate). The trend variable i6 positive and 
significant indicating a secular decline of the franc against the 
pound; this may indicate higher British productivity (as in the 
pound-dollar case), increasing war scare on the continent - one 
would have anticipated a flow of funds to America but this might 
have occurred via Britain - or that the franc was overvalued in 1931 
and this was gradually corrected throughout the sample period.
There is also evidence of a seasonal effect with a combination 
of three different variables significant. The seasonal effects 
indicated by the two versions of the equation are plotted in Fig. 5*3 
(on the assumption that A1 = 0 B1 = +3*19 and B2 = -1.23 in the COL 
version and A1 = -2.88 B1 = +1.93 and B2 = 0 in the WP version). It 
can be seen that the pattern is basically the same particularly in 
the first part of the year, the main difference occurring in the 
final quarter with the WP version suggesting an earlier seasonal 
weakening of the pound against the franc (October) than the COL version
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FIGURE 5.3
ESTIMATED SEASONAL VARIATION IN THE POUND-FRANC
(December). The overall impression is of a weak pound (strong franc) 
in November-March and strong pound (weak franc) in April-October.
There is no particular expectation about seasonal variation in this 
exchange rate - the crop moving-induced variation of the pound against 
the dollar applied equally to Britain and Europe - but it could imply 
that France bought less of these North American goods than Britain.
What is perhaps surprising is the larger seasonal variation (- 3*9% 
of the average value of the exchange rate in 1931-8) of the pound-franc 
rate compared to the pound-dollar rate (- 2»k%),
The speculative dummies did not perform as well as they had in 
the pound-dollar estimates. Nearly half (seven out of sixteen) were 
insignificant and these are examined first. The insignificance of
1 7 2  -
was not entirely surprising as it had also failed to show up 
in the pound-dollar estimates but K1 and K3 had been significant 
and correctly signed. K3 is easy to explain: its period of operation 
falls exactly within that of a significant French dummy with the same 
expected (and actual) sign (F3). The reason for the significance 
of K1 is less obvious since there was a dip (strengthening of the 
franc) in the pound-franc rate in December 1931-February, 1932 
similar to that in the pound- dollar rate. The most likely explanation 
would seem to be that this was caused by changes in other variables.
An examination of the French price indices and interest rates did not 
reveal any potential cause but there was a discontinuous drop in the 
French "income" (production) index of twelve points from November, 193*1 
to March, 1932 (82.6 to 70.b) which may have caused a franc appreciation
There are four insignificant French dummies. Three of these are 
also insignificant in the franc-dollar estimates: F1 and F2 represented 
potential speculation due to political uncertainties which clearly 
seems not to have occurred; the insignificance of F^ , which represents 
the run on the franc after the Belgian devaluation in 1935» is more 
surprising but most probably reflects the existence of official support 
of the franc (not picked up by the intervention dummy). The fourth 
insignificant French dummy is F12; its performance would suggest 
that the collapse of the Blum regime and his replacement by Chautemps 
in July, 1937 did restore confidence to some extent.
Of the remaining eight (significant) French speculative dummies 
half were correctly signed, half incorrectly. In the former group is 
included F5 - the Laval deflation - which had no expected sign but was 
positive implying franc weakness; however, it was correctly signed in 
the sense that it was also significant with the same implication in the
(72)
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franc-dollar estimates. The Doumergue ministry (F3) seems to have
(73)had the hoped for effect and caused the franc to strengthen 
whilst the political and financial uncertainties of November, 1935 
(F6) and early 1936 (F7) appear to have led to franc weakness. The 
four significant and wrongly signed variables - F8, F9, F10 and F11 - 
correspond with the Blum experiment and paradoxically, therefore, 
they suggest franc strength throughout the period (June, 1936 - June, 
1937)* In two cases there was some reason to be doubtful of the 
direction in which the franc would tend (F9 and F11), but it was 
felt that weakness was the most likely, and F8 and F10 should 
definitely be associated with weakness. The most plausible explana­
tion (once again) would seem to be the presence of heavy official 
support for the franc.
It is perhaps instructive to examine the performance of the 
speculative dummies in Ozmun's study (1976) of the same exchange 
rate. The dummies here were constructed independently (and from more 
sources) and so there are important differences but, nevertheless, the 
major incidents led to the creation of similar dummies in both studies, 
although the period of operation may differ slightly. Broadly speaking, 
where similar dummies existed in both studies they performed in a 
similar manner with two exceptions: the Laval deflation dummy (F5) 
and the Blum "pause" dummy (F11) which, whilst being positive and 
negative (respectively) here, were curiously negative and positive 
in the Ozmun study.
However, Ozmun did find that the performance of a (single)
"Blum experiment dummy" covering the June, 1936-February, 1937 period 
and corresponding to F8, F9 and F10, did unexpectedly indicate a stronger 
franc although he suggested rather different reasons for this:
17*t -
".....there was in fact a strong "Keynesian" flavour 
to the Popular Front programmes. Measures which reduced unemployment and increased consumers' income served business and industry as well as the labour 
force. Higher wages could result in higher profits.To the extent that the experiments of the Popular Front government were viewed in this latter perspective, their effect would have resulted in an appreciation of the franc". (7*0
In addition, two of Ozmun's variables that anticipated franc weakness 
and correspond (approximately) with F2 and F12 were insignificant as 
they were here. Finally, a variable representing the impact on the 
franc of the belga devaluation is significant and correctly signed, 
whereas F4 was not; however, Ozmun's variable also incorporates the 
November, 1935 capital flight which is picked up by another (significant) 
variable (F6) in the present study. In conclusion, the performance of 
the speculative dummies in the pound-franc estimates is clearly less 
satisfactory then in the pound-dollar estimates, but an important 
speculative effect nevertheless emerges, even if it is occasionally 
in an unanticipated direction.
The third leg of the pound-dollar-franc triangle was the franc- 
dollar exchange rate and the performance of the model in the earlier 
estimates were equally satisfactory. In the first stage estimates 
there was firm evidence of relative price and relative income effects 
and also of ROW effects. The coefficient of determination was high, 
as was the Durbin-Watson statistic (greater than two). In addition 
there was some indication that official intervention was effective 
although it was the found-dollar ID rather than the franc-dollar ID 
that was significant; however, when the "wide" version of the latter 
variable was replaced by the "narrow" version it did become significant 
(and correctly signed). Finally, some seasonal variation seems to have 
occurred and numerous speculative dummies were significant though the 
trend variable was not. The final versions of dollar-franc equation 
are presented in Table 5*6.
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( 1 )TABLE 5.6v J: THE DOLLAR-FRANC FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant 26.6 (7.89) 15.7 (5.71)
French prices/U.S. prices -5.76 (Ht.8) -4.98 (16.8)
U.K. prices -10.8 (4.46) -5.16 (4.02)i 2 )French income/U.S. income -2.54 (6.96) -3.14 (7.77)
U.K. income -3.89 (1.40) 1.09 (0.40)
French-U.K. interest rates 0.07 (3.06) 0.06 (2.60)
Pound-dollar ID 0.03 (1.0*0 0.06 (2.18)
Dollar-franc ID^^ 0.22 (2.12) O.16 (1.49)
Seasonal Variables: A1 0.05 (1.35) -0.09 (2.75)
B2 0.11 (*+.23) 0.11 (4.02)
Trend 0.003(0.62) -0.005(1.13)
Speculative dummies: F4 -0.13 (0.92) -0.11 (0.73)
F5 -0.19 (2.13) -0.30 (3.34)
F9 -0.69 (4.09) -0.39 (2.30)
F10 -0.71 (5.60) -0.29 (1.99)
F11 -0.61 (5.26) -O.23 (1.26)
F12 -1.00 (7.88) -O.63 (3.67)
S3 -0.07 (0.63) O.05 (0.44)
S'* 0.60 (5.26) 0.55 (7.30)
S5 1.10 (12.7) 0.76 (11.4)
S6 0.15 (1.26) -0.03 (O.30)
S7 -0.45 (2.31) -0.66 (2.87)
S9 0.11 (1.22) O.15 (1.50)
R - SQUARED 0.99 0.99
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1«77 1.86
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 0.156 0.155
F - STATISTIC 331.8 334.5
Notes : 1. T-statistics in brackets.
2. French employment and U.S. employment.
3. Based on British employment index.
4. "Wide" version.
5. "Narrow" version
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The correct signs (negative) and high t-statistics of the 
relative income and (particularly) relative price variables are 
immediately apparent although the French-U.S. interest rate differential 
is excluded as it had been insignificant in the earlier estimates. An 
increase in RCW prices and possibly also RCW income was associated 
with an appreciation of the dollar against the franc. There were, 
however, problems with the latter variable which was significant in 
only the COL equation and then only at the 2 0 % level. Furthermore,
ROW (British) "income" in Table 5*6 is actually based on the British 
unemployment index as the employment index had been insignificant in 
the first stage estimates. The French-U.K. interest rate differential 
is significant (as it was in the pound-franc estimates) and carries 
a plausible sign implying that a widening of this differential caused 
the franc to strengthen not only against the pound but also the dollar.
It does, however, make the insignificance of the French-U.S. differential 
puzzling although, since the U.K.-U.S. differential was insignificant 
in the pound-dollar estimates but the French—U.K. differential was 
significant in the pound-franc estimates, this may simply imply an 
inappropriate choice of American interest rate.
Official intervention seems to have influenced the franc-dollar 
exchange rate both directly and indirectly: the "narrow" franc-dollar 
ID is significant and correctly signed and the "wide" pound-dollar ID 
is negative and significant in the WP version implying that support 
for the dollar against the pound also caused it to strengthen against 
the franc. The insignificance of the "wide" franc-dollar ID (but 
significance of the "narrow" version) may imply that only major 
interventions had a significant effect on this exchange rate. This 
conclusion is supported by the size of the coefficient on the "narrow"
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version which is comparatively large indicating that official 
intervention led to exchange rate changes of the order of 3*2 - 4.4%.
This can be compared to the pound-dollar ID which was associated with 
changes of (approximately) only 1.1# in the pound-dollar rate 
(Table 5*4) and 1.2% in franc-dollar rate (Table 5*6).
The trend variable remains insignificant even though a 
secular decline in the franc against the dollar might have been 
expected due to increasing fears of war. It may be that the trend 
variable began too early to capture this effect (since Hitler did 
not come into power until 1933) or that the influence was an uneven 
one or that it was mostly felt in 1939 (which is not part of the sample 
period). There is, however, evidence of a seasonal effect although 
different combinations of variables are significant in each version of 
the equation. They are plotted in Fig. 5*4.
The seasonal effect in the COL version is not entirely clear: 
the same variables (as in the WP version) are significant but, whilst 
B2 has the same value and sign, A1 has a different value, the opposite 
sign and is only significant at the 20% level. Therefore two alternative 
seasonal patterns were plotted in Fig. 5*4 for the COL version, one 
based on both variables, the other with A1 = 0. In fact, all three 
potential seasonal patterns are strikingly similar, with identical 
peaks and troughs in terms of timing, the only difference being the 
value of the troughs. The main expectation about the seasonal pattern 
of the franc-dollar exchange rate is that it would probably be similar 
to that of the pound-dollar rate since European currencies as a whole 
tended to weaken against the dollar in the autumn and strengthen in 
the spring. This is precisely what Fig. 5.4 suggests. There was also 
an unexplained weakening of the franc (strengthening of the dollar) in
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FIGURE 5,k
ESTIMATED SEASONAL VARIATION IN THE DOLLAR-FRANC
KEY
VP : A1 = -0.09 , B2 = +0.11
COLO): A1 = +0.05 , B2 = +0.11
C0L(2): A1 = 0 , B2 = +0.11
April-June and strengthening of the franc (weakening of the dollar) 
in July-September. This corresponds closely to the pound-dollar 
pattern with the dollar tending to strengthen and then weaken in the 
April-August period (Fig. 5.2). Furthermore the size of the seasonal 
variation in the franc-dollar rate (- 2,2% - - 3»2%) is of a similar
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order to that of the pound-dollar rate (- 2.*+%) and to a leaser 
extent that of the pound-franc rate (- 3.9%).
Fewer speculative dummies were significant than in the pound- 
dollar and pound-franc estimates but all that were significant were 
correctly signed. A further difference relates to the tendency for 
smaller coefficients in the WP version than in the COL version (with 
the exception of F5 and S7). The performance of the American dummies 
was broadly consistent both with expectations and their performance 
in the pound-dollar estimates. S1, representing the flight of gold 
from the U.S. to the gold bloc in November, 1931» rather surprisingly 
fails to show up, and it must be assumed that official resistence 
(through intervention not picked up by the ID) prevented the implica­
tions of the gold movement from affecting the course of the exchange
(75)rate. S2, which was only significant at low levels in the pound-
dollar equation, is insignificant here. This is less unexpected than 
the failure of S3 which was significant in the latter. However, the 
interregnum period (between Roosevelt's election and taking office) 
was one of conflicting influences, and it may be that, as far as the 
franc-dollar exchange rate is concerned, they cancelled each other 
out.
Sk and S5 represent the 1933-3*+ period of dollar undervaluation 
and perform as expected indicating that the undervaluation was greater 
in 193*+ (following the U.S. gold buying policy) them in 1933» They
further suggest, in conjunction with earlier results, that the under-
(76)valuation was greater vis-a-vis the franc than the pound, which 
is perfectly consistent with historical fact since any undervaluation 
of the dollar might have been expected to be compounded by the over­
valuation of the franc in this period. It was anticipated that 36
-  1 8 0  -
would be associated with dollar strength due to the uncertainties 
caused by the impending gold clause judgement in early 1935» but it 
was, in fact, significant and wrongly signed in the pound-dollar 
estimates indicating dollar weakness; this was interpreted as 
suggesting a continued undervaluation of the dollar into 1935 and 
it may have been that in the determination of the franc-dollar 
exchange rate these two offsetting influences cancelled each other 
out thereby causing S6 to be insignificant. S7 and S9 are correctly 
signed and significant (albeit the latter at rather low levels) and, 
although S8 was excluded, because it corresponded exactly with two 
French dummies of the same expected sign (FIO and F11) their signifi­
cance may be at least partly attributed to the influence represented 
by S8. S10 is insignificant as it was in the final estimates of the
pound-dollar exchange rate.
The significant French speculative dummies are all correctly 
signed but there is some conflict with their performance in the pound- 
franc estimates where this was not the case. F1, F2 and Fk were 
insignificant in the estimates of both exchange rates. Four variables - 
F3, F6, F7 and F8 - which were significant in the pound-franc estimates 
were not significant here. This is a little surprising but it may 
reflect a tendency for events in France to have more impact (in 
terms of effects in confidence) in Europe than in America although 
this contention is somewhat undermined by the significance of F12 
which was insignificant in the pound-franc estimates. However, this 
is not necessarily the case since the "Blum experiment" (and the 
dummies associated with it) do seem to be a plausible exception to 
the suggested rule that incidents in France may have influenced 
European opinion more strongly. Another exception is the Laval
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d e fla t io n  (F5) w hich seems to have created equal pessimism about 
the franc on both  sides o f  the A t la n t ic .
The fo u r "Blum dummies" (F8, F9, F10 and F11) were s ig n if ic a n t  
and wrongly signed in  the pound-franc estim ates but in  the d o l la r -  
franc estim ates th ree  o f them are s ig n if ic a n t  and c o rre c t ly  signed.
At f i r s t  s ig h t , th e re fo re , the "Blum experim ent" seems p a ra d o x ic a lly  
to have caused th e  franc to strengthen against the pound but weaken 
against the d o l la r .  Th is is  not an im possible scenario but would 
seem an u n lik e ly  one; fo rtu n a te ly , a more p la u s ib le  a lte rn a t iv e  
explanation is  a v a ila b le  when the fo ur v a r ia b le s  are examined 
in d iv id u a l ly .  F8 is  in s ig n if ic a n t  and there is  no c o n f lic t  w h ils t  
F9, F10 and F11 correspond v i r t u a l l y  exa ctly  w ith American sp ecu la tive  
dummies which repre sen t periods o f  expected d o lla r  s tre n g th . Th is  i s  
p a r t ic u la r ly  tru e  o f F10 and F11 which correspond exactly  w ith  S8 
which was s ig n if ic a n t  and c o rre c t ly  signed in  the po un d -d o lla r 
estimates but was excluded here (to  avoid m u lt ic o l l in e a r it y ) .
Consequently an a lte rn a t iv e  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  F10 and F11 would be 
that they in d ic a te  the importance o f American ra th e r than French 
in fluence in  the shape o f a s ig n if ic a n t  and c o rre c t ly  signed S8. Th is  
is  s tro n g ly  supported by the s im ila r it y  o f  the actual c o e ffic ie n ts  o f 
F10 and F11. Thus there is  a case fo r  arguing that the "Blum experim ent" 
va ria b le s  are p ic k in g  up American and not French influences and th e re ­
fore there is  no c o n f l ic t  between the re s u lts  in  the pound-franc and
(77)poun d -do lla r estim ates.
In  co n c lu s io n , i t  is  c le a r that the performance o f the sp ecu la tive  
dummies and indeed, the general performance o f the two vers ion s o f the 
fra n c -d o lla r  exchange ra te , are h ig h ly  supp ortive  o f  the main hypotheses 
incorporated in  th e  model; in  p a r t ic u la r , there is  strong evidence o f
- 182 -
the expected r e la t iv e  p ric e  and r e la t iv e  income e ffe c ts . However, 
before d e riv in g  some general conclusions about the p o u n d -d o lla r-fra n c  
t r ia n g le  three outstanding issues have to be de a lt w ith : f i r s t l y ,  the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  re p la c in g  the sp ecu la tive  dummies by a "b la n k et" proxy 
fo r  sp e cu la tio n  based on forward exchange market data has ye t to be 
e m p ir ic a lly  exp lored ; secondly, s ince many o f  the va ria b le s  (most 
o b v io u s ly  the sp ecu la tive  dummies) appear in  more than one equation, 
an e x p l ic i t  examination o f  the consistency o f  th e ir  performance would 
seem a p p ro p ria te  -  fo r  example, i f  the same v a r ia b le  was associated 
w ith  s t e r l in g  a p pre c iation  against the d o lla r  but de prec iation  against 
the franc then th is  would re q u ire  exp la n a tio n ; f i n a l l y ,  the p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f  p o s it iv e  s e r ia l  c o rre la t io n  has to  be addressed since the D urbin-
/rpQ \
Watson s t a t is t ic s  are p e rs is te n t ly  in  the indeterm inate range.
These issues are  discussed in  the next s e c tio n .
( IV )
In  the d iscussion  o f how to e m p ir ic a lly  approximate the 
existence o f specu lation  ( in  chapter fo u r)  a v a r ie ty  o f p o s s ib i l i t ie s  
were d iscussed. U ltim ate ly  i t  was decided to  t r y  one v a ria n t o f each 
o f  the "g e n e ric "  types o f method that were id e n t i f ie d :  a measure aimed 
at p ic k in g  up the p o te n tia l speculation  induced by s p e c if ic  incidents 
(dummy v a r ia b le s )  and a "b la n k et" measure (based on forward market 
d a ta ). The form er was p re fe rre d  fo r  a number o f  reasons, most 
im porta n tly  the fact that "b la n k et" measures may pick up n on -specu lative  
in flue n ce s and, at the p ra c t ic a l le v e l ,  the lack o f su ita b le  data from 
which to  construct "b lanket" measures; in  fa c t , fo r  th is  la t t e r  reason -  
lack o f  re a d ily  accessible forward market data -  the "b lanket" measure
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used here could o n ly  be t r ie d  fo r  exchange ra te s  in v o lv in g  the 
pound.
Thus a s e r ie s  o f regression s were run fo r  the pound-do lla r
and pound-franc exchange ra te s  in  which the sp ecu la tive  dummies were
dropped and replaced by an SV (sp e cu la tive  v a r ia b le )  which consisted
o f the average three  month forward exchange ra te  adjusted by the
(79)three month in te re s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t ia l .  Speculation is  thereby
incorporated on the basis o f  the assumption that when there was an 
adjusted forward discount (premium) on a cu rre n cy, speculators were 
expecting i t  to  depreciate (a p p re c ia te ) and c a p ita l was therefore 
flow ing out o f ( in t o )  the country in  question  in  a n t ic ip a tio n , causing 
the spot ra te  to  weaken (s tre n g th e n ). In  both the po un d-do lla r and 
pound-franc equations the SV is  constructed in  such a way as to be 
expected to  have a negative s ig n .
In  the pound-franc equations i t  d id  indeed have a negative 
sign but was o n ly  s ig n if ic a n t  at ve ry  low le v e ls  (20 per c e n t). In  
a d d itio n  the two equations' performances were considerably worsened 
in  terms o f  h ig h e r standard e rro rs  o f the reg re ssion  and ( s l ig h t ly )  
lower R-squareds and F -s t a t is t ic s .  Furtherm ore, the Durbin-Watson 
s t a t is t ic  became very  low in d ic a tin g  the presence o f  s e r ia l  co rre la ­
t io n . In s o fa r  as th is  could be taken as evidence o f  omitted variab les  
(which is  a p o ss ib le  cause o f  s e r ia l  c o r re la t io n ) ,  one o f  which could 
be the presence o f  sp ecu la tive  c a p ita l flow s inadequately proxied 
by the SV, i t  could be in te rp re te d  as suggesting that the SV picked 
up le s s  o f  the sp ecu la tive  in fluence than the specu lative  dummies 
and so the la t t e r  are a b e tte r way o f m odelling speculation in  practice 
(as w e ll as in  th e o ry ) .
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The SV in  the p o u n d -d o lla r estimates was h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t  
but in c o r r e c t ly  signed. O ffs e tt in g  o f f i c i a l  in te rv e n t io n , not 
picked up by th e  ID , might have caused in s ig n if ic a n c e  but a p o s it iv e  
sign i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  in te rp re t .  The exp lanation  is  most probably 
to be found in  two sources: the va ria b le  may be based on inadequate 
data o r i t  may not be a su ita b le  proxy fo r  sp e c u la tio n  (o r  b o th ). 
Concerning the form er p o s s ib i l i t y ,  the choice o f in te re s t  ra te s  
may have created  some d is to r t io n ; the U .K .-U .S . in te re s t  ra te  
d i f f e r e n t ia l  was in s ig n if ic a n t  and i t  has been suggested that the 
in te re s t  ra te s  chosen may be in a p p ro p ria te . With regard to  the la t t e r  
p o s s ib i l i t y ,  i t  is  conceivable that the assumption th a t specu lators 
dominated the forw ard market does not h o ld ^ * ^  and th e re fo re  speculators 
were ( f o r  some reason) re a ctin g  against the expectations embodied in  
the forw ard ra te  o r , more fundam entally, the SV was p ic k in g  up some­
th in g  o th e r than sp ecu la tive  c a p ita l flow s. Perhaps some solace can 
be drawn from the observation  that g e n e ra lly , in  terms o f  R -squared, 
the Durbin-W atson and F -s t a t is t ic  and the standard e r ro r  o f  the 
re g re ssion  the p o u n d -d o lla r equation perform s b e tte r i f  sp ecu la tive  
dummies are used ra th e r than S V 's . As th is  i s  even more c le a r ly  
the case in  the pound-franc estimates the use o f sp e cu la tive  dummies 
in  the f in a l  equations seems ju s t i f ie d .
Use o f sp e c u la tive  dummies introduces th e  question o f  consistency: 
do, fo r  example, B r it is h  specu lative  dummies perform in  a consistent 
(o r at le a s t n o n -c o n tra d ic to ry ) way in  the p o u n d -d o lla r and pound-franc 
estim ates? T h is  question is  a lso  re levant f o r  the French and American 
sp ecu la tive  dummies and a lso  fo r  some o f the "economic fundamental" 
v a r ia b le s . The performance o f  the re levant v a r ia b le s  i s  summarized 
in  Tables 5*7 and 5*8» The expected signs
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o f the v a r ia b le s  are a lso  given in  Table 5«7 although, in  the 
present d is c u s s io n , emphasis is  placed mainly on consistency o f 
performance ra th e r  than p la u s ib i l i t y  (since th is  has a lready been 
dealt w ith  at some length above).
There are twenty s ix  sp ecu la tive  dummies in  Table 5 «7 . Four 
o f  these are s ig n if ic a n t  and c o rre c t ly  signed in  both exchange rates 
to which they a re  a pp licab le  w h ils t  a fu rth e r eleven are s ig n if ic a n t  
in  one but not in  the o th e r, g iv in g  a to ta l o f f i f te e n  dummy va ria b le s  
(5890 that are s ig n if ic a n t  and c o rre c t ly  signed fo r  at le a st one 
exchange ra te . The former are c le a r ly  perform ing in  a p e rfe c t ly  
consistent manner w h ilst the la t t e r  are not a c tu a lly  behaving incon­
s is t e n t ly .  A reasonable explanation would be that s ig n ifica n c e  in  one 
exchange ra te  b u t not the other suggests, on the one hand, that events 
which had e ffe c ts  on fo re ig n  confidence did  not in fluence opinion 
eq ua lly  s tro n g ly  in  a l l  fo re ig n  countries and, on the o th e r, that 
dom estically owned c a p ita l d id  not n e ce ssa rily  flow  out to (o r  re tu rn  
from) a l l  fo re ig n  countries in  equal p roportions when p o l i t ic a l  fa c to rs
were causing such c a p ita l to  move; both o f these p o s s ib i l i t ie s  are qu ite
, . . .  (81)p la u s ib le .
Of the o th e r eleven dummy va ria b le s  three are s ig n if ic a n t  and 
"w rongly" signed in  one o r both exchange rates and, to the extent 
that adequate explanations were found fo r  these "wrong" s ig n s , there 
is  no in co n siste n cy here . Nor is  there any in  the performance o f the 
f iv e  dummies th a t were always in s ig n if ic a n t ;  c le a r ly ,  the events that 
these va ria b le s  represented did not have the e ffe c t  on c a p ita l flows 
that might have p la u s ib ly  been expected. This leaves three f in a l  
va ria b le s  -  F9, F10 and F11 -  which are s ig n if ic a n t  and suggest a 
strong franc a ga in st the pound but a weak franc against the d o lla r ,
TABLE 5.7: SUMMARY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF 
THE SPECULATIVE DUMMIES
POUND-DOLLAR POUND-FRANC FRANC-DOLLAR
K1
POUND EXPECTED TO: 
Dec. 31-Feb. 32 D D X
K2 Jan.-Feb. 33 A X A
K3 May-Aug. 3^ D D X
#4 Mar. 35 D X X
S1
DOLLAR EXPECTED TO: 
Oct. 31 D NI X
S2 Apr.-May 32 D D* X
S3 Nov. 32-Feb. 33 D A X
Sk Apr.-Oct. 33 D D D
S5 Nov. 33-Dec. 3^ D D D
S6 Jan.-Apr* 35 A D D*
S7 Oct.-Nov. 36 A X A
s8 Jan.-June 37 A A NI
S9 Oct. 37-July 38 D D D*
S10 Aug.-Dec. J>8 A A* X
F1
FRANC EXPECTED TO: 
Nov.-Dec. 32 D X X
F2 Nov.-Dec. 33 D X X
F3 Mar.-Oct. J>h A A X
Fk Apr.-May 35 D X X
F5 June-Oct. 35 ? D D
F6 Nov. 35 D D X
F7 Jan.-Mar. 36 D D* X
f8 June-Sept. 36 D A X
F9 Oct.-Dec. 36 ? A* D
F1G Jan.-Feb. 37 D A D
F11 Mar.-June 37 7 A D
F12 July-Oct. 37 D X D
Key: A = A ppreciate, D = Depreciate, X = In s ig n if ic a n t ,  NI = not 
included fo r  th is  exchange ra te , * = o n ly  s ig n if ic a n t  at low 
le v e ls  or in  one va ria n t (WP or COL) o f the equation.
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thereby behaving in an apparently inconsistent manner. However, 
a close examination reveals (as already indicated in the discussion 
of the dollar-franc estimates) that this inconsistency is more apparent 
than real since all three variables correspond either exactly (F10 and 
F11 with S8) or almost exactly (F9 with S7) with American dummies 
associated with dollar strength. Hence F9, F10 and F11 are really 
picking up (expected) American effects in the dollar-franc estimates.
Thus there is no inconsistency in the performance of these (or any 
other) speculative dummy variables.
The performance of the "economic fundamental" variables which 
might be expected to behave in a consistent manner across the three 
exchange rates is summarized in Table 5*8. Although one variable - 
the pound-franc ID - carries a curious sign in the pound-dollar 
estimates, there is no actual inconsistency at all in Table 5*8.
Only one interest rate differential is significant; this is the U.K.- 
French differential which implies that a rise (fall) in French interest 
rates caused the franc to appreciate (depreciate) against both the pound 
and the dollar. There is no inconsistency but, at first sight, the 
significance of this variable and not the U.S.-French differential in 
the franc-dollar estimates seems rather strange. However, no differential 
which involved the U.S. interest rate (not even the U.K.-U.S. differential 
in the pound-dollar estimates) was ever significant and this has been 
put down elsewhere in the chapter to an inappropriate choice of U.S. 
interest rate and Table 5*8 would seem to support this conclusion. Only 
one intervention dummy was significant in two equations: this was the 
pound-dollar ID and its positive sign in both the pound-dollar and 
franc-dollar equations indicated that attempts to support the dollar 
against the pound were not only successful in doing just that but had
TABLE 5.8: A SUMMARY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF "ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS"
APPEARING IN THE ESTIMATES OF MORE THAN ONE EXCHANGE RATE
POUND-DOLLAR POUND-FRANC DOLLAR--FRANC
An increase in this variable is associated with:- POUND DOLLAR POUND FRANC DOLLAR FRANC
U.K.-U.S. interest rate differential X X X X X X
U.K.-French interest rate differential X X D A D A
U.S.-French " " " X X X X X X
Trend variable A D A D X X
A positive value of this variable is associated with:-
Pound-dollar intervention dummy (wide) A D X X D A
" " " " (narrow) NT NT NT NT NT NT
Pound -franc " " (wide) D A X X X X
" " " " (narrow) NT NT X X NT NT
Dollar-franc " " (wide) X X X X X X
" " " " (narrow) NT NT NT NT D A
KEY: A = Appreciate, D = Depreciate, X = Insignificant, NT = not tried.
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the side effect of causing the dollar to appreciate against the 
franc also (which seems quite plausible). The trend variable 
indicated a tendency for the pound to appreciate against both the 
dollar and the franc throughout the 1930's.
The third outstanding issue relates to the fact that in all 
the equations presented above« the Durbin-Watson statistic is in the 
inconclusive range, albeit towards the top of it in most cases. How­
ever, the suspicion of positive serial correlation nevertheless exists 
and must be faced. In many ways this is not surprising as an obvious 
a priori reason for it exists in the form of omitted variables, 
particularly trade controls, but also additional speculative or "non­
economic" influences; in this latter connection low Durbin-Watson 
statistics might be interpreted as suggesting that speculative 
influences had a greater role in exchange rate determination than is 
indicated by the speculative dummies. There are various ways of in­
vestigating the possibility of serial correlation and two avenues are 
explored here: firstly, it seemed reasonable to re-estimate the final 
equations' using the Cochrane-Qrcutt (CORC) techniquev since 
this option was available as part of the computer package that was 
being used; secondly, and in some ways preferably, given that the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is really only a summary measure, is to examine 
the residuals of the OLSQ final equations (presented above). Doing 
this would also give some indication of exactly when excluded variables 
were important and, to the extent that their effects took the form of 
speculative capital flows, when dummy variables should have been 
included. The CORC estimates are described first.
Using the CORC technique did slightly "improve" the equations 
in terms of lower standard errors of the regression, higher R-squareds
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and higher Durbin-Watson statistics (for two of the exchange rates) 
but, on balance, any other changes were inconsequential, and so the 
results are not presented in detail and only the changes are discussed. 
The most affected exchange rate was the pound-dollar: the relative 
price and income variables became significant in one less equation, 
leaving relative incomes significant in two out of three versions 
and relative prices in only one, although this was the WG version, 
arguably the most severe test of the PPP hypothesis, whilst ROW 
prices and incomes became insignificant in all three variants and 
the level of significance of the pound-dollar ID (insofar as it could 
still be called significant) dropped to 30 per cent; on the other hand, 
the awkwardly signed pound-franc ID is not even significant at this 
low level, half the previously significant speculative dummies are 
no longer significant and the U.K.-U.S. interest differential is now 
significant (and correctly signed) in all three versions.
Whether or not the CORC estimates actually provide any less 
support for the central hypothesis of "stable" exchange rates is 
therefore debateable. Furthermore some general doubts about the CORC 
estimates are created because of the change in sign (yet continued 
significance) of Sk which now indicates that the dollar was over­
valued in April-October, 1933 by some 20 cents. Not only does this 
run counter to the OLSQ and CORC estimates of the dollar-franc which 
indicate a substantial dollar undervaluation but it would seem to 
conflict with historical fact. Therefore, even if it were judged 
that there is a slight unfavourable balance in support for the model 
involved in switching from an OLSQ to CORC estimation technique, this 
should perhaps not be taken too seriously.
This is especially true given that the balance of support for
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the model is higher in the CORC estimates of the pound-franc 
exchange rate. To the fact that half the speculative variables 
become insignificant, as for the pound-dollar, can be added the 
insignificance of the previously significant and wrongly signed 
relative income variable and the observation that the reinstated 
pound-franc ID is significant (at the 10 per cent level) and correctly 
signed. Finally as rho is insignificant in both WP and COL equations, 
the OLSQ and CORC estimates of the franc-dollar exchange rate are, 
not surprisingly, virtually identical. Thus the CORC estimates do 
not really shed any further light on the main hypothesis of the study 
although they would not appear to undermine the OLSQ results.
An examination of the residuals, as already indicated, is likely 
to be more useful to the extent that it suggests exactly when important 
variables were being excluded (assuming that this is a plausible reason 
for any serial correlation). Obviously there is an initial difficulty 
in that no rules exist for interpreting residuals: how large does a 
residual have to be to merit consideration and how many consecutive 
residuals of the same sign constitute a significant cluster?^^ The 
procedure adopted here was to look for months in which the residuals 
were larger than one standard error of the regression in one of the 
variants and, unless the residual in the other variant(s) was very 
small or carried the opposite sign, to examine these plus any adjoining 
months in which the residuals of all variants carried the same sign. 
This rule, however, was not rigidly applied and sustained periods in 
which the residuals carried the same sign but remained smaller than 
one standard error were also considered. Such an approach should 
take in all periods of potential interest and all the periods identi­
fied by this "rule" are given in Table 5»9*
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TABLE 5.9(1 S^ SUMMARY OF LARGE RESIDUALS IN THE
ESTIMATES OF THE POUND-DOLLAR-FRANC TRIANGLE
POUND-DOLLAR POUND-FRANC DOLLAR-FRANC
1931 Nov. +
1932 Jan. Feb. ! ♦ JAN. Feb. -
MAR. APR. May!
June July AUG
Sept. OCT. - Sept. Oct. -
1933 APR. - APR. -
JULY + JULY +
AUG. -
Sept. Oct.
NOV. DEC. » + NOV. Dec. !♦193** Jan. Jan. FEB. - JAN. FEB. Mar!
May JUNE July -
SEPT. Oct.
Nov. DEC. Nov. Dec. - Nov. DEC. -
1935 JAN. +
MAY June July
Aug. Sept. Oct. NOV.,
Dec.
+
DEC. ♦
1936 Jan. .
JUNE +
JULY Aug. +
SEPT. -
OCT. + OCT. -
NOV. +
DEC. -
1937 NOV. Dec. -
1938 Mar. Apr. i 
May June
+ May June 
July +
äug. ; + Aug. Aug. ;
Sept. Oct. SEPT. OCT. )
Nov. Dec. +
Note (1) Months in block capitals are those in which the residual was
larger than one standard error in all variants of the exchange 
rate final estimates.
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It has been implied that large residuals probably represent 
omitted variables and therefore can be explained by examining what 
was happening in foreign exchange markets and specifically looking 
for potential reasons for speculation; this is the approach of 
Hudgins (1973) who does not use dummy variables. Unfortunately, in 
the present study it is likely to be difficult to identify reasons 
for large residuals because all the plausible reasons have been "used 
up" to derive dummies already incorporated into the model. However, 
there are several other possibilities: firstly, information on the 
effects of protection and all official intervention was not available 
and therefore either of these two influences may explain large residuals 
secondly, dummy variables of constant value are "blanket" measures which 
ignore the possibility of differing intensity over time of the effects 
they are seeking to capture. Finally, an alternative interpretation 
is that serial correlation is not indicative of excluded variables 
but rather suggests a misspecification of the dynamics of the model; 
whilst this is a simple model with no dynamics as such, the possibility 
of such a misspecification still exists if it is interpreted in terms 
of whether or not the timing of the dummies in the model is correct. It 
would therefore be instructive to examine whether periods of large 
residuals are adjacent to periods covered by dummy variables to look 
for "mistiming".
It is not proposed to examine the residuals on an individual 
exchange rate basis since any excluded variable that affected, for 
example, the pound would presumably cause residuals in both the pound- 
dollar and pound- franc estimates. Therefore it is more appropriate to 
examine the residuals of all three exchange rates at the same time. In 
fact, the single large residual in 1931 only actually involved one
exchange rate and occurred in the dollar-franc estimates in 
November, indicating a weaker dollar than predicted by the model.
The explanation for this would seem to be straightforward and lie 
in a mistiming of S1 which covers October, 1931 and was insignificant; 
hence the main impact of the outflow of gold from the U.S. to France
on the exchange rate appears to have been felt in November, not
(85)October as originally postulated. ^
Mistiming of a dummy variable - S3 (November, 1932 - March, 1933) -
would also seem likely to explain the September-October, 1932 residuals,
indicating unexplained dollar strength, in both the pound-dollar and
dollar-franc estimates. S3 was expected to be associated with dollar
weakness, but in the pound-dollar estimates it was significant and
"wrongly" singed. However, this sign was not entirely implausible
and hence the mistiming argument used here is not inconsistent with
the originally expected sign of S3 . The January-May, 1932 positive
residuals in the pound-franc estimates are probably explained by the
pound's recovery in early 1932; in particular, the large residual in
March is indicative of this, given that this is when the "most
( 8 6 )sensational developments" took place. The sudden drop in the
pound in November, 1931 and its recovery in early 1932 had been modelled, 
in dummy variable terms, by treating the November, 1931 - February, 1932 
period as one in which the pound was artificially weak rather than 
treating the March-April, 1933 period as one of exceptional sterling 
strength. This seems to have been appropriate for the pound-dollar 
exchange rate (since K1 is significant) but the experience of the 
pound in its fluctuations against the franc appear to have been 
slightly different.
The other two sets of large residuals in 1932 are less easy to
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explain: the June-August residuals in the pound-franc equation 
suggest sterling weakness and these months did witness a gradual 
depreciation of the pound against the franc which may indicate some 
reaction to the sterling strength in the first half of the year and 
possibly that the pound had reached an artificially high level; 
alternatively, this may represent official British intervention, 
aimed at pushing the pound down, carried out by the EEA in the first 
few months of its existence. The January-February residuals in the 
dollar-franc equation suggest dollar strength which could also indicate 
undetected official intervention in the form of support for the dollar, 
still tending towards weakness in early 1932, although this is 
admittedly fairly tenuous.
In 1933 large residuals only occur in the two dollar exchange 
rates and are therefore clearly related to the U.S. abandonment of 
the gold standard in March. This period represented an artificial 
undervaluation of the dollar but the actual downward movement was an 
uneven one and the large residuals almost certainly reflect the inad­
equacy of using a dummy variable with a constant value to take account 
of this. The large April negative residuals indicate a strong dollar 
but the dummy variable (S**) gives the average level of undervaluation 
in the April-October, 1933 period and the dollar did not depreciate 
substantially until May. There wa6 a sudden (and large) depreciation 
in July which the "averaging dummy" must inevitably understate, thereby 
explaining the large positive residuals in this month. Finally the 
downward trend in the dollar temporarily reversed itself in August 
which accounts for the large negative residual in the dollar-franc 
estimates. (There are also negative residuals in all three versions 
of the pound-dollar equation in August but they are all le6S than one 
standard error and therefore do not appear in Table 5*9)*
- 196 -
The positive residuals in both dollar exchange rates at the 
end of 1933 and going into the beginning of 193*+ can also probably 
be explained in terms of the inadequacy of a constant value dummy.
In this case it is the fact that S5 (November, 1933 - December, 193*+) 
cannot fully allow for the rapid depreciation at the end of 1933 whilst 
simultaneously allowing for the levelling off of the dollar in 193*+. 
Hence, in the November, 1933 - March, 193*+ period S5 only picks up 
part of the effect thereby leaving positive residuals, suggesting 
unexplained dollar weakness. The negative residuals at the end of 
193*+ are a symptom of the same problem: just as S5, in "averaging out" 
the undervaluation of the dollar in November, 1933 - December, 193*+ , 
underestimates the degree of dollar undervaluation in the first part 
of the period, so it seems to overestimate it at the end, leading to 
negative residuals (suggesting dollar strength).
The two sets of residuals in the pound-franc estimates in 193*+ 
obviously require a different explanation. The reason why there 
should be unexplained franc strength in January-February, 193*+
(negative residuals) is not immediately clear. On the one hand, it 
does precede a dummy variable designed to pick up franc strength 
(March-October, 193*+) so the mistiming of dummies may be a possibility 
but, on the other hand, this is rendered unlikely because these residuals 
immediately follow a period of alleged franc weakness in November- 
December, 1933 (F2). A more likely explanation is that the franc 
was receiving official support in early, 193*+« There are two good 
reasons to believe this: firstly, F2 i6 not significant, possibly 
indicating official support in late 1933, and secondly, a contemporary 
source reports that the Bank of France was buying francs in January,
193*+• ' However, the suggestion that the November-December, 193*+
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residuals, also indicating franc strength, are due to a mistiming 
(or rather a continued applicability) of F3 is quite plausible.
In 1935» the large residuals are mainly in the pound-dollar
estimates. The January residual (dollar weakness) could indicate
another averaging problem since the sign and significance of S6
(January-April, 1935) suggests that the 1933-*+ undervaluation of
the dollar continued into 1935 and it may be that January is more
properly considered as part of the period covered by the preceding
(8 8 )dummy variable (S5). The May-December residuals, indicating
further dollar weakness, are difficult to explain but could be 
interpreted as evidence that the dollar remained undervalued during 
the whole of 1935» The other residual in 1935 - December in the pound- 
franc - which carries over into January, 1936 could plausibly be 
interpreted as mistiming of (or rather a continuation of the effects 
of) F6 and F7, both of which are significant.
Just as the residuals in 1933 were all related to the dollar 
depreciation, so all the 1936 residuals appear to be related to the 
franc devaluation since they all occur in franc exchange rates. The 
June residual indicates unexplained franc weakness and could be due 
to a combination of the averaging implicit in the significance of F8 
covering June-September (which indicated franc strength) and the fact 
that in June, the first month of the Blum administration, the franc 
was particularly weak. The September residual in the pound-franc
equation could be interpreted as representing the very strong support 
for the franc required in its last month at its old value. Such support 
did occur^^^ and is represented in the pound-franc ID but this variable 
does not differentiate between strong and weak levels of intervention. 
Official support for the franc may also explain the positive July-Augu6t
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residuals in the dollar-franc estimates especially since, although 
F8 was insignificant, it was positive (indicating a stronger franc).
The October and December residuals in the pound-franc equation
are arguably due (once again) to the inability of dummy variables
to pick up uneven effects. F9 (October-December) is insignificant
in the COL version and significant (strong franc) in the WP version.
The positive residual in October and negative residual in December
would suggest that the forces causing the franc strength, being
picked up by F9, gradually became stronger in this three month
period and F9 seems to have gone through the middle of the period
(November) averaging out the effect, thereby overstating the degree
of franc strength in October and underestimating it in December. A
similar problem seems to have occurred in the dollar-franc estimates
in the same period, only in this case there are two significant dummies
(91)concerned - F9 (October-December) and S7 (October-November). 7
The negative residuals in November-December, 1937 in the dollar-
franc show unexplained franc strength (dollar weakness). One possible
interpretation would be mistiming (or rather continuation) of the final
three French speculative dummies - F10, F11 and F12 - which were all
significant, indicating sustained franc weakness throughout the first
ten months of 1937« However, this is doubtful given that the franc
(92)apparently recovered at the end of 1937« A more plausible
explanation may relate to the unevenness of the effect picked up 
by S9 (October, 1937 - July, 1938), a period of dollar weakness; 
this would suggest that the weakness of the dollar was more pronounced 
in the later part of this ten month period than in the earlier part. 
Such an explanation is consistent with the March-June, 1938 positive 
residuals in the pound-dollar estimates also being interpreted as
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indicative of the unevenness of the effect picked up by S9, since 
the sign of the residuals would suggest greater dollar weakness 
in the latter part of the period covered by S9.
The other three sets of residuals involving the dollar in 
1938 would all seem to be related to the reported flight of capital 
from Europe to America in autumn, 1938 and hence S10, which aims to 
pick up the associated dollar strength. S10 is insignificant in the 
dollar-franc estimates and the August-December residuals show why: 
it seems a fairly clear case of mistiming with S10, covering the 
whole of this period, insignificant because the dollar apparently 
strengthened in the first three months (especially September and 
October) and the franc recovered slightly at the end of the year.
The August-October residuals in the pound-dollar also overlap with 
S10 which was insignificant in the final estimates. The positive 
sign of these residuals (sterling strength) may show why: their sign 
would indicate that there was some pressure on the pound to appreciate 
possibly in the shape of official intervention to support the pound 
(which was certainly taking place at this time). Finally, the May- 
August residuals in the pound-franc estimates probably represent an 
undervaluation of the franc in this period in the sense that it was 
deliberately depreciated by Daladier in May, 1938. This action
possibly required a dummy variable in the first place.
Thus it would seem that there are plausible explanations for 
the majority of the large residuals in the estimates of the pound- 
dollar-franc triangle. These explanations relate principally to 
mistiming of dummy variables, undetected official intervention and 
the inability of dummies with a constant value (unity) to adequately 
pick up speculative influences of varying intensity. To this list
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might be added the distortions created by tariffs and import 
controls whose effects, by their very nature, are impossible to 
quantify and difficult to work out even in general terms (let alone 
in terms of explanations for specific residuals) and are therefore 
not used. It is also likely that a variety of minor speculative 
effects took place which it has not been possible to detect even from 
contemporary sources.
(V)
At this stage, it might be suggested that, having obtained 
these results, it would be appropriate to re-estimate modified 
versions of the final equations, perhaps using new speculative 
dummies derived from the analysis of the residuals. However, this 
is resisted for a number of reasons. Firstly, a certain amount of 
"experimentation" has already been carried out in various ways, most 
obviously the use of different income proxies and "narrow" and "wide" 
versions of the ID's in some equations. Secondly, such a procedure 
is, in some ways, rather dubious: economic models should be developed 
on the basis of economic theory not empirical results. Finally, and 
perhaps most important, a halt has to be called somewhere and, to the 
extent that the basic model "explains" exchange rates and that the 
large residuals have been satisfactorily accounted for, a modified 
version of the model is unlikely to shed any further light on the 
hypotheses being tested.
However, before drawing some preliminary conclusions a few 
words should be said about a theoretical matter, raised in chapter two, 
relating to the fact that in any exchange rate triangle to estimate
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all three exchange rates involves, in a sense, one estimation too 
many, in that once two of the exchange rates have been estimated 
so has the third (implicitly) and its predicted value can be 
calculated through cross-rates. A number of arguments were 
advanced at that point, to suggest that the third exchange rate 
ought to be estimated anyway but it was also indicated that it might 
be interesting to examine the difference between the predicted direct 
rate and the predicted cross-rate for each of the three exchange 
rates in the major exchange triangle, and it was suggested that any 
large inconsistencies would merit some comment. Before doing this 
it seemed reasonable to make an adjustment for any differences 
between the actual direct and actual cross-rates; in fact, these 
turned out to be very slight (as would be expected) and so the 
adjustment was a minor one.
The results of this exercise were rather surprising: for all
three exchange rates there were frequent and occasionally large
differences. For the pound-dollar rate 55% of the observations have
a difference between the predicted direct and cross-rates which is
greater them one standard error of the regression of the final equation
(and 30% are greater than two standard errors). The comparable figure
for the other two exchange rates are less discouraging - 30% (10%) for
(04)the pound-franc and k0% (15%) for the dollar-franc - but never­
theless quite large, sufficiently so to require some explanation.
This may be found by observing that there are, in fact, three 
conditions for the predicted direct and predicted cross-rates to be 
identical and that these may not have been fulfilled. Firstly, there 
should be no differences between the actual direct and cross-rates 
but this cannot be used as an explanation here because an adjustment
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has been made to allow for it. Secondly, there must be a linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables in 
the equations for all three exchange rates; this has obviously been 
assumed to be the case in the estimations and therefore cannot be used 
as an explanation either. Thirdly, the independent variables should 
be the same in all three equations. This can be used as it is clearly 
not the case and no adjustment has been made to make allowance for it. 
Even in the initial estimates (with all relevant variables included) 
this was not the case: although the "economic fundamental" variables 
of all three countries are included in each exchange rate this is 
not true of the speculative dummies; thus, for example, the pound- 
dollar estimates include British and American but not French dummies 
and so on. In the final estimates the differences in the independent 
variables in the three equations are even greater because the in­
significant variables omitted differ for the three exchange rates.
Thus this may to a large extent explain the differences between the 
predicted direct and predicted cross-rates.
Nevertheless, these differences may be interpreted as providing 
some evidence to suggest that some important influences have been 
excluded from the model, probably relating to the effects of 
(unidentified) speculation and the high level of protection. On 
the other hand, however, it may be argued, with some justification 
given the lack of fulfilment of the third condition listed above, 
that to exject accurate predictions of cross-rates is a very severe 
test of the model and, an optimistic way of interpreting the above 
results would be to conclude that, not only does the model seem to 
largely determine movements in directly observed exchange rates, but 
it also "explains" what determines cross-rates (to within two standard
203
errors of their predicted direct values) for approximately four-fifths 
of the time.
To conclude then, the performance of the model in explaining 
the movements within the pound-dollar-franc triangle is, on the whole, 
good enough to generate a fair measure of support for most of the
hypotheses embodied within it. There is substantial evidence to suggest 
that the major exchange rates were not exclusively determined by specu­
lative factors but that the underlying "economic fundamental" influences 
w.ere of great importance and, to that extent, these exchange rates were 
more "stable" than is commonly supposed.
Furthermore, where speculation was apparently important (in the 
shape of significant speculative dummies) it was not always entirely 
clear that it was "destabilising". In a situation where speculation 
(as represented by the dummy variables) is based on "correct" expectations 
about changes in "economic fundamentals" then it is stabilising rather 
than destabilising (although possibly still inconvenient from the 
government's point of view). Speculation can only really be described 
as destabilising either where there is some extrapolation of such 
expectations causing the exchange rate to fluctuate excessively or 
where it is based on reaction to non-economic fundamentals - for 
example, to political events - which should not influence the exchange 
rate. This difficulty of interpretation is present in the other tests 
of the model and is ta-:en up again in the conclusions of this section.
In the next two chapters the model is tested for exchange rates 
involving four minor currencies and, on the basis of the results of 
these tests and of those in the present chapter, some conclusions 
will be drawn about bilateral exchange rates in the 1930's in general.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5
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crucially depended on France staying on gold and, as soon as France 
left gold and devalued, the remaining gold bloc countries (Switzerland 
and Holland) were compelled to do the same (against their will).
Hence the currencies of such countries were, in a sense, "pegged" to 
the franc.
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56. Economist, 29/5/37, p. 15*+. See also Yeager (1976), p. 36**, and Lloyds Bank Review, April, 1937, pp. 190-1 and May, 1937, p. 2*+8: "The market has lately been inclined to take a less 
hopeful view of the French financial outlook..."
57. For example, see Lloyds Bank Review, August, 1937, pp. *t63-*+ 
and October, 1937, p. 575, Economist, 2*t/7/37, p. 187, 18/9/37» 
p. 563 and p. 568.
58. Yeager (1976), p. 36*+.
59* There were also two groups of partially overlapping dummies: firstly, where the period a (shorter) dummy was "on" fitted entirely within the (longer) period another dummy was "on" - 
K2 into S3, K3 into S5, K*+ into S6, K3 into F3, F1 into S3, F2 and F3 into S5; and secondly, where two dummies overlapped for a 
month or more - F*+ and S6, F9 and S7, F12 and S9.
60. This is an inexact exercise and some insignificant variables may 
still appear in the final equations. The main reason for this is that where a variable was clearly significant in one version of a particular equation (for example, pound-dollar cost-of-living indices), it was felt to be inconsistent not to include it in other versionsof that equation (pound-dollar wholesale prices and pound-dollar wage indices), regardless of its level of significance in the first and second stage estimates of these other versions.
61. The F-statistics for the "economic fundamental" and "speculative" groups (followed in parenthesis by the F-statistic value to beexceeded to indicate significance at the 1% level) were respectively: pound-dollar (COL) 65-5 (2.9) and *+*+.0 (3«*+); pound-dollar (WP)57*0 (2.9) and 30.1 (3.**); pound-dollar (WG) 52.6 (2.9) and 32.8 (3.*+); pound-franc (COL) 271.5 (3-0) and 1*t.O (3.0); pound- franc (WP) 186.3 (3.0) and 12.** (3.0); franc-dollar (COL) 58.2 (2.9) and 26.1 (2.5); franc-dollar (WP) 51.7 (2.9) and 15-3 (2.5).
62. In addition S1 was excluded from the regressions. It represented weakness of the dollar in November, 193”1 as attention shifted from the pound to the dollar. Such weakness of the dollar can hardlybe expected to show up against the pound which had just depreciated 
sharply.
63. Hudgins (1973) tried a variety of interest rates and ultimately concluded: "The consistent failure of any interest rate - whether it be a call rate differential, a three month bond differential, or a treasury bill rate - to have a significant effect on the exchange rate indicates that funds did not flow from country to country because of a simple difference in money interest rates".
(pp. 222-3).
6**. These latter two possibilities are discussed in detail in Ch. **,
Section III.
65. This figure corresponds remarkably well with that of Whitaker andHudgins (1976) who suggest that "a typical intervention by the EEA altered the exchange rates by between 2 and 8 cents" (p. 1*+83). It is true that the variable here refers to both British and American
cont /
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intervention, but if the conclusion of Hudgin's earlier 6tudy (1973* p* 220) is correct then the American fund was ineffective 
anyway and therefore the figures in Table 5**+ are comparable with those of Whitaker and Hudgins. However, Hudgins' earlier work also suggested a somewhat higher value - in the 4-11 cents range 
(1973» Tables 4.1 - 4.12) - although the figure in the present study still falls within this range.
66. In fact, this variable was significant and correctly signed in 
the franc-dollar estimates.
67. An alternative explanation would be that this result is supportive of a monetary approach to exchange rate determination which would predict a positive sign for the relative income variable. See footnote 12 of Ch. 4 for an explanation of why a positive sign 
should be expected.
68. See, for example. Ozmun (1976) Tables 4.5 and 4.6, p. 95 and p. 98 respectively.
69» See, for example, the Economist, 4/4/36, p. 17 and 30/1/37, p. 243.
70. Ozmun (1976), p. 86.
71. This was not done because it would have involved some clumsy and ill-defined averaging process.
72. It is true that the bi-lateral income ratio carried the wrong sign but it was suggested above that probably only one of the two income proxies was indicating a negative income effect and though 
they are not tested seperately here, the suspicion, based on Qzmun's study (1976), would be that it was the British not French 
income proxy that was behaving in this manner (See Ozmun, 1976,Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.7 on pages 82, 88, 90 and 100 respectively). Therefore, the drop in French income at the turn of 1931 can be legitimately put forward as an alternative (to K1) reason for the strengthening of the franc against the pound in spite of the incorrect sign of the ratio form of the variable. A completely different explanation for the insignificance of K1 is that it is "mistimed". This possibility is taken up in the discussion of the 
residuals for this period in Section IV below.
73« As already suggested it may also have reflected the influence ofK3 which was significant in the pound-dollar estimates but surprisingly 
not in the pound-franc estimates.
74. Ozmun (1976), pp. 84-5.
75« Another possibility is "mistiming" of S1 which is taken up in the discussion of the residuals below.
76. The coefficients of S4 and S5 would suggest that in April-October,
1933 the dollar was undervalued by 7.6-9«13» against the pound and 11.1-12.1% against the franc and in November, 1933 - December, 193^  by 13*9-16.1% against the pound and 15*3-22.1% against the franc.
- 209 -
77« Admittedly this is less true of F9 (October-December, 1936)which corresponds closely with S7 (October-November, 1936) since the latterwas insignificant in the pound-dollar estimates and 
significant and correctly signed in the franc-dollar estimates 
(so that the "American effect" i6 arguably already being picked up). However, there was some ambiguity about the sign of F9 anyway (Table 5«3, Section II) so it is not entirely implausible for it to carry different signs in estimates for different exchange rates.
78. This is actually quite wide; in most of the equations the lower limit is approximately 1.1 and the upper limit 2.1.
79. SV = iUK^  “ (FR/SP x 1+00 )_7
where ip = annual foreign interest rate on three month prime bills 
iyp = " British " " " " » " "
FR = three month forward premium (+) or discount (-) in units of foreign currency per pound
SP = spot exchange rate in units of foreign currency per pound.
80. Although this runs counter to the views of at least one very important contemporary observer - Governor Norman of the Bank of England - who certainly thought that it did. See Howson (1980), p. 39-
Si . Thus, for example, political uncertainty in France may, on the one hand, have caused British owners of capital in France to repatriate it whilst having no effect on American owners of capital in France and, on the other, caused French owners of capital in France to shift their funds out of the country mainly to Britain. Therefore the franc might have weakened against the pound but not the dollar 
and hence, a speculative dummy seeking to pick up such capital movements would be significant in the pound-franc but not the dollar-franc estimates.
82. Some variables excluded from the final equations because of insignificance in the first stage estimates were restated in the CORC estimates. In particular, the pound-franc ID ("wide" version) was included in the pound-franc estimates.
83. This is an iterative process which involves obtaining estimatesof the autoregressive parameter, rho (p), from the residuals of the original OLSQ estimates, re-estimating the transformed equation
( t Yt .  n_7 = a Z“1 - + e C \  - e _7. etc.)
and then repeating the procedure using the value of £> calculated from the residuals of the transformed equation and so on until the 
value of (3 converges.
8*t. Allied to this, is the further problem that as more them one variant of each exchange rate is used, different variants may have different patterns of residuals. Fortunately, this problem does not materialise, particularly in the potentially most likely case (because there are three variants) - the pound-dollar - in which the three sets of residuals are virtually identical.
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85. This gold outflow occurred throughout the October-December, 1931 period but, it was argued, was at its heaviest in October, which
is why S1 covered that month. (S1 was not used in the pound-dollar 
estimates as it was not applicable. See footnote 25 above).
86. Economist, 9/7/32, p. 57.
87. Economist, 27/1/3**» p. 179« In fact, this leads to the wide 
version of the pound-franc ID having a value of -1 in January,
193**.
88. It must be conceded that this is not a strong argument. S6 was,
in fact "wrongly" signed since the dollar was expected to be strong 
in early 1935» partly because of the impending gold clause judgement 
which affected January in particular. The argument that S6 reflected continued undervaluation of the dollar was originally introduced as 
an explanation of its "wrong" sign.
89. In addition, the franc apparently rallied in July. See footnote 
52 (above).
90. See the Economist, 19/9/36, p. 569 and 25/9/36, p. 618.
91. The values of S7 are -0.45 (COL) and -0.66 (WP) and of F9 are 
-O.69 (COL) and -0.39 (WP). These would suggest the followingcombined effect:
Oct. Nov. Dec.
COL -1.14 -1.14 -0.69
WP -1.05 -1.05 -0.39
The residuals are identical (with opposite signs) in October and 
December in both COL (- 0.29) and WP (- 0.22) versions. This would 
adjust the above effect to indicate that the pressures causing franc weakness became progressively weaker:
Oct. Nov. Dec.
COL -1.33 -0.85 -0.69
WP -1.28 -0.82 -0.39
92. See the commentary on events in France and potential influences 
on the franc in Section II of this chapter above.
93« See the Economist, 7/5/38, pp. 302-3» for example.
94. Using R-squareds, Durbin-Watson statistics, t-statistics and the 
standard errors of the regression as criteria, the regressions 
involving predicted direct rates were clearly "better" than those 
using predicted cross-rates.
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CHAPTER 6
THE REST OF THE GOLD BLOC: THE BELGA,
THE GUILDER AND THE SWISS FRANC
( I )
Following the abandonment of the gold standard by Britain 
in 19311 a number of European countries stayed on gold with France 
and formed what came to be known as the gold bloc. Although in a 
sense these correncies were "fixed" (to gold) for much of the period, 
some of them - the "free gold bloc currencies", that is those which 
did not engage in extensive exchange controls (like Italy) - might 
provide a further testing ground for the model developed here, to the 
extent that other currencies, like the pound floated against them and 
hence the pound-belga exchange rate,for example, could be viewed as 
"floating" (even though Belgium was on the gold standard). Further­
more, the guilder and the Swiss franc actually did float after the 
final collapse of the gold bloc in 1936.
Nevertheless, it might still be argued that the course of the 
belga, guilder and Swiss franc was largely determined by the relation­
ships within the pound-dollar-franc triangle and that the exchange 
rates of these minor gold bloc currencies against these three major 
currencies were little more than cross-rates. However, whilst this 
may be true to a point, it might still be expected that the basic 
hypotheses of the model should hold in the sense that these currencies' 
exchange rates could not stray too far away from the path indicated 
by "economic fundamentals" and the model is therefore applicable in a 
permissive sense. Thus the relationship between the exchange rates
of the minor gold bloc currencies and the variables in the model 
is still hypothesised to hold but in a much looser sense although 
some indication that relative prices and the other "economic 
fundamentals" were important is still expected. In view of this, 
however, the depth of study of these currencies will be rather less 
than for the pound-dollar-franc triangle: only exchange rates between 
each of the three minor gold bloc currencies with each of the three 
major currencies will be examined (nine exchange rates in all) and 
the results will be presented and analysed more briefly; for example, 
there will be no detailed analysis of the residuals. This is in line 
with the lesser importance of these currencies and the lesser applica­
bility of the model.
The estimation procedure will, nevertheless, be the same 
although there is an additional problem in that for each of the three 
minor gold bloc currency exchange rates considered there will be two 
potential "third countries" to represent the RCW. It may seem obvious 
that France, as the leading gold bloc currency, should represent the 
ROW wherever possible but, not only does this not solve the problem 
for exchange rates involving the French franc, it is also rather 
contentious. The importance of the U.K. and U.S. to these countries 
should not be overlooked both in terms of their positions as major 
countries in the world economy and also in terms of specific links; 
for example, Britain was one of Holland's two major trading partners 
(and the other was Germany not France) and Belgium was technically 
linked with the U.S. in 193&-8 due to the fact that they were both 
on the gold standard and indeed, the belga (and also the guilder and 
the Swiss franc) moved with the dollar in the 1937-8 period on occasion. 
The solution to the problem adopted here was to use both potential third
countries. For example, in the belga-pound case, two sets of
preliminary estimates, one using the U.S. as the ROW and the other 
France, were estimated and the significant third country variables 
of both the U.S. and France were included simultaneously to produce 
only one set of estimates in later stages.
(1)
Before examining the economic history of these countries to 
derive speculative dummies, it might be useful to give a brief over­
view of the movements of the belga, guilder and Swiss franc in the 
1930's. The history of the belga is very straightforward: it remained 
on the gold standard until the end of March, 1935 when it was devalued 
by 28% and the gold standard was maintained at this new value for the 
rest of the 1930's. With this one exception then, exchange rate 
movements of the belga were dominated by changes in the other currency: 
thus the belga appreciated unevenly against the pound in the September, 
1931 to March, 1935 period, then depreciated sharply to a value 
approximately 2 0 % higher than its 1929 value where it stayed until 
appreciating slightly in late 1938* it does much the same against 
the dollar only the appreciation is in the April, 1933 to March, 1935 
period and there is no appreciation in late 1938; finally, the belga 
hovers around its gold parity with the franc until the sharp devalua­
tion to a new parity in late March, 1935 where it remains until the 
franc begins its decline in late 1936 which continued until late 1938.
The fluctuations of the guilder against the major currencies 
were very similar to those of the belga, only the guilder depreciated 
not in March, 1935 but at the end of September, 1936. There were also 
two other differences: firstly, the depreciated level of the guilder 
was 30% (not 20%)above its 1929 value against the pound and the dollar 
in October, 1936 and, indeed, it actually appreciated by 10% against
the franc; secondly, and more importantly, the guilder did not
readopt the gold standard at a lower parity but, according to the
Dutch authorities, was floated - "we just want to see how the guilder
(2 )will manage" - although it is probable that the guilder was 
temporarily and unofficially pegged to the dollar for part of 1937»
The course of the Swiss franc in 193'!—8 was virtually identical 
to that of the belga with the obvious difference that the Swiss 
depreciation came in late September, 1936 (like the guilder) although 
the new level of the Swiss franc was similar to the belga's rather 
than the guilder's (in terms of its relationship with 1929 values). 
However, the type of exchange rate regime adopted by Switzerland was 
unlike that of Belgium or Holland in that the Swiss franc was neither 
fixed at a new gold parity nor freely floated; instead it was allowed 
to float but with the intention of trying to maintain its value 
approximately 10% above that of the pound and the dollar; further­
more, like the guilder (and belga), the Swiss franc moved with the 
dollar for part of the autumn, 1936 to 1938 period (though certainly 
not all of the time).
(II)
In spite of the importance of external pressures in determining 
the exchange rates of the minor gold bloc currencies, it seemed 
desirable to allow for possible speculative effects by deriving 
dummy variables in the same way as this had been done for the three 
major currencies and this exercise is carried out for each country 
in turn below. It would be useful to begin the discussion of Belgium 
and the belga with a few general points. In the first place, it should
-  2 1 5  -
be noted that there was a strong "psychological" link between the 
belga and the French franc, even as late as 1938:
"The position of the belga has undoubtedly been 
affected by the recent depreciation of the French 
franc.....It is true that economic ties linking the 
two countries are no longer so close...^ ior are7»*.their 
political relations. But the psychological link is still 
there and its power has been clearly demonstrated lately". (3)
This would imply that any weakness in the French franc would be 
transferred (via speculation) to the belga.
However, this relationship should not be overstressed: in
autumn, 1938, the belga (for a time) strengthened with the dollar,
even though other European currencies were weakening, because of the
indirect link with the dollar due to both currencies being on the gold
standard; furthermore, there were those who believed that Belgium's
strongest attachment (via trade flows) was with the sterling bloc and
that after the March, 1935 devaluation the belga should have been
tied to sterling not gold, or even that the belga ought to have
(4)followed the pound in 1931. A second major characteristic of 
Belgium in the 1930's that is particularly relevant here is that, 
mainly because of its position as an open economy, Belgian protec­
tionism was generally half-hearted with a preference for "a policy
(5)  .of negotiation....to one of direct attack". This would indicate 
that distortions due to tariffs and other import controls are likely 
to be less of a problem in the Belgian case. Tnis is not necessarily 
true of speculation, however, and attention is now turned to deriving 
dummy variables to allow for this.
The British abandonment of the gold standard in 193^  caused very 
little alarm in Belgium. Indeed, in February, 1932, a contemporary
Bouree was moved to comment:
"The general trust in the Belgian currency has caused 
the belga to stand at a premium in the exchange market, 
even in ratio to the French franc exchange except in September...." (6)
This confidence seems to have continued into the first half of 
1932 despite a slight change in the composition of the government 
in May. However, in July, 1932, there was a miners' strike and 
even riots when some miners refused to accept wage cuts; the government, 
with less them a year left to run, was reluctant to deal with this and 
the further cuts in expenditure needed to balance the budget and 
eventually chose to resign (in October). Thus July-October, 1932 
represents a period of probable belga weakness. On the election of a 
new government, in November, confidence returned and November-December, 
1932 may well have represented a period of belga strength.
In 1933 the budget was brought back into balance (with the 
government ruling by decree for a period) and:
"The currency was stable throughout the year". (7)
This was undoubtedly due to the internal political stability of 
Belgium and also the country's general monetary position:
"The monetary situation of the country remains very strong....Belgium is the only country still on the 
gold standard which has seen its gold reserves increase in the last six months". (8)
No speculative dummies would therefore seem to be required for 1933»
However, the story is rather different in 193^ « a year of 
recurrent speculation about the future of the belga, which became 
particularly excessive towards the end and carried on into 1935 until
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the belga wae devalued in late March. The deterioration began in
mid-l^^ with the fall in gold prices necessitating further deflation
(if Belgium were to maintain the gold standard) at the same time as
the effects of the U.S. undervaluation were beginning to be felt.
At the end of September, the members of the gold bloc met and confirmed
their intention to maintain the gold standard; the necessity to do
this might have been interpreted as a sign of weakness. A week
later the belga developed "sudden weakness as a result of the
(9)political crisis at the end of last week" which involved rows 
over further deflation culminating in the resignation of two ministers. 
The arguments continued and ultimately the whole cabinet resigned 
(on November, 13th). To some extent this reflected a growing debate 
within the country in which those in favour of devaluation were rapidly 
gaining ground. The effect on the belga was a further decline in 
confidence:
"Rumours of devaluation and the consequent capital outflow 
became particularly intense in November, 193**"« (10)
Loans were raised in America (in November) and Switzerland and 
Holland (in December) but the problems continued.
Matters were not helped by the fact that this loss of confidence 
in the belga coincided with a major banking crisis which, according 
to one source was ultimately the main cause of the devaluation:
"The need for fundamental reform in Belgian banking had 
become glaringly apparent in the banking crisis late in 
193*4 and early in 1935, which more than any other was the 
factor immediately responsible for the devaluation of the 
belga...." (11)
Thus the weakness continued into 1935 and, indeed, intensified in 
February when it became clear that the Socialist Party would strongly
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resist further deflation. In March, an attempt to persuade the
French to give concessions in a bilateral trade and financial
agreement (to help prop up the belga) failed. On March 19th, the
government resigned and by March 26th planeloads of Belgium currency
were being flown out of the country to be sold for what they would 
(1 2)fetch. At the end of the month the newly formed "National
Government" devalued the belga (by 28%). This sustained period of 
pressure on the belga obviously requires some kind of representation 
in the model and it was decided to use two speculative dummies (to 
try and take account of the differing degree of intensity of the 
speculation), BG3 (September, 193*+ - January, 1935) and BG*+ (February- 
March, 1935)» both of which are expected to be associated with belga 
weakness.
The next year witnessed a dramatic change in Belgium as 
prosperity very rapidly returned and no more speculative dummies 
are required until June, 1936, when a variety of political influences 
may have led to uncertainty about Belgium and the belga (and hence 
weakness). Although the election in late May left the three major 
parties with the majority of the seats, the improved position of 
the extremist parties - the Communist and a new (fascist) party, the 
Rexists - gave a certain shock to confidence which was further 
undermined by the delay and difficulties of forming a new government 
(it took three weeks) and by an outbreak of strikes in June. A fifth 
speculative dummy will therefore be included for June, 1936.
The focus of attention in 1936 was, however, very much on the 
rest of the gold bloc which ultimately collapsed in late September.
It seems reasonable, nevertheless, to suppose that there may have
(13)been some effect on the belga, probably a weakening, and at least
to include a variable in the October-December period to test for 
. . 0*0 „this. In the first half of 1937 there is no evidence of
speculative effects but in July the belga apparently weakened due
mainly to events in France and the "psychological" link between the 
(15)two countries and also further internal political uncertainties 
(connected with the Rexists).
The real problems for the belga, though, came in the latter 
part of the year and continued into 1938. In September there was an 
internal political scandal involving the Prime Minister which had an 
immediate effect on the belga:
"The crisis in Brussels gave rise to a transfer of funds 
to New York". (16)
Nor was the situation helped by the troubles of the French franc.
In late October, the Prime Minister resigned which led to fears of a 
more left wing government and hence the belga stayed weak. In fact, 
it took four weeks to form a new government and confidence continued 
to wane until the end of the year.
In the new year (1938), this decline was fuelled by more trouble 
with the miners and a government decision to increase taxation. Matters 
took a further turn for the worse in March, initially set off by fresh 
weakness in the franc:
"The fall in the French franc has put a severe strain on 
the belga. Capital is leaving the country". (17)
Budget difficulties were causing internal political problems and in 
late April the Finance Minister resigned, quickly followed by the entire 
government (on May 5th). Thus the reasons for the belga weakness in 
March-May, 1938 were twofold:
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"The unfortunate coincidence of a political crisis 
with a devaluation of the French franc has provided 
the required background for this attack on the belga 
to develop". (18)
Thus there are good reasons to believe that the belga was weakened 
by speculative forces in the whole of the September, 1937 - May, 1938 
period. However, two separate dummies will be used - BG8 (September, 
1937 - February, 1938) and BG9 (March-May, 1938) - partly to reflect 
the probability of differing intensities of the speculation and partly 
because, in a sense, the March-May, 1938 weakness had different causes. 
The Belgian speculative dummies are summarized in Table 6.1.
TABLE 6.1: BELGIAN SPECULATIVE DUMMIES
VARIABLE PERIOD ON TENDENCY OF BELGA REASON
INAPPLICABLE
TO
BG1 July-Oct. 1932 weak Strikes, unrest, government resignation.
BG2 Nov.-Dec. 1932 strong New government and return of confidence.
BG3 Sept. 193^  - 
Jan. 1935
weak Loss of confidence for various reasons (including fall of the government and banking crisis)
BGif Feb.-March 1935 weak Accelerated loss of confidence (various reasons).
BG5 June, 1936 weak Strikes, difficulties in forming a government (after 
elections).
BG6 Oct.-Dec. 1936 weak Sympathy with French franc. France
BG7 July, 1937 weak Sympathy with French franc. France
BG8 Sept. 1937 - Feb. 1938
weak Loss of confidence for various reasons (including an internal 
political scandal).
BG9 Mar.-May 1938 weak Accelerated loss of confidence (various reasons).
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In many wayB Holland had the most depressing experience in
(19 )the 1930's of the countries in the study end unlike the others 
(such as Belgium) experienced only a very brief recovery after 
abandoning its old gold parity in 1936; the Economist's economic 
reports on Holland in the 1930's carry the heading "Unemployment 
Rising" with depressing regularity. More specifically there are two 
characteristics of the Dutch economy which might be highlighted in the 
present context (before examining events in detail), both of which 
may act to undermine the model developed here. In the first place, 
the Dutch supported the gold standard with a fervour that was almost 
religious, led by the Governor of the Central Bank who vowed, on taking 
office in October, 1931s
"With all the means within my power I shall maintain the 
standard of our coinage". (20)
Nor was this feeling in any way diminished by mid-1936:
"Holland may put up a longer resistance to the forces 
of devaluation. The authorities in that country are 
probably more rigidly orthodox and deflationist than 
anywhere else in the world". (21)
This extreme "orthodoxy" may have created pressures that caused the 
guilder to deviate from the path indicated by "economic fundamentals".
A second distortion may have been created by the strong protectionist 
policy of Holland, although in fairness this was largely retaliatory. 
Nevertheless:
"The Government of the Netherlands still pursues its active 
protectionist policy. The system of quota restrictions on 
imports is constantly being extended". (22)
"The quota policy of the Dutch government is being pursued 
unremittingly". (23)
Moreover, the Dutch were not prepared to backtrack on their 
protectionist policy after the devaluation (as the Belgians had 
done). Although it is true that Dutch protection was retaliatory 
and, insofar as it merely offset foreign protection, there could 
have been a cancelling out leaving the influence of relative prices 
and other "economic fundamentals" undistorted, this is rather tenuous 
and the applicability of the model to the guilder may turn out to be 
limited.
During the 1931-8 period Holland displayed remarkable political 
stability, much more so than Belgium (or ft*ance), being governed by the 
same right wing coalition and having the same prime minister (except 
for a short period in 1935)» This may have been expected to Instil 
confidence in the country and the currency but, nevertheless, there 
were still periods during which speculative influences may have been 
operative and these should be examined. The British abandonment of 
the gold standard had a minimal effect on the guilder which is not 
surprising; given the strong Dutch feelings about the gold standard, 
there was no question of the guilder following the pound and con­
sequently no evidence of speculation to this effect either in late 
1931 or throughout 1932. However, the American depreciation in 1933
did cause "fears that the guilder would have to follow the fate of the
(ph )dollar" and, in particular, the guilder experienced difficulties 
in May and June:
"In the early summer....Holland....suffered such a panic 
flight of capital that.../it wa£7...within measurable 
distance of having to suspend gold payments". (25)
Indeed, it was the "run on the guilder /_That~J precipitated a move
(26 )towards the formal organisation of the 'gold bloc' " in July which
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Beems to have brought this period of speculation to a halt. The 
first Dutch dummy, therefore, reflects guilder weakness in May-June,
1933.
The guilder suffered no further setbacks in 1933 but in 193*+
there were two periods which may have been associated with guilder
weakness. In February-March there was an influx of gold into the
U.S. which exerted a deflationary effect on the gold bloc currencies
and led to fears about their ability to remain on gold; this may have
particularly affected the guilder, given the comparatively greater
depth of the depression in Holland, and therefore may require a
dummy variable. In July, there were Communist-led riots in Amsterdam
and lesser disturbances in three other cities in protest against the
policy of deflation and expenditure cuts (necessary to maintain the
gold standard); in August a coal strike was narrowly averted and the
budget deficit was causing concern; by September it was becoming
increasingly clear that further wage cuts were out of the question
(27)as prices were actually rising. However, the gold bloc collabora­
tion agreement at the end of September may have restored some degree 
of confidence, but a speculative dummy for the whole of the July- 
September, 193*+ period would still seem appropriate.
The year 1935 continued in the same vein with intermittent "runs" 
on the guilder. The first of these, in early 1935» was related to 
the gold clause judgement in the U.S. and is therefore picked up by 
an American dummy (S6) but the others were more specifically related 
to Holland. The devaluation of the belga in late March, 1935» not 
surprisingly led to fears about the other members of the gold bloc, 
including the guilder. In fact Holland lost a great deal of gold in 
the first fortnight of April as the run on the currency reached alarming
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proportions. The problems continued:
"During May the gold bloc currencies were subject to heavy pressure". (28)
The situation eased in June but an even worse crisis developed in 
July when Dr. Colijn, the Prime Minister, could not raise the support 
to get his retrenchment bill through Parliament:
"...this 6pelt the defeat of M. Colijn'6 deflationary 
policy, and therefore, in the eyes of the world, the 
end of the attempt to bolster up the value of the 
guilder. The exchange crisis followed inevitably". (29)
However, the opposition could not form a government and so within 
four days (July 30th) Colijn returned to office, and confidence (and 
gold) returned.
The problem was not so much that Holland lacked the technical 
position to stay on gold but rather whether the country could take 
the required deflation. For the time being it seemed that it could:
"At the expense of continued internal economic stagnation, 
the guilder weathered attacks against it in April and May 
and again in July, 1935"« (30)
Unfortunately, this proved to be only temporary and the return of
Parliament from its summer recess in September was awaited with some
trepidation and its approach was sufficient to set off a fresh flight
from the guilder. The budget deficit that Colijn had been trying to
cover with his retrenchment bill had widened and, in addition, the
devaluation movement was gaining ground having "derived stimulus
(31)from the proximity of Belgium to Holland". It was only at the
end of the month, following two statements by Colijn that his government 
would do everything in its power to maintain the gold standard, that
confidence began to return. Thus three speculative dummies are 
required for 1935 - April-May, July and September - all representing 
guilder weakness.
In 1936 the guilder's position remained technically strong 
but fears about the ability of Holland to tolerate further deflation 
grew and, in June, difficulties in France spilled over into Holland 
and there was another run on the guilder:
"The guilder has...been at the very centre of the storm". (32)
More statements of the commitment to the gold standard stemmed the 
flow but a Dutch speculative dummy for June, 1936, still seems 
appropriate. Finally, in late September, in the wake of the French 
and Swiss francs, the guilder succumbed and abandoned the gold standard^^ 
entering into its "floating" phase and depreciated. In the October, 1936 
to December, 1938 period there was little evidence of any major speculative 
effect. For much of 1937 the guilder apparently moved in line with the 
dollar, although not all the time, and this year contains the only 
significant speculative influence in the late 1936 to end-1938 period; 
in May there was a large influx of gold which forced the Dutch 
Equalisation Fund to lower its buying rate for dollars which led to 
rumours of impending guilder revaluation; this will be represented 
by the final Dutch speculative dummy (H8), the only one associated 
with guilder strength. The Dutch dummies are summarized in Table 
6.2.
Switzerland was the smallest of the gold bloc countries. It 
has a number of other characteristics though, relevant here, which it 
shared with Holland: in the first place, it embraced the gold standard 
with a similar (if slightly lesser) degree of intensity to that of Holland
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TABLE 6.2: DUTCH SPECULATIVE DUMMIES
VARIABLE PERIOD ON TENDENCY OF 
GUILDER
REASON
H1 May-June, 1933 weak Adverse reaction to U.S. leaving gold.
H2 Feb.-April 193^ weak Gold influx into U.S. leading to 
Dutch deflation.
H3 July-Sept. 193^ weak Political disturbances.
Ek April-May, 1935 weak Belga leaving gold.
H5 July, 1935 weak Defeat of Dutch government.
H6 Sept. 1935 weak Budget deficit, general loss of 
confidence.
H7 June, 1936 weak Loss of confidence.
h8 May, 1937 strong Gold inflow and rumours of revaluation.
whilst, at the same time, pursuing a (similar) commercial policy which 
was far reaching but not particularly aggressive; in addition, Switzerland 
too exhibited great internal political stability and this together with 
the small size of the country, may diminish the likelihood of there 
being any internal events which could have been strong enough to exert 
speculative effects. There are also two aspects of the economy peculiar 
to Switzerland alone. Firstly, the importance of tourism, particularly 
the winter season, may give a strong seasonal variation to the Swiss 
exchange rate (although the number of tourists declined dramatically 
during the depression). Secondly, Switzerland had a role as a safe 
haven for funds in the 1930's (as it does now) because of its neutrality 
and this may distort the hypothesised effect of interest rates in the 
model; for example, in 1937-8, Switzerland was awash with foreign 
funds, so much so, that in early 1938 a scheme was devised to dis­
courage further capital inflows by charging a commission on foreign 
deposits. Turning from general factors to more specific ones, it is
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necessary to briefly examine the economic history of Switzerland 
to search for possible causes of speculative effects (even though, 
as indicated above, there might be some scepticism about their 
likely importance).
Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard induced a "dumbfounded
(3*0attitude" in Switzerland and led to rumours about the country’s
ability to remain on gold but little else because:
"...¿Switzerland's financial/. •.position is stronger now 
than it has been for some years and deserves the confidence 
which Swiss and foreign investors have placed in it". (35)
However, the pound's depreciation did help to bring the depression 
to Switzerland, to which it had been to some extent immune, due to 
its comparatively low level of industrialisation, and the Swiss found 
their export and tourist trades increasingly in difficulties. The 
weakness in the economy ultimately transferred itself to the currency 
which, towards the end of 1932, was plagued by rumours of impending 
devaluation:
"The culminating point was reached in the closing weeks 
of the year, when the fall of the French government and 
rumours of Swiss banking difficulties caused...the Swiss franc... to fall to...¿an/.».appreciable discount...." (36)
Consequently, December, 1932 represents the first Swiss period of 
speculative influence which is expected to be associated with weakness.
The U.S. decision to leave the gold standard in 1933 created a 
brief adverse reaction in Switzerland in March but, as with Holland, 
the real difficulties came in May and June:
"During May and June the conviction gained ground that 
..../Switzerland/....would have to abandon gold, and as 
a result there was a serious flight of funds...." (37)
-  2 2 8  -
recovered but a second speculative dummy for May-June, 1933 seems
appropriate. This renewal of confidence appears to have sustained
the Swiss franc during the rest of 1933 and throughout 193^ ; indeed,
it seems to have peaked in September-November, 193^  and therefore
give cause to include a speculative dummy to take account of expected
Swiss franc strength in these months. This was probably initially
caused by the gold bloc collaboration agreement in September and the
realisation that Switzerland was probably the "strongest" gold bloc 
( )member and further fortified by the successful formation of new 
governments in France and Belgium in November allied with the pre­
dominance of pro-gold standard feeling in Switzerland itself:
"The devaluationists seem recently to have lost some ground and the government is stubbornly resolved to maintain the 
gold standard". (39)
The year 1935 began with a flurry of activity due to the 
impending gold clause judgement in the U.S. which may have weakened 
the Swiss franc to some extent but is more properly viewed as an 
American speculative influence. In any case, much more serious 
weakness occurred in the spring, initially set off by the defection 
of the belga from the gold standard in late March. The Swiss franc 
seemed to be particularly affected:
"There is a general lack of confidence in the gold bloc currencies, which is most marked in Switzerland". (kO)
There were a number of reasons for this, most obviously the continued
downward trend in the Swiss business situation and also the fact that
(1+1 )the Swiss banking situation was known to be weak. It could be
argued, of course, that these problems were not unique to Switzerland
In July, following the formation of the gold bloc, the Swiss franc
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but a third element operating at this time certainly was and could
be expected to lessen confidence in the currency. This was the
referendum on the "Kriseninitiative", a Socialist proposal aiming
(k2 )"to assure to all Swiss citizens a sufficient livelihood", which 
was to be held on June, 2nd. Exactly how a "sufficient livelihood" 
was to be assured was not spelt out in detail but it was clear that 
the means would be inflationary and hence would threaten Switzerland's 
adherence to the gold standard. In fact, it was the rejection of 
the "Krieeninitiative" in early June which restored confidence, so 
much so that:
"By June 1935» the run on the Swiss franc subsided". (*+3)
Thus a dummy variable for April-May, 1935 seems appropriate.
The Swiss franc then entered into an uneasy period of respite 
during which any weakness elsewhere in the gold bloc tended to be 
transmitted to Switzerland. However, the situation did not deteriorate 
excessively until April, 1936, when many of the various influences 
that had been undermining the Swiss frame combined to cause sudden 
weakness, initially set off by events elsewhere in the gold bloc:
"The sudden weakness of the Swiss exchange was due to... 
a further efflux of capital from Switzerland, a movement 
prompted by the turn of political,/ events in France.... This development happened to coincide....with reports of 
troop movements on the Austro-German frontier and thus exerted its maximum effect on somewhat frayed financial
nerves... Quite apart from these external influences
the situation in Switzerland has not been developing at all happily....a precarious budget situation has been 
thrown completely out of equilibrium by the decision to embark on....an exceptionally expensive programme of rearmament and frontier fortification. Further, the banking position.••.remains unsatisfactory and....the 
balance of payments is deteriorating". (4*+)
Any relief in May was short-lived because the situation flared up once
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again in June :
"The...gold bloc exchanges were weak. Forward Swiss 
francs and guilders went to wide discounts against sterling...." (1+5)
These two months - April and June - are the only two months 
in 1936 that would seem to require speculative dummies because the 
devaluation of the Swiss franc in the autumn was not preceded by a 
period of panic; indeed the Swiss tended to gain gold rather than 
lose it in the twelve month period immediately preceding devaluation 
(admittedly mainly at the expense of France). In fact, the initial 
Swiss reaction to the French devaluation was a public announcement 
that the Swiss franc was to stay on the gold standard although this 
decision had to be reversed within a matter of hours as gold begem 
to leave the country. Nevertheless, the effect of the devaluation 
on Switzerland was beneficial and fairly dramatic: the upturn had 
already begun in the spring of 1936 and the depreciation accentuated 
recovery considerably. The tourist trade improved to the extent of 
contributing to apparent Swiss franc strength (and the need for a 
dummy variable) in February, 1937^
"Swiss francs have been firm owing to further repatriation 
of capital and a successful winter sports season". (^ 6)
For the first time, 6ince the beginning of the depression, 
income from Swiss invisibles offset the visible trade deficit and 
this encouraged the inflow of funds even more. Capital continued to 
flow into Switzerland throughout 1937 to the extent that, by the end 
of the year, money was so abundant that it was being suggested that 
steps be taken to reverse the flow and get rid of some of the excessive 
amount already in Switzerland. In the first two months of 1938 (the
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height of the tourist season) the influx became very excessive 
due mainly to the favourable balance of payments and a scheme was 
adopted for repelling unwanted capital by charging a commission on 
foreign deposits. This period - January-February, 1938 - will be 
represented by the eighth dummy variable, also associated with Swiss 
franc strength.
In April, however, the flow reversed itself:
"Swiss francs weakened...as a result of repatriationof funds to France". (V?)
There were two main reasons for this: firstly, the German annexation 
of Austria caused much uneasiness about the neutral position of Switzerland; 
and secondly, there were rumours to the effect that the Swiss franc would 
be affected by the recent depreciation of the French franc. But, later 
in the year, the Swiss franc strengthened when it apparently moved with 
the dollar in the October-November period. These events provide the 
reasons for the final Swiss speculative dummies covering April and 
October-November, 1938. The Swiss dummies are summarized in Table 6.3»
TABLE 6.3: SWISS SPECULATIVE DUMMIES
VARIABLE PERIOD ON TENDENCY OF FRANC REASON
SW1 Dec. 1932 weak Rumours of banking difficulties, fall of French government.
SW2 May-June, 1933 weak Adverse reaction to U.S. leaving gold.
SW3 Sept.-Nov. 193*+ strong Increased confidence (various reasons ).
SW it Apr.-May, 1935 weak Belga leaving gold, "Kriseninitiative."
SW5 April, 1936 weak Capital outflow (various reasons).
sw6 June, 1936 weak Capital outflow.
SW7 Feb. 1937 strong Capital inflow, revival of tourism.
sw8 Jan.-Feb. 1938 strong Excessive inflows of Foreign capital.
SW9 May, 1938 weak War scare, French franc depreciation.SW10 Oct.-Nov. 1938 strong Sympathy with U.S. dollar
INAPPLICABLE! 
TO
U.S.
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(III)
There were three exchange rates examined for each of these 
(minor) gold bloc currencies giving a total of nine in all. These 
were estimated in the same way as the pound-dollar-franc triangle with 
two versions of each (WP and COL) and a series of estimates initially 
including all variables but gradually dropping all insignificant 
variables until "final equations" were produced.Before considering 
these, however, the speculative dummy variables should be examined 
for overlap with British, French and American dummies. There is a 
substantial amount of this which is not surprising given the relatively 
large number of dummy variables involved. Even so, it would not be 
particularly useful to catalogue and discuss every incidence of 
overlap. In some cases partially overlapping variables reflect 
different influences, sometimes working in the opposite direction, 
and it is therefore necessary to include them both and so there is 
nothing to discuss. Nevertheless, in many cases, overlapping dummies 
may have offset or reinforced each other but it would be more appro­
priate (and less tedious) to only discuss those cases where this 
actually seemed to happen, that is in the examination of the empirical 
results.
There is, however, one specific type of overlap that should be 
dealt with at this point: this is where two variables coincide exactly. 
There are four cases of this: BG2 with F1, BG6 with F9, with F4 
and SW4 with F^+. Inclusion of both variables when they are perfectly 
collinear would lead to indeterminancy of the coefficients and so one 
must be excluded and the one remaining is implicitly testing for 
significance of both sets of influences. In the second case (BG6/F9)
*
there is no problem because BG6 represents a possible sympathy 
weakening of the belga with the franc and is therefore not applicable 
to the belga-franc exchange rate anyway. In the other three examples, 
all involving French franc exchange rates, the overlapping French dummies 
(F1 , Fk and F^  respectively) are omitted.
The final equations involving the belga are presented in 
Tables 6.^ A-6.4C. In general, the model seems to have been fairly 
successful in explaining fluctuations in the belga in the 1930's.
There Eire significant (and correctly signed) relative price and income 
effects in the estimates of all three exchange rates whilst the R- 
squareds are very high Eind there is no firm evidence of serial 
correlation (although the Durbin-Watson statistics are in the incon­
clusive range so that its existence cannot actually be rejected).
Turning to the belga-pound estimates first, not only is there clear 
evidence that the bi-lateral "economic fundamentals" - relative prices 
Eind, to a lesser extent, incomes - were important but there seems also 
to have been a highly significant ROW "economic" effect.
This includes the French-U.K. interest rate differential whose 
significance indicates that a rise in U.K. interest rates compared to
(1+9)French rates caused the pound to strengthen not only against the franc 
but also the belga; this could be evidence of the purported "psychological" 
link between the franc arnd the belga. However, the significance and 
"wrong" sign of the Belgiain-U.K. interest rate differential is puzzling.
It may indicate that a rise in Belgian interest rates did not attract 
funds but instead was interpreted as a sign of weedcness. It ms^  also 
be the case that changes in French interest rates were more important 
than changes in Belgian rates, for BelgiEm exchange rates; this is 
supported by the insignificance of the Belgian-U.S. differential and
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TABLE 6 . 4 A ( 1 BEL3A-P0UND FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL VP
Constant 18.4 (2.75) 48.6 (13.5)
U.K. prices/Belgian prices -16.0 (2.22) -28.5 (12.1)
U.S. prices 71.5 (10.4) 21.0 (4.18)
French prices -13.5 (6.72) -8.64 (7.51)(2 )U.K. income/Belgian income -8.01 (4.89) -0.83 (O.52)
U.S. income -17.3 (6.42) 0.22 (0.06)
Belgian-U.K. interest rates 0.72 (3.04) 0.45 (2.68)
French-U.K. interest rates -0.21 (1.31) -O.51 (3.71)
Seasonal Variables : A1 -0.62 (3.51) -0.89 (5.82)
B1 0.59 (3.76) -0.05 (0.29)
Trend 0.06 (4.01) 0.06 (3.87)
Speculative dummies: K1 -O.71 (1.02) -1.26 (2.07)
K3 -2.53 (4.54) -1.93 (3.93)
BG2 -1.85 (2.82) -1.31 (2.24)
BG3 -5.13 (11.3) -2.19 (4.24)
BG4 -6.55 (9.77) -3.65 (5.49)
BG6 O.49 (0.86) 0.53 (1.01)
bg8 O.60 (1.40) 1.29 (3.35)
BG9 1.59 (2.57) O.81 (1.43)
R-SQUARED 0.95 0.96
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.11 1.68
STANDARD ERROR OR THE REGRESSION 0.803 0.725
F-STATISTIC 68.9 83.4
Notes : 1. T-statistics in brackets.
2. U.K. Belgian employment indices.
3. U.S. employment index.
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TABLE 6.4B: BELGA-DOLLAR FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant 10.it (6.39) 11.9 (17.1)
U.S. prices/Belgian prices -1.17 (1.28) -1.65 (3.O7)
U.K. prices
(1)income
0.66 (0.42) -1.02 (1.76)
U.S. income/Belgian -2.75 (5.01) -2.27 (4.59)
U.S.-French interest rates 0.09 (3.42) 0.07 (2.59)
Pound-dollar ID -0.06 (1.89) -O.O6 (2.21)
Seasonal variables : A1 -0.11 (3.34) -0.07 (2.22)
A2 0.10 (2.86) 0.10 (3.10)
B1 0.12 (3.07) 0.10 (2.73)
B2 -0.07 (2.21) -O.O6 (2.13)
Trend -0.01 (3-29) -0.01 (3.90)
Speculative dummies: BG3 -0.31 (2.59) -0.19 (1.59)
BG4 -0.87 (4.16) -O.8O (3.98)
S4 -1.41 (11.9) -1.33 (15.6 )
S5 -1.77 (17.1) -1.53 (13.6)
s6 -0.67 (3.71) -0.39 (1.92)
R-SQUARED
DURBIN-WATS ON STATISTIC
STANDARD ERROR OF THEREGRESSION
F-STATISTIC
0.96
1.95
O.199
122.8
0.97
2.01
O.19O
135.1
Notes : 1 U.S. and Belgian employment indices
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TABLE 6.4C : BELGA-FRANC FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant 58.8 (8.13) 7O.2 (11.1)
French prices/Belgian prices -36.5 (12.1) -23.9 (11.2)
U.K. prices 13.3 (1.58) -12.6 (1.93)(1)French income/Belgian income -2.46 (1.04) -5.09 (1.91)
Belgian-French interest rates -1.21 (6.07) -1.02 (4.59)
Belgian-U.S. interest rates 0.73 (2.81) 0.44 (1.50)
Seasonal variable : A1 -1.08 (3.82) O.17 (0.79)
Trend -0.11 (8.05) -0.05 (2.85)
Speculative dummies: BG1 2.14 (3.69) 1.26 (2.01)
BG5 -4.10 (3.38) -3.73 (2.82)
BG8 -1.15 (2.13) -0.79 (1.26)
BG9 -1.54 (2.06) -1.60 (1.96)
F4 8.19 (10.0) 6.47 (6.91)
4.87 (8.39) 2.94 (4.01)
f6 3.83 (3.50) 2.67 (2.20)
F7 3.82 (5.27) 3.24 (4.02)
F8 7.43 (10.6) 6.52 (8.04)
F9 -0.50 (0.68) -0.97 (1.18)
F11 -1.56 (2.23) -1.77 (1.93)
F12 -4.12 (6.65) -3.87 (4.74)
R-SQUARED 0.98 0.98
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.31 1.34
STANDARD ERROR OF THE 
REGRESSION 0.99 1.08
F-STATISTIC 210.0 175.9
Notes : 1. French and Belgian employment indices
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the significance of the French-U.S. differential in the belga- 
dollar estimates. No ID's were significant which is perhaps more 
likely to reflect the inadequacy of the sources used to derive these 
variables (particularly the ones for the minor currencies) rather 
than to indicate that intervention was unimportant.
There is also evidence of a clear seasonal effect and a long 
run trend for the belga to weaken against the pound. Although 
different combinations of seasonal variables were significant in 
COL and WP versions, the indicated seasonal effect is very similar 
with the belga tending to be weak against the pound in the middle of 
the year (March-August) and to be strong at the turn of the year 
(September-February). To a large extent this is in line with the 
"traditional" seasonal pattern of the pound, more usually associated 
with its exchange rate against the dollar, of autumnal weakness and 
spring strength. The trend variable may reflect a combination of 
increasing war scare on the continent and higher British productivity 
growth. At any rate its performance is consistent with that in the 
estimates of the pound's exchange rate with the franc and the dollar 
(although not with the guilder and the Swiss franc, discussed below).
Two British speculative dummies are significant (and correctly 
signed), K1 and K3, as they were in the pound-dollar estimates; 
furthermore, their insignificance in the pound-franc equations was 
satisfactorily explained in terms of mistiming (K1) and overlap with 
a significant French speculative dummy of the same expected sign 
(K3 with F3). Five of the nine Belgian dummies were significant 
and one of the others, BG6, had been significant and correctly signed 
in earlier estimates but became insignificant in the final estimates; 
this may be interpreted as a very tentative indication that the final
-  2 3 8  -
collapse of the gold bloc (in autumn, 1936) did cause the belga 
to weaken in sympathy. Two of the significant Belgian dummies are 
incorrectly signed - BG3 and BG^  - which cover the period immediately 
preceding the belga devaluation in March, 1935» The belga was under 
pressure at this time and therefore these variables were postulated 
to be associated with belga weakness; in retrospect, given that the 
belga was on the gold standard, they should probably have been expected 
to carry the "wrong" sign, showing belga strength, due effectively to 
official intervention to keep the belga on the gold standard during 
a period when it was under pressure (in part because "economic 
fundamentals" suggested that it was overvalued). The sign and 
significance of these two variables is therefore not surprising.
The insignificance of BG1, BG5 and BG7, as with all insignificant 
speculative dummies, either suggests that the influences they represent 
were unimportant or of very brief duration.
The belga-dollar results in Table 6.4B are rather striking: 
they give very strong support to the hypothesis that exchange rates 
were determined primarily by "economic fundamentals". The coefficients 
of determination and Durbin-Watson statistics are high, there is strong 
evidence of relative price^0  ^and relative income effects and only 
five speculative dummies are significant which are either associated 
with the period of U.S. dollar undervaluation in 1933-5 (S4, S5 and S6), 
or with the propping up of the belga in the period immediately before 
its devaluation in 1935 (BG3 and BG^ ), discussed above in connection 
with the "wrong" signs of BG3 and BG^ . Thus "economic fundamental" 
effects predominate and principally bi-lateral ones at that, since 
only the U.K. WP index is significant of the main third country
"economic" variables
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As in the belga-pound estimates the interest rate differential 
between the other country (the U.S., in this case) and France is 
significant and signed in such a way as to indicate that a rise 
in French interest rates caused the belga to strengthen (thereby 
supporting the idea of a belga-franc "psychological" link). The 
pound-dollar ID is also significant and, as might be expected, 
suggests that official support for the dollar against the pound 
caused it to appreciate against the belga. The significance of these 
latter two variables allied with the insignificance of their Belgian 
equivalents may indicate that it is the American "economic fundamentals" 
that are the most important component of the bi-lateral variables and 
hence that these dominated the belga-dollar exchange rate; this would 
seem to be quite plausible.
A comparatively large number of seasonal variables are significant 
(although they have the same sign and approximately the same values 
in both COL and WP versions). In fact the seasonal effect that 
emerges from adding them together is a rather simple one: the belga 
strengthened in the November to March period and weakened in April- 
October. This is virtually the opposite to what might be expected 
given the traditional tendency for the dollar to strengthen against 
European currencies during the crop-moving season (autumn). Never­
theless, the seasonal effect as described here is a significant one 
and is also a fairly smooth cycle and, moreover, it should be remembered, 
that it is virtually identical to, and hence perfectly consistent with, 
the belga's seasonal variation against the pound which may suggest 
that the explanation is of Belgian origin. The performance of the 
trend variable is also surprising: it suggests a tendency for the 
belga to appreciate against the dollar in the 1930's when a depreciation
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(due to increasing war scare) might have been more reasonable. In 
conclusion, despite the unexpected direction of these effects, the 
belga-dollar estimates do, on balance provide a large measure of 
support for the model developed here.
To a large extent, this is also true of the belga-franc 
estimates. These are slightly different in that they relate to an 
"internal" gold bloc exchange rate and hence it may be expected 
that Belgian variables would be quite important. In fact, this turns 
out to be the case to the extent that these are the only belga exchange 
rate estimates in which Belgian interest rates are significant and 
also there are proportionately more Belgian speculative dummies 
significant than elsewhere. Once again there is strong evidence 
of a relative price effect and lesser evidence of a relative income 
effect but ROW effects are of only slight importance (U.K. prices).
On the one hand, this is not surprising as this is an "internal" gold 
bloc exchange rate but, on the other, it is surprising that only one 
U.S. variable showed up - the Belgian-U.S. interest rate differential - 
and this is "wrongly" signed. However, whilst the scarcity of U.S. 
variables in Table 6.4c is perhaps unexpected, the "wrong" sign of 
the latter interest rate differential is not. This variable was 
"wrongly" signed in the preliminary belga-dollar estimates (and on 
one occasion significant at the 2 0 % level) and the Belgian-U.K. 
differential was significant and "wrongly" signed in the belga- 
pound estimates where it was interpreted as indicating that a rise 
in Belgian interest rates was taken as a sign of Belgian weakness 
in the ROW. However, within the gold bloc itself, interest rate 
effects may have operated more conventionally as indicated by the 
correct sign of the highly significant Belgian-French interest rate
differential
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There iB no significant ID although to the extent that both 
countries were on the gold standard for much of the time, intervention 
must have taken place. The negative trend variable suggests a long 
run tendency for the belga to strengthen against the franc (as well 
as the dollar) and the single significant seasonal variable (A1) 
indicates belga strength in September-March and weakness in May-July. 
This is very similar to the seasonal movements of the belga against 
the pound and the dollar.
A number of Belgian speculative dummies are significant although 
two (BG6 and BG7) are inapplicable and three (BG2, BG3 and BGh) are 
insignificant. The performance of these latter variables is a little 
surprising: BG2, associated with belga strength, overlaps exactly 
with F1 (therefore excluded), which is associated with franc weakness, 
and hence might be expected to be significant for two sets of reasons. 
However, F1 is insignificant in all French franc estimates (both in 
this and the preceding chapter) whilst BG2 is insignificant in the 
belga-dollar though not the belga-pound estimates, and, consequently, 
it is possibly just a straightforward case of the influences represented 
by BG2 (and F1) not being important. The failure of BG3 and BG*+ is 
taken up in the discussion of the residuals later on. Of the four 
significant Belgian dummies, one (BG1) is correctly signed whilst 
the other three (BG5, BG8 and BG9) are not; these "wrong" signs are 
almost certainly due to the fact that the franc was also weak at these 
times, obviously more so than the belga.
Two-thirds of the French speculative dummies are significant, 
three of which - F9 (significant in earlier estimates), F11 and F12 
are correctly signed. The other five are all "wrongly" signed: they 
are expected to be associated with franc weakness but all appear to
be associated with franc strength against the belga. One of them 
(F8) was "wrongly" signed in the pound-franc estimates (and insignificant 
in the dollar-franc); this was interpreted as indicative of official 
support for the franc, an explanation which can also be used here. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be used for the other dummies because they 
were found to be either insignificant (F*+) or correctly signed (F5,
F6 and F7) in the estimates of the pound-dollar-franc triangle. A 
plausible alternative may be found in terms of the "psychological" 
link between the franc and the belga along the lines of "anything 
that weakened the franc may have weakened the belga even more".
However, there is a more obvious explanation: three of these 
variables cover periods in 1935 after March (when the belga was 
devalued) and the other covers the first three months of 1936; it may 
well be that the period April, 1935 - September, 1936 represented one 
of belga undervaluation against the franc and that F8 (June-September, 
1936) should also be interpreted in this light. An examination of the 
residuals may be instructive in this connection. In the whole of the 
April, 1935 - September, 1936 period there are only three months not 
covered by these significant (and positive) French dummies - December, 
1935 and April, May, 1936. If the belga were "undervalued" against 
the franc in the 1935-6 period then large positive residuals might 
be expected for these months; this is precisely what happens. Thus, 
the argument that the "wrongly" signed French dummies indicate belga 
"undervaluation" in this period begin to look very plausible.
In general the contents of Table 6.^  give strong support to 
the model developed here. Before examining the guilder and Swiss 
franc, however, two tasks remain: firstly, the performance of variables 
appearing in more than one belga exchange rate should be examined to
test for consistency; and secondly, something might be said (very 
briefly) about the residuals. As far as "economic" variables are 
concerned, since no interest rate differential or ID appears in 
more than one equation there is little opportunity for inconsistency; 
furthermore the belga's seasonal pattern is virtually identical for 
all three exchange rates - weak in the middle and strong at the turn 
of the year - although different combinations of seasonal variables 
are involved in each case.
Only the trend variable appears to exhibit inconsistency with 
the belga apparently gradually weakening against the pound but 
strengthening against the dollar and franc. This is not entirely 
unacceptable but a similar trend of the belga against all other 
currencies might appear more plausible. The differences can be 
reconciled in that the pound tended to strengthen over time against 
both the dollar and the franc and a gradual weakening of the French 
franc might be expected (in view of its large depreciation in 1936-38) 
but the tendency for increasing belga strength against the dollar is 
less easy to explain, although it may simply represent a gradual 
change in tastes or some omitted variable (such as a gradual, relative 
increase in Belgian protectionism towards the U.S.) Turning to the 
speculative dummies there is no inconsistency since they either only 
appear in one final equation (BG1, BG2, BG5 and BG6) or in none (BG7) 
or in two but carry the same sign (BG3 and BGk) with the exception of 
BG8 and BG9 whose differences can be explained: they were associated 
with belga weakness (as expected) in the belga-pound equations but 
this was partly a sympathy movement with the franc and hence their 
association with belga strength against the franc was interpreted 
as indicating that the franc weakened comparatively more than the belga
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in these periods
It i6 not proposed to examine the residuals in detail but 
it might be useful to briefly discuss the larger ones. In the belga- 
pound estimates there are only two periods of large residuals which 
indicate belga weakness in the first half of 1932 and strength in 
February-April, 193*+« The former group can probably be explained 
by the tendency of the pound to strengthen in spring, 1932 and the 
latter possibly by a mistiming of K3 (or perhaps better an extension 
since it is significant). The majority of the large residuals in 
the belga-dollar estimates occur in the April, 1933 to April, 1935 
period and can therefore mainly be explained in terms of S*t, S5 and 
S6 (which cover this period and are significant) being of constant 
value and therefore of having to average out the effect of the dollar 
undervaluation even though it was an uneven affair in practice; this 
explanation was plausibly used to explain some of the residuals in the 
pound-dollar-franc estimates.
This type of argument can probably also be used for some of the 
residuals in the belga-franc estimates. In addition two residuals 
(December, 1935 and April-May, 1936) have already been accounted for 
above in terms of a belga undervaluation against the franc in 1935-36. 
The other residuals of specific interest are those from November, 193*+ 
to March, 1935 which are particularly large in the latter three months 
and indicate unexplained belga strength. This would suggest that BG4 
and possibly BG3 would be significant if they are included in the 
regression. These two variables were significant and associated 
with belga strength in the belga-pound and belga-dollar estimates. 
Strictly speaking, this is the "wrong" sign but a plausible explanation 
was that there was heavy official intervention taking place at this 
time to keep the belga on the gold standard. Thus it seems that had
would have performed in a manner consistent with the other belga 
(51 )estimates.
BG3 and BG*f been included in the final belga-frane equations they
(IV)
Cki balance« the belga estimates seem to support the model; 
this is less true of the guilder estimates which are presented in 
Tables 6.5A - 6.5C. The guilder-dollar and guilder-franc results 
are reasonably supportive in terms of high R-squareds, significance 
of "economic fundamentals" and so on but the guilder-pound estimates 
are very poor: the COL ratio is significant but "wrongly" signed, the 
relative income variable is significant and "wrongly" signed in both 
versions and the regressions are serially correlated. These "wrong" 
signs are especially difficult to interpret; whilst insignificance can 
be taken as an indication that these variables had no effect, it is 
extremely difficult to provide precise reasons for actually perverse 
effects. Usually recourse has to be made to the existence of 
"distortions". Certainly there are two good candidates for this 
here: Dutch protectionism may be cited, especially in terms of 
retaliation against one of her two main trading partners, Britain, 
and also the intensity of the Dutch desire to remain on the gold 
standard and the technical ability to do so may have led the Dutch 
exchange rate to move in the opposite direction to that indicated by 
"economic fundamentals".
Thus it is possible that perverse effects actually did take 
place and there is some contemporary evidence to support this contention. 
The political difficulties of further deflation were becoming apparent
i <1 \TABLE 6.5A 1 23l GUILDER-POUND FIN A L ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant -7.13 (3.79) 3.43 (1.59)
U.K. prices/Dutch prices 6.28 (3.09) -0.71 (0.4o)
U.S. prices 0.20 (0.11) -2.71 (1.67)
French prices 6.8o (12.5) 5.92 (12.6)(2 )U.K. income/Dutch income 1.65 (2.12) 1.85 (2.75)
U.S. income 2.95 (4.14) 3.37 (3.21)
Seasonal variables: A1 -0.09 (1.94) -0.07 (1.50)
B1 0.16 (2.44) 0.14 (2.07)
Trend -0.04 (9.96) -0.03 (7.51)
Speculative dummies: H1 0.55 (2.43) 0.41 (1.89)
H2 -0.16 (0.78) -0.37 (2.05)
H3 -0.32 (1.57) -0.12 (O.65)
K1 -0.71 (3.52) -O.52 (2.77)
K3 -0.20 (0.98) -0.46 (2.41)
R-SQUARED 0.89 0.89
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC O.87 0.97
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 0.274 O.265
F-STATISTIC 43.4 47.0
Notes : 1. T-statistics in brackets
2. U.K. and Dutch employment indices.
3. U.S. employment index.
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TABLE 6 . 5 B :  GUILDER-POLLAR FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL VP
Constant 1.75 (2.82) 4.31 (7.76)
U.S. prices/Dutch prices -1.79 (2.31) -1.95 (6.43)
French prices 0.92 (3.70) 0.002 (0.01)
U.S. income/Dutch income^1^ -0.38 (2.24) -0.39 (3.07)(2)U.K. income 2.09 (2.36) 0.74 (1.14)
Dutch-U.S. interest rates -0.05 (3.99) -0.02 (2.60)
Seasonal variables: A2 0.02 (1.49) 0.02 (2.31)
Trend -0.01 (7.48) -0.01 (5.61)
Speculative dummies: H1 0.17 (2.43) 0.07 (1.19)
H2 -O.O9 (1.58) -0.12 (2.77)
S3 0.11 (2.03) 0.03 (O.69)
S4 -0.38 (6.38) -O.32 (9.78)
S5 -0.57 (10.6) -0.42 (15.5)
S6 -0.27 (5.64) -0.18 (4.63)
S7 O.31 (5.24) 0.29 (6 .15)
s8 O.17 (3.86) 0.10 (2.69)
S9 -0.03 (0.90) -0.07 (2.33)
R-SQUARED 0.97 O.98
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.64 1.92
STANDARD ERROR OF THEREGRESSION 0.078 O.063
F-STATISTIC 121.3 191.5
1. U.S.
2. U.K.
Notes: and Dutch employment indices 
employment index.
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TABLE 6.5Cî GUILDER-FRANC FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL VP
Constant 17.6 (14.6) 14.1 (11.1)
French prices/Dutch prices -6.48 (22.3) -4.99 (16.5)
U.K. prices -0.64 (0.^ 1) -4.97 (5.04)
U.S. prices -2.60 (2.46) 0.15 (0.18)\ * JFrench income/Dutch income 0.32 (0.98) 1.50 (4.56)
U.K. income 1.65 (1.05) 3.97 (2.05)
Dutch-French interest rates -0.12 (5.40) -0.13 (6.03)
Dutch-U.S. interest rates 0.09 (2.98) 0.12 (4.4o)
Seasonal variables: A2 0.03 (1.19) 0.05 (2.29)
B1 -0.09 (2.58) 0.04 (1.21)
Trend -0.0b (9.54) -0.05 (11.4)
Speculative dummies: H3 0.16 (1.77) 0.09 (0.96)
H7 -O.bO (2.41) -0.53 (3.14)
F5 -0.05 (0.49) -0.13 (1.52)
F7 0.20 (2.07) 0.28 (3.07)
F8 0.99 (10.1) 0.92 (9.20)
F9 0.60 (6.39) 0.76 (8.07)
F10 0.93 (8.83) 1.21 (11.0)
F11 0.90 (9.46) 0.98 (8.62)
F12 -0.28 (2.65) -0.06 (0.52)
R-SQUARED 0.99 0.99
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.08 1.37
STANDARD ERROR OF THEREGRESSION c .132 0 .132
F-STATISTIC 70b. 2 696.3
1.
2.
Notes: French production index and Dutch employment index 
U.K. employment index.
in Holland in autumn, 193**» so much so that prices were reported
(5 2 )as rising even though the guilder was actually appreciating 
against the pound at this time. Furthermore, trade flows between 
Britain and Holland in this period apparently moved in a somewhat 
perverse manner and in the opposite direction to that postulated in 
chapter four. Given relatively lower prices and income in Holland 
than in Britain, Dutch exports might be expected to hold up rather 
better than imports. In fact the opposite seems to have been the 
case: by 193** Dutch imports had decreased to 62.7% of their 1931 
value but exports had declined to an even lower level (**2.*t%); more­
over, the ratio of imports to exports had also risen from *+8% in 1931 
to 71% in 1932, 83% in 1933 and 70% in 193**.(53)
To summarize then, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
model is not applicable to the guilder-pound exchange rate and that 
"perverse" effects are taking place. On the other hand, of course, 
these estimates are serially correlated which may indicate that the 
price and income ratios' significance is apparent rather than real. 
However, a re-estimation of the guilder-pound final equations using
(5*0the Cochrane-Qrcutt technique probably removed the serial correlation 
and left these variables significant although at lower levels. Finally, 
it is possible that the guilder-pound exchange rate was, in a sense, a 
"residual" or "cross" rate with the guilder% level being decided in 
other exchange rate markets and the pound-guilder rate simply the conse­
quence of this, kept at its "artificial" level by protection and a 
strong affinity for the gold standard (which perhaps amounts to the 
same thing as saying that the model does not "work" because of 
distortions).
The performances of the other variables in the guilder-pound final
equations are more easily explained. There is some indication of 
a significant ROW (particularly American) effect, a seasonal effect 
that indicates guilder strength in November-March and weakness in 
May-September which is similar to that of the belga against the 
pound and is approximately in line with the pound 's "traditional" 
seasonal pattern and the negative trend would indicate a tendency 
for the guilder to appreciate against the pound. Two British 
speculative dummies are significant and correctly signed and three 
Dutch dummies are significant, two of which are incorrectly signed:
H2 coincides with a set of large residuals in the belga-pound 
estimates which were interpreted as indicative of a mistiming (or 
rather extension of) K3 and a similar interpretation seems reasonable 
here to explain H2's "wrong" sign; H3 may be related to the perversely 
signed economic fundamentals since it overlaps with the period (autumn, 
193*0 in which Dutch prices were reported as rising which should have 
caused the guilder to weaken when in fact it strengthened.
In sharp contrast to those for the guilder-pound, the guilder- 
dollar estimates are highly supportive of the model and indeed are 
reminiscent of the belga-dollar estimates (which may indicate that 
the major exchange rate for the minor gold bloc currencies was against 
the dollar and their other exchange rates were to some extent pre­
determined by this). There is clear evidence of the expected relative 
price and relative income effects and the bi-lateral (U.S.-Dutch) 
interest rate differential is significant and correctly signed; in 
addition, there is limited evidence of a ROW effect, a surprisingly 
volatile seasonal effect - guilder weakness in March-April and 
September-October, guilder strength in December-January and June- 
July - and, as in the guilder-pound estimates, a negative trend.
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A number of speculative dummies are also significant, two of 
which are Dutch (H1 and H2) and were significant in the guilder-pound 
equations, and hence can presumably be interpreted as they were then, 
and seven of which are American. Three of these (S4, S5 and S6) 
represent the period of dollar undervaluation in 1933-55 and S3 is 
"wrongly" signed, as it was in the pound-dollar estimates, where a 
plausible explanation was provided. The others - S7, S8 and S9 - 
are all correctly signed as they were in the pound-dollar-franc 
estimates. In conclusion, the model developed here would seem to 
satisfactorily "explain" variations in the guilder-dollar exchange 
rate and the hypotheses embodied within it receive substantial support.
This is broadly true of the guilder-franc estimates also. There 
is some suspicion of serial correlation but re-estimates of the final 
equations using the Cochrane-Qrcutt technique substantially raised 
the Durbin-Watson statistic without changing the signs or significance 
of most of the variables to any great e x t e n t . O f  the major "economic 
fundamentals" two - relative prices and the Dutch-French interest rate 
differential - are significant and correctly signed but there were 
problems with the relative income variable. The original version 
of this, involving Dutch and French employment indices, was insignificant 
and the variable in Table 6.5C is based on Dutch employment and French 
production indices. A similar problem was encountered with the franc- 
pound estimates (and will be met in the Swiss franc-French franc estimates 
below) where an explanation was sought in terms of distortions due to 
trade controls and government intervention. In the guilder estimates 
this "wrong" sign is not entirely surprising and a similar explanation 
to that given of the "wrong" signs of both price and income ratios 
in the guilder-pound estimates seems appropriates distortions have
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been created by Dutch protectionism and the strong affinity to the 
gold standard.
A number of BCW "economic" variables are significant in 
Table 6.5C. A problem arises with the Dutch-U.S. interest rate 
differential whose sign is inconsistent with that in the guilder- 
dollar estimates; the suggestion is that a rise in Dutch interest 
rates relative to U.S. rates caused the guilder to strengthen against 
the dollar but weaken against the franc. An explanation could be 
sought in terms of rises in Dutch interest rates being interpreted 
as strength in the U.S. and weakness in France but this is not 
tenable because the Dutch-French differential is significant and 
negatively signed. The performance of the seasonal variables is 
equally unsatisfactory; some of them do show up but there are 
differences between the COL and WP equations and, in fact, this 
exchange rate is one of the few for which no clear seasonal pattern 
emerges. The negative trend variable indicating gradual guilder 
appreciation is not surprising given the tendency for the franc to 
depreciate from 1936 onwards.
Finally, several speculative dummies are significant although, 
with the exception of H3, F5 and F12, they are "wrongly" signed.
The only Dutch dummy in this category (H7)t expected to be associated 
with Dutch weakness, can probably be explained in terms of it over­
lapping with a French dummy representing French weakness, and con­
sequently its "wrong" sign indicates that the French franc was even 
weaker. The "wrong" sign of F7 can also be plausibly explained: the 
(franc) strength it represents may have been due to official inter­
vention to maintain the guilder-franc relationship, bearing in mind 
that both countries were on the gold standard.
However, the fact that F8, F9, F10 and F11 were associated with 
franc strength is difficult to interpret. The same difficulty was 
experienced in the pound-franc estimates and one possibility out­
lined there was that these variables coincided with the"Blum 
experiment" which, to the extent that it may have succeeded and 
improved economic conditions in France, could have led to an increase 
in confidence and hence franc strength. But this point of view appears 
an unlikely one to have been adopted by a country as steeped in gold 
standard orthodoxy as Holland. Fortunately an alternative explanation 
is available: the dummy preceding the September, 1936 devaluation (F8) 
can be interpreted as indicative of the presence of official inter­
vention whilst the dummies after the devaluation (F9, F10, F11) could 
be due to the guilder depreciating by more than the franc, making 
the latter appear temporarily strong against the former. In fact, 
this turns out not to be the case but an equally valid argument 
would be that, even so, the franc had not depreciated enough (as is 
shown by the fact that it was to depreciate a great deal more in 
subsequent months) and hence, in a sense, was "overvalued" against 
the guilder in this period until it depreciated again in June, 1937, 
the end of the period covered by these "wrongly" signed dummies.
This completes the examination of individual guilder exchange 
rates. A brief look at the performance of variables appearing in 
estimates of more than one of them reveals one apparent inconsistency 
in the Dutch speculative dummies; this is provided by H3, apparently 
associated with guilder weakness against the franc (as expected) but 
strength against the pound. It may be that reactions on the continent 
to political disturbances (which is what H3 represents) were stronger 
than in Britain. On the other hand, H3 is only significant in one of
the two guilder-pound equations (and then only at the 20% level) 
and these estimates are unreliable because of serial correlation; 
consequently, the "wrong" sign and significance of H3 in the guilder- 
pound estimates is perhaps best ignored.
As far- as the other variables are concerned, an inconsistency 
of the performance of the Dutch-U.S. interest rate differential in 
the guilder-dollar and guilder-franc estimates has already been 
mentioned and there is no obvious explanation for this. The most 
likely one would seem to be that the choice of interest rate is 
inappropriate and this is taken up again when a similar difficulty 
arises in the Swiss estimates. Furthermore, there is no common 
seasonal pattern as occurred in the belga estimates although this 
may very well be less indicative of any inconsistency them of simply 
suggesting that no particular seasonal pattern exists which is not 
entirely surprising since none is expected. The trend variable is 
significant and suggests gradual guilder appreciation against all 
three major currencies and only one ID is ever significant.
Finally, a brief look at the large residuals for the guilder- 
dollar and guilder-franc (but not the guilder-pound) estimates may be 
useful. In the former case the majority of the large residuals (and 
there were not that many) occur, as in the belga-dollar results, in 
the 1933-35 dollar "undervaluation period" and are therefore almost 
certainly caused by the averaging process of S^ , S5 and S6 in their 
(unsuccessful) attempt to completely pick up an uneven influence.
This averaging problem is also apparent in the guilder—franc residuals. 
There i6, in addition, a strong case for explaining some of the 
residuals of the guilder estimates in terms of Dutch protectionism 
and strong affinity for the gold standard.
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In conclusion, the application of the model to the guilder 
is not entirely successful. In particular, the guilder-pound 
exchange rate does not seem to have been determined by "economic 
fundamentals" or, to the extent that it was, these tended to behave 
in a way which is lacking in theoretical foundation.^ Ch the 
other hand, this may be explained in terms of the distortions 
created by Dutch retaliatory protection against British goods and 
the strong Dutch desire to remain on the gold standard. Certainly, 
the fluctuations of the guilder against the franc and, in particular, 
the dollar seem to be reasonably well explained by the model. In 
addition, the failure of the Dutch speculative dummies to show up very 
well is supportive (in a negative sort of way) although it may equally 
well suggest that events in a small country like Holland exerted little 
speculative influence on its exchange rate.
The final equations of the three Swiss franc exchange rates 
are given in Tables 6.6A-6.6C. The performance of the model is 
rather better than it was for the guilder, if not quite as satisfactory 
as for the belga. In the Swiss franc-pound estimates the relative 
price variable is correctly signed (although insignificant in the 
COL version) but the problem of a "wrongly" signed income ratio is 
once again apparent. This seems to be a recurring anomaly and, in 
the absence of any theoretical explanation (if the monetary approach 
is discarded), it may well be the case that the choice of income proxy 
is not a particularly good one; unfortunately, in the Swiss case, there 
is only one proxy available (unemployment data) and consequently 
alternatives cannot be tested. However, the Swiss-U.K. interest 
rate differential is correctly signed and significant, although the 
U.K.-U.S. differential is perversely signed, indicating that a rise
-  256 -
(1 )
TABLE 6 . 6 A V : SW ISS FRANC-POUND FIN A L ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP
U.K. prices/Swiss prices -it.67 (0.8it) -8.47 (2.26)
French prices 12.9 (it.28) 11.3 (it.66)r 2 ìU.K. income/Swiss income 20.2 (5.05) 23.1 (5.5^ )
French income -9.75 (1.19) -3.39 (0.7it)
U.K.-U.S. interest rates 1.56 (it.53) 1.19 (3.56)
Swiss-U.K. interest rates -1 .iti (it.91) -0.86 (3.19)
Swiss franc-pound ID -i.if8 (2.7it) -0.82 (1.58)
Seasonal variables: B1 1.38 (5.30) 1.26 (5.i+8)
B2 -0.68 (it.60) -0.6it (it.77)
Trend -0.03 (1.81) -0.06 (3.39)
Speculative dummies: SW3 -1.35 (2.it8) -0.70 (1.43)
SW5 -1.32 (1.52) -1 .iti (1.80)
SW6 -1.59 (1.82) -l.ito (1.78)
SW7 1.80 (2.0it) 1.02 (1.25)
SW10 -1.5Ì+ (2.35) -1.12 (1.86)
K1 -1.55 (2.02) -1.07 (1.59)
K2 I.52 (2.29) I.09 (1.79)
K3 -I.26 (2.85) -0.6it (1.49)
R-SQUARED O.92 0 .93
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.it6 1.
STANDARD ERROR OF THEREGRESSION 0.827 O.75I
F-STATISTIC 43.9 5^ -9
Notes : 1. T-statistics in brackets.
2. U.K. employment index and Swiss unemployment index.
3. French employment index.
TABLE 6 . 6 B :  SW ISS FRANC-DOLLAR FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant 2.2b (0.89) 6.82 (7.52)
U.S. prices/Swiss prices -b.27 (1.97) -3.66 (5-59)
U.K. prices 3.67 (1.68) 2.41 (2.27)
French prices 4.36 (6.52) 1.65 (2.80)\ I /U.S. income/Swiss income -0.2b (0.51) -1.06 (2.55)
U.K.-U.S. interest rates 0.09 (1.71) 0.07 (2.03)
Pound-dollar ID -0.0 b (1.10) -0.04 (1.60)
Seasonal variables : B2 -0.07 (2.17) -0.04 (1.42)
Trend -0.01 (2.86) -0.01 (4.09)
Speculative dummies: SW3 0.20 (1.42) 0.22 (2.03)
S3 0.22 (1.76) 0.18 (1.85)
S4 -0.58 (4.67) -0.63 (8.11)
S5 -0.93 (10.8) -0.69 (10.3)
s6 -0.23 (1.97) -0.01 (0.06 )
S7 0.88 (5.73) 0.77 (5.99)
s8 0.b2
/"■
N
00-3“• 0.23 (2.38)
S9 -0.45 (3.54) -0.19 (1.77)
S10 -0.56 (3.15) 0.18 (0.11)
R-SQUARED 0.96 0.97
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.45 1.71
STANDARD ERROR OR THEREGRESSION C>.191 C>.155
F-STATISTIC 89.5 139.2
Notes: 1. U.S. employment index and Swiss unemployment index.
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TABLE 6 . 6 C : SW ISS FRANC -  FRENCH FRANC FINAL ESTIMATES
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant 23.5 (20.3) 21.7 (17.2)
French prices/Swiss prices -2.96 (1.24) -7.03 OOC^•-d-
U.S. prices -9.97 (4.24) -3.56 (2.45)
French income/Swiss (1 )income 7.76 (7.07) 6.25 (6.08)(2 )U.S. income 4.02 (7.O8) 5.36 (8.93)
Swiss-U.K. interest rates 0.25 (4.93) 0.35 (8.58)
Pound-franc ID -0.08 (2.08) -0.10 (2.62)
Seasonal variable : A2 -0.06 0.5*0 -O.03 (0.84)
Trend -0.07 (18.8) 00.01 (20.5)
Speculative dummies: SW2 0.38 (2.12) 0.11 (0.64)
SW10 -0.21 (1.13) -0.40 (2.14)
F3 0.42 (3.52) 0.37 (3.33)
F5 -0.39 (2.81) -O.54 (3.91)
F6 -O.38 (1.50) -0.70 (2.83)
F7 -0.24 (1.40) -0.17 (1.08)
F8 0.72 (4.94) O.90 (6.74)
F9 1.93 (12.6) 2.O5 (14.0)
F10 2.79 (15.O) 3.O3 (16.8)
F11 2.90 (20.4) 2.70 (17.6)
R-SQUARED
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC
STANDARD ERROR OF THE
REGRESSION
F-STATISTIC
0.99
1.81
O.232
712.1
0.99
1.88
0.222
778.7
Notes : 1
2
French employment index and Swiss unemployment index 
U.S. employment index.
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in U.K. interest rates caused a depreciation in the pound. This 
may also be due to inadequacy of data and, indeed, the choice of 
the U.S. interest rate has already been criticised in the preceding 
chapter. Two other ROW "economic fundamentals" are also significant.
The Swiss franc-pound ID is significant but "wrongly" signed 
although whether this can be taken as showing that intervention was 
unsuccessful in this exchange rate, in that it was not sufficiently 
strong to overcome the factors that it was trying to offset, is perhaps 
rather dubious. The variable only actually takes on a value in three 
months and hence it is almost certainly not comprehensive enough to 
adequately test for the presence of official intervention. A clear 
seasonal pattern emerges with the Swiss franc strong against the 
pound in December-April and weak in May-November. This is (almost) 
in line with the "traditional" seasonal pattern of the pound and is 
similar to that of the belga and the guilder against the pound; 
furthermore, the Swiss franc strengthened during the winter tourist 
season (in the first quarter) which is precisely what is expected.
The majority of the British speculative dummies are significant 
and correctly signed. Half of the Swiss dummies are significant but 
three are "wrongly" signed. In the cases of SW5 and SW6 this might 
be explained by the fact that they cover two months in the six month 
period preceding the Swiss franc depreciation in 1936 and, as the 
franc was still on the gold standard, they may be picking up official 
intervention which was necessary to keep it there. This inter­
pretation is borne out by an examination of the residuals: in the 
four of the six months immediately preceding depreciation not covered 
by dummy variables there are large negative residuals indicating that 
the Swiss franc was stronger than predicted by the model. The same
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explanation in reverse can be used for the "wrong" sign of SW7: 
in the six months after leaving the gold standard the Swis6 franc 
was "undervalued" as is indicated by large positive residuals in 
these months except for February, 1937, where the effect is picked 
up by SW7.
The performance of the model in "explaining" the Swiss
franc-pound exchange rate is only adequate but for the Swiss franc-
dollar it is extremely good. There are significant and correctly
signed relative price and income effects and an important ROW effect.
Furthermore the two "third country" variables that could be expected
to have a given sign if their influence is to be plausible, do indeed
behave as expected: the U.K.-U.S. interest rate differential indicates
that an increase in the U.S. rate compared to the U.K. rate caused
(57)the dollar to appreciate against the Swiss franc and the pound- 
dollar ID suggests that official support for the dollar against the 
pound also caused it to appreciate against the Swiss franc. There 
is a significant seasonal variable which suggests a seasonal variation 
not dissimilar to that of the guilder-dollar exchange rate but the 
fact that it involves two periods of strength and two of weakness 
make it a rather unlikely seasonal pattern; however, as against the 
pound, the Swiss franc does strengthen during the winter tourist 
season (January-March). The negative trend is consistent with the 
other Swiss exchange rates examined.
A number of (mainly American) speculative dummies are significant. 
The single Swiss dummy is "wrongly" and, perhaps more important, in­
consistently signed, given its performance in Swiss franc-pound 
estimates. However, an obvious explanation is at hand: SW3 covers
sub-period of (the significant) S5 and its effect is therefore clearlya
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distorted due to overlapping of dummy variables. With one exception, 
the U.S. dummies are correctly signed or where they are not (S3) are 
also "wrongly” signed in other dollar exchange rates and this has 
been plausibly explained in the preceding chapter. The exception 
is S10 which represents dollar strength in late 1938. In retrospect, 
its inclusion was probably a mistake since not only was the Swiss 
franc reported to have moved in sympathy but a dummy variable included 
to capture this effect (and specifically excluded from the Swiss franc- 
dollar estimates), SW10, was significant and correctly signed for 
the other two Swiss exchange rates. S1Cfe incorrect sign is therefore 
not surprising and, as it is only significant in the COL equation, 
probably not important.
As with the guilder, the degree of support given to the model
by the Swiss franc-French franc results lies somewhere in between
that provided by the Swiss franc-pound and Swiss franc-dollar estimates.
( )There is evidence of a relative price effect'' but the relative 
income variable is significant and "wrongly" signed. This appears to 
be a recurring problem as far as French "income" is concerned and it 
was suggested above that it may indicate more about the choice of 
income proxy than about any relative income effect. There is a ROW 
effect but once again the problem of inconsistent interest rate 
differentials emerges. In this case it is the Swiss-U.K. differential 
which, having indicated that a (relative) increase in the Swiss rate 
caused the Swiss franc to appreciate against the pound, suggests here 
that the same change led to a depreciation against the franc. It may 
be that rises in Swiss interest rates were treated as a sign of weakness 
within the gold bloc and led to a decline in confidence but this is tenuous 
and a more plausible explanation may be an inappropriate choice of
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interest rate. Another significant RCW variable is the pound- 
franc ID which is plausibly signed: official support for the franc
against the pound apparently caused it to strengthen against the
(59)Swiss franc. There is very limited evidence of a rather strange
(double peaked) seasonal effect which is probably best interpreted 
as indicative of no clear seasonal effect. The trend variable is 
once again negative and significant.
As with the Swiss franc-dollar estimates, the speculative 
dummies are mainly non-Swiss. Four of these, and the two significant 
Swiss dummies, are correctly signed but the other four - F8, F9, F10 
and F11 - are not; they are unexpectedly associated with French franc 
strength. The same problem was encountered in the guilder-French franc 
estimates and the same explanation seems appropriate; F8 represents 
official support for the French franc and the other three suggest 
that in the period immediately following September, 1936 the franc 
was "overvalued" (and this was not corrected until 1937-8).
On balance, the Swiss franc seems to have fluctuated more or 
less in accordance with changes in "economic fundamentals" and a fair 
amount of support for the model is provided. Nevertheless, speculative 
effects are significant and although the contention that Switzerland, 
as a small country, would find that internal events which may have 
caused "speculation" would tend to be unimportant is borne out in 
the Swiss franc-dollar and Swiss franc-French franc estimates, the 
relatively large number of significant Swiss speculative dummies in 
the Swiss franc-pound estimates is rather surprising.
There is very little inconsistency of performance of any of the 
variables in different exchange rate estimates: there is evidence of
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the expected seasonal pattern of the Swiss franc - strength in 
the first quarter during the height of the winter tourist season - 
in two of the exchange rates, the trend was significant and
negative for all three and only one Swiss speculative dummy displayed 
different signs for different exchange rates; this was SW3 and its 
"wrong" sign was explained in terms of overlapping with another 
speculative dummy (S3). Admittedly, there were problems with 
interest rate variables, particularly the Swiss-U.K. differential, 
but this has been encountered elsewhere and is perhaps best explained 
in terms of the difficulties involved in selecting appropriate interest 
rates and, indeed, by the fact that interest rate effects may have 
been swamped and distorted by speculative effects.
Finally, there were several clusters of large residuals in 
each of the three Swiss exchange rates. In the Swiss franc-pound 
estimates the majority of the residuals occur in the period immediately 
preceding the abandonment of the gold standard in September, 1936 (and 
have already been discussed above in the context of the performance 
of the Swiss speculative dummies) or can be explained in terms of 
mistiming of Swiss dummies, especially SW4 and SW8 (both of which are 
insignificant). Obvious explanations of the residuals, with one 
exception, also come to mind in the Swiss franc-dollar estimates.
These include the problem of averaging speculative dummies in the 1933-35 
dollar undervaluation period (which seems to have affected most dollar 
exchange rates), mistiming, or rather an extension of, S8 and, once 
again, the fact that many of the residuals occurred in the periods 
before and after the gold bloc collapse in September, 1936. This 
factor can also be used to explain many of the residuals in the Swiss 
franc-French franc estimates along with mistiming of some of the
speculative dummies (F2, SW1, SW^t and SW8), although it is not 
easy to rationally explain some of the others.
(V)
Before drawing some preliminary conclusions, reference should 
be made to an attempt to model speculative effects by use of a 
"speculative variable" (SV) based on forward exchange rate data 
instead of dummy variables. This could only be done for the three 
exchange rates involving the pound because of data limitations. The 
performance of an equivalent variable in the pound-dollar and pound- 
franc estimates led to pessimistic expectations about this exercise 
which turned out to be well founded: although the SV was significant 
with the correct (negative) sign in the belga-pound estimates, it was 
insignificant for the Swiss frame-pound and only significant in one 
out of the four guilder-pound equations, where it was "wrongly" signed. 
In view of this rather limited success, and in order to make the gold 
bloc results comparable to those for the pound-dollar-franc triangle, 
the use of "speculative variables" was not pursued.
In conclusion, the application of the model to the exchange rates 
of the minor gold bloc countries was undertaken with a certain amount 
of trepidation as these were clearly not freely floating exchange 
rates although all nine exchange rates were involved in a period of 
managed floating during part, and in some case most, of the 1930's. 
However, it was argued that the model should hold in a "permissive" 
sense to the extent that even these exchange rates could still not 
diverge too far from the path indicated by "economic fundamentals" 
if indeed "economic fundamentals" did determine exchange rates in this
period
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In fact, this view turns out to be broadly supported by the 
results, ftily in the guilder-pound estimates was there no evidence 
of a (correctly signed) relative price effect and for seven of the 
nine exchange rates the relative price variable was significant (or 
in two cases almost significant) at the 20 per cent level or higher 
in both COL and WP versions. The relative income variable was less 
successful although it was always significant and correctly signed 
in exchange rates involving either the belga or the dollar. Moreover, 
the incorrect sign and significance in the Dutch and Swiss 
exchange rates against the pound and French franc may raise more 
questions about the choice of income proxy rather than the direction 
of the relative income effect. The bi-lateral interest rate differentials 
also performed tolerably well: they were correctly signed and signifi­
cant in half of the estimates and tended to be insignificant rather 
than significant and "wrongly" signed in the rest. However, there 
were some problems with the consistency of performance of third 
country interest rate differentials but these were put down either 
to plausible perverse effects - a rise in interest rates leading to 
a decrease in confidence rather than attracting funds - and the problems 
involved in choosing suitable interest rates. More generally, RCW 
effects did seem to play a part in determining these exchange rates 
as was expected.
Che group of variables that did not show up very well was the 
gold bloc official intervention dummies. Only the Swiss variable 
was ever significant (in the Swiss franc-pound estimates) and then 
it was wrongly signed. To interpret the failure of these variables 
as suggesting that official intervention was ineffective is, however, 
rather dangerous because they were constructed on the basis of very
limited and probably inadequate data' and consequently the
number of months in which they actually take on values is very
(62 )small. Indeed, the more extensive pound-dollar and pound-franc
ID's are significant and plausibly signed on three occasions. There­
fore, a more reasonable assumption would be to say that no explicit 
evidence of effective official intervention has been found but it is 
not ruled out because of the probable inadequacy of the test.
This is not true of the seasonal and trend variables: there 
is ample evidence to suggest that the belga tended to weaken in the 
summer and strengthen at the turn of the year and that the Swiss franc 
strengthened during the winter tourist season (as expected) in the 
first quarter although the guilder's seasonal variation, if indeed 
there was any, is less certain. The trend variable suggests that the 
minor gold bloc currencies gradually strengthened (with the exception 
of one exchange rate). This is rather surprising as the opposite 
may have been expected due to increasing fear of war but at least 
the performance of the trend is consistent across exchange rates.
A number of speculative variables were significant and those 
of Belgium, Holland and Switzerland have been examined for consistency 
in different exchange rates and possible explanations have been provided 
for the (few) inconsistencies. It was anticipated that the potential 
speculative influence of such small countries may be swamped by other 
effects and not therefore be important. This was only clearly the 
case for Holland although it was also true for Switzerland except 
in the Swiss franc's exchange rate against the pound; however, the 
Belgian dummies were apparently quite important. Nevertheless, the 
U.K., U.S. and France did provide alot of significant dummies which 
generally behaved in a manner consistent with their performance in
(61)
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the pound-dollar-franc estimates. All this would suggest
speculation did have a role in the determination of these exchange 
rates, but not an exclusive one. In addition, it appears that the 
belga may have been "undervalued" against the franc in the period 
between the belga devaluation (March, 1935) and the French devaluation 
(September, 1936), and that the franc may have been "overvalued" in 
the October, 1936 - June 1937 period.
Finally, there was a clear order of exchange rates in terms of 
the degree to which the model was supported: exchange rates involving 
the dollar were "best" followed by those involving the French franc 
and lastly, those with the pound. This may suggest that the principal 
exchange rate for these countries was that with the dollar and, to 
some extent, the rest simply followed. However, only one of the 
pound exchange rates - against the guilder - actually failed to 
provide any support for the hypothesis that exchange rates were 
determined by "economic fundamentals", and in this case distortions 
caused by Dutch protectionism and strong affinity for the gold standard 
can plausibly be put forward as reasons for this. Indeed, these 
results would seem to indicate that the degree of protection may 
have played a role in determining exchange rates in the 1930's: the 
"best" results in this chapter are provided by the belga, the currency 
of a country where protection was half-hearted, and the worst are 
those of the guilder, that of a country which pursued a vigorous 
protectionist policy.
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60. Fears of capital loss due to devaluation may completely override 
the attraction from any gain to be had from interest rate differentials particularly in the case of the gold bloc currencies.
61. The sources for the ID's for the three main currencies (pound-dollar- 
franc) are much more extensive and reliable.
62. The Belgian, Dutch and Swiss ID's actually take on a value in four, seven and four months (out of eighty-eight) respectively.
63. An examination of the U.K., U.S. and French dummies' performance 
for consistency across all the exchange rates they were included 
in will be carried out in Chapter 8.
CHAPTER 7 
THE CANADIAN DOLLAR
( I )
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Canada is rather different from the other countries included
in the study in a number of ways. Most obviously, it is the only
Iknpire country examined, mainly because it is the only member of the
Enpire whose currency did not maintain a fairly rigid attachment to
the pound and can be said to have floated in some sense. The reason
for this was that Canada, unlike other Iinpire countries, had very
close links not only with Britain but also with the U.S.; indeed,
Canada is unique in that it maintained a very close relationship with
both the U.K. and U.S. simultaneously. The importance of these two
countries in Canadian economic affairs is made clear by considering
firstly, that Canada was a very open economy - approximately thirty
per cent of Canadian national income arose directly from external
(1)sources - and secondly, that in the 1930's the U.S. and U.K.
accounted for almost a half and a third, respectively, of Canadian
trade whilst the rest of the world accounted for barely a quarter,
( 2 )as is shown by Table 7.1» In fact, this rather underestimates
TABLE 7.1; PERCENTAGE SHARES OF TOTAL CANADIAN TRADE(3)
1928 1933 1938
IMPORTS EXPORTS TOTALTRADE IMPORTS EXPORTS
TOTALTRADE IMPORTS EXPORTS TOTALTRADE
U.S. 67.6 37.1 51.5 56.7 37.3 45.6 62.6 32.9 46.1
U.K. 15.7 32.8 24. 7 21.6 41.2 32.8 17.6 40.1 30.1
US+UK 83.3 69.9 76.2 78.3 78.5 78.4 80.2 73.0 76.2
the importance of Britain and the pound in a sense, since the 
proportion of total Candian trade with the Qnpire as a whole was 
rather larger than that with Britain itself, amount to 30.6% in 1931 
and rising to k2.5%  by 1936. ^
In addition, Britain and the U.S. injected substantial amounts 
of capital investment into Canada during this period: for example, the 
value of U.S. assets accumulated in Canada reached $4,928 by 1930 and 
stayed around this level throughout the decade and the comparable 
figure for British assets held in Canada in this period was approx­
imately $2,700. There was also substantial Canadian investment in the 
U.S. (though not so much in the U.K.) in the 1930's. This predominance 
of two countries in Canadian economic affairs, in terms of both trade 
and capital flows, clearly points to the two exchange rates which ought 
to be examined and makes the choice of third country to proxy the 
rest of the world equally obvious. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
importance of the U.S. and U.K. for Canada, external factors should 
not be emphasised to the point of totally excluding internal factors.
Even so, the course of the Canadian dollar in the 1930's does 
largely reflect the dominance of these two countries, particularly 
in the 1931-33 period. The Canadian dollar had left the gold standard 
during WW1 and had returned (at the old parity) in July, 1926. In 
early 1929» however, the exchange rate came under some pressure due 
to deficits on both current and capital accounts and, in January, 1929, 
the government abandoned the gold standard (de facto) by imposing an 
informal embargo on the export of gold. Surprisingly, the Canadian 
dollar did not drop to a substantial discount until October, 1929»^^ 
when the Wall Street Crash meant that Canadians who had speculated 
there had to transfer large amounts to cover previous purchases.
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However, large (long term) capital inflows in 1930 pushed the 
Canadian dollar back to parity where it remained (more or less) 
until Britain left the gold standard in 1931.
Britain leaving gold created a problem for the Canadians. If
the Canadian dollar were not depreciated with the pound then Canadian
goods would become less competitive in a major export market.On
the other hand, if it were depreciated with the pound then, although
it is true that this would have given Canadian exports a competitive
edge in the U.S., any advantage was not only slight, since demand
for the main export good (newsprint) was (price) inelastic, but
overwhelmingly offset by the disadvantage of an increased debt burden
and cost of debt servicing since this would now have to be paid in
(7)more expensive U.S. dollars; this drawback was of great importance 
given the high level of Canadian indebtedness to the U.S. Caught 
between these two stools, Canada chose a middle path and the currency 
floated half-way between the depreciated pound and the American dollar 
until the U.S. left the gold standard in 1933J
"On the whole, it was considered wiser to take the buffetsfrom both sides rather than a knock-down blow from one". (8)
For a short time the Canadian dollar stayed half-way between the 
French franc (still on gold) and the depreciated dollar and pound 
but it then followed the former and from January, 193^ » onwards, the 
Canadian dollar, U.S. dollar and pound all stayed fairly steady at 
slightly over k O per cent below their pre-1931 gold parity until the 
outbreak of WW2 when the Canadian dollar dropped to a 10 per cent 
discount against the U.S. dollar.
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In terms of the model developed here and the independent 
variables that are included, several other aspects of the Canadian 
economy in the 1930's also require some discussion. These include 
the degree of official intervention in the foreign exchange market, 
the roles of protection and relative price effects (which are obviously 
related) and the seasonal aspects of an economy heavily dependent on 
wheat exports. The first issue can be dealt with very quickly; with 
the exception of the government's deliberate currency inflation in 
late 1932, which was one of several factors which may have caused 
the currency to weaken in this period and is therefore represented 
by a speculative dummy, there seems to have been very little attempt 
to influence the course of the exchange rate. In the first half of 
the 1930'e (before the Central Bank was set up in 1935)s
"Except for the above case, there was no attempt at 
control. The Minister of Finance announced that it was considered the best policy to allow the dollar to find its own level....The policy of drift was not regarded 
as satisfactory, but as the best thing possible in ... 
.. T^he7«»»circumstances". (9)
This policy seems to have continued even after the setting up of a 
Central Bank and an exchange fund:
"...there does not appear to be any clear evidence 
that the Bank of Canada, the last government, or the 
new Government which took office in November ^ 93^7» have decided on any definite policy or any change
from allowing the Canadian dollar... to find its
own level". (10)
More specifically:
"The Canadian fund never operated at all....." (11)
In view of this evidence (or rather lack of it) no exchange fund dummy 
variable will be constructed for the Canadian dollar.
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The role of relative prices in the determination of the
Canadian exchange rate needs to be discussed in particular detail
because there is some evidence to suggest that relative prices
were of little importance in determining Canadian trade flows.
The price inelasticity of American demand for Canadian newsprint
has already been mentioned and it seems plausible to argue that
European demand for Canadian wheat and flour was similarly inelastic.
More generally, the trends in Canadian exports in the 1931-33 period
have led some authors to conclude that it was income levels in
Canada's major customers rather than relative price effects through
changes in the level of the Canadian exchange rate that determined
(1 2)Canadian exports. More formal (econometric) evidence is provided
by Thompson (1970) whose estimates of a Canadian export function 
for the period 1926-38 produced insignificant price variables and 
highly significant income variables. Thompson also estimates a 
Canadian import function which produces better results for the 
relative price variables but still finds that income fluctuations 
were the predominant influence.
The existence of various protective measures, which is 
particularly important in the Canadian case (and is discussed below), 
would, of course, undermine relative price effects, particularly in 
the import function, but whatever the reasons, the implications are 
clear: relative income effects are more likely to be important in 
the determination of the Canadian exchange rate. Fortunately, this 
does not really undermine the model being tested here since it is 
not completely wedded to the PPP hypothesis but rather stresses 
"economic" factors in general, including income levels. In any 
case there is some contemporary evidence to suggest that relative 
prices did play some role in determining Canadian trade flows on
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occasion and so they should not be completely dismissed at this 
stage.
The "frankly protectionist p o l i c y o f  the 1930-35 
Conservative government requires further examination. In fact 
the Bennett administration was largely elected on the basis of his 
advocacy of protectionism as a panacea and received much of its 
support from the protectionist manufacturing sector (which it 
rewarded handsomely). Indeed, within two years of the Conservatives 
taking office the "Economist's" Canada correspondent was moved to 
comment:
"We have reached the stage in Canada where a man ought 
to thank God every morning if no new industry has been 
born during the night, because every time a new Canadian 
industry is born it adds to the cost of living and 
increases the difficulty of doing business in Canada". (14)
However, the success achieved by this protectionism, in terms of
(15)steering Canada out of the depression, is rather doubtful. Never­
theless, it was pursued by the Bennett government to the very end of 
its term of office and despite the policy of tariff reduction 
pursued by the Liberal government elected in 1935» protection remained 
at a high level in Canada throughout the 1930's; this must inevitably 
undermine the model used here.
Furthermore, any interpretation of the Canadian tariff is
difficult because it was not just the height and coverage that was
important, but the arbitrary and ungenerous way in which the tariff
(1 6)was interpreted by the Canadian authorities and, in the present 
context, the use of special anti—dumping duties on imports from Britain. 
This was basically an extra duty aimed at counteracting the pound's 
depreciation and meant that imports from Britain were effectively
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entering the country at an artificial exchange rate (higher them 
the market rate). For a while, this effectively operative exchange 
rate was £1 = .86f (September, 1931 to late November, 1931) - in
other words the old par value - until it was reduced first to £1 = 
$*+.**0 (late November, 1931 to March, 1933), then to £1 = $4.25 and 
finally overtaken by events as the pound appreciated against the 
Canadian dollar in 1933-3** when this arbitrary valuation was dropped. 
An attempt was also made to impose a similar special anti-dumping 
duty on American goods at the end of 1933 following the U.S. 
depreciation but threats of retaliation by the U.S. led the 
Canadians to drop this proposal except for a very small number of 
goods.
The other important aspect of Canadian commercial policy
relates to Canada's trade agreements with other countries including,
of course, the Ottawa Agreements. Canada's policy towards trade
negotiations not surprisingly mirrored that on tariffs, being much
more generous after 1935» The effect of the Ottawa Agreements on
Canada's balance of payments with her two major trading partners
was to improve it in both cases. Canada's trade balance improved
with the U.K. because Canadian tariff concessions and interpretations
(17)of tariffs were less generous than those of Britain. The Ottawa
Agreements were also likely to improve the Canadian trade balance 
with the U.S. since their objective was to encourage members of the 
Qnpire to take each others' exports rather than those of third 
countries but, in addition, the capital account improved as American 
firms set up branch factories to circumvent the higher Canadian 
tariffs/ 18 J
Ch returning to power in 1935» the Liberals set about reversing
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the drift towards high protectionism and negotiated a commercial
(19)treaty with the U.S. which cam into force in January, 1936« A 
new treaty with the U.K. followed in February, 1937 and, in late 
1938, both these treaties were revised as the Liberal government 
continued its policy of freer trade. However, despite this
slight relaxation of Canada's protectionist stance, this management 
of trade must inevitably undermine the model developed here (insofar 
as there is no specific allowance for protection). In particular, 
the special dumping duties on Canadian imports from the U.K. in 
1931-3  ^must create a distortion since the exchange rate being used 
for this portion of Canadian trade was not the market rate (the 
dependent variable here), although it did at least move in the same 
direction (in discrete steps). Since these duties were not applied 
to Canada-U.S. trade, the model in general (and the relative price 
variables in particular) might be expected to perform less well for 
the Canadian dollar-pound exchange rate than for that between the 
Canadian and U.S. dollars. Nevertheless, as suggested above, the 
high level of Canadian protection may also affect the application of 
the model to the latter and, for this reason, it seems desirable to 
explore the possibility of devising a "protection" variable.
Fortunately, in the Canadian case where the use of such a 
variable seems especially important, its construction (in a fairly 
crude form) would appear to be relatively easy, since the direction
of influence of Canadian protection is fairly obvious, as are the
(21) _turning points in Canadian commercial policy. In fact, the
"protection" variable takes the form of three dummy variables 
relating to Anglo-Canadian trade (TT1), American-Canadian trade 
(TT2) and a third simpler variable relating to either, which could
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be used to replace TT1 and TT2. This latter variable carries a 
value of zero during the highly protectionist, Conservative 
government's period of office and one after the Liberals came to 
power, reflecting the relaxation of protectionism following the change 
in government in 1935«
TT1 and TT2 are more complex. The former will measure protective 
influences which might be expected to create pressure on the Canadian 
dollar to appreciate against the pound: from September, 1931, the 
variable takes a value of one to reflect Canadian protective measures 
(such as the anti-dumping duties) aimed at imports from Britain until 
the Ottawa Agreements, after which it takes a value of two up to 
the first Anglo-Canadian commercial treaty, since the effect of 
Imperial Preference seerred to favour Canadian exports to the U.K. 
more than vice-versa; finally, following the relaxation of Canadian 
protectionism after the first Anglo-Canadian trade treaty, the variable 
falls back to a value of one and then zero after the second Anglo- 
Canadian treaty. The U.S.-Canada dummy (TT2) is rather simpler and 
merely reflects the relaxation of Canadian protectionism (towards 
the U.S.) after the first U.S.-Canada commercial treaty signed at 
the end of 1935 (operative at the beginning of 1936). This might 
be expected to work in favour of the U.S. and so TT2 should carry 
the opposite sign to TT1. These Canadian trade policy dummies are 
summarized in Table 7.2.
The final area of particular interest in the Canadian case 
relates to seasonal factors. Given the importance of wheat in the 
Canadian economy (particularly as an export) it might be expected 
that there would be observable seasonal variations in the exchange 
rate. In addition, foreign tourism played a fairly important role
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TABLE 7.2: CANADIAN TRADE POLICY DUMMIES
VARIABLE PERIOD ON VALUE EFFECT OF AN INCREASE 
ON CANADIAN DOLLAR
TT1 (U.K.-CANADA) Sept. 31-Nov. 32 1 APPRECIATE
Dec. 32-Feb. 37 2
Mar.-37-Nov. 38 1
Dec. 38 0
TT2 (U.S.-CANADA) Sept. 3''~Dec. 35 0 DEPRECIATE
Jan. 36-Dec. 38 1
TT3 (BOTH) Sept. 31-Oct. 35 0 DEPRECIATE
Nov. 35-Dec. 38 1
in the Canadian economy and this too was of a seasonal nature with the 
inflow of (mainly American) tourists reaching its height in the summer. 
The tendency of Canadian business conditions to vary in a seasonal 
(and fairly predictable) manner may also have influenced the exchange 
rate: there was a general lull in mid-winter (December-January),
followed by a recovery in spring, some decline in mid-summer -
(22)"Business is experiencing its usual mid-summer torpor..." - and
an important improvement in the crop moving season - "The general
(23)autumn expansion..." For these reasons, it might be expected
that the Canadian dollar would tend to be strong in the summer due 
to tourism and also in the autumn when exports of wheat to Europe
were at their height but weak at the turn of the year during the lull
. . . . 4 (2*f)in business activity.
(Ill)
Having examined the special factors in the Canadian case it now 
remains to take account of the speculative influences on the Canadian
►exchange rate by constructing appropriate dummy variables. The 
movements of the Canadian dollar in the 1930*e have already been 
summarized and what follows is an elaboration of this and a 
chronological examination of the various speculative influences.
Some of these only apply to movements of the Canadian dollar against 
the pound or the American dollar (when the Canadian dollar was moving 
in sympathy with the other major currency) and will only be included 
in the estimates for the appropriate exchange rate.
Although Britain's abandonment of the gold standard did cause
problems for Canada particularly in its relations with the U.S.
(discussed above), there appears to have been little to merit a
speculative dummy until the latter half of 1932 with one exception.
In the first quarter of 1932 the pound began to appreciate (having
dropped to a very low level in November-December, 1931)» This trend
was, in part, due to speculative inflow of funds into Britain and
(25)reached its height in March, 1932 at which point it seems to 
have dragged the Canadian dollar along in sympathy:
"During the past fortnight the Canadian dollar has 
strengthened considerably in New York...." (26)
This would suggest a first Canadian speculative dummy (for the 
Canadian dollar-U.S. dollar exchange rate only) in March, 1932.
A number of influences then began to operate in the latter half 
of 1932 and in early 1933. Initially, there was evidence of a modest
strengthening of the Canadian dollar against both the pound and the
(27)U.S. dollar in August and September although this may have been 
partially seasonal. This tendency, however, was very quickly reversed 
and the Canadian dollar entered a period of weakness in November which 
lasted until January. This was partly an inevitable consequence of
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the earlier strength but was aggravated by the government's 
decision "to embark on a deliberate policy of currency inflation" 
when, on November, 1st, following the partial failure of an internal 
loan, the government borrowed |£35 million from the banks. Despite 
the apparent unwillingness of the government to go any further than 
this these two factors, along with increased agitation for inflation 
in Canada (especially amongst Western prairie farmers), "inevitably 
aroused a feeling of alarm and caused heavy sales of Canadian 
dollars".(29)
The position then becomes confused. The "Economist" reports
that:
"In the past fortnight the Canadian dollar has experienced 
a sharp decline in New York, and its fall is attributed 
partly to the pessimistic tone of Mr. Bennett's speeches 
and partly to the inflationist campaign which is still 
proceding vigorously". (30)
But on the other hand:
"....the American banking crisis in February-March 1933 did not spread to the Canadian banks. Funds flowed in 
from the United States to Canada for safety..." (31)
However, whilst the net effect of these two sets of factors on the 
Canadian dollar-U.S. dollar exchange rate in February is not clear, 
it does seem that the U.S. abandonment of the gold standard (and 
the burst of rapid depreciation that followed) did encourage the 
Canadian dollar to depreciate against the pound in March-June, 1933:
"...the sterling rate in Montreal has risen sharply" (32)
It would also seem likely that the second round of rapid U.S. dollar 
depreciation, following the adoption of Roosevelt's gold buying policy 
in November, 1933» may have triggered off another sympathy movement 
in the Canadian dollar against the pound.
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A number of dummy variables would therefore seem to be 
required in the mid-1932 to mid-193^  period: for August-September,
1932, for November, 1932 to January, 1933, for March-June, 1933» and 
for November, 1933 to May 193^ , with the latter two dummies only for 
use in the Canadian dollar-pound estimates since they represent 
sympathy movements of the Canadian dollar with the U.S. dollar.
As far as February, 1933 is concerned, given the conflicting 
direction of the reported speculative effects, it seems prudent to 
include no dummy at all for this month. Throughout the rest of the 
1930's the Canadian dollar moved fairly closely with both the pound 
and the dollar and there were no obvious periods of extreme pressure 
on the Canadian currency. However, in vitually every year there was 
a month or two in which there was some evidence of potential speculative 
influences on the exchange rate and so a number of further dummy 
variables will be created whose importance is perhaps less certain.
The year 1935 marks a watershed for Canada in that it ended 
with the general election in which the protectionist Conservative 
government was routed by the Liberal opposition. Not surprisingly 
there was a certain amount of political uncertainty and agitation 
throughout the year which may have led to doubts about the Canadian 
dollar: in May, there was considerable labour unrest with a docker's 
strike in Montreal and a serious riot in Vancouver; in June, the 
"Economist" was moved to comment: "There is no lack today in Canada 
of political unrest born of economic troubles";^ in July, a new 
party was formed by the ex-Minister of Trade (Stevens) and this month 
also witnessed the rise of the inflationist Social Credit Party in 
Alberta; in August, the latter were elected into office in local 
elections. Whether all or part of this was sufficient to cause any
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speculative pressure against the Canadian dollar is perhaps debateable 
but a dummy variable for the May to August period would seem worth 
trying.
In 1936 the Canadian dollar moved against the pound (according 
to contemporary sources) in sympathy with U.S. dollar on at least 
two occasions. Firstly, in the first two months of the year when 
the dollar weakened against the pound due to a variety of factors:
"...the Canadian dollar has weakened on London in the 
company of its southern neighbour...." (3*0
Then in October:
"The Canadian dollar is following the American dollar 
in its appreciation against sterling". (35)
This tendency of the U.S. dollar to strengthen continued into 
November and therefore it seems plausible to assume that the 
sympathy movement of the Canadian dollar did the same. Thus there 
will be two Canadian speculative dummies in 1936, both of which are 
for use in the Canadian dollar-pound estimates only.
Only one month in 1937 is worthy of a speculative dummy and 
this is July when an appreciation of the Canadian dollar probably 
occurred due to "hot money" flows from Europe. This would clearly 
affect the Canadian exchange rate against the pound but in addition, 
although the U.S. was also a recipient of these funds, it may have 
influenced the Canadian dollar-U.S. dollar relationship to the extent 
that Canada was receiving "hot money" from the U.S. also because of 
fears of its safety there due to industrial unrest and various rumours:
"...there was...the influence of "hot money" flows from 
Europe, coming directly or via the New York markets..." (37)
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"Stories have appeared in the Canadian papers that the 
Government and the banks are worried about a steady 
inflow of "hot money" on a large scale, due to the 
fears of European investors who, having placed their fluids in the United States, have now become alarmed 
about industrial troubles and the possibility of new 
taxation directed against foreign investors". (38)
Finally, in autumn 1938, there were substantial capital move­
ments out of Europe to American because of fears of war. These have 
already been discussed in the context of a potential strengthening 
of the U.S. dollar against the pound and the franc (in Chapter 5)» It 
seems likely that the Canadian dollar may have strengthened against 
the pound (but obviously not the U.S. dollar) for the same reason and 
so a final Canadian dummy is created for the Canadian dollar-pound 
estimates only. The Canadian speculative dummies are summarized in 
Table 7-3•
TABLE 7.3: CANADIAN SPECULATIVE DUMMIES
VARIABLE PERIOD ON
TENDENCYOFC. DOLLAR
APPLICABLETO REASON
DC1 Mar. 1932 strong US Sympathy with pound.
DC2 Aug.-Sept. 1932 strong US, UK Inflow of capital.
DC3 Nov. 1932-Jan. 1933 weak US, UK Inflationary policy of government.
DC4 Mar.-June 1933 weak UK Sympathy with dollar.
DC5 Nov. 1933-May 193^ weak UK Sympathy with dollar.
DC6 May-Aug. 1935 weak US,UK Political unrest.
DC7 Jan-Feb. 1936 weak UK Sympathy with dollar.
DC8 Oct.-Nov. 1936 strong UK Sympathy with dollar.
DC9 July, 1937 strong US, UK Inflow of "hot money" from U.S. and Europe.
DC10 Sept.-Dec. 1938 strong UK Inflow of "hot money" from Europe due to war scare.
The estimation of the C/P (Canadian dollar—pound) and C/D 
(Canadian dollar-U.S. dollar) exchange rates followed the pattern 
established for the pound-dollar-franc triangle. Two versions,using 
WP's and COL indices respectively, were tried and, in the first instance, 
employment indices proxied income and the "wide" version of the ID 
(intervention dummy) was used. The Canadian, U.K. and U.S. speculative 
dummies were checked for any close correspondence but the incidence
of overlap was either partial or the variables concerned carried
(39)opposite expected signs; consequently, no speculative dummies 
had to be omitted on the grounds of overlap. The estimation proceded 
in a number of stages with insignificant variables being omitted or, 
where appropriate, replaced by alternative proxies. The final equations 
are presented in Tables 7»^  and 7*5* In general the results are supportive 
of the model (although this is more true of the C/D than the C/P estimates). 
Many of the important variables are significant and plausibly signed, 
the R-squared is high and there is no positive evidence of serial 
correlation.
Examining the C/P equation in more detail would suggest ROW 
effects had a very significant influence (which is not surprising given 
the importance of the U.S. to the Canadian economy). U.S. "income" 
and, to a lesser extent, prices are clearly important while the 
significance and negative sign of the U.S.-U.K. interest rate differen­
tial would indicate that a fall in U.K. interest rates relative to 
those in the U.S. caused the Canadian dollar to appreciate against 
the pound, Ihis is plausible in the sense that a decrease in U.K. 
interest rates should lead to a depreciation of the pound in general 
and, to the extent that the U.S. interest rate may have proxied the
TABLE 7.4: CANADIAN DOLLAR-POUND: FINAL ESTIMATES (1)
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant 8.42 (6.02) 6.87 (6.49)
U.K. prices/Canadian prices -2.33 (1.38) -1.08 (1.37)
U.S. prices
(2)income
-2.73 (2.18) -1.18 (1.27)
U.K. income/Canadian -1.07 (0.87) -2.28 (2.05)
U.S. income^^ 1.01 (3.95) 1.41 (2.95)
U.S. interest rate-U.K. interest
rate -0.20 (*+.9*0 -0.11 (3.52)
Seasonal variables : A1 -0.06 (2.00) -0.03 (1.37)
B1 0.03 (1.50) 0.03 (1.61)
B2 0.02 (1.38) 0.02 (1.32)
Trend 0.02 (7.O7) 0.02 (7.12)
Speculative dummies : K1 -0.28 (3.40) -0.2k (2.88)
K2 -0.34 (4.00) -O.3O (3.16)
DC2 -0.18 (1.97) -0.23 (2.67)
DC3 -0.48 (6.82) -O.kk (5.83)
DC4 -0.13 (1.80) -0.11 (1.46)
DC5 0.30 (6.15) 0.31 (6.24)
DC7 0.14 (1.79) 0.19 (2.32)
DC10 -0.25 (3.10) -0.21 (2.75)
Protection dummies: TT1 0.16 (4.06) 0.20 (6.70)
TT2 -0.21 (4.15) -0.24 (3.42)
R-SQUARED
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 
F-STATISTIC
0.95
1.60
0.096
73.0
0.95
1.38
0.099
68.5
Notes : 1 •
2. 
3.
T-statisticsin brackets.
U.K. unemployment index and Canadian employment index. 
U.S. employment index.
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Canadian interest rate, even more 6o; indeed the insignificance of 
this variable in the pound-dollar estimates would support this latter 
interpretation. Finally the apparently greater importance of O.S. 
incomes over U.S. prices is not surprising given the expectation 
that incomes rather than prices were the major determinant of the 
demand for Canadian exports.
The bi-lateral ratio variables perform less well. They are 
all correctly signed but both the relative price variables (WP'b and 
COL indices) are only significant at low levels (.20%) and the original 
relative income variable based on employment indices was insignificant, 
although when British employment index was replaced by the unemployment 
index the variable did become significant in the WP version (as shown 
in Table 7.4). This poor showing of relative prices is not unexpected 
and the likelihood is that it is British prices that are unimportant, 
and are causing the low levels of significance of the relative price 
variable, because of the existence of a variety of Canadian protective 
devices, discussed in Section II, which have undermined the expected 
effect of changes in British prices on Canadian demand for British 
imports (such as the artificially high exchange rate in 1931-33)» This 
hypothesis is supported by the performance of the price variables in 
the C/D estimates where the Canada-U.S. price ratio is highly signifi­
cant (thereby suggesting that Canadian prices did influence Canadian 
exchange rates) but U.K. prices are only significant at low levels. 
Moreover, a comparable study of the Canadian dollar-pound-U.S. dollar 
triangle which tested a similar model in non-ratio form found that
U.S. and Canadian prices tended to be significant but not British
(40)prices.
Unfortunately, the poor showing of the income ratio is less easy
to accept, particularly as it had been anticipated that relative
incomes would play a major role since income levels in the U.K.
seem largely to have determined the demand for Canadian exports
(according to the evidence examined earlier). However, there is
evidence to suggest that it is Canadian income that is unimportant
not U.K. income: in the C/D estimates the U.K. employment index is
significant (at the 1% level) and Ridpath found that the Canadian
employment index carried the wrong sign in his initial estimates and
( in )was insignificant in his final equations. The final major quanti­
fiable independent variable, Canadian interest rates, could not be 
examined because of the lack of any data. Ridpath did manage to
construct two series of Canadian three month interest rates based
(1*2 )on proxies but found them of little importance. This would
indicate that their omission from the present study is of little 
consequence.
Of the non-quantifiable "economic" variables both the "narrow"
and the "wide" versions of the pound-dollar ID were found to be 
( 1+3 )insignificant whilst the trend variable was significant and 
indicated a secular tendency for the pound to appreciate against the 
Canadian dollar. There is clear evidence of a seasonal effect with 
three significant variables. When these are combined it is quite 
obvious that Canadian wheat exports were the dominant influence on 
seasonal patterns in the C/P exchange rate (as expected) with the 
Canadian dollar tending to strengthen during the crop moving season 
in autumn (September-February) and weaken in the spring (March-
August).(MO
The performance of the dummy variables representing changes in 
protection is difficult to interpret: both TT1 and TT2 are significant
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(and consequently TT3 was not tried) but they carry the wrong signs.
However, the signing of the protection variables was based on an
examination of Canadian bi-lateral trade flows with the U.S. and
U.K. which, in retrospect, may have been a fairly tenuous exercise
since it involved the implicit assumption that such changes were
due solely (or at least mainly) to changes in commercial policy;
not only may this assumption be incorrect but it is also,to some
extent, inconsistent with one of the main hypotheses of the model,
(1*5)that trade flows were determined by prices and incomes. Perhaps
the performance of TT1 and TT2 is best interpreted as providing a 
good example of the impossibility of adequately incorporating the 
effects of protection into the model, even in an apparently promising 
case.
Two of the British speculative dummies are significant but two 
are not (K3 and K^). K1 is correctly signed but the "wrong" sign 
of K2 is surprising; however, K2 overlaps with the significant DC3 
and may be negatively signed for the same reasons (discussed below).
Of the ten Canadian speculative dummies six are significant of which 
two are "wrongly" signed. The "wrong" sign and significance of DC3 
is initially puzzling; however, a rational explanation may be found 
in terms of the Canadian dollar strengthening against the pound in 
sympathy with the U.S. dollar since the significance and sign in the 
pound-U.S. dollar estimates of an American speculative dummy (S3), 
which closely corresponds to DC3» indicated that the U.S. dollar 
did tend to strengthen against the pound in this period. Similarly 
the "wrong" sign of DC4*, included to take account of expected Canadian 
dollar weakness in the period immediately after the U.S. left the gold 
standard in 1933, is difficult to explain. The most credible explanation
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would seem to lie in the possibility of (unreported) official inter­
vention by the British authorities to hold the pound down in order 
to maintain some degree of competitiveness (with the U.S.) in the 
Canadian market.
In conclusion, the performance of the model in representing 
the influences that determined the C/P exchange rate i6 perhaps not 
entirely satisfactory although, to a large extent, the problems were 
correctly identified a priori (particularly with respect to relative 
prices). However, the results did indicate some measure of support 
for the model and the results of the C/D estimates (Table 7»5) are 
highly supportive. There is clear evidence of both strong relative 
income and (a little surprisingly) strong relative price effects.
In addition, the third country (U.K.) economic variables show up 
well although the U.K.-U.S. interest rate differential is not 
significant as it was in the C/P equations. (This would tend to 
indicate more support for the argument, presented above, that U.S. 
interest rates proxied Canadian interest rates to some extent).
There is also evidence of a seasonal effect with the Canadian 
dollar tending to weaken against the U.S. dollar in the first half 
of the year (January-June) but strengthen for the remainder (July- 
December). As the effects of the crop moving season should have been 
important in both Canada and the U.S.,the reason for the autumnal 
strengthening of the Canadian dollar is not immediately obvious 
although, given the comparatively much greater importance of wheat 
in the Canadian economy, it may be that the tendency for the currency 
to strengthen in the autumn was more marked in Canada. The strength 
of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. dollar in the summer was 
expected and is due to the influx of American tourists into Canada
- 293 -
which reached its height at this time. The negative trend variable 
would indicate a secular tendency for the Canadian dollar to 
appreciate vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar in the 1930‘s; there is no 
obvious reason for this. All three protection dummies (TT1, TT2 
and TT3) were tried and found to be insignificant which would seem 
to reinforce the earlier conclusion (in connection with their 
performance in the C/P estimates) that this indicates the impossi­
bility of adequately modelling protection.
Seven of the American speculative dummies were significant
and three were not. The insignificance of S1 and S7 is not surprising
given the poor performance of the former in estimates of other U.S.
dollar exchange rates and the fact that the latter represents an
inflow of "hot money" into the U.S. following the final collapse
of the gold bloc; consequently, this influence may also have affected
the Canadian dollar and, in any case, S7 clearly represents an effect
that is really only applicable to U.S. dollar exchange rates against
(46)European currencies. The final insignificant American dummy -
S4 - represents the first phase of the undervaluation of the U.S.
dollar in 1933; it may be that the Canadian dollar tended to move
with the U.S. dollar in this first phase of depreciation but not in
the second (and even more undervalued) phase after the U.S. gold
(47)buying in November, 1933» It is certainly the case that the U.S. 
dollar appears to have been undervalued against the Canadian dollar 
in the November, 1933 to December, 1934 period as S5 was both 
significant and correctly signed.
Of the seven significant U.S. speculative dummies five are 
correctly signed (S2, S5, S8, S9 and S10). This is not inconsistent 
with their performance in estimates of other dollar exchange rates
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TABLE 7 . 5 ’- CANADIAN DOLLAR-U.S. DOLLAR: FINAL ESTIMATES^  ^^
VARIABLE COL WP
Constant 0.93 (6.13) 0.96 (5.42)
U.S. prices/Canadian prices -0.46 (3.61) -0.22 (3.56)
U.K. prices 0.28 (1.68) -0.13 (1.51)
U.S. income/Canadian income -0.28 (4.74) -O.34 (6.96)
U.K. income^^ 0.73 (4.09) 0.90 (4.09)
U.S. interest rate-U.K. interest
rate -0.003(0.87) -0.004(1.10)
Seasonal variable: A1 -0.02 (5*40) -0.01 (4.02)
B1 -0.02 (4.52) -0.02 (6.46)
B2 -0.004(1.83) -0.003(1.14)
Trend -0.004(7.42) -0.004(6.68)
Speculative dummies: S2 -O.O5 (^ .13) -0.04 (3-77)
S3 O.O8 (7.11) 0.08 (7.07)
S3 -O.O8 (13.7) -0.08 (16.4)
s6 -0.03 (2.68) -0.0*4 (4.22)
s8 0.01 (0.95) 0.01 (1.49)
S9 -0.02 (2.55) -O.03 (2.87)
S10 0.02 (1.19) 0.02 (1.55)
DC1 -O.O5 (2.99) -0.04 (2.55)
DC3 -0.06 (4.45) -O.06 (4.23)
R-SQUARED O.96 0.96
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.82 1.93
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 0.014 0.014
F-STATISTIC 103.6 101.9
Notes : 1.
2.
3 .
T-statistics in 
U.S. employment 
U.K. employment
brackets.
index and Canadian employment index, 
index.
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and would therefore seem to require little comment other than to 
note the clear indication that American speculative influences were 
important in determining the C/D exchange rate. Moreover, the 
incorrect signs of S3 and S6 were perhaps to be expected given their 
performance elsewhere and possible reasons for their incorrect 
sign were examined in detail in the discussion of the pound-U.S. 
dollar estimates. It was concluded that the wrong sign of S6 
represented a continuation of the U.S. dollar's undervaluation into 
1935 and, less plausibly, that S3 reflected a combination of con­
fidence engendered by Roosevelt's victory in the Presidential election 
and (or) unreported official support for the dollar. However, there 
are complications relating to S3 in the Canadian context because of 
its overlap with a Canadian dummy (DC3) which are discussed below.
Only five of the ten Canadian speculative dummies were applicable 
to the U.S. and only two of these were significant. The insignificance 
of DC6 and DC9 is consistent with the C/P estimates in which they 
were also insignificant. Moreover, when the Canadian dummies were 
constructed, there was some suspicion that the influences represented 
by DC2 were seasonal and so this variable's insignificance is not too 
surprising. DC1 was significant and represented a sympathy movement 
with the pound in March, 1932. Its significance posed the question 
as to whether a Canadian speculative dummy should also have been 
included for the final quarter of 1931 to reflect potential sympathy 
depreciation of the Canadian dollar with the pound and an examination 
of the residuals suggests that such a movement probably did occur.
The final Canadian dummy, DC3, is significant and wrongly signed.
This is difficult to explain since a similar occurrence in 
the C/P estimates had been interpreted in terms of a sympathy movement
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with the U.S. dollar; therefore DC3 might have been expected to 
be insignificant in the C/D equations. Furthermore, S3 (which covers 
much the same period) carries the opposite sign to DC3; thus the 
former is indicating a Canadian dollar appreciation and the latter 
an appreciation at (approximately) the same time. A rather complicated 
explanation in terms of a longer term tendency for U.S. dollar appre­
ciation in the November, 1932-March, 1933 period (picked up by S3) 
containing a sub-period, November, 1932-January, 1933 (picked up 
by DC3), in which there was a panic flow of American capital into 
neighbouring Canada because of Roosevelt's election, thereby causing 
a Canadian dollar appreciation (U.S. dollar depreciation) is possible, 
but unlikely. A more plausible explanation may lie in the three month 
overlap between the two variables (the three month DC3 fits into the 
five month S3) and it may be that this is causing the rather odd 
result and that this overlap should have been considered sufficiently 
large to merit the exclusion of one of these two variables.
(V)
This completes the analysis of the Canadian dollar. Before 
drawing some general conclusions something should be said about con­
sistency of performance of the variables in the two Canadian exchange 
rates examined. This has already been referred to in numerous cases 
and, in fact, there are not many cases where inconsistency could arise 
(especially since half of the Canadian speculative dummies were not 
applicable to the C/D exchange rate). Of the four Canadian speculative 
dummies that appeared in the estimates of both exchange rates, three 
were insignificant in both and the other was significant and carried 
the same sign (albeit the "wrong" one). There were a few other variables
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appearing in both exchange rate equations which could have displayed 
inconsistency but, in the event, none of them did: the third country 
interest rate differential was significant in the C/P and not the C/D 
estimates but this was interpreted as perhaps indicating that Canadian 
and U.S. interest rates moved together and so the latter proxied the 
former, and third country official intervention appeared to have no 
effect on either Canadian exchange rate.
Besides considering the possibility of inconsistency it would 
be instructive to examine the residuals. This was done and revealed 
eleven clusters of large residuals for each of the two Canadian dollar 
exchange rates and these are listed in Table 7*6. Explanations of
TABLE 7.6: CANADIAN DOLLAR RESIDUALS
CANADIAN DOLLAR-POUND CANADIAN DOLLAR-U.S. DOLLAR
Period Sign Period Sign
July 1932 - Nov. 1931 -
Sept.-Oct. 1932 - Dec. 1931-Jan. 1932 +
Dec. 1932 - April 1932 -
Feb. 1933 - May-Aug. 1932 +
April 1933 - April-May 1933 +
May-Oct. 1933 + June-Oct. 1933 -
Oct.-Dec. 193^ + Jan. 1935 -
Mar.-April 1936 + May-July 1935 -
Oct. 1936-Feb. 1937 - Sept. 1935 +
Feb. 1938 + July-Oct. 1936 +
July-Aug. 1938 — Oct. 1937 +
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varying degrees of plausibility can be provided for most of these 
residuals, mainly in terms of mistiming or extensions of speculative 
dummies and the difficulties involved in trying to use constant value 
dummy variables to pick up uneven effects.
Approximately half the C/P residuals can be explained by
(i*9)mistiming of Canadian speculative dummies: an extension of DC2 
would have removed the July and September-October, 1932 residuals 
and similarly extensions of DC7 and DC10 would account for the March- 
April, 1936 and July-August, 1938 residuals; also the October, 1936- 
February, 1937 residuals could be caused by a mistiming of DC8 (which 
would explain its insignificance in the final estimates). A number 
of other residuals would seem to be related to the U.S. dollar 
depreciation and undervaluation in 1933-3 »^ DC5 was significant 
indicating a sympathy depreciation of the Canadian dollar with the 
U.S. dollar and the May-October, 1933 residuals would seem to provide 
further evidence of this. Furthermore, it was suggested in the examina­
tion of the pound-dollar-franc triangle that the U.S. dollar depreciation 
was an uneven affair and the April, 1933 and October-December, 193^  
residuals here would seem to bear this out. Similarly, the December,
1932 and February, 1933 residuals quite clearly suggest that the 
significant (and negatively signed) DC3 is inadequately picking up 
an uneven effect. Finally, there is no obvious explanation for the 
February, 1938 residuals.
Similar explanations for most of the residuals in the C/D 
estimates are possible. Mistiming of S1, DC6 and S8 would seem to 
explain the residuals in November, 19311 September, 1935 and July- 
October, 1936 respectively. An identical mistiming of S1 with dollar 
weakness occurring not in October, 1931 (as S1 supposes) but in November
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was discovered in the examination of the pound-dollar-franc 
residuals (in Chapter 5)» Two other sets of residuals were also 
similar to those in the pound-dollar-franc estimates: the negative 
January, 1935 residual once again indicates the continuation of the 
U.S. dollar devaluation into 1935 and that January, 1935 is possibly 
more properly considered as part of S3 rather than S6, and the May- 
July, 1935 residuals suggest continued dollar undervaluation well 
into 1935* Moreover, the April and May-October, 1933 residuals, 
allied with the insignificance of S4, may also be caused by the U.S. 
dollar undervaluation, in that it was an uneven affair that cannot 
be adequately handled by a constant value dummy variable. Finally, 
the December, 1931-January, 1932 residuals may reflect a U.S. dollar 
recovery (following its November weakness) or a sympathy weakening 
with the pound whilst the April, 1932 residual almost certainly 
reflects a sympathy strengthening with the pound (and an extension 
of DC1). This leaves two sets of large residuals - May-August, 1932 
and October, 1937 - for which there is no obvious explanation. Thus, 
it is possible to adequately explain most of the large residuals in 
the Canadian dollar exchange rates.
Moreover, in general terms it would seem that the model developed 
here and the hypotheses embodied within it, largely explain the 
fluctuations of the Canadian dollar in the 1930's, particularly against 
the U.S. dollar. There were some problems with the relative price 
variables in the C/P estimates but these had been anticipated. The 
expected seasonal effects materialised and there was some evidence of 
an important speculative effect as indicated by the significance of a 
number of (particularly the American) speculative dummies.^  ^ The 
significance of the third country variables (proxying the RCW) bears
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out the contention that the Canadian economy was heavily influenced 
by events in two countries, the U.K. and U.S. Finally, the major 
disappointment was the performance of the protection dummies which 
were, at best, insignificant and, at worst, wrongly signed; however, 
it was concluded that these problems were more likely to be due to 
the methodology of these variables • construction rather them to any 
actual perverse "protection effects".
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1. Marcus (195*0 p. 2. Also Hodson (1938) talks of "Canada's.... peculiar dependence upon wheat exports".(p. 286.)
2. Of course trade was much reduced in 1935 and 1938 compared with 
1928. In value terms Canadian trade flows in 1935 were only 3096 of their 1928 value and by 1938 had only risen to 3896 (although 
the decline in volume terms was not so great). A further change, 
which is made clear by Table 7.1, is the increase in trade with 
the U.K. (as a proportion of total Canadian trade) in 1935» this presumably reflects the impact of the Ottawa Agreements.
3. Calculated from the League of Nations' "Network of World Trade". Canada accounted for a much smaller proportion 6f U.S. and U.K. 
trade, 15% and 5-7% approximately.
4. Calculated from Marcus (195*0» pp. 25-6.
5. The average discount against the U.S. dollar in January-September,
1929 was less than 1%.
6. In practice, this problem was aggravated by the fact that two of 
the three rival producers (Australia and Argentina) of the main 
product in question (wheat) did depreciate their currencies by 
more than the Canadian dollar. On the other hand, Canada did not 
suffer too much from the increase in competitiveness of British exports to Canada (caused by the fact that the pound depreciated 
by more than the Canadian dollar) because of the imposition of special "anti-dumping" duties (discussed below).
7. Much of the Canadian debt incurred in the U.S. contained clauses 
giving the creditors the choice of currency in which the debt was 
to be repaid and serviced. The American creditor would obviously choose the U.S. dollar in preference to a depreciated Canadian dollar.
8. Economist, 18/1/36, Special Review of Canada, p. 47»
9. Ibid. p. **7»
10. Ibid. p. 48. See also Ridpath (1975)» especially pp. 353-4, and A.F.W. Plumptre: "Exchange Rate Policy: Experience with Canada's 
Floating Rate" (Princeton Essay in International Finance, No. 81,
June, 1970).
11. Whitaker and Hudgins (1976), p. 1479, n. 7«
12. See Marcus (1954) p. 107 and Safarian (1959) p* 72.
13. Safarian (1959) p* 56.
14. Economist, 2/9/32 p. 13«
15. For example, Marcus (1954), p. 110, states: "As for the resulting effects on the cyclical course of the Canadian economy it is doubtful if the tariff and other protective measures had any important effect". 
See also Safarian (1959) PP* 56-7 and Brecher (1957) Ch. XI.
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16. An example of this would be the long running and ultimately
unsuccessful attempts of British woollen producers to get the 
tariff on their products reduced which are reported in various 
issues of the Economist (1934-35)» The Canadian Tariff Board's 
final report - see Economist 6/4/35 p» 788 - more or less justified the existing tariffs and only made some slight cuts on woollen fabrics.
17» It was also due to the comparatively earlier and stronger recovery in the U.K. which meant that British import demand held up better than Canadian demand for imports.
18. This trend was also encouraged, in the September, 193'1~April, 1933 
period, by the fact that the Canadian dollar was depreciated against the U.S. dollar.
19» There was also a demand for this treaty on the American side. The 
U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had been engaged in a policy of negotiating bi-lateral trade treaties for some time.
20. During the same period the commercial treaties with New Zealand 
and Australia were revised (October, 1937) and, following a minor 
trade war, Japan (December, 1935)«
21. Canada is therefore a special case where some kind of plausible "protection" variable can be constructed. However, in general, the 
problems outlined in Chapter 4, Section III, make such an exercise 
impossible.
22. Economist, 17/6/35« P» 328.
23» Lloyds Bank Review, December, 1936, p. 621.
24. For example, the Economist, 4/2/33» P* 231» talks about "the development last month (January) of a certain seasonal weaknessin the (Canadian) dollar...." This would suggest that the implicit 
assumption of the analysis here - that business activity decreased 
because of a decrease in foreign demand for Canadian goods - is correct. If it were due, instead, to a fall in Canadian demand then this would presumably also affect Canadian demand for imports 
and the Canadian dollar would strengthen.
25. This is discussed in mare detail and in relation to the construction of
the British speculative dummies in Chapter 5*
26. Economist, 5/4/32, p. 519»
27. Statist, 12/11/32, p. 614.
28. Economist, 3/12/32, p. 1033»
29. Economist, 4/2/33» p» 231»
30. Economist, 25/2/33» p» 412.
31. Marcus, (1954)» p. 202.
32. Economist, 1/4/33* p» 692.
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33. Economist, 29/6/35, p. 1*433.
3**. Economist, 8/2/36, p. 308.
35» Economist, 17/10/36, p. 118.
36. Indeed it was felt necessary to construct an American speculative 
dummy (S7) for October-November, 1936 to reflect this tendencyof the U.S. dollar.
37. Marcus, (195*0, pp. 159-60.
38. Economist, 2*4/7/37» P* 183.
39* The overlapping variables were as follows (with the expected signs 
of the variables in brackets): for the C/P relationship there was 
a partial (one month) overlap between DC3(+) and K2(+) and between 
DC5( + ) and K3(-) and, in addition, K*f(-) fitted into DC6( + ); for the C/D DC6(+) and S6( + ) overlapped partially (two months) and 
DC3(+) fitted S3(-).
*40. See Ridpath (1975) pp. 1*+5~6 and p. 1*49. This study applies the same basic model to the C/P and C/D exchange rates although there 
are important differences. Unfortunately it was only discovered at a very late stage in the writing of Chapter 7 of the present 
study and therefore had little influence on it. However, Ridpath's 
results sire referred to wherever they are of interest in terms of 
either supporting or contradicting those of the present study.
*41. Ibid, p. 115 and pp. 1*45-6 respectively. It should be pointed out that Ridpath also found that the British employment index tended to be insignificant although this may have been due to multi- 
collinearity between income and money supply variables since Ridpath included the latter in his regressions (unlike the present 
study).
*42. Ibid. See Tables D7(a) and D7(b), pp. 363-**, for the interestrate data and pp. 1**5-6 for their performance in the final equations.
*43. This is very much in line with Ridpath's results. See especially 
pp. 137-1*+0.
*4*4. The results of Ridpath's study would support this. He uses dummy
variables to capture seasonal effects and in his C/P final equation 
(p. 1*45) he finds one seasonal dummy, S3, which covers September- November, is significant and negative, indicating that the Canadian 
dollar strengthened against the pound in this period.
*45. Furthermore, the belief that the relaxation of Canadian protection embodied in the Canada-U.S. commercial treaty of 1935 would tend 
to increase Canadian demand for U.S. exports proportionately more than U.S. demand for Canadian exports, expressed above, may have
been false even though it is true that: "During the 1930's Canada experienced....a growing net debit current balance of payments with the U.S." (Ridpath, 1975, p. 53). It could be argued that this was due to other factors and that changes in protection were working in 
the opposite direction as the "wrong" sign of TT2 suggests.
- 304 -
46. Indeed it was felt necessary to include a Canadian speculative dummy (DC8) in the C/P estimates to allow for a sympathy movement 
with the U.S. dollar (of the Canadian dollar) at this time.
47. Unfortunately there are some difficulties attached to this 
interpretation because a Canadian dummy (DC4) included in the 
C/P estimates, which was intended to reflect a sympathy de­preciation of the Canadian dollar, carried the wrong sign 
indicating that the Canadian dollar tended to appreciate 
against the pound (whilst the U.S. dollar depreciated as 
indicated by the correct sign and significance of S4 in the pound-U.S. dollar estimates). However, it may be possible to 
reconcile this apparent conflict by recognising that DC4 and S4 
cover different periods, March-June, 1933 and April-October, 1933 respectively, and it could be that the Canadian dollar tended to 
move with the U.S. dollar after a lag, thereby appreciating in 
the March-June period but depreciating with the U.S. dollar there­after; this could explain the insignificance of S4.
48. A negative residual implies that the actual Canadian dollar was stronger than that predicted by the model and hence indicates the 
presence of unexplained Canadian dollar strength. Conversely 
positive residuals imply unexplained Canadian dollar weakness.
49. Either in the sense of speculative dummies being insignificant because they are constructed for the wrong months or in the sense 
of significant dummies that should have been extended.
50. It was not possible to construct a "blanket" speculative variable based on forward exchange rates and interest rates because of lack 
of data.
>
CHAPTER 8
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
(I)
The last three chapters have attempted to test the hypothesis 
that exchange rates were relatively "stable" (or at least not violently 
"unstable") in the sense of being determined by "economic fundamentals" 
for fourteen bi-lateral exchange rates (involving seven currencies) 
which can be said to have been "floating" in some sense for part, if 
not most, of the 1930’s. From the onset it was clear that, in addition, 
speculative influences probably played some role and so these were 
explicitly modelled and therefore the test is also, in a fairly 
crude way, for the presence of "instability" as well. The purpose 
of the present chapter is principally to examine the performance of 
the different variables across all the exchange rates in which they 
were included to discover to what extent (if any) a given variable 
can be said to appear to have determined bi-lateral exchange rates 
generally and to look for consistency of performance of variables 
in estimates of different exchange rates.
The model used has been presented, on occasion, as an extended 
PPP hypothesis and it is encouraging (though not surprising given the 
results of comparable studies) to discover that relative prices stand 
out as the most important individual independent variable in the study. 
In all but one of the fourteen sets of estimates there is evidence of 
a significant and correctly signed relative price effect and in over 
half the price ratio is significant at the 5^ level or less in both 
the VP and COL versions of the tests. The only "wrongly" signed
- 306 -
and significant price ratio occurs in the COL version of the 
guilder-pound estimates and a rational explanation was provided 
in terras of retaliatory Dutch protection and the strong Dutch 
affinity for remaining on the gold standard even during sub-periods 
of 1931-36 when prices were actually rising.
In general, as was expected, the WP index is the "best" price 
index with relative prices in the WP versions being significant at 
the 1# level and correctly signed in eleven out of the fourteen 
equations and only actually failing to be significant at the 20% 
level or less in one case (the guilder-pound) where the variable is 
at least correctly signed. Given that WP indices are dominated by 
traded goods, doubts were expressed (in chapter two) about the 
validity of any tests based on WP's and an extreme view would be 
that interpreting their performance here as supportive of PPP only 
compounds the mistakes of earlier authors who have mainly tended to 
use this type of index.
However, whilst it is true that COL indices generally perform 
less well, they are still significant and correctly signed for half 
the exchange rates at the 5% level or less (and at the 1% level in 
two legs of the pound-do liar-franc triangle) and are significant at 
the 20% level or less in nine of the fourteen exchange rates; in the 
other five, they are almost significant at the 20% level (and were in 
some of the earlier stage estimates) for two exchange rates and in one 
case (the pound-do liar) another largely non-traded goods-based index 
(wages) was significant and correctly signed at the 1% level. There 
is therefore overwhelming evidence of a short run bi-lateral relative 
price effect in the 1930’s. This would seem to indicate some support 
for the PPP hypothesis and furthermore, the short run nature of the
307 -
relative price effect highlighted does not, of course, preclude 
a longer term, more »'traditional" PPP relationship.
Unfortunately, two other "economic fundamentals" - relative 
incomes and interest rate differentials - were less successful 
although it should be remembered that problems were always likely 
as these variables sire based on proxies. The relative income vsiriable 
is always significant in at least one version of each exchange rate 
but for five of the fourteen exchange rates it is "wrongly" signed.
Whilst this could be optimistically interpreted as indicating the 
existence of the expected relative income effect for two-thirds of 
the exchange rates the "wrong" signs require some comment.
One possibility is to invoke the monetary approach to exchange
rate determination: instead of people reacting to an increase in
income by buying more goods, including imports (the "traditional"
approach), they attempt to hold more money, some of which they
obtain from abroad by selling more goods (increasing exports) • If
the income ratio were always "wrongly" signed this might be satisfactory
but it is not. However, it is possible to argue that at different times
in different places the reaction to an increase in income might have
differed and this possibility might be explored. In this connection
it is worth observing that the "wrong" signs occur (with one exception)
in exchange rates involving the guilder or the French franc; in fact,
these currencies are more often than not associated with "wrongly"
signed bi-lateral income ratios (two out of three and three out of
(1)five occasions, respectively). It might therefore be possible to 
argue that a "monetary approach" to the relative income effect is 
suitable for the guilder and the franc but a "traditional approach" 
should be used for the other currencies in the study, especially the
dollar
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This would suggest that the relative income effect is 
extremely important as it is significant in all fourteen exchange 
rates. However, this attempt to argue that significance of the income 
ratio - whatever its sign - supports the hypothesis of "stable" 
exchange rates seems rather dubious. An alternative explanation 
would be to notice that the "wrong" signs occur either in guilder 
exchange rates or in exchange rates where there have been problems 
with the income proxy and an alternative has had to be used (or in 
the Swiss case is unavailable). Dutch protection and extreme gold 
standard orthodoxy have already been used to explain perverse relative 
price effects and this argument may also be applicable to relative 
income effects; it might also be extended to Swiss exchange rates 
(although the relative price effects were not distorted). The other 
"wrong" signs can be explained in terms of poor choice of income proxy; 
it is possible that the proxy is distorted in some way or that it 
simply does not adequately proxy income and so it is not an "income 
effect" that is being picked up at all. In conclusion, it is there­
fore plausible to point to the fact that the relative income variable 
is significant and correctly signed for nine exchange rates and to 
interpret this as (at legist tentatively) indicating the existence 
of the expected bi-lateral income effect.
It is less easy to argue a csise for the expected bi-lateral
(2)interest rate differential effect. Half of these (six)' ' are simply 
insignificant. (In addition there are problems of inconsistency when 
some of these interest rate differentials sire used as HOW variables; 
this is discussed below). However, this is not entirely unexpected 
and some doubts were expressed in chapter two about the importance 
of interest rate differentials, mainly because of the possibility
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that when a capital loss was feared differences in such differentials 
might well become relatively unimportant. This may have led to a 
situation where a rise in the interest rate was interpreted as a 
sign of weakness and therefore led to a capital outflow and hence 
a perverse effect; another possible reason for a perverse effect 
occurred in the Swiss case since Switzerland was, to some extent, 
viewed as a "safe haven" for capital.
In fact, such perverse effects seem, by and large, not to 
have occurred; there is only one "wrongly" signed significant 
bi-lateral differential and on the other five occasions the variable 
was significant and correctly signed. This would suggest that interest 
rate differentials did influence exchange rates in the expected manner 
to some extent, especially as the insignificance in half the estimates 
can plausibly be a ttr ib u te d  to an in a p p ro p ria te  choice of interest 
rate to proxy "the interest rate".^^ This seems to be particularly 
true of the U.S. interest rate which was involved in four of the six 
insignificant bi-lateral differentials and, in fact, variables 
incorporating the American interest rate were only significant in 
one out of the five exchange rates in which they were involved.
Moving on from bi-lateral variables, there is evidence of a 
significant RCW "economic" effect and that the use of a third country 
to proxy the RCW has been reasonably successful with the RCW price 
or income variable (or both) being significant in at least one version 
of each exchange rate equation. As with the ratio variables it is 
prices more so them income which seem to be important, although 
this may of course reflect the inadequacies of the income proxies; 
indeed, proxies based on data other than employment indices are used 
on several occasions. This argument is likely to be particularly
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relevant with regard to the "invisibles effect" (discussed in 
Chapter 4, Section II) for which a more comprehensive RCW income 
proxy is probably required than one based on a single country.
RCW interest rate differentials have a less obvious effect
and, on the occasions that they are significant, their sign is often
inconsistent with the one they carry in estimates of other exchange
rates. A variety of explanations were suggested, most of which were
rather unsatisfactory. Perhaps it is best remembered that not only
are all the problems associated with the bi-lateral interest rate differentials
applicable (discussed above) but the RCW differential is effectively
( Ma proxy based on two other proxies.
To some extent the performance of the ID's can also be inter­
preted in terms of the inadequacy of the proxies used: where ID's 
were based on a number of extensive sources they performed reasonably 
well but where they were not, they were insignificant. This latter 
problem occurred for all the minor gold bloc currency ID's for which 
information was scant and the number of months in which they took 
a non-zero value was small. The probability is that such variables 
inadequately represented official intervention and, indeed, the 
presence of unreported intervention was used (with some plausibility) 
to explain some of the residuals.
Given these data deficiencies, the only real test for the presence
of official intervention therefore occurred in the estimates of the
pound-dollar-franc triangle find the results there were very encouraging:
(5)the pound-dollar ID and franc-dollar ID were significant and correctly 
signed in the pound-dollar and franc-dollar estimates and, although the 
pound-franc ID was insignificant in the OLSQ estimates of the pound-franc,
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it is worth noting that this too became significant (and correctly 
signed) in the CORC estimates. As ROW variables these ID's achieved, 
perhaps not surprisingly more limited success but,on the few occasions 
they were significant,they were plausibly signed. Thus there is 
fairly strong evidence to the effect that official intervention was 
an important influence on exchange rates in the 1930's although it 
should, of course, be observed that significance of these variables 
does not indicate anything about whether such intervention was stabilising, 
merely that it was effective.
On balance, the seasonal variables also perform quite well.
Their unconventional nature - they are sine and cosine waves as 
opposed to dummy variables - might have caused problems but the 
incidence of significant seasonal variables with more than one peak 
and trough is, in fact, fairly small. In most cases there was 
evidence of a smooth and, where there were any expectations (particu­
larly the pound and Swiss franc), plausible seasonal variation in the 
exchange rate. The trend variable is also mainly significant and 
indicates a tendency for the pound and the "minor" gold bloc currencies 
to strengthen over time whilst the French franc and U.S. dollar weakened. 
To some extent this is surprising as the only expectation about this 
variable was that the pound and other European currencies might tend 
to weaken against the U.S. dollar over time due to increasing fears 
of w a r ; ^  indeed, this argument may actually apply to the U.S.- 
Canadian dollar estimates (since Canada was part of the Empire), the 
one currency against which the U.S. dollar did strengthen. However, 
from the beginning,two other possibilities were suggested — changes 
in productivity (which has been applied to the pound in Chapter 5) 
pwri simply changes in tastes - and two further arguments were introduced
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in the discussion of the empirical tests; firstly, the trend 
variable may be picking up the effects of protection (which caused 
a "change in tastes") and secondly, the French franc did tend to 
move only in one direction (depreciate) and the trend may reflect 
this.
(II)
On balance it seems reasonable to conclude that "economic 
fundamentals" did play a major role in exchange rate determination 
in the 1930's. Nevertheless, it is also clear that there was an 
important speculative effect in the sense that many of the speculative 
dummies were significant. Their performance was examined in detail 
and they were checked for consistency of performance across exchange 
rates (as indeed were the "economic fundamentals") in the preceding 
chapters. As far as the four "minor" currencies were concerned 
speculative effects due to events in these "small" countries seem 
to have been of limited importance in the case of Holland and 
Switzerland. However, this is less true of Belgium and Canada 
and, in any case, a number of British, American and French dummies 
were significant in the exchange rates of all four "minor" currencies 
which suggests that speculative effects, in general, were of some 
importance; this conclusion is strengthened, to some extent, by 
the existence of occasionally large residuals. Finally, there was 
no inconsistency of performance of the speculative dummies of Canada 
and the three smaller gold bloc countries.
The dummies relating to the three "major" currencies were also 
discussed earlier but only in the context of the pound—dollar-franc
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triangle. The performance of these variables across all the exchange 
rate regressions in which they were included therefore requires 
discussion and is summarized in Table 8.1. The most striking 
feature of this comparison is the consistency of performance of 
the British and American variables. It is clear that the influences 
expected to cause the pound to depreciate in 1931 (K1) and mid-193*t 
(K3) were important but this was not true in 1935 (K*f), although 
it should be pointed out that in the latter case the expectations 
were weaker, as the weaker pound largely reflected the stronger 
dollar due to the gold clause judgement. The insignificance of 
K1 and Kj5 in the pound-franc estimates was due to •'mistiming" and 
overlap with a significant (and similarly signed) French dummy (F3), 
respectively. There is also limited evidence to support the contention 
of a speculative appreciation of the pound in early 1933. 1
The most obvious conclusion to be derived from the performance
of the American dummies is that the dollar was clearly undervalued
(9)in the 1933-3^  period (S^  and S5) which was widely suggested by 
many sources and, furthermore, that this undervaluation continued 
into 1935 (S6); indeed, the residuals of some of the regressions 
were interpreted as possibly indicating that it continued well into 
1935» All the other American dummies were significant and plausibly 
signed to a greater or lesser degree. This was especially true of 
S8 and S9 which only failed to show up in the dollar-belga estimates.^  ^
Thus the gold and dollar "scares" of 1937 appear to have induced an 
appreciable speculative effect. The effects of S2 and S7 seem only 
to have occurred in non-gold bloc and gold bloc exchange rates against 
the dollar respectively; in the latter case this is unsurprising and 
it waus conceded during the construction of the American dummies that
TABLE 8.1: SUMMARY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MAJOR SPECULATIVE DUMMIES ACROSS ALL EXCHANGE RATES
* p x ► o
it » ii ii »
o p p a.B O  3 1 1 »  
P  f K »  tJ  X  H- *1 P  
P f l  (  O 
n *o 3 a o 
p**o H- H* P* «  H  M> p p 
P H - P - c f c *  
H- O O ® ® 
Hj P  P
p- o' 5O I-« rt- 
P o
prt-
O
XM
a<
«
oP
p»
p
0 p •
<
1
ap*
op
pj
op
aof
EXCHANGE RATE OF POUND AGAINST-» POUND u.s.DOLLAR
FRENCH
FRANC
CANADIAN
DOLLAR BELGA GUILDER
SWISS
FRANC
K1 (Dec. 31-Feb. 32) D D X D D D D
K2 (Jan.-Feb. 33) A - X A D X X A
K3 (May-Aug. 3*0 D - D X X D D D
K*f (March, 35) D - X X X X X X
EXCHANGE RATE OF DOLLAR AGAINST-» POUND U.S.DOLLAR
FRENCH
FRANC
CANADIAN
DOLLAR BELGA GUILDER
SWISS
FRANCDOLLAR EXPECTED TO—--'V
S1 (Oct. 31) D n.a. .. X X X X XS2 (Apr.-May, 32) D D* - X D X X X
S3 (Nov.32-Mar. 33) D A - X A X A* A
S^  (Apr.-Oct. 33) D D - D X D D DS5 (Nov. 33-Dec. 3*0 D D - D D D D D
S6 (Jan-Apr. 35) A D - D* D D D D*
S7 (Oct.-Nov. 36) A X - A X X A A
S8 (Jan.-June 37) A A - n.a. A* X A A
S9 (Oct. 37-July 38) D D - D* D X D* D
S10 (Aug.-Dee. 38) A A* - X D* X X D*
EXCHANGE RATE OF FRANC AGAINST-» DflTT^m U.S. FRENCH CANADIAN QPTfìA flTTTTTMPD SWISSFRANC EXPECTED TO— — rUUliJJ DOLLAR FRANC DOLLAR UUILU&XI FRANC
FI (Nov.-Dee. 32) D X X — « n.a. X X
F2 (Nov.-Dee. 33) D X X mm - X X X
F3 (Mar.-Oct. 3*0 A A X - - X X A
F*f (Apr.-May 35) D X X - - A n.a. n.a.F5 (June-Oct. 35) ? D D - - A D* D
F6 (N o v .  35) D D X - - A X DF7 (Jan.-Mar. 36) D D* X — - A A D*
F8 (June-Sept. 36) D A X - _ A A A
F9 (Oct.-Dec. 36) ? (D) A* D - - X A A
F10 (Jan-Feb. 37) D A D - - X A A
F11 (Mar.-June 37) ? (D) A D - - D A A
F12 (July-Oct. 37) D X D mm - D D* X
-1
-p -I
TABLE 8 . 1 :  SUMMARY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MAJOR SPECULATIVE DUMMIES ACROSS ALL EXCHANGE RATES
* 9> X  >  Ö  Il II II II II
0 3 H- » O. 3 O 3 U  ® 
I—■ c f  a  >3 • tf  *< H' 4 *1
IB 05 »  W01 *d 3 o O H*>0 H- H* H* 
®  H  H, (B »  3H-H-rt-rt- H- O O 9 « nj » 8>H- o' 3 n H tt 
«B ®
3
0«+
o<
HO
<9
0»1
03
<91 9 H* O 3
*0
o3
Oof
EXCHANGE RATE OF POUND AGAINST-» POUND u.s.DOLLAR FRENCHFRANC CANADIANDOLLAR BELGA GUILDER
SWISS
FRANC
K1 (Dec. 31“Feb. 32) D D X D D D D
K2 (Jan.-Feb. 33) A - X A D X X A
K3 (May-Aug. 3*0 D - D X X D D D
K4 (March, 35) D - X X X X X X
EXCHANGE RATE OF DOLLAR AGAINST-» POUND U.S.DOLLAR
FRENCH
FRANC
CANADIAN
DOLLAR BELGA GUILDER
SWISS
FRANCDOLLAR EXPECTED TO---------<v
S1 (Oct. 3D D n.a. X X X X XS2 (Apr.-May, 32) D D * - X D X X X
S3 (Nov.32-Mar. 33) D A - X A X A* A
S4 (Apr.-Oct. 33) D D - D X D D DS5 (Nov. 33-Dec. 3*0 D D - D D D D D
S6 (Jan-Apr. 35) A D - D* D D D D*
S? (Oct.-Nov. 36) A X - A X X A A
S8 (Jan.-June 37) A A - n.a. A* X A A
S9 (Oct. 37-July 38) D D - D* D X D* D
S10 (Aug.-Dee. 38) A A* - X D* X X D*
EXCHANGE RATE OF FRANC AGAINST-» D n m m U.S. FRENCH CANADIAN D17T/ÎA flTTTT TYPD SWISSFRANC EXPECTED TO— ---------V  . _ r U U r i i J DOLLAR FRANC DOLLAR DüiXAJ/i U  U X LdJJJlX FRANC
FI (Nov.-Dee. 32) D X X — n.a. X X
F2 (Nov.-Dee. 33) D X X - - X X X
F3 (Mar.-Oct. 3*+) A A X - - X X A
F k  (Apr.-May 35) D X X - - A n.a. n.a.
F5 (June-Oct. 35) ? D D - - A D* D
F6 (Nov. 35) D D X - - A X D
F7 (Jan.-Mar. 36) D D* X - - A A D*
F8 (June-Sept. 36) D A X - - A A A
F9 (Oct.-Dec. 36) ?  (D) A* D - — X A A
F10 (Jan-Feb. 37) D A D — - X A A
F11 (Mar.-June 37) ?  (D) A D - - D A A
F12 (July-Oct. 37) D X D - - D D* X
I
-F-I
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the "hot money" flows represented by S7 were, to some extent, a 
gold bloc phenomenon.
The remaining three dummies are less straightforward. S1 is
never significant but some of the residuals suggested that this was
mainly due to "mistiming" (particularly in the relationship of the
U.S. dollar with the French franc and Canadian dollar): the main
impact of the shift of speculative attention from the pound to the
dollar in late 1931 seems to have been felt in November rather than
October. "Mistiming" may also be a problem with S10, especially in
the pound-dollar-franc triangle. Similarly the "wrong" sign of S10
in the dollar exchange rates with the Canadian dollar and Swiss franc
(and also its insignificance in the Belgian case) may reflect a tendency
for these currencies to move in sympathy with the dollar for part of
(1 1)the period that it covers. Finally, S3 is mainly significant but
"wrongly" signed. This covers the period in 1932-33 between Roosevelt's 
election and his taking office and there was some doubt about its 
expected sign in the first place. The conclusion reached in the 
earlier discussion of the empirical results seems quite reasonable: 
the sign of S3 probably reflected a combination of a capital inflow 
due to confidence engendered by Roosevelt's election and (more likely) 
official intervention to maintain the value of the dollar in the period 
immediately preceding its devaluation.
Of the three groups, the speculative dummies that perform least 
well are those of France; in particular there are several cases of 
unexpected and apparently inconsistent signs. Two variable - F1 and 
F2 - are never significant and F*+ is significant only once (in the 
belga-franc estimates) where it is "wrongly" signed. However, this 
"wrong" sign, it was argued, is due to a belga undervaluation against
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the franc in the period between the Belgian and French devaluations 
(April, 1935-September, 1936) which also explains the apparently 
inconsistent signs of F5, F6, F7 and possibly F8 in the belga-franc 
estimates* However, the apparent failure of any speculative weakness 
of the franc to show up in other French exchange rates following the 
Belgian devaluation is surprising, although it may reflect a mistiming 
of F^t. In any case, F5 and, to a lesser extent, F6 do indicate that 
the frame weaLkened later in 1935* indeed, the performamce of F5 
(ignoring the belga) could be interpreted ais reflecting both a lack 
of confidence in the success of the deflation undertaiken by the Laval 
administration (whose policy it represents) and a continuation of 
doubts about the franc due to the Belgian devaluation.
Three variables, F3, Fo and F12, are significamt and correctly 
signed in some franc exchange rates whilst F7 is ambiguous; its 
"wrong" sign has already been discussed in the belga-framc context 
and it may be that the overvaluation of the franc implied there also 
applied to the franc-guilder exchange rate, or that there was official 
intervention which, since it would be required to maintain any over­
valuation, amounts to the same thing. This leaves F8, F9, F10 and F11 
which are "wrongly" signed being associated with a strong franc except 
in the case of the dollar and the belga. In the dollar-franc estimates 
this apparent inconsistency, it was suggested, was caused by the fact 
that these variables overlapped with American dummies and were, in 
fact, picking up (plausibly signed) American effects; thus these 
French variables were, as in the Belgian case, really insignificant.
Ozmun (1976) had similar problems and suggested that the 
"Keynesian flavour" of the Blum experiment may have increased confidence 
and attracted capital. This was dismissed as being unlikely, particu­
larly in the Dutch case, and the only plausible explanation that remained
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was that the franc was receiving heavy official support in the 
mid-1936 to mid-19 3 7 period because it was overvalued (even after 
its devaluation). Such an explanation is supported by the fact that 
the franc depreciated substantially further in mid-1937.
In general, a sufficient number of the speculative dummies 
(of all seven countries) are significant and consistently signed to 
suggest that speculative effects had an important (though not over­
whelming, as Nurkse would have it) role in exchange rate determination 
in the 1930*s. However, this conclusion requires heavy qualification. 
In the first place, the modelling of speculation has proved difficult 
and the use of dumny variables has not been entirely satisfactory 
in numerous respects; in particular an "averaging” problem has often 
occurred (and is apparent from the examination of residuals) due to 
the inability of a constant value dummy variable to pick up an
(12)influence of differing degrees of intensity in different months.
Nevertheless, attempts to model speculation by use of a proxy variable
based on forward market data were rather less successful and are, in
(13)any case, subject to theoretical objections. Furthermore the
significant speculative dummies are, in some cases, not picking up 
speculative influences at all but are "wrongly" signed and it was 
often argued that they were picking up official intervention aimed 
at offsetting the speculation or, particularly in the case of the 
dollar in 1933-35, their significance represented an over- or under­
valuation of a currency (which amounts to the same thing). In this 
sense, the significance of a speculative dummy is not indicative of
effective speculation but quite the opposite - that is, successful
(^if)official intervention.
Another qualification relates to the question as to whether
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the significance of dummies picking up capital flows due to speculation
(as opposed to official intervention) is really indicative of de-
(15)stabilising speculation. To the extent that speculators were
acting on the basis of expectations that were correct (in the sense 
that their behaviour was likely to push the exchange rate towards 
the level it should have been at, given the values of the "economic 
fundamentals") and the level of the exchange rate was being artificially 
maintained by the authorities, then the speculation was stabilising 
rather than destabilising. Even so, having made these qualifications, 
to the extent that unexplained exchange rate variations and low Durbin 
Watson statistics still exist, this may indicate the presence of 
unmodelled and (genuinely) destabilising speculation. Nevertheless, 
these qualifications about the speculative dummies would seem to turn 
the balance of the interpretation of the regressions to the conclusion 
that the most important role in exchange rate determination in the 
1930's was played by "economic fundamentals"; it would also indicate 
that more importance should be attached to official intervention than 
is suggested by the performance of the ID's.
A final "variable" that is probably of importance is protection; 
this may also weaken the above argument that large residuals may imply 
destabilising speculation since trade controls constitute another 
omitted variable and hence they may account for some of the unexplained 
variation in exchange rates. It is virtually impossible to quantify 
protection and the only attempt to do so (in the Canadian case) was 
rather unsuccessful. But quite apart from the residuals, it was
specifically concluded on two occasions (for Holland and Canada)
jthat protection played some role in influencing the flow of goods 
and services end hence currency flows and the exchange rate. It was
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also suggested (above) that significant trend variables may have 
represented the effects of protection. Whilst this may lessen the 
role of "economic fundamentals" in exchange rate determination in 
the 1930's, it certainly does not strengthen the Nurkse view of the 
predominance of destabilising speculation.
(Ill)
Having reviewed the performance of individual variables across 
different exchange rates, it might be useful to briefly consider the 
success of the model on an individual currency basis. In general, with 
the possible exception of the guilder, the model can be said to have 
satisfactorily "explained" much of the variation of all seven currencies. 
The model is perhaps most applicable to the U.S. dollar and especially 
so in its relationship with the four "minor" currencies. Although 
it is true that the dollar did go through a sustained period of 
(deliberately engineered) undervaluation, its underlying trend does 
seem to have largely followed the path indicated by "economic 
fundamentals" with a slight interruption due to the gold and dollar 
"scares" in the latter part of the decade.
The model performed slightly less well in the case of the pound 
although even here the importance of speculative effects (in the shape 
of significant speculative dummies) was very limited and the source 
of deviations from the course indicated by "economic fundamentals" 
appears more likely to have emanated from the EEA than destabilising 
speculation. In the case of the French franc, a relatively large 
number of speculative dummies were significant but the extent to 
which these represented genuinely destabilising speculation is suspect:
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the franc seems to have undergone periods of overvaluation but the 
highly significant relative price variables - whether WP or COL 
indices are used - would indicate the underlying importance of 
"economic fundamentals". Given the political instability and 
uncertainty in France in this period« this is probably rather more 
than could have been expected and the performance of the model in 
successfully "explaining" French franc variation is perhaps particularly 
noteworthy.
The smaller gold bloc currencies were expected to be less suited 
to the model and this did turn out to be the case* However, with the 
exception of the guilder whose path, particularly against the pound, 
was distorted by protection and extreme gold standard orthodoxy, these 
currencies did, by and large, follow the course indicated by "economic 
fundamentals", especially in their relationship with the dollar. Finally, 
movements in the Canadian dollar were satisfactorily "explained" by 
the model, especially in view of the fact that it was expected that 
the role of "economic fundamentals" may have been diminished because 
of Canadian protectionism and various other factors.
Two final tasks remain: firstly, to weigh up the evidence as 
to the relative importance of "economic" and "speculative" effects 
and, secondly, to consider the results presented here in the context 
of other studies examined in chapter three. A fairly crude attempt 
was made to compare the relative importance of "economic" and 
"speculative" influences in the examination of the pound-dollar-franc 
triangle using F-tests. Whilst this perhaps indicated that "economic 
fundamentals" were more significant (in the sense of haying a higher 
F-statistics), a more considered interpretation would probably be 
that both were important. In any case, such an exercise is made rather
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tenuous by the fact that whereas the group of "economic fundamentals" 
is fairly comprehensive, this is not true of the speculative variables 
which - probably only include part of the speculative effect. On the 
other hand, the discussion of the speculative dummies (above) did 
suggest that on numerous occasions when these variables were significant, 
they did not necessarily indicate the presence of speculation and, where 
they did, it was not necessarily of the destabilising variety. In 
addition alternative explanations (to speculation) of residuals were 
found in many cases. On balance, therefore, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that, although destabilising speculation may have occurred 
on some occasions in the 19 3 0 's» it was certainly not dominant and a 
greater role in exchange rate determination should be given to "economic 
fundamentals" and official intervention.
Finally, the results and conclusions presented here are in broad 
agreement with those in the studies of Hudgins (1973)» Ozmun (1976) 
and Ridpath (1975)» which constitute the only comprehensive empirical 
studies of exchange rates in this period that have been found. Whilst 
their agreement with the present study is perhaps to be expected, given 
the similar methodology, the much wider range of the model developed 
and tested here, in terms of bi-lateral exchange rates examined and 
variables used (particularly the use of COL indices), would suggest 
that interpretations of exchange rate movements in the 1930*s would 
perhaps be improved by reference to these studies and the present 
one, rather than to the assertions of Nurkse (19M*-) and others. In a 
wider context the results presented here would indicate that the use of 
the 1930's experience as a good example of the inherent problems involved 
in adopting a system of floating exchange rates is erroneous. Further­
more, this issue cannot be dealt with satisfactorily without an examina­
tion of multilateral exchange rates which is undertaken in the next section.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1. Where they are not, either the level of significance is low 
(belga-franc) or the other currency involved in the exchange 
rate is the dollar (dollar-franc and guilder-dollar), and in 
eleven out of the twelve equations involving dollar exchange 
rates the relative income ratio is significant and correctly signed.
2. No Canadian interest rate is available.
3. The problems are discussed in detail in Chapter Section III.
4. This is also true of the ROW income variable.
5» It must be conceded that the "wide" version wets insignificant and 
it is the "narrow" version that is included in the final regression.
6. That is, variables that suggest two or more periods of seasonal 
strength and two or more of seasonal weakness in each year.
7. In fact, Ridpath (1975, p. 1^3) does find a "war scare dummy" 
significant and correctly signed in M s  estimates of the pound- 
Canadian dollar exchange rate but this variable is only operative 
after Hitler's annexation of Austria in March, 1938 and is of 
constant value. Therefore, it is rather different to the trend 
variable used here.
8. The "wrong" sign of K2 in the pound-Canadian dollar estimates is 
probably caused by an overlap with DC3, a Canadian dummy.
9. The insignificance of Sk in the TJ.S.-Canadian dollar estimates
is probably explained by the depreciation of the Canadian dollar in
1933.
10. The non-applicability of S8 in the dollar-franc estimates was due 
to overlap with two French dummies (F10 and F11), the significance, 
coefficients and signs of wMch (in the dollar-franc estimates), 
were interpreted as indicating that they were actually picking up 
not French influences (wMch they represented) but the American influences associated with S8. Hence s8 was also significant, in 
this sense, in the dollar-franc estimates.
11. Indeed, in the Swiss cause a dummy variable (SW10) wau3 constructed 
specifically to capture this sympathy movement and was, in fact, significant in the Swiss exchange rate against the pound and the 
franc. (It was excluded from the Swiss franc-dollar estimates).
12. The obvious solution is to assign different monthly values to proxies 
covering a number of months. However, not only is it often difficult 
to do this because of lack of information, but it would be a Mghly subjective exercise anyway, which is probably best avoided.
13. See Chapter *f, Section IV.
1^f. It must be conceded that this conclusion is, on occasion, based solely 
on one possible interpretation of the regression results. However, 
in other cases, the dummy variable coincides with an observation in one of the ID's (based on actual evidence of intervention).
15. This was discussed in Chapter Section IV.
SECTION III: MULTILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES
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CHAPTER 9
THE METHODOLOGY OF EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
( I )
A detailed examination of bi-lateral exchange rates must 
provide an integral component of any study of exchange rate movements 
in the 1930's. However, in the 1970's, following the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods adjustable peg system, it has become widely 
accepted that, in a period of floating exchange rates, any indi­
vidual bi-lateral rate can only partially reflect the overall move­
ment of any particular currency. Consequently, a new concept - the 
effective or multilateral exchange rate - has been developed, which 
seeks to take account of the movements of a currency against all 
others in a single measure. The importance of thi6 indicator in 
the 1970's has been acknowledged to the extent that the Bank of 
England now pays more attention to the pound's effective exchange 
rate than to any individual bi-lateral rate. This section of the 
present study seeks to apply this concept to the 1930's and this 
chapter begins the exercise by examining how effective rates are 
(and should be) calculated.
The need for such an application becomes clear when it is 
realised that, in the 1930's, the three major currencies - the pound, 
the dollar and the franc - followed radically different paths 
(particularly in the 1931-36 period). This implies that the bi­
lateral exchange rates of these (not to mention other) currencies, 
four of which are included here, inevitably follow a different path 
according to the choice of numeraire currency. When allowance is
also made for "minor" currencies and therefore other bi-lateral 
rates the necessity of examining effective exchange rates in this 
period is self-evident. Examples of differences in bi-lateral 
exchange rate movements for all seven currencies are provided in 
Table 9*1« Thus, for example, the U.S. dollar depreciated kO.8% 
against the French franc in the period from January 1931 to January 
1936 whilst depreciating only 17.7% against the Belgian franc and 
2 . 1 % against the pound, appreciating 20.6% against the Danish krone 
and 1.9% against the Australian pound and so on.
Clearly therefore, the basic rationale involved in calculating
an effective exchange rate (EER) i6 to provide an average (in some
sense) of the movements of the currency concerned against all other
currencies which allows for the fact that bi-lateral exchange rate
movements against different individual currencies may differ in
degree and even in direction. Unfortunately, moving from this
general definition to a more precise definition of an EER creates
various difficulties and rather depends on the purpose for which it
is being calculated. In other words there is presumably an interest
in the effect of exchange rate changes on some variable or policy
objective and the exact definition of an effective exchange rate (and
its weights) is determined by the variable or policy objective which
is chosen as being of primary interest or importance. A fairly
obvious choice would be the competitiveness of exports which would
imply that the effective exchange rate of, for example, the dollar
( 1 )would be defined as follows: a change in the dollar's effective 
exchange rate in a given period should imply the same change in U.S. 
export competitiveness that actually did occur as a consequence of 
all the exchange rate changes that actually did take place. If the
TABLE 9.1: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN EXCHANGE RATES (Jan. 1931 to Jan. 1936)(1)
Appreciation (+T^\^ainst that 
or Depreciation (-) ^ "\^of: 
of the currency of:
U.S.A. Canada France Belgium Holland Switz. U.K. Argentina Denmark Spain Australia
Composite
Effective
Rate
U.S.A. — -0.1 -40.8 -17.7 -41.0 -40.7 -2.1 -7.3 +20.6 -24.3 (+1.9) -7.5
Canada +0.1 - -40.5 -17.5 -40.9 (-40.6) -2.0 -1 2 .1 +20.6 -24.3 +2.0 -5.1
France +69.0 +67.9 - +39.1 -0.3 +0.1 +65.4 (+73.7) (+IO3.9) +2 8 .1 (+72.1) +4 5 .0
Belgium +21.5 +21.2 -2 8 .1 - -28.3 -28.0 +18.8 (+24.8) +46.5 -7.8 (+2 3.6 ) +3.3
Holland +69.4 +69.2 +0.3 +39.5 - +0.4 +65.7 (+74.1) (+104.4) +2 8 .1 (+72.5) +4 5.0
Switzerland +68.7 (+68.4) -0.1 +38.9 -0.4 - +6 5 .1 (+73.4) (+103.6 ) +27.7 (+71.8) +42.5
U.K. +2.2 +2.0 -39.5 -15.8 -39.7 -39.4 - +15.3 +23.3 -22.9 +4.1 -7.0
Note: (1) Figures in parenthesis are based on cross-rates
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variable of interest were the cost of imports (in national currency) 
then the effective exchange rate would have to be redefined with the 
words "export competitiveness" replaced by "cost of imports" and this 
would imply a different set of weights.
However, whilst such definitions are appropriate when specific
variables are of interest, a more general definition would relate the
EER to a more generally important variable and the most obvious is
(2)the balance of payments, although there are still some problems 
with this in that it implicitly involves defining "the balance of 
payments": is it the trade balance, current account, basic balance, 
total currency flow or something else? In fact most EER calculations 
focus on the current account and ignore the relationship between 
exchange rate chsinges and capital flows; indeed most go even further 
and concentrate only on merchandise trade, thereby also ignoring 
invisible trade. This tendency to concentrate on the merchandise 
trade balance is usually justified in terms of its usefulness in 
providing some indicator of changes in competitiveness due to exchange 
rate movements.
Nevertheless, it is important to realise that insofar as an 
effective exchange rate concentrates on the merchandise trade balance 
and yet is treated as if calculated in relation to the balance of 
payments as a whole, it is inaccurate or, at best, an approximation 
and the weights derived from merchandise trade flows are strictly 
speaking incorrect (no matter how sophisticated the manner in which 
they are calculated). For this reason the use of a complex model - 
along the lines of the IMF's multilateral exchange rate model (MERM), 
for example - to calculate effective exchange rates, whilst it may 
provide a sounder basis for calculating weights derived from merchandise
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trade flows than simpler methods, still suffers from the fundamental 
weakness that it ignores invisible trade and (especially) capital 
flows, and its application is therefore strictly limited. This is 
not to say that those who calculate EER's from MERM are unaware of
(4 )these difficulties but rather to imply that in comparing MERM - 
type weighting with much simpler weighting schemes such limitations 
should always be remembered.
Having recognised the conceptual necessity of relating an 
EER to the balance of payments as a whole and defining a change in 
a country's EER as the proportionate change in the value of its 
currency against all the other currencies (expressed as an index) 
that would have had the same effect on its balance of payments as 
all the changes in its bi-lateral exchange rates that actually did 
occur, there is, unfortunately, no way in which this can be put into 
practice for the 1930's. The reason for this relates mainly to the 
lack of any suitable data. Whilst data on invisible trade and capital 
flows are available for some countries, they are unavailable, inaccessible 
or unreliable for many others and, consequently, to use a weighting 
scheme based on the whole balance of payments would reduce the 
countries included to an unacceptably small number. Therefore for 
purely technical reasons merchandise trade flow6 only will be used as 
a basis for the weighting scheme. However the weights will be 
varied and a number of EER's calculated for each country and so the 
possibility of invisibles and capital flows having some effect on the 
weights will be allowed for in a sense (although the effective rates 
presented must remain in principle subject to the limitations discussed 
above).
This means that some criteria are required to determine how
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exactly the weights should be varied and what has been done is to 
use trade flows for three different years which it was found gave a 
fairly large variance in the size of the weights, probably enough to 
allow for the effects of invisibles and capital flows. The remaining 
question to be answered is whether a simple or MERM-type weighting 
scheme should be used and the likelihood is that the large amount of 
extra work involved in calculating weights based on the latter may 
well not be worthwhile since the extra degree of accuracy may be 
spurious as neither weighting scheme avoids these more fundamental 
objections. Consequently a simple weighting scheme with fairly 
widely varied weights seems more appropriate. The choice of weights 
is obviously of crucial importance and is taken up again later.
(II)
Having defined the effective exchange rate (and noted the 
limitations implied by the definition) the next step is to deal with 
three technical aspects of the calculation: these are the selection 
of the countries to be included, the choice of base year and the 
precise form of weighting scheme (having already opted for weights 
based on merchandise trade flows). If it were possible to include 
all countries then this would obviate the need to choose countries 
for inclusion. However it is not feasible because of lack of 
complete data (certainly for the 1930's) nor is it necessarily 
desirable. For example if the main interest is the effect of exchange 
rate fluctuations on international competitiveness then the countries 
included should compete with each other to a significant extent and 
the inclusion of countries that are not competitors may be actually
misleading
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More importantly a small open economy may well find itself 
a price-taker as far as it6 exports are concerned with prices 
denominated in a foreign currency and, in the case of many developing 
countries, its supply of exports may be very inelastic; consequently 
an exchange rate change of this small country may have little effect 
on the trade balance of other countries since the price of its exports 
(denominated in foreign currency) will stay approximately the same as 
the exchange rate change will be largely reflected in changes in export prices 
in local currency. Unfortunately a simple trade share weighting 
scheme implies that price elasticities of demand for all goods in 
all countries are equal which is obviously incorrect in this context 
whilst a weighting scheme based on trade balance effects of exchange 
rate changes (like the MERM-weights) would have to calculate elas­
ticities (which may not be easy) or make assumptions about them.
For these reasons it may be better actually to exclude some countries - 
probably the developing countries - and concentrate on industrial 
countries where, if the former weighting scheme is used the assumption 
of equal price elasticities is more plausible and if the latter is 
used reliable estimates of price elasticities of different countries 
are more likely to be readily available.
The present calculation largely ignores these difficulties and 
is clearly, therefore, subject to criticism on the above grounds.
However, it was felt that some of the more questionable countries 
included were so important in terms of trade flows that, in the absence 
of any conclusive evidence that they did adjust their export prices 
in local currency and maintain them at the same level in foreign 
currency, their large share of trade (particularly bi-lateral trade 
with some of the countries whose effective exchange rates are being
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calculated) justified their inclusion. In any case observed 
changes in export prices in local currency may not be entirely 
passive but may represent a deliberate choice to maintain export 
prices in foreign currency terms (presumably for reasons of competi­
tiveness). The lack of a trade balance effect is therefore due to 
deliberate policy aimed at offsetting exchange rate effects which 
would presumably otherwise have taken place. Given that an effective 
exchange rate seeks to isolate exchange rate effects only, then 
adjusting a country's weights (or excluding it altogether) to allow 
for a deliberate policy would be invalid.
The position adopted by Honohan (1979) in his discussion of 
the treatment of agricultural and primary producers would seem to 
be very much in this spirit:
"The idea of modifying indices to take account of 
special factors, such as the response of agricultural 
trade to exchange-rate changes has considerable merit. However, such modifications can be multiplied to the 
point where the 'index' is more like the prediction of a complex model, based on many unproven assumptions, 
than a simple summary measure of a range of exchange 
rate movements. Such models will always be subject 
to misunderstanding and controversy....and will not 
attract universal acceptance. For this reason there is merit in retaining simple, albeit crude, indices...." (6)
Thus the indices presented here have merely concentrated on maximising
the number of countries included subject to availability of data. This
has meant that all major trading countries are included along with
a large number of less important ones with the result that countries
accounting for approximately 90 per cent of bi-lateral trade and
(7)three-quarters of total (global) trade flows are included.
The choice of base year for an effective exchange rate index 
is not particularly important except insofar as there is sometimes
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a tendency to treat the base period as in some 6ense "normal" or 
more specifically a period in which the exchange rate was at an 
equilibrium level. This is mistaken as the choice of base year is 
usually rather more pragmatic:
"The base date is normally chosen so as to make the 
index show deviations from a set of rates to which 
general interest attaches, say from par values in existence at the time when they were last generally observed". (8)
Thus for the 1970's the date of the Smithsonian Agreement (December 1971)
or the month preceding the shift to generalised floating (March 1973)
is appropriate. In the absence of anything better this convention
of choosing the last period of fixed par values was followed in the
present calculations and the year 1929 was chosen as the base as it
represents a year in which most of the countries were still on the
(9)gold standard. At a more simplistic level the calculations are 
of effective rates for the 1930'e and so the last full year preceding 
the decade is an obvious choice of base. So long as the lack of 
significance of the base period is remembered then the period 
actually chosen is not important.
The third technical aspect of the calculations which requires 
attention is the most difficult one and relates to the choice of 
weights. This has already been discussed and the limitations of 
basing *he weights on merchandise trade flows only and excluding 
invisible trade and capital flows have been indicated. The present 
discussion mainly relates to the choice of the different weighting 
schemes that can be derived from merchandise trade flows. However,
an initial difficulty relates to the choice of period from which to 
take data on trade flows on which the weights are to be based; this
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will generally differ from the base period of the effective exchange 
rate itself. The practice for the calculation of current effective 
rates is to use recent data and periodically update this to allow 
for the fact that trade patterns may change over time for reasons 
other than changes in exchange rates and in fact the IMF has recently
( 1 1 )done this so that the weights it uses are now based on data in 1977»
The problem of finding up-to-date data on trade flows is in 
principle easier for past periods. However, in practice the data may 
not exist, be incomplete or at least extremely difficult to gather 
for the number of countries involved. Therefore use has been made 
of the League of Nations' "Network of World Trade" which has complete 
data on visible trade flows for a large number of countries for three 
years: 1928, 1935 and 1938. This still leaves the question of which 
year to choose and it would be possible to calculate both a Laspeyres 
index based on all three years and a Paasche index with weights (for 
example) for 1930-32 based on 1928 trade flows, for 1933-36 on 1935 
trade flows and for 1937-39 on 1938 trade flows.
The theory of index numbers indicates that a Laspeyres index 
would overstate the importance of an appreciating currency and under­
estimate the importance of a depreciating currency (since no allowance 
would be made for the changes in quantity caused by the price changes)
whilst a Paasche index would do the opposite. This would suggest that
(1 2)some average of Iaspeyres and Paasche indices would be appropriate. 
However, the former is preferred for a number of reasons: firstly, 
since separate indices based on trade flows from each of the three 
years are calculated then a Paasche index has effectively been calculated 
and, by examining the range of variation between the different indices, 
is being implicitly compared;secondly, the sole Paasche index
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which is explicitly calculated (for the pound) was very similar 
to the Laspeyres version anyway and, indeed, the major difficulty 
(and difference) probably relates to reconciling bi-laterally and 
globally weighted indices; finally, Paasche indices would have to 
be based on limited data (for only three years, one of which is 
outside the 1930's) and would consequently be very crude. For these 
reasons, and also for the sake of simplicity, the weights chosen for 
all the main indices presented below are an average of the weights 
derived from all three years for which suitable data are available.
However, the most important difficulty to be overcome, having
decided that the weights are to be based on visible trade flows and
having chosen the years for which the trade flows are to be taken,
is to decide which of the different ways of calculating weights from
trade flows is to be used. The simplest and most obvious method is
to use weights based on bi-lateral trade shares: for example, the
weights for the dollar's EER would be calculated on the basis of the
( 11*)share of each country in O.S. trade (imports and exports).
Unfortunately this is open to three fundamental objections: 
firstly, such weights ignore competitive relations in third markets 
between the U.S. and other countries - for example, the U.S. may have 
very little bi-lateral trade with a particular country but may compete 
intensively with that country in the rest of the world and consequently 
a change in the exchange rate of the dollar against that country's 
currency may have extensive effects on the U.S. balance of payments and 
these would not be picked up by a bi-lateral trade-weighted effective 
exchange rate of the dollar; secondly, bi-lateral weights take no 
account of the different price elasticities for different countries 
and different goods which will imply, for example, that the effect of
- 33** -
changes in the exchange rate of the dollar against the currencies 
of two countries with identical shares in U.S. trade on the balance 
of payments will differ if, as is very likely, these countries have 
different price elasticities of demand and supply; finally; bi-lateral 
weights do not allow for changes in the prices of traded goods induced
by changes in exchange rates which may offset the effect on the balance
(15)of payments of the original exchange rate changes.
The first of these objections can be overcome by basing the 
weights on global trade shares (country shares of total world trade) 
although this has the disadvantage of ignoring important bi-lateral 
trading relationships such as that between the U.S.A. and Canada. 
However an acceptable compromise might be achieved by using an average 
of the bi-lateral and global weights. Unfortunately this does not 
deal with the two latter objections. This is because such a simple 
trade-weighting scheme does not directly deal with the question of 
primary interest which is what proportionate change in the dollar's 
EER would imply the same effect on the U.S. balance of payments as 
that caused by the changes in individual bi-lateral dollar exchange 
rates which actually did occur. To answer this question, account must 
be taken of the different price and supply elasticities of different 
countries (and goods); this is precisely what the IMF's MERM tries to 
do.
This would seem to provide a good case for basing the weights 
on a multi-lateral exchange rate model for the 1930's. The problem 
is that in order to do this a great deal of information about price 
elasticities of different goods in different countries along with a 
number of other basic parameters (including supply and expenditure 
elasticities) are required. Hie task of obtaining reliable estimates
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of these parameters is difficult enough for the calculation of
current effective exchange rates and frequent recourse to assumptions
is required where such estimates are not available. A critique of
MERM (in 1976) pointed to some of the more questionable assumptions
made in the model which in some ways core only more acceptable than the
assumption of equal price elasticities implied by a simple trade weighted
(17)index because of the exclusion of non-industrial countries. The
provision of estimates of similar parameters for the 1930's would be 
a Herculean if not impossible task and the actual weights derived 
would only be as reliable as the parameters included and consequently:
"While this approach is, for many purposes, an improvement 
over the simpler weighting schemes from a conceptual view­point, it has the practical limitation that existing 
techniques for estimating elasticities, as well as data 
problems, are such as to raise the question of whether 
the inevitable wide margin of uncertainty surrounding the 
elasticity figures offsets the advantages of the more 
elaborate technique for deriving the weights." (18)
This is particularly true for the 1930's. Moreover, the limitations 
due to ignoring invisible trade and capital flows apply with equal 
force to any weighting scheme based solely on merchandise trade flows.
However, the decision to use a simple weighting scheme creates 
its own problems: the choice between bi-lateral and global (or multi­
lateral) weights is conceptually difficult since both are subject to 
major drawbacks. Not only do the former ignore effects in third 
markets but they implicitly assume that the home country (the one 
whose effective rate is being calculated) has the same elasticity 
of demand for all imports, whatever their source; whilst the latter 
underemphasise important bi-lateral trading links and implicitly 
assume identical elasticities of demand for the home country's exports
(19)in all foreign countries Thus both weighting schemes ignore
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important trade effects and make unrealistic assumptions about 
elasticities.
Not surprisingly, therefore, different authorities favour 
different weighting schemes. The Federal Reserve Board apparently 
prefers multilateral weights in the case of the U.S. dollar partly 
because bi-lateral weights give an excessive (and unwarranted) 
importance to Canada and partly because empirical tests suggest that 
a multilaterally weighted index is marginally better at predicting 
changes in the American trade b a l a n c e . C h  the other hand, the 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company favours bi-lateral weights because they 
tend to be more stable and relate directly to the exchange rate effects 
on prices which actually confront buyers and sellers in each national
market and also because multilateral weights inadequately reflect third
(2 1)market effects anyway.
Consequently, given the inherent weaknesses in both types of 
weighting scheme, it would seem plausible to argue that the choice 
rather depends on the purpose for which the effective rate is being 
calculated and indeed, possibly for which country. Unfortunately, 
whilst this may be true, it provides no guidance for selecting an 
acceptable weighting scheme to produce an approximation of a "general 
purpose" effective rate which can be used for all countries. The
matter is further complicated by the fact that there are substantial
(2 2)differences between indices calculated both for the current period 
and the 1930's^ 2^  (using the different weighting schemes). Since 
there is no theoretical reason for preferring either (in general), 
as both have major drawbacks, some kind of averaging procedure seems 
reasonable.
This raises the question as to how exactly this should be done.
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There are two obvious methods — arithmetic and geometic averaging - 
and a third possibility is to use the harmonic average. The main 
difference would seem to be that geometric (and to an even greater 
degree harmonic) averaging would tend to reduce the weights (compared 
to the arithmetic average) of countries which had a large share of 
bi-lateral trade but a small share of multilateral trade (or vice 
versa) and increase the weights of those which had similar shares 
of bi-lateral and multilateral trade. This may be seen as a desirable 
property to the extent that it increases the weights of countries 
which tend to be equally important in bi-lateral and global (total) 
trade, although it may tend to give disproportionately large weights 
to countries which have similar but small shares of both bi-lateral 
and global trade.^^)
Partly for the above reasons, geometrically averaged weights
(26)were preferred for the pound's effective rate. This was the
first to be calculated and consequently was subject to most experi­
mentation (in the same way as the pound-dollar exchange rate was the 
first bi-lateral rate to be estimated and was therefore subject to 
most experimentation). On the basis of comparing different indices 
for the pound, it quickly became clear that this degree of sophistication 
and complication was unnecessary and so a simple arithmetic average was 
used for the subsequent calculations of the effective rates of the 
other six currencies. In any case, it is not unreasonable to argue 
that there are strong a priori grounds (in the shape of data deficiencies 
and other difficulties) for regarding this as a relatively trivial 
problem.
Finally, it should be remembered that the choice between bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral weights is, to some extent, an empirical one. Fortunately,
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if it is accepted that MERM-veights are likely to be fairly accurate 
(given that the effective rate is being calculated with reference to 
the trade balance only), there are two studies whose results can be 
interpreted as suggesting that the "correct" weights lie somewhere 
between the bi-lateral and multilateral weights. Rhomberg (1976) 
calculates a number of different indices for a variety of currencies 
in the 1970's and concludes:
"...the MERM-veighted index more often than not (in 
9 of 15 cases) falls between the two trade-weighted 
indices....It assumes the largest or smallest of the 
calculated index values in only 5 of the 15 countries and even then it does not deviate very much from the 
trade-weighted index that is closest to it". (27)
Much the same can be said about a similar study in World
(pO \
Financial Markets (1979)» In eight out of fifteen cases the
MERM index lies between the bi-laterally and globally weighted indices 
and in five others it is within 2%% of the nearest trade-weighted 
index. This leaves only two countries (Denmark and Sweden) for which 
the MERM-index is appreciably outside (in both cases above) the range
between the two similar indices. Nor is it clear that the bi-laterally
(2and globally weighted indices are always related in a systematic way. 
Thus, the (fairly limited) empirical evidence would suggest that, on 
the basis that the MERM-index is the "best" one - admittedly not an 
unquestionable assumption (and, indeed, its fallibility has already 
been indicated) but perhaps the only one available - an average of 
bi-lateral and multilateral weights is more likely to produce a 
reasonable approximation than either system used on its own.
(Ill)
There is one final problem which relates to the high degree of
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protectionism in the 1930's. Tariffs and quotas could distort an 
effective exchange rate in that even if the weights are "correct" 
and derived from a MERM-type model which incorporated invisibles 
and capital flows, given exchange rate changes would not lead to 
the expected changes in the balance of payments and consequently 
weights that did not allow for trade controls would be incorrect 
in a sense. Unfortunately there is no totally satisfactory method 
of incorporating this adjustment. However, it is, in effect, 
partially allowed for in the following way: an increase in a 
country's level of protection is tantamount to an appreciation (in 
that it is an alternative way of relieving balance of payments pressure 
to depreciation) and, although its exchange rate will not change, its 
share of trade (both bi-lateral and global) will decline and so the 
country's weight in any other's effective exchange rate index will 
also fall; thus, in spite of the quoted exchange rate remaining the 
same, the total contributed to other countries' indices by the country 
increasing import controls will fall, thereby (to a certain extent) 
allowing for its higher level of protection. This provides an 
argument for ignoring 1928 trade flows and basing the weights on 
1935 (or 1938) trade flows although, in any case, bi-lateral exchange 
rates are subject to the same distortion and so perhaps such adjustment 
is unnecessary. More fundamentally, it may be argued that an effective 
exchange rate should more properly be concerned with balance of pay­
ments effects due solely to exchange rate changes and adjusting
(30)weights to allow for deliberate acts of policy is inappropriate.
To summarise then,the EER's calculated here can be defined as 
follows: a change in a country's EER equals the proportionate change 
in the value of its currency against all other currencies (expressed
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as an index) that would have the same effect on its trade balance 
as all the changes in its bi-lateral exchange rates that actually 
did take place* The weighting system is based on data on trade 
flows in three years - 1928, 1935 and 1938 - contained in the 
League of Nations's "Network of World Trade" (19^ 2). Specifically 
the weights are an average (either geometric or arithmetic) of two 
set6 of weights: one based on the average of weights derived from 
bi-lateral trade flows in each of the three years, the other on the 
average of weights derived from global trade flows (country shares 
of total world trade) in each of the three years.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 9: THE IMF'S MULTILATERAL EXCHANGE RATE MODEL 
(MERM)
The MERM hase been developed in the IMF’s Research Department 
to analyse the effects of exchange rate changes on trade flows in the 
medium term (that is, after an adjustment period of two or three years). 
It is, therefore, inappropriate to use MERM to consider either the 
short run (one year or less) or the long run effects of such changes.
One of the major applications of MERM has been to develop a weighting 
pattern for simultaneous changes in a number of exchange rates, in 
order to derive an indicator of the extent to which the external value 
of a given currency has changed in relation to other currencies in 
general; this indicator is the effective (or multilateral) exchange 
rate.
The MERM is continually being further developed and two versions 
of it have been described in the IMF Staff Papers: MERM I in
The critique of MERM by Dixon (1976) discussed earlier in the chapter 
related to MERM I (although much of it is still valid if, in some 
cases, to a slightly lesser extent). The description of MERM in 
this appendix, however, is of MERM II, the current version, and 
draws heavily on Artus and McGuirk (1981) who summarise it thus:
"^fhe^...theoretical structure ¿ o f MERi^ is basically 
the Walrasian general equilibrium framework, simplified 
to a great extent by the use of input-output relationships.
As far as possible, the numerical values for the various 
behavioural parameters were derived from econometric 
studies; however, emphasis was placed on maintaining the 
structural relationships derived from economic theory 
rather than modifying these relationships according to 
data availability. A priori judgement was used, when 
necessary, in the choice of parameter estimates". (31)
Hie MERM is based on three major assumptions: firstly, that 
costs and prices (in local currency) are somewhat inflexible. If 
this were not the case then, since costs and prices could be adjusted 
easily and quickly by monetary policy, exchange rate changes would 
not be needed to maintain balance of payments equilibrium; the 
assumption therefore implies that an exchange rate change will help 
to restore equilibrium (by changing the relative price structure).
The second assumption is that "many of the countries, in particular 
the industrial countries, produce differentiated goods that are faced
by finite, in fact sometimes small, price elasticities of demand in
( -*p )world markets;" this implies that changes in exchange rates, 
through relative price effects, cause a reallocation of demand among 
similar, but differentiated goods produced by different countries.
Hie third major assumption is that "the overall level of nominal 
final domestic demand can be influenced by the central authorities. 
This allows the model to concentrate on what is believed to be more
Artus and Rhomberg (1975) and MERM II in Artus and McGuirk (1981).
- 3^2 -
relevant, namely the effect of exchange rate changes on the 
allocation of demand rather than on its overall level (in real 
terms).
There are eighteen countries and two groups of countries
(the major oil exporters and the rest of the world) in MERM and
six groups of goods (five traded and classified according to the
SITC, one non-traded). Each good is both an intermediate and a
(3*0final product and is differentiated by its country of origin 
creating 120 "products" (20 x 6). Each "product" has a single supply 
function but a separate demand function in each market (country), with 
the exception of the non-traded good which has only one (domestic) 
market, creating a total of 120 supply functions and 2,020 demand 
functions (5 goods x 20 countries x 20 markets plus one non-traded 
good x 20 countries). Demand for each product is a function of 
expenditure on the good and the prices of all products. Supply of 
each product depends on prices in the supplying country; shift 
parameters are also incorporated to allow for changes in wages and 
indirect taxes induced by the effect of changes in exchange rates 
on the cost of living. The model is closed by assuming equality 
of supply and demand for each product and that the level of real 
output in each country remains constant. The various basic para­
meters - price elasticities, expenditure elasticities, trade shares, 
supply elasticities and supply shift factors - have to be either 
calculated, estimated or assumed for the model to be used.
A number of reservations about the suitability of MERM for
(35)calculating EER's might briefly be expressed at this point. Firstly,
it takes no account of invisible trade and capital flows; this deficiency 
has already been highlighted and it must be conceded that it is equally
true of all the weighting schemes discussed (and indeed used) in 
the present study. Secondly, as indicated above, it is concerned 
with the reallocation of demand following exchange rate changes and 
assumes that (real) output and employment remain unchanged; short 
run output effects can occur because of exchange rate changes and 
the model ought to recognise this and its implications for the 
balance of payments (and hence for the weights used to compute EER's). 
Thirdly, the assumption that exchange rates are determined exogenously 
(by governments) is not acceptable, especially in the context of the 
present study which is largely based on the contention that exchange 
rates are primarily determined by prices.
Nevertheless, in spite of these problems, it might well be true 
(as Honohan, 1979« points out) that:
"....the weaknesses of the MERM for modelling balance- 
of-payments developments may not seriously impair its 
ability to calculate effective exchange-rate changes.
It may be quite suitable for finding the unilateral 
depreciation which, in terms of balance-of-payments 
effects, is equivalent to a set of actual bilateral 
exchange rate changes, even if its estimates of these 
balance-of-payment6 effects may be inaccurate". 06)
if it were not for the final criticism of MERM which has already been 
extensively stated: the elasticities employed to give numerical content 
to the model are either assumed or based on limited empirical evidence. 
However, all calculations of EER's make assumptions about elasticities 
and at least MERM does this explicitly rather than implicitly. Con­
sequently, it may be the case that, whilst less than ideal, MERM 
provides the best available means for calculating EER's in the current 
period (although its potential application to the inter-war period 
is doubtful).
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9
1. Effective exchange rates are always defined in terns of change.
This is because the concept of an EER cannot be expressed in 
absolute terms. For example, in January, 1931 the pound was 
worth J&4.855 tut it is not possible to "quote" the pound's EER in a similar fashion; this can only be done in terms of how the 
EER has changed since an earlier period.
2. An alternative "general definition" would involve using the EER 
as an indicator of changes in the overall asset value of a 
currency. This is not explored here mainly on the grounds that 
it is more usual to calculate EER's with reference to balance of 
payments changes, presumably because this is considered to be 
more important. However, it should be pointed out that such an 
index could be calculated but that data on trade flows would not 
provide a suitable basis for the weights; GDP data may be most 
appropriate for this purpose (and indeed is used to calculate 
the value of the ecu, the "reserve asset" of the European 
Monetary System). For this reason the EER's presented here are not really suitable for this purpose and, indeed, most indices 
calculated for current EER's are similarly "less than ideal"
(Honohan, 1979» p. 84).
3. One study - Hirsch and Higgins (1970) - concentrates solely on 
trade in manufactures and uses this as a basis for the weights.
4. Indeed, the limitations of the EER's calculated from the IMF's 
MERM are made quite clear in Artus and Rhomberg's (1973) description of MERM (p. 591). A summary of MERM is provided in the appendix
to this chapter.
5. Thus, changes in a country's EER (calculated here) are more accurately defined as: the proportionate change in the value of 
its currency against all other currencies (expressed as an index) 
that would have the same effect on its trade balance as all the changes in its bi-lateral exchange rates that actually did occur.
6. Honohan (1979)» PP* 88-89.
7. The figures for the bi-lateral trade of the U.K. (86$) and the U.S. (80#) are slightly lower than for the other five countries.
8. Rhomberg (1976), p. 88.
9. For the pound's EER the base period is slightly different; it is 
the average for 1929-30. The difference arises because this 
calculation was undertaken (much earlier) as a separate exercise 
and an average of the 1929-30 period was chosen because these were the last two full years that Britain was on the gold standard. In 
fact this change of base makes little difference: on the basis of 
1929 = 100 the pound's EER in 1930 only increased to 101.916. Therefore to rebase the pound's EER from 1929-30 = 100 to 1929 = 0^0 would simply involve a multiplication by 1,00958. (Consequently, a 
1929-based version of the pound's EER would be approximately one 
percentage point higher).
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10. For example, a change in the base year of the current effective 
exchange rate of the pound (to 1973) was announced in January,
19&1* This is of little importance. The base year does, however, 
become important in the next chapter when multilateral PPP tests are carried out.
11. Previously, data for 1972 and, before that, 1969 were used.
Indices using weights based on 1977 trade flows appeared forthe first time in the January, 1981 issue of "International Financial 
Statistics". (This updating also applies to other aspects of the IMF's MERM).
12. Indeed, in a very early calculation of the pound's EER (not 
presented here), a Fisher ideal index was calculated (involving a geometric average of the laspeyres and Paasche indices).
13« In fact, this is a more severe test for the extent to which Iaspeyres and Paasche indices may vary since the latter would 
not have, for example, used weights based on 1928 data for 1938 
and weights based on 1938 data for 1931, as is done in some of the indices calculated here.
14. Some indices use either exports or imports. However, all trade 
weighted indices discussed in this study are based on imports plus 
exports.
15. This point is particularly relevant in the case of developing countries with inelastic supply schedules and has already been 
discussed in this context above.
16. Dixon (1976).
17. These include the assumptions that supply elasticities are the 
same for all countries and that expenditure elasticities are equal 
to one. This latter point received particularly severe criticism: 
"Expenditure elasticities are comparatively easy to measure, and 
there would seem to be little justification in simply assuming them 
all to be 1. For example, elasticities in the food group (SITC 1) 
have systematically been found to be less than 1." (Dixon, op.cit., 
p. 7*0. MERM is also criticised for its rigid definition of final 
and intermediate goods and for recognising only one type of user
of the former.
18. Blackhurst and Tumlir (1980), p. 64. A similar view i6 taken by 
the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company: "Although the theoretical 
cogency of.••.¿VERM/, ...is attractive, the model's empirical realism is less certain. Many assumptions and guesstimates of 
real world parameters are required". (World Financial Markets,
1979, p. 9).
19. Moreover, neither weighting scheme makes any allowances for 
differences in supply elasticities.
20. Hooper and Morton (1978), p. 786.
21. World Financial Markets (1978), p. 7. The third argument is rather a curious one since it would seem equally valid to argue that bi­
lateral weights inadequately reflect bi-lateral effects (for exactly 
the same kind of reason).
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22. See Rhomberg (1976) and World Financial Markets (1979)«
23« See Chapter 10 below.
2k. For example« a country accounting for 1# of bi-lateral (or global) 
trade and 9% of global (bi-lateral) trade would have an arith­
metically averaged weight of *f.5, a geometric weight of 3*0 and a 
harmonic weight of 1.8. In practical terms, it would reduce the 
weights of "smaller" countries which can often be important in the 
bi-lateral trade of certain countries but relatively insignificant 
in global trade flows. Good examples are provided by colonies of 
many European countries and by Canada (arithmetic weight = 11.38, 
geometric weight = 9.36) in the case of the U.S. dollar.
25. Consider a country with 0.95# of bi-lateral and 1.05# of global 
trade. The arithmetic weight is 1.0 and the geometric weight is
0.999« The latter is apparently smaller but once this has been 
"scaled up" to compensate for the fact that geometrically averaged 
weights sum to less than a hundred, it will actually be larger than 
the arithmetically averaged weight.
26. The weights summed to less than a hundred leaving a small residual 
which could be allocated to the U.S. to increase the weight of that 
country which was felt to be desirable; this was an additional 
reason for adopting a geometric average.
27« Rhomberg (1976), p. 100. It should be pointed out that Rhomberg 
himself interprets these results rather differently: "It cannot be 
assumed, therefore, that one of the trade-weighted indices, or any 
average of them, is an acceptable substitute for the MERM-weighted 
index", (op.cit., p. 101). However, this comment relates to a 
slightly different context and assumes that finding plausible 
values for MERM parameters is not impractical.
28. Thi6 discussion is based on World Financial Markets (1979), Table 3, 
p. 7, which compares nominal EER's for March, 1979 using bi-lateral 
multilateral and MERM weighting schemes (March, 1973 = 100).
29. Although there is a tendency for the global index to be the higher 
(in eleven cases), the difference between the two simple indices 
varies considerably (and is often small) and the four countries for 
which the bi-lateral index is the higher include the U.S. and Japan.
30. This point has already been made in connection with countries 
deliberately maintaining prices of their exports in foreign currency 
(and adjusting them in local currency) in order to offset exchange 
rate effects.
31. Artus and McGuirk (1981), p. 275«
32. Ibid, p. 277.
33. Ibid.
3*+. This is a modification of MERM I which goes some of the way to
disarming one of Dixon's (1976) criticisms referred to in footnote 17 abov«
35* Thi6 paragraph and the next draws heavily on Honohan (1979), PP* 82-4.
See also Dixon (1976).
36. Honohan (1979), P* 83.
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CHAPTER 10
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES FOR THE 1930*8 
AND SOME APPLICATIONS
( I )
The calculations of the EER's proceeded as follows: for each 
currency twelve indices (plus a few extra in the case of the pound) 
were calculated. This was done for three reasons: firstly, to make 
full use of the available data; secondly, there was no way of deciding 
which set of data (available for three separate years) was most 
appropriate and therefore it seemed reasonable to try all possible 
permutations; and thirdly, varying the weights illustrated whether or 
not basing them solely on visible trade flows introduced a substantial 
degree of bias, to the extent that the variation in each country's 
weight was sufficiently large to accommodate any change that would be 
required to the visible trade based weights to allow for invisible 
and capital flows of a feasible size (although this is admittedly a 
rather tenuous method of dealing with this problem).
The twelve indices can be divided into three groups of four.
Four bi-lateral indices were calculated with weights based on bi-lateral
trade flows (imports plus exports) in three different years - 1928, 1935
and 1938 - and on an average of the weights derived from trade flows
in these three years. Four parallel global indices used countries'
(1)shares of total (global) trade and four "average" indices used the 
average of the bi-lateral and global weights in 1928, 1935 and 1938 
and the average of the weights used in the average bi-lateral and 
average global EER's (the composite index). In the case of the pound,
- 3^8 -
a Faasche index and two indices in which the weight of the U.S. 
were increased (to follow for the fact that the dollar is important 
for reasons other than trade^^) were also calculated.
There are several other differences between the calculation 
for the pound and those for the other six currencies, mainly because 
the pound's EER was calculated first and was subject to most experi­
mentation, in the light of which the method of calculation was modified. 
One difference has already been referred to in the preceding chapter 
and relates to the fact that the "average" in the calculation of the 
pound's EER is geometric whereas in the others it is arithmetic. This 
difference largely arises from the fact that experimentation with the 
pound's EER indicated that differences between variants were relatively 
small and consequently use of geometric averaging represented unnecessary 
sophistication.
Two further differences exist but are relatively minor and 
relate to the different choice of base period for the pound and the 
inclusion of one less country (28 compared to 29 for the others). The 
pound's EER uses 1929-30 as its base period while the later calculations 
use 1929 only (and in fact calculate monthly values of EER's from the 
beginning of 1930). However, the final (composite) version of the 
pound's EER can quite easily be adjusted (to make it comparable) and
(4)rebased on 1929 by simply multiplying any given value by 1.00958.
The reason why there is one less country in the calculation of the 
pound's EER is that when the second EER - that for the U.S. dollar - 
was examined it was felt necessary to add Mexico since it had a 
significant share in U.S. bi-lateral trade in the 1930's (approximately 
3 per cent) and Mexico was subsequently included in all EER calculations. 
Given the small share of Mexico in world trade in general and British
(2)
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bi-lateral trade in particular (^), it hardly seemed worthwhile 
to recalculate all the variants of the pound's EER to incorporate 
this extremely minor adjustment.
Having noted these differences,the purpose of the rest of the 
chapter is twofold: firstly, to examine the empirical aspects of the 
problem of choosing an index which can be put forward as the most 
representative EER of those calculated for any particular currency, 
which basically involves looking at the consequences of varying the 
weighting pattern; secondly, to undertake a very brief consideration 
of some of the implications of EER's in terms of a reinterpretation 
of some economic aspects of the 1930's.
(II)
A graphical comparison of the different types of index for
the seven currencies is presented in Figs. 10.1-10.7» With the
exception of the pound only the average bi-lateral and average global
(and composite) indices are shown since the differences within the two
"families" of indices tends to be relatively small and it is differences
between indices based on the different types of weighting scheme that
are important. This limited variation within the two "families" is
indicated by the two additional graphs for the pound's EER'6 (Figs. 10.1A
(4)and 10.1B) which plot the range of variation within the families of 
bi-lateral and global indices. The range of variation is seen to be 
small with the possible exception of the lower limit of the bi-lateral 
indices where the point at which the pound regains its 1929-30 value 
is much later, and is nearer the point indicated by the global indices 
(1937), than that of the other bi-lateral indices.
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However, there i B  an appreciable difference in absolute 
levels between the pound's average global and average bi-lateral 
indices (Fig. 10.1C) in the period 1932-36, in which the latter is 
significantly higher. In particular, the bi-lateral index suggests 
that the pound had appreciated back to its 1929-30 level by mid-193  ^
whereas the global index indicates that the pound stayed at least 5% 
below its 1929-30 level (and nearly 1056 below its pre-devaluation 
level) until as late as mid-1937» The first possibility that comes 
to mind is that the former may give a larger weight to the U.S.A. 
which devalued its currency by approximately a third in 1933-^ » but 
this does not seem to have been the case since, in fact, it is the 
global index which gives the U.S.A. the larger weight. A more likely 
explanation is to be found in the fact that the bi-lateral system 
allocates higher weights to the Commonwealth countries, three of 
which,substantially depreciated their currencies against the 
pound early in 1933»
Three additional indices were also calculated for the pound: a
Paasche index and two indices in which the U.S. weight was raised to
take account of the possibility that the U.S. should be given a higher
weight than indicated by trade shares alone because this did not
adequately reflect the dollar's importance. The results are pre-
(7)sented in Table 10.1 on an annual basis. It is clear that the 
Paasche index is very similar to the Laspeyres (composite) index and 
also that increasing the American weight (even from 20.063 to as high 
as 35»251) had little effect. Furthermore the point at which the 
pound regained its 1929-30 level is much the same for all four indices.
The remaining six countries' EER's are presented and compared
TABLE 10.1s ALTERNATIVE INDICES OF THE POUND'S EER
Composite (Iaspeyres) (1 )Paaschev 7i(2) A2(5i
1929/30 100 100 100 100
1931 IOO.O8 100.56 99.40 98.78
1932 86.75 86.73 85.29 83.97
1933 91.28 92.07 90.82 90.40
1934 95-92 96.36 96.70 97.39
1935 95.44 95.91 95.99 96.48
1936 97.51 97.98 97.99 98.42
1937 100.75 100.88 100.84 100.92
1938 IO5.O5 104.57 104.61 104.21
1939(lf) 105.35 104.43 104.43 103.60
Notes : 1. Weights for 1931-2 based on 1928 data, for 1933-6 on 
1935 data and for 1937-9 on 1938 data.
q2. U.S. weight = 28.056; all other weights are /10 of 
their value in the composite index.
5. U.S. weight = 35.251? all other weights are ^/10 of 
their value in A1.
f^. January-August only.
in Figs. 10.2-10.7. Unlike the pound,it is the global index that is 
the highest in the case of the four gold bloc currencies (with the 
exception of France after the third quarter of 1937)« This indicates 
the absence of any general tendency of either global or bi-lateral 
indices to be highest (which i6 not surprising) and, more importantly, 
suggests that the bi-lateral version is least variable: the multi­
lateral pound was depreciated during most of the 1930's whilst the 
gold bloc currencies were appreciated and, what seems to emerge, is 
that the bi—lateral version of the former depreciated less and those
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of the latter appreciated less (than the global versions). Similarly, 
the Canadian bi-lateral index is the least variable, rising less than 
the global in appreciated periods (early and late 1930's) and falling 
less during the depreciated period (mid-1930's). The only ambiguous 
case is the U.S. dollar whose bi-lateral index remains above the global 
index even during appreciated periods. However, a comparison of 
standard deviations (Table 10.2) does show the bi-lateral version 
was (marginally) less variable. Furthermore, Table 10.2 also gives 
more precise (statistical) evidence of the lesser variability of 
bi-lateral indices generally.
TABLE 10.2: STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
O.K. U.S. Canada France Belgium Holland Switzerland
Composite
Index 6.421 12.145 4.604 25.714 14.303 15.912 15.457
Bi-lateral
Index 5-337 11.928 2.283 20.769 12.828 12.368 12.039
Global
Index 7.300 12.669 7.173 30.718 16.140 19.562 18.944
This lesser variability is interesting in that, whilst both 
global and bi-lateral indices have drawbacks, an argument can be pre­
sented for preferring the latter in the 1930's. Although it has been 
argued (in Chapter 9) that acts of deliberate policy should be ignored 
and EER's should simply reflect the effect of exchange rate changes on 
the balance of payments, the high level of protection in the 1930's may 
be so important as to demand attention. Since protection, and later its 
relaxation, were pursued in such a way as to give (usually reciprocal)
preferential treatment to major trading partners then any exchange 
rate of the latter was likely to have more effect on the trade balance 
of a given country than a similar change by a trading country important 
in global terms but not bi-laterally (and therefore not a recipient of 
preferential treatment). Hence bi-lateral indices are more important 
and the fact that they exhibit lesser variability emphasises the 
inference (drawn below) that multi-lateral exchange rates are more 
"6table,, than bi-lateral exchange rates in this simplistic sense.
However, such an argument is fairly tenuous and probably only 
applicable to the 1930's. Consequently, the most striking features 
of Figs. 10.1-10.7 remain the fairly large differences between bi­
lateral and global indices in terms of levels and similarities in 
terms of trends. In the absence of any theoretical justification and
on the basis of empirical evidence suggesting that the most accurate
(8 )EEE lies somewhere between the two, the composite index is preferred. 
Nevertheless, the difference in levels of the different types of index 
should be remembered: it is much safer to deal with trends and examine 
levels only insofar as a range is being considered and this range is 
clearly above or below something else (or at least most of it is). For 
this reason the composite index, when compared with bi-lateral exchange 
rates in Figs. 10.8-10.14, is flanked by its upper and lower limits 
(based on the highest and lowest values of all twelve indices calculated) 
and, although something will still actually be said about the levels of 
the composite indices, such observations should be treated with caution.
(Ill)
Hie (composite) EER's and major bi-lateral exchange rates are 
compared in Figs. 10.8-10.14. There are two general points which might
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ueefully be made: firstly, and most obviously, the EER's of all 
seven currencies exhibit much les6 variability than the bilateral
rates and secondly, six of them show a tendency to appreciate from
(9)the end of 1936 onwards, with the exception being the French franc 
(whose depreciation in 1936-38 obviously contributed to the appreciation 
of the others). A possible implication of these appreciations is that, 
in the absence of WW2, overvalued exchange rates may once again have 
become a problem. Of course, this is a fairly tentative inference, 
since there may be good reasons for the appreciations, but the rise 
in most EER's in the late 1930's is still quite striking and worthy 
of comment.
However, it is the other general characteristic - the lesser 
variability of the EER's - that is probably most important. This is 
because there is some tendency to treat exchange rate variability 
and instability as being the same thing. That this is incorrect is, 
of course, central to the present study and the stability (more 
properly defined) of EER's is taken up in the next chapter; but, if 
this incorrect definition of stability were accepted, then it is clear, 
both from an examination of Figs. 10.8-10.11+ and from a comparison of 
the standard deviations (Table 10.3)» that EER's were relatively 
"stable" in the 1930's compared to bilateral exchange rates and so
TABLE 10.3: STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES
EXCHANGE 
RATE OF
AGAINST
4/
U.K. U.S. Canada France Belgium Holland Switzerland
Composite
Index 6.1+21 12.11+5 1+.601+ 25.711+ 11+.303 15.912 15.1+57
Found - 11+.968 8.535 35.191+ 19.515 21.91+3 23.911+
U.S.Dollar 11.1+79 - 1+.959 36.638 21.739 27.568 28.129
French franc 30.531* 29.232 - - 32.579 36.205 26.590
Nurkse's contention of extreme exchange rate volatility (based on 
the latter) loses much of its force when EER's are examined.
In addition to these general points, some specific observations 
relating to individual currencies might be of interest. In the case 
of the pound, it would seem that the tendency to concentrate on the 
pound-dollar exchange rate has not only led to an overstatement of 
the variability of the pound but has also produced a sort of contra­
diction in discussions of the effects of the 1931 devaluation in much 
of the literature: while the existence of the gold bloc and the deflation 
required by its members to maintain the gold standard is acknowledged, 
the potential effects on British trade and the balance of payments, and 
the general exchange rate implications of these countries maintaining 
their currencies at the old gold parities are not brought out; the 
effects of the British devaluation are usually dismissed as being over 
by 1 9 3 3 » However, the EER (composite index) suggests that the 
pound remained 4-5 per cent below its 1929-30 level and 8 per cent 
below its level in August, 1931 until well into 1936. Thus it would 
seem that concentration on the pound-dollar exchange rate has led to 
the benefits of freeing the exchange rate and their role in Britain's 
recovery being overstated in the period 1931-33 and understated in 
1934-36.
The contention that the pound remained below its 1929 value is 
strongly supported by two other independently calculated sterling EER's 
that have recently become available. The three alternative indices 
are compared in Table 10.4. It is quite clear from the Dimsdale and 
Andrews indices that the pound's EER remained considerably below its 
1929 level in the 1930's. However, whilst these two indices are very 
similar to each other, they are rather different to the composite index 
presented here and this requires some explanation.
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TABLE 10.4: ALTERNATIVE STERLING EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES (1929-38)
Redmond (Composite) Dimsdale Andrews
1929 100 100 100
1930 101.9 99.6 100
1931 101.3 93.7 91
1932 87.7 75-2 77
1933 92.3 77.0 77
1934 97.1 75.4 81
1935 96.6 74.5 77
1936 98.7 77.7 79
1937 101.9 84.7 86
1938 106.4 86.9 91
Sources: (1) Redmond: the 1929 based composite index (for comparability) 
and not the 1929-30 version discussed in the text.
(2) Dimsdale: from Dimsdale (1981) Table 3» P* 317 and Table 
9, p. 333.
(3) Andrews: approximate values from a graphical presentation 
of an index calculated by B.P.A. Andrews (Balliol College, 
Oxford); I am indebted to Mr. Andrews for his permission 
to refer to this unpublished material.
It would be possible to adopt a defensive posture and to attempt
to criticise these alternative indices: Dimsdale uses multi-lateral
weights thereby ignoring important bilateral relationships and his
data for calculating weights is taken from only one year (1929)» even
though trading patterns clearly changed in the 1930's following the
shift to protectionism; Andrews includes only five countries, uses
bilateral weights (and so ignores third country effects) and his use of
(11)a Paasche index can also be criticised. However, the index presented
here could also be criticised on various technical grounds and to
It is quite clear that the main reason for the differences in levels 
between the indices is the inclusion of a large number of colonies 
and primary producers in the composite index, calculated here. The
(1 2)arguments for and against this practice have already been discussed.
Ultimately the differences in Table 10.4 may well stem from 
the initial definitional problem of EER's: how an EER is constructed 
depends on its purpose. An EER required to examine changes in com­
petitiveness (such as that of Andrews) should quite rightly be based 
on countries which produce mainly manufactures but in calculating a 
"general purpose" EER (such as that presented here) the inclusion of 
at least some primary producers can probably be justified. To this 
extent then, the EER's presented in Table 10.4 are not "competitors" 
but represent different "solutions" to the same "problem" (how to 
measure exchange rate changes multi-laterally) and it is useful to 
consider a range of EER's for a given country, during a given period, 
using different weighting schemes and different countries. It is 
therefore encouraging to note that the main inferences drawn from the 
composite index for the pound could equally well be drawn from Dimsdale's 
and Andrews' indices.
This is especially true of the tendency for the pound to remain 
below its 1929-30 level and also, to a lesser extent, of the other 
interesting feature of the pound's EER, namely its steady upward trend 
(common to composite, global and bilateral indices after 1932). This 
may shed some light on the widely held belief that the EEA was holding 
the pound down in the 1930's.^^ On the one hand, this could be taken 
as an indication that the EEA was simply doing its job of smoothing out 
the external value of the pound; on the other, it could suggest that
pedantically defend it would not be a particularly useful exercise.
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had not the EEA intervened then the pound would have quickly risen
(14)to its old level or above. Certainly there were clear motives
for holding the pound down in terms of boosting the export trades and 
freeing Bank Rate freon its external responsibilities to allow a "cheap 
money" policy to be pursued.
Some additional evidence is provided by an examination of the 
capital inflow into Britain in the 1930's. In the period 1931-37 
official gold holdings increased by approximately £600 million, 
sterling balances increased by £350 million and there was, in aggre­
gate, a (net) current account deficit of £270 million; this implies 
a capital inflow of the order of £520 million. At the same time,
there was a total increase in new overseas issues of about £400 million^ 
which indicates a gross capital inflow of nearer £900 million. This 
large capital inflow, combined with only a moderate appreciation of 
the pound, does lend some support to the hypothesis that the pound 
was being deliberately held down. The EER does not actually prove 
anything in this respect but it does indicate that while the EEA was 
dealing in the few main currencies in which it operated, the pound, 
on average, was appreciating against all other currencies; thus, there 
was a much stronger motive for holding the pound down than is indicated 
by simply examining the pound-doliar exchange rate.
Thus the calculation of a sterling EER and the data presented 
above provide both a motive for and evidence of an official attempt 
to hold sterling down. However, although this is highly suggestive, 
it is hardly conclusive and so it may be appropriate, at this point, 
to digress briefly and consider more directly how the EEA's activities 
in the 1930's should be interpreted. This was briefly examined in 
chapter 4 (appendix) where neither contemporary and more recent accounts
(page 358A follows)
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of the EEA's early years nor the econometric tests of Hudgins and
Ozmun^^ were found to provide any direct evidence of competitive
depreciation in the sense of the EEA and another exchange fund each
trying simultaneously to depress the value of its currency against
that of the other. Moreover, it was further argued that, although
the EEA may have sometimes deliberately prevented sterling appreciation,
this was incidental rather than deliberately aggressive in that it was
(18)a bi-product of internal policy rather than a major policy in itself.
The views expressed in three recent examinations of the EEA in
(19)the 1930's (two of which had access to official sources) would
suggest that this conclusion is perhaps a little too kind to the
British authorities. While Sayers is not directly concerned with the
motives behind official intervention, the impression given by his account
of events is that the EEA did, on occasion, do rather more than simply
smooth out trends in the pound. It is true that the pound was supported
as well as depressed at certain times and, indeed, there were
( 2 1 )occasions when intervention was precluded by lack of funds but the
general tenor of Sayers' comments appears to be accepted by Howson (both 
implicitly and explicitly) in the only extensive study of the EEA's 
activities in this period:
"...the U.K. authorities in the 1930's certainly had 
exchange rate targets..." (22)
"...in the mid-1930's...the authorities intervened heavily 
whenever the pound threatened to rise..." (23)
However, Howson's principal conclusion is rather more liberal:
"At various times...the EEA's management of^  sterling in the 
1930's included aggressive intervention../etc/..Yet of none of 
these episodes can it be said that the EEA would...have violated 
the principles recently adopted by the IMF /designed to prevent 
aggressive intervention/." (24)
(page 358B follows)
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A rather less generous view is taken by Dimsdale who, whilst 
accepting Howson's general position, nevertheless concludes:
"It appears, however, that in some years, such as 1932 
and 1936, intervention went beyond the smoothing of 
market fluctuations and that a deliberate attempt was 
made to prevent the appreciation of sterling". (25)
Although these views expressed by Howson and Dimsdale are, on the
surface, at variance, the difference between them would seem to be
one cf emphasis rather than substance. It is clear that intervention
of a competitive nature - in the sense of preventing an appreciation
of the pound that would otherwise have occurred - did take place from
time to time but such activity was not as endemic as is often suggested
(or seemingly was believed to be by many Americans at the time)
and, by any standard, to portray the EEA in its early days as primarily
(27)a device to competitively depreciate the pound seems unfair.
The major implication of the EER's of the four gold bloc
currencies is that they were not as overvalued in the 1931-35/6
period as their bi-lateral exchange rates against the major currencies
(2 8)suggests. This is an interesting, although on reflection unsur­
prising observation. The reason why the effective rates were lower
than the main bi-lateral rates is that a fairly large proportion of
(29)their trade was with each other and with colonies. Nevertheless,
continued over/
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this point need6 to be made and the appreciation of theBe currencies 
in the first half of the 1930'e should clearly not be overstated.
These lower effective rates would suggest that the decline in exports 
of the gold bloc countries should be blamed less on a high exchange 
rate and more on protection and furthermore that competitive 
depreciation was not as much a problem in the 1930's as is often 
implied.
In the second half of the 1930's the paths of the gold bloc 
countries' exchange rates diverge, particularly that of France.
Nevertheless two generally applicable observations can be made: firstly, 
and fairly obviously, their EER's depreciated by rather less than their 
major bilateral exchange rates (against the pound and the dollar)^~°^ 
when they were finally forced to abandon their old gold parities; 
this is not surprising as the former take account of exchange rates 
with other members of the gold bloc whose currencies were also de­
preciating and this parallel movement is, of course, an important 
reason why effective rates did not appreciate so much in the first 
place. This smaller movement of effective rates would imply that 
exchange rate depreciation had a lesser role in stimulating recovery.
However, it is not clear that this is the case because the second 
observation would seem to imply the opposite: despite their greater 
decline the bilateral rates still remain well above their 1929 levels and 
their levels immediately preceding the first major breach of the inter-war gold 
standard (August, 193*1) and the onset of depression in Europe but 
the effective rates, whilst not dropping back to their earlier levels, 
came rather closer to doing so (especially in relation to their August,
193*1 levels). Consequently this latter point would suggest that the 
exchange rate did perhaps play a greater role in stimulating recovery 
in these countries than bilateral rates suggest.
This is particularly true of Belgium whose EER dropped to 
within 8% of its 1929 level when the belga was devalued in March,
1935 and, in fact, almost all the way back to its August, 1931 level 
(within 2%) whilst the Belgian bilateral exchange rates against the 
pound and the dollar remained some 20% above their August, 1931 
(and 1929) levels. Switzerland also provides a good example of 
this: its effective rate fell to within 1^% of its 192? level in 1936 
and was only 7% above its August, 1931 level compared to bilateral 
rates some 1£-19% above their earlier levels. Moreover, although 
both Dutch bilateral and effective rates remained well above their 
earlier levels, in spite of large depreciations, the argument would 
seem to apply with equal force in this case also since the latter 
dropped within 17% of its August, 1931 level whilst the former remained 
more than J>0% above their levels in the corresponding period. The 
difference between the relationships of the levels of the French 
effective rate and French bilateral rates after September, 1936 with 
those in the earlier periods is less marked but is appreciable even 
here: in October, 1936 the effective rate was less than 10% above 
its August, 1931 level and the bilateral rates 18-19% higher although 
the fact that both French effective and bilateral exchange rates soon 
fell well below their earlier levels undermines the validity of this 
general argument as far as France is concerned. In fact the French 
effective and bilateral exchange rates move fairly closely together 
from late 1936 onwards and the latter is, in this particular case, a 
reasonably good proxy for the former in the 1936-9 period.
A final point, relating mainly to the three smaller gold bloc 
countries, is that there was a marked upward trend in their effective 
rates after 1936 which was also true of the two North American effective
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rates and ha6 already been discussed. Thus to summarise, as far as 
the four gold bloc countries are concerned, the EER's indicate, 
firstly, that reference to bilateral exchange rates overstates the 
extent (and therefore influence) of the appreciation of their 
currencies in the 1931-35/6 period and secondly, that the latter 
do not show how close the exchange rates of these countries came to 
returning to their early 1931 (and to a lesser extent 1929) levels 
following their devaluations in 1935/6.
The major divergences between the U.S. dollar's EER and its 
exchange rate against the pound (its main bilateral rate) occur in 
1931-33 and 1937-39 with it being lower in the former period and higher 
in the latter. As with the gold bloc currencies the lower level of 
the effective rate in 1931-33 would indicate that any role the exchange 
rate had in contributing to the depression was rather less important 
than the dollar-pound exchange rate suggests. Of more importance 
perhaps, is the relationship between the exchange rate and the recovery.
It has been argued that the dollar devaluation in 1933-** vaE a de­
liberate attempt to stimulate internal recovery on the basis of the 
(mistaken) belief that there was a direct relationship between the 
price of gold and internal commodity price levels and that if one 
rose so would the other. The same author goes on to argue that prices 
rose for different reasons and that the existence of beneficial effects of
devaluation on internal recovery (in terms of prices and employment)
( 31)is rather debatable. The effective rate would seem to add some
measure of support to this in that the actual depreciation of the 
dollar in effective terms (from March, 1933 to January, 193*0 was 
less (29»5SO than the dollar-pound rate suggests (32#). On the other 
hand in the 193**-6 period the effective rate maintained a value of
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between J>% and 6# less than its 1929  level and b e  much as 11-1*+# 
below xts August, 1931 level which may well have facilitated American 
recovery.
Finally, it i6 interesting to note the movement of the effective 
rate during the 1937-8 recession. In September, 1937 this stood at 
105«2 and then rose progressively until it reached 113*3 in July, 1938. 
What, if any, contribution this made to the recession may be doubtful but 
it is nevertheless true that the possibility of the exchange rate 
having any effect is not made clear by referring only to the bilateral 
rate which remained fairly stable, at a level of 97*9 in September, 1937 
and 98.5 in July, 1938 varying between 96.8 and 98.5 in this eleven 
month period. Moreover, whilst it is true that the effective rate 
continued to rise even after the upturn in the second half of 1938, 
this rise did not match the 7*7% increase of the September, 1937 to 
July, 1938 period reaching only 116.8 - a further rise of only 3*^# - 
in June, 1939 (although it had reached as high as 118.*+ in January,
1939) with the effective rate not really taking off until July, 1939 
(119*5) and August, 1939 (125*2) when the calculation becomes rather 
unreliable and distorted.
The most notable feature of the Canadian EUR is its lack of
variation (an issue which has already been discussed): all twelve
versions fluctuated within a 30# band around the base level (+20% to
-10#) whilst the composite index fluctuated within only 17# compared
with as much as 559= for the two major bilateral rates. Perhaps a more
important point, however, relates to the 1933-36 period when the EER
was several percentage points below both major bilateral rates and,
indeed, its 1929 levelfgiving Canada, a country heavily dependent on
(32)exports, a competitive edge on the rest of the world 
appreciation (common to all countries except France).
until the 1937-39
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The Canadian calculation i6 interesting because its provides 
a good opportunity to take up once again the possibility of giving 
the D.S. a higher weight (previously discussed in relation to the 
pound). At the same time, it allows an empirical test (of sorts) 
of the importance of capital flows since much of the Canadian capital 
inflow came from the D.S. (and so the two issues amount to the same 
thing). Canadians were acutely aware of the importance of American 
capital and, indeed, its large volume (and the consequent large debt 
repayments) were a major reason why the Canadian dollar only followed 
the pound part of the way in its 1931 depreciation.^3"^  Thus U.S. 
capital flows influenced the Canadian exchange rate but causation also 
ran ran the other way since any depreciation of the Canadian dollar 
against the D.S. dollar encouraged D.S. capital to flow to Canada 
(because it became cheaper to invest there).
Both these arguments would indicate a need for a higher D.S. 
weight for the Canadian EER: in the first case, if the D.S. dollar- 
Canadian dollar exchange rate is being deliberately held back because 
of D.S. capital flows, then it is not changing as much as it ought and 
so a larger D.S. weight should be used to offset this; and, in the 
second case, if a depreciation of the Canadian collar attracts U.S. 
capital then this improves the Canadian balance of payments and an 
EER calculated for general purposes should allow for this effect.
It was argued (in chapter 9) that varying the weights by 
calculating different indices was one method, in the face of inadequate 
data on international capital flows, of testing for the effect of using 
weights based on the complete balance of payments. The Canadian case 
would seem to bear out the validity of this approach while throwing 
light on the influence of increasing the U.S. weight at the same time.
where the average bilateral and global indices are charted; in the
i 3 4 )former the D.S. has a weight of 51 »9» in the latter 12.9» Of
course, this test is not strictly valid in that the weights of other 
countries differ also but it is highly suggestive: the effect of 
increasing the D.S. weight (and allowing for capital flows) would 
seem to be that the variability of the Canadian EER is considerably 
reduced. Furthermore, Fig. 10.11 implies that the effect of allowing 
for capital flows is also fairly minimal, at least in the Canadian 
case, as despite the extremely large variation of the U.S. weight 
(and of that of the U.K., the other main supplier of Canadian capital) 
in the twelve indices, the gap between the highest and the lowest of 
them is never more than twenty percentage points (and the trend is 
unaffected). ^“^
Finally, it would be useful to compare the 29 country EER's 
calculated and presented above with the 7 country EER's calculated 
for regression purposes in the next chapter. The latter could be 
considered as indices that exclude primary producers, although it 
should be remembered that they also exclude numerous industrial 
countries (since they were calculated with a view to the availability 
of price data and income proxies and whether or not the exchange rates 
of the included countries were "free"). However, for the 6ake of 
completeness, a comparison is made in Table 10.5«
It is clear that the two EER's for each country are brcadly 
similar, particularly in terms of trends, for all seven currencies. 
This is especially true of the four gold bloc countries. The other 
major feature of Table 10.5 is the fact that the 7 country EER's 
tend to be lower in all cases (probably because they exclude primary
The effect of increasing the U.S. weight is apparent in Fig. 10.^
TABLE 10.5: COMPARISON OF 7 COUNTRY AND 29 COUNTRY EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
COOJ••t=> 100 101.9 101.3 87.7 92.3 97.1 96.6 98.7 101.9 106.4 108.6
D.K. (7) 100 99.9 93.8 74.1 80.7 86.3 8 6 .1 89.4 95.9 10 1.0 98.4
U.S. (29) 100 101.7 110 .6 129.3 114.5 94.4 96.5 98.1 104.8 1 1 2 .6 1 1 8 .2
U.S. (7) 100 99.7 104.1 117.4 102.4 84.5 87.4 88.7 94.7 100.6 103.9
Canada (29) 100 101.3 102.8 106.6 99.5 96.5 97.1 9 8 .1 10 1 .6 10 5.8 1 1 0 .1
Canada (7) 100 100.5 99.5 100.1 93-5 91.7 9 2.2 93.3 97.2 100.2 102.8
France (29) 100 101.7 108.2 120.7 129.9 144.5 149.5 140.9 1 0 1 .1 78.4 76.1
France (7) 100 100.0 102.9 112.5 124.7 142.5 15 0 .1 141.0 95.9 6 8 .5 64.0
Belgium (29) 100 101.7 108.0 120.5 130.4 145.3 117.3 109.0 1 1 6 .9 126.4 133.3
Belgium (7) 100 10 0 .1 10 2.6 1 1 1 . 1 122.3 137.7 110.3 103.0 114.7 125.9 131.1
Holland (29) 100 101.4 107.6 120.8 129.4 144.0 148.7 143.0 129.4 13 6 .6 138.4
Holland (7) 100 100.0 103.3 114.2 1 2 5 .1 141.8 149.3 144.0 130.8 13 8 .2 138.2
Switzerland (29) 100 10 2.0 108.6 120.7 129.5 143.6 147.2 139.0 114.9 122.7 127.2
Switzerland (7) 100 100.4 103.4 111.7 122.4 138.4 142.7 134.7 1 1 3 .6 124.7 127.7
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producers with depreciating currencies). As far as Canada and 
the gold bloc countries are concerned, this gives further support 
to the inferences drawn from the 29 country EER: in the former case, 
the 7 country version indicates that the comparative edge given to 
Canadian imports in the 1933-36 period was somewhat larger than 
previously suggested; in the latter case, the argument that the gold 
bloc currencies were not as overvalued as indicated by the major 
bilateral exchange rates is reinforced (particularly for Belgium 
and Switzerland).
The U.K. 7 country EER, not surprisingly, lies somewhere between 
the 29 country version and the Dimsdale and Andrews EER's (discussed 
above) and, as it was concluded that the latter tended to reinforce 
rather than contradict the inferences drawn from the 29 country EER, 
no further comment is required. The O.S. country EER is also markedly 
lower and this would tend to emphasize the role of the exchange rate 
in the American recovery which has been tentatively suggested. In 
conclusion, the 7 country EER's would not seem to contradict any of 
the inferences drawn from the 29 country EER's.
This completes the examination of some of the more obvious 
implications of the movements of the seven EER's that were calculated.
To some extent this discussion is peripheral to the main concerns of 
the study, but it was felt necessary to do a little more than merely 
present the EER's without comment. There are numerous problems involved 
in the calculations (discussed in chapter 9) and the EER's presented 
here are by no means completely free of them (although data deficiencies 
make some of the problems virtually unavoidable). Consequently, the 
results that have been presented and the conclusions derived should
be treated with caution
Nevertheless, some of the points made do carry some authority, 
since they can be derived from any of the twelve indices calculated 
for a particular country; for example, it has been argued that the 
main bilateral exchange rates overstate the extent of overvaluation 
of the four gold bloc currencies in the 1931-35/6 period, and this is 
apparent whichever variation of any particular country's EER ia 
considered since the whole range of indices calculated - from the 
highest to the lowest values - lies below the main bilateral rates in 
all four cases. The next chapter returns to the central theme of the 
study and examines the extent to which EER's can be considered to have 
exhibited stability in the 1930's (in the sense of being determined by 
"economic fundamentals").
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 10
1. The toted value of world trade is derived by adding together total trade of each of the 29 countries with the other 28. (It 
would lead to incorrect weights if each of the 29 countries total 
trade with all other countries were used to calculate total world trade in this context).
2. All the other EER's presented here are Iaspeyres indices.
3. Such a reason could be that the index was intended to reflect the 
asset value of the pound to some extent; this is a potential applica­
tion of EER's that trade-weighted indices are not well suited for 
(see Chapter 9« n. 2) and raising the weight of the U.S. above
that suggested by trade flows could be a first step in modifying 
trade-weighted EER's for this purpose.
4. Given the relatively small degree of this adjustment - it raises 
the EER by about 1% - it seems unimportant • In fact a 1929 based index was calculated (and indeed is used in the next chapter) but 
only the composite version. Therefore, in the context of the 
present chapter, it is necessary to discuss the 1929-30 based 
sterling EER's since all the indices using different weighting 
patterns, calculated for comparison, used a 1929-30 base. It 
would have been possible to recalculate all the different variations 
with a 1929 base but, as this would have had little effect on either 
the values of sterling EER's or on the ensuing comparisons, it did 
not seem worthwhile.
5» The upper (lower) limit value is the highest (lowest) value of any index of that family calculated. Therefore, it is not an index in 
itself since its values are not all provided by the same index. 
Consequently, the range of variation in the diagrams is, in a sense, overstated because no individual index deviates from the average as 
much as the upper and lower limits plotted in the graphs.
6. South Africa, Canada and New Zealand. (The combined bilateral 
rates of these countries are nearly twice as great as the combined 
global weights).
7. Monthly values are given in Appendix III.
8. This evidence was surveyed in the previous chapter. See Rhomberg 
(1976) and World Financial Markets (1978) (1979).
9« In the case of the pound this is part of a much longer period of gradual appreciation, beginning in early 1933« However, it was not 
until after 1936 that the pound regained and then surpassed its base 
year level.
10. For example, see Aldcroft (1977)» P* 281 and l«wis (19^ 9)» P* 82.
11. See Chapter 9, Section II.
12. Ibid.
13. This possibility is extensively discussed in the appendix to 
Chapter k.
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14. This latter argument is less applicable to the Dimsdale and 
Andrews indices but not inapplicable: they both began a rising 
trend in 1935.
15. These figures are taken from Table N in the L.C.E.S.'s "The British 
Economy Key Statistics, 1900-1970". More recent data in Sayers 
(1976), Appendices, Table C, pp. 312-3 suggest a slightly lower 
gold and foreign currency inflow (£500 million) but larger current 
account deficit (£310 million). These changes do not affect the 
conclusions being drawn.
16. This is calculated from data given in Richardson (1967), p. 58. 
Aldcroft (1977), p. 264 and Sayers (1976), Appendices, p. 313 
suggest a similar figure while Youngson (1968), p. 164 gives data 
for 1932-36 which would imply a lower figure, probably around 
£250 million.
17. See Hudgins (1973) , pp. 220-1 and Ozmun (1976), p. 157 for their 
conclusions.
18. See p. 125 above. The argument is that the British authorities. 
did not deliberately set out to depreciate the pound to make British 
exports more competitive and so on but, rather, having decided on a 
cheap money policy to stimulate internal recovery, wished to free 
Bank Rate from its external responsibilities and to avoid the 
recessionary influence of an overvalued pound (which was perceived 
as a major problem in the 1925-31 period). In a sense, therefore, 
the downward pressure on sterling was not an attempt to undervalue 
the pound artificially but, rather, to prevent it from becoming 
overvalued.
19. The EEA in the 1930's is the direct concern of Howson (1980) and
is examined as part of Sayers (1976), especially vol. 2, pp. 416-30, 
452-3, 463-500, 562-75, and Dimsdale (1981), pp. 329-32.
20. For example, in July - October, 1933 (Howson, 1980, p. 
1938-9 (Sayers, 1976, pp. 561-7) .
22) and in
21. This happened in November, 1932, as reported in Sayers (1976), p. 453
22. Howson (1980), p. 45.
23. Ibid., p. 27.
24. Ibid., p. 56.
25. Dimsdale (1981), p. 332.
26. See Comstock (1933) .
27. Sayers (1976) , pp. 474-5, gives an account of an instance, in late
1936, when a suggestion to engineer a sterling depreciation deliberately 
was discussed and rejected.
28. This mirrors the depreciated level of the pound's EER in the same 
period.
(page 369A follows)
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29. In the composite index the combined weight of the other three 
gold bloc countries plus colonies was 29.02 for France, 26.48 for 
Belgium, 22.02 for Holland and 19.95 for Switzerland. (In the 
bilaterally weighted indices it was obviously higher: 42.29,
36.59, 27.51 and 21.98 respectively in the average bilateral 
indices).
30. This is not true of Belgium where the depreciation of effective 
and bilateral rates was more or less the same (26-28%) but in the 
other cases - France, Holland and Switzerland - the bilateral rate 
depreciations were respectively 5%, 5% and 10% (approximately) 
greater than the effective rate depreciations.
31. Arndt (1944), pp. 38-40.
32. A priori it was felt that, in the Canadian case, relative prices 
were of less importance than generally expected because the major 
determinant of demand for the main Canadian imports was income 
levels (Chapter 7, Section II). This would indicate that this 
point about extra Canadian price competitiveness is unimportant. 
However, the regression results presented in Chapter 7 did suggest 
that relative price effects were of some importance in Canadian 
trade.
33. See Chapter 7, Section I.
34. The range of variation of the U.S. weight is actually slightly 
larger when all twelve Canadian indices are taken into account: 
from 11.97 to 55.16.
35. All these arguments also apply to the Canadian weight in the U.S. 
EER, although capital flows between the two countries were obviously 
much less important to the U.S. than to Canada.
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CHAPTER 11
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES AND STABILITY
(I)
In the preceding chapters the methodology of constructing 
EER's was discussed, they were calculated for the seven currencies 
in the study and some preliminary observations were made about their 
implications. The present chapter seeks to place EER's in the wider 
context of the thesis, specifically to examine the hypothesis that, 
like bilateral exchange rates (to some extent at least), multilateral 
exchange rates were also principally determined by "economic fundamentals". 
In fact, what follows can only be a first approximation in that a 
thorough examination of this hypothesis would require not a chapter 
but an extensive study in itself. The conclusions drawn will there­
fore be preliminary and based on fairly simple tests. There are a 
few studies which have carried out a similar exercise but these are
mainly concerned with different time periods and confine themselves
(1 )to the relationship between exchange rates and prices only. The
tests described below try and go a little further.
However, it would be useful to begin by considering the results 
of these other studies to examine, in particular, to what extent they 
found a relationship between exchange rates and relative prices. Those 
of Genberg (1978), Thygesen (1978) and World Financial Markets (1978,
1979) deal with recent periods and so only the more general conclusions 
are of interest here. Thygesen is summarizing the OPTICA Reports and 
strongly supports the contention that there is an important relationship 
between relative prices and exchange rates:
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"...changes in the exchange rates of EC member currencies 
during the period between the early 1960's and the mid-1970's predominantly reflect inflation differentials". (2)
Interestingly enough, he also concludes that:
"Conformity to PPP was considerably closer multilaterally 
than bilaterally against the DM (Deutchemark)". (3)
The EER's are based on an eighteen country model and are consequently 
very comprehensive. On the other hand the tests used wholesale prices 
which are widely condemned as a biased indicator of PPP (as suggested 
in Chapter 3)»
Genberg's results are rather less encouraging: using a fourteen 
country model to calculate EER's for the 1957-76 period and, (perhaps 
ominously) consumer prices, he finds that deviations of exchange rates 
were larger in the floating rate period (1973-76) and presents evidence 
to suggest a bias in PPP calculations using consumer prices. Specifically 
he discusses:
"....the possibility that there has been a shift in PPP 
relationships,as measured by CPI's, due to changes in 
relative prices of traded goods combined with intercountry 
differences in the weights they are accorded in national indexes. The obvious candidate for such a relative price 
change would be the increase in oil prices in late 1973"« (*0
Nevertheless, Genberg does concede that:
"...*/his/r...evidence indicates that actual exchange rates 
are not likely to be far off their PPP levels if a simple 
adjustment for structural change is allowed for". (5)
He also admits that the period of floating examined may not be very 
representative as it comprises the first four years of floating 
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. To the extent 
that relative income and trend variables can pick up structural changes
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and dummy variables can capture abnormal factors following the 
collapse of the gold standard, the second exercise undertaken below, 
involving regression analysis, makes some allowance for Genberg's 
criticism.
The World Financial Markets articles do not explicitly test the 
PPP hypothesis but do calculate real EER's for the 1970's, compare 
these to nominal EER's and conclude:
"...it is remarkable that the floating rate system has 
brought so little real effective exchange rate variation..." (6)
"the variability of effective exchange rates in real terms 
is empirically much less than the variability of the nominal 
indices...". (7)
This lack of variability of real effective rates clearly suggests a
strong relationship with relative prices. Two other points are of
interest: firstly, when EER's are adjusted for inflation differentials
the choice between the different possible weighting patterns for EER's
becomes less important as the differences become smaller; secondly,
real EER's adjusted with wholesale prices are more stable than those
/ q  )adjusted with consumer prices. In the present context, the former
point would appear to reduce the importance of a potentially awkward 
problem whilst the latter reinforces the claim that it is important to 
consider PPP tests using prices other than WP's (made in earlier 
chapters).
The Dimsdale (1981) and Officer (1980) studies are of more 
interest because the period they cover includes at least part of 
the 1930's. This is particularly true of Dimsdale's real EER index 
for the 1921-38 period (Table 11.1) since it uses the same base (1929) 
as that chosen here and the nominal EER is adjusted by consumer (retail) 
prices. Whilst the real EER still depreciates substantially in the
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TABLE 11.1: NOMINAL AND REAL EER'S, 1929-38 (AS CALCULATED BY 
DIMSDALE, 1981)
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 193^ 1935 1936 1937 1938
Nominal 100 99.6 93.7 75.2 77.0 75.** 7*+-5 77-7 8^.7 86.9
Real 100 98.5 9k.2 81.it 82.8 81.7 81.8 86.1 91.9 91.8
Source: Dimsdale (1981), Table 3» p. 317 and Table 9» p. 333*
mid-1930'e the fact that the degree of this depreciation is much reduced,
(9)along with the lesser variability of the real EER, clearly suggests 
that there was a relationship between the multilateral exchange rate and 
relative prices of the type postulated here; that PPP does not hold 
especially well is not surprising in view of the results presented in 
Section II of the present study which indicated that relative prices, 
though important, were not the only determinant of (bilateral) exchange 
rates.
Officer's (1980) study is a fairly comprehensive test of the long 
run PPP theory for fourteen EER's, using a variety of base periods, and 
calculates PPP for a "current" period (1975) and two intervening periods 
(1938 and 1963-66). Whilst his choice of price index (GNP deflator) is 
methodologically sound, his EER's have a limited country coverage 
(between two and six). Calculations are made using up to four different 
base periods (as data availability permits) and six of the seven countries 
in the present study are included. (The exception is Belgium). The 
relevant results are summarized in Table 11.2. Officer's conclusions 
are fairly optimistic:
"For any sample and time period the average absolute percentage 
error is less than 30#." (10)
"Regression analysis suggests that deviations from PPP can be explained in terms of structural changes in economies". (11)
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TABLE 11.2: PERCENTAGE OVER ( + ) OR UNDERVALUATION (-) OF THE EFFECTIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE IN 1938 ACCORDING TO OFFICER'S O 98O) PPP 
CALCULATIONS
Source; Officer (1980), Tables 2, 3» 4 and 5» pp. 214-7.
However, a rather less encouraging interpretation of the results
for 1938 may seem appropriate: given the tendency for structural changes
to become increasingly pronounced over time, the larger average absolute
error in 1975 (up to 2890 than in 1963-66 (up to 16%) is perhaps to be
expected; for the same reason, the error in 1938 ought to be the smallest
but, in fact, it is almost the largest (up to 24%). Fortunately,
although this is disturbing, it undermines any exact application of a
simple PPP hypothesis rather than the hypothesis being tested here,
which does not suggest that relative prices are the only determinant
of exchange rates. Moreover, the structural changes involved after
a world war, a major world-wide depression and the collapse of the
established system for regulating exchange rate values would certainly
be large; consequently, the fact that four of the six currencies in
Table 11.2 apparently stayed within approximately 10% of their PPP
value (ignoring the 1879-88 based U.S. calculation) might be interpreted
(1 2)as a "good" result.
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This completes a brief review of relevant empirical work.
The major conclusion would seem to be, both in a general sense and 
in relation to the 1930's in particular, that multilateral exchange 
rates were determined partially, but by no means only, by relative 
prices. This does not contradict the view of bilateral exchange rates 
taken earlier in the study. Consequently, the hypothesis that relative 
prices played a role in the 1930's in determining the multilateral (as 
well as bilateral) exchange rates of the seven currencies examined in 
Section II is considered below. Two separate tests are carried out: 
the first involves a simple PPP test and takes the form of calculations 
of inflation differential adjusted (or real) EER's; the second employs 
regression analysis which allows the inclusion of non-price explanatory 
variables (although, because of data deficiencies, at the expense of 
substantially reducing the country coverage of the EER's used as the 
dependent variables).
(II)
As a preliminary to constructing a real EER it was necessary 
to calculate an effective or "rest of the world" price index (using 
the same countries and weights as in the EER). The real EER can then 
be calculated:
Real EER = ¿Nominal EER/(EP/PD)7* 100 (11.1)
where EP = an effective (ROW) price index 
PD = a domestic price index
This variable is constructed in such a way that if PPP held exactly 
then the real EER would be one hundred, if it is greater then the
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multilateral exchange rate is overvalued (in PPP terms) and if it 
is less then the exchange rate is undervalued; in addition the degree 
of "misvaluation" is clear because the real EER is effectively the 
nominal EER expressed as a percentage of its PPP value. Finally, 
as in the examination of bilateral exchange rates, prices are lagged 
by one month.
Two versions of the real EER were calculated for each country,
one adjusted by WP's, the other by COL indices. This creates an
immediate data problem due to limitations in the availability of price
data but, in fact, the number of countries that had to be excluded turned
out to be very small: the 29 country model used to construct EER's in
Chapter 10 was reduced to 28 countries for tests involving WP's and
24 for those involving COL indices. v Thus the nominal EER's were
recalculated using scaled up values of the weights used in the 29
(14)country versions. This is not quite correct as, strictly speaking,
the global "half" of the composite weights is based on a model in­
cluding the trade of the countries excluded from the 28 and 24 country 
versions. However, any discrepancy is likely to be small given the 
size of the excluded countries (in global trade terms) and the fact 
that the results presented in the previous chapter indicated that the 
weights of EER's could be varied quite substantially with little effect.
Real versions of the 7 country EER's used in the regression
analysis below were also calculated. This was desirable for several
reasons, most importantly because they are indices which are free of
(15)primary producers and therefore any associated criticisms but
also, at a more trivial level, the global half of the composite weights
are based only on trade between the seven countries thereby avoiding
(16 )the criticism of the previous paragraph. The four versions of
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each country's real EER are presented in Figs. 11.1-11.7«
A recurring problem in this kind of exercise is deciding just 
how large a deviation has to be before it indicates that the PPP 
hypothesis i6 discredited. There is no objective method of resolving
this issue and so it becomes a matter of judgement and hence potentially
/ \of dispute. In the turbulent 1930's, as portrayed by Nurkse (19M0,
a similarly extreme view (to his) might be adopted and it could be 
argued that relatively large deviations - perhaps 10% or even 15% - 
from PPP values might still be interpreted as encouraging for the PPP 
hypothesis and somewhat larger deviations might be expected. However, 
this is an extreme view. Nevertheless, the evidence relating to bi­
lateral exchange rates (presented above) did suggest an important role 
for non-price variables and consequently, it may be reasonable to 
ignore deviations of up to 5% and only treat those greater than 10% 
as being excessive. A further complication concerns the adequacy of 
1929 as a base year. Whilst it has been argued that the pound, for 
example, was possibly at equilibrium in some general balance of 
payments sense in 1929, this was probably not the case in terms of 
relative prices, both for the pound and for several other currencies. 
Thus a deviation from the 1920-based PPP may, in fact, represent a 
movement towards, rather than away from, equilibrium if 1929 were 
a disequilibrium year. This possibility must be remembered.
Despite these problems the results for the pound are basically 
encouraging particularly for the "wide" (28 and 2k country) versions: 
the wide COL-adjusted index is within 5% of a hundred for 70% of the 
February, 1930 - August, 1939 period and the VP-adjusted version for 
60% of the time. The "narrow" (7 country) versions tend to be rather 
lower but still remain within 10% for much of the time. Moreover,
(17 )
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in spite of the differences in levels, the trend of all four real
(19)EER's is virtually identical: the pound became undervalued in
autumn, 1931 and remained so until late 1936 but for the rest of 
the period was approximately at an equilibrium level. It is not 
difficult to explain this undervaluation. The most obvious explanation 
lies in the activities of the EEA which is widely believed to have 
been deliberately holding the pound down in this period; this 
possibility has already been extensively discussed earlier in the 
study. Secondly, the fact that a recovery was beginning to take place 
in Britain at this time, whilst many other countries (notably those in 
the gold bloc) were still in a state of depression, may provide an 
additional explanation in terms of relative income effects. Finally, 
if the pound were indeed overvalued in 1929 and that year is an 
unsuitable base, then at least part of this "undervaluation" is 
apparent rather than real.
It may also be possible to explain some specific sub-periods 
by reference to the speculative dummies (or to periods characterised 
in the bilateral exchange rate regressions by large residuals). The 
extent of the undervaluation at the turn of 1931 and its decrease in 
spring, 1932 clearly falls into this category; this period is covered 
by K1, a highly significant British speculative dummy (in the bilateral 
regressions), associated with sterling weakness due to various specu­
lative factors.Similarly, a slight tendency towards more under­
valuation in early 1935» which occurs in the two COL adjusted indices, 
may be associated with the influences represented by K*t and the 
decrease in the degree of undervaluation in early 1933 of all four 
indices is quite clearly related to K2. This does not account for 
all the deviations of the pound from its PPP value - in particular
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there is no obvious reason for the real effective pound to be at 
its lowest level in late 1932 - but it is highly suggestive: much 
of the effective pound's deviation from its PPP level can be 
adequately explained. Finally, it is interesting to note that the 
conclusion reached on the basis of the pound's nominal EEE - that the 
EEA deliberately depressed the pound in the 1930's - is supported by 
the movements of the pound's real EER.
Unlike the pound's real EER's, there are significant differences 
between the WP and COL adjusted indices for the dollar, particularly 
in the wide version. The conclusions that should be drawn from the 
COL versions are quite clear: for the period between the pound leaving
gold in 1931 and the beginning of the dollar depreciation in 1933 the 
dollar was overvalued, possibly by as much as 155^ 5 from the spring
of 1933» however, the dollar became undervalued until the end of the 
decade, particularly in 1933-3** and by more than 1C$ until late 1936.
The implications of the WP versions are equally clear: the dollar was 
overvalued for most of the decade, excessively so in the late 1931 to 
early 1933 period, with the exception of 1933-3** and possibly early 
1938.
Expectations (and probably the truth) lie somewhere between these
two views and a compromise based on both indices would suggest a middle
position consisting of three main propositions. Firstly, the dollar
became overvalued in the October, 1931 - March, 1933 period (possibly
reflecting the undervalued pound) reaching two peaks: the first of
these at the turn of 1931 coincides with K1 and clearly, therefore,
does reflect the undervalued pound and the other, at the turn of 1932,
coincides with a U.S. speculative dummy (S3), significant in the bi-
(23 )lateral regressions and associated with dollar strength. The
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second proposition is that the dollar was undervalued in 1933-3*+; 
this was expected and the fact that it is true multilaterally as 
well as bilaterally (as strongly suggested by the significance of 
Sk and S5 in the bilateral regressions) is no surprise.
Thirdly, from 1935 onwards the position of the dollar is not 
clear: the WP version indicates that it became slightly overvalued 
but remained fairly close to its PPP level but the COL version showed 
a persistent undervaluation which, for 1935» is more consistent with 
the bilateral results (bearing in mind the significance and signs of 
S6 in the latter). A common feature of all four of the American indices 
in this final sub-period is the increase in the extent of the under­
valuation in early 1938. This could have been caused either by the 
1937/38 recession and consequent relative income effects or by the 
influences associated with S9, an American speculative dummy which 
was significant in the bilateral regressions and covers this period.
In general, the course of the real EER of the dollar gives less support 
for the PPP hypothesis than that of the pound but, nevertheless, 
deviations did tend to occur where expected and after 1935 the WP 
version does seem to indicate that PPP held approximately.
The Canadian real EER's are rather similar to those of the U.S.
in that the COL adjusted versions are appreciably lower but dissimilar
in that there is no important conflict between the latter and the WP
adjusted indices. The WP indices would, in fact, suggest that PPP
held quite well for the Canadian dollar in the 1930's» remaining
(2*+)within 5% of its PPP value for three-quarters of the time and 
always within 10$. The COL versions are less encouraging: although 
they concur with the apparent equilibrium in the first three years or 
so, from mid-1933 onwards they indicate undervaluation (of up to 1 W
until the end of the 1930's. However, this does not actually 
contradict the WP adjusted EER’s because they too indicate an under­
valuation for much of this period, particularly during 1933~36. Indeed, 
fairly obvious explanations for this tendency to be undervalued after 
mid-1933 (and especially until late 1936) are available in the shape 
of the apparent overvaluation of the gold bloc countries for much of 
this period (discussed below) and also the fact that the Canadian 
dollar may have moved in sympathy with the undervalued U.S. dollar.
(Two Canadian speculative dummies, DC5 and DC7 specifically included 
to represent this latter possibility were significant in the bilateral 
regressions ).
It is also possible (as with the pound and the dollar) to look 
to dummy variables and large residuals in the bilateral regressions to 
explain specific sub-periods : the increase in overvaluation at the turn 
of 1932 coincides with a Canadian dummy (DC3) which was significant 
and associated with Canadian dollar strength in the bilateral re­
gressions (although admittedly "wrongly" signed); the increase in 
the degree of undervaluation at the turn of 1933 also corresponds to 
a significant Canadian dummy (DC5); finally, the tendency towards 
greater undervaluation for much of 1936 can be associated with a 
combination of speculative effects (DC7» January-February), positive
residuals in the Canadian dollar-pound estimates (March-April) and in
(25)the Canadian dollar-U.S. dollar estimates (July-October).
Moreover, on the basis of a priori expectations, the role of 
relative incomes might also be expected to be important in the Canadian 
case although it is difficult to pick out specific examples of this. 
Indeed, it was anticipated that, for a number of reasons (including 
the high level of Canadian protection), relative price effects would
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be weak and in the Canadian dollar-pound regressions this did turn 
out to be the case. Consequently, the lack of extreme deviations 
from PPP (particularly in the WP adjusted case) could be construed 
as indicative of a rather greater role for relative prices than 
might have been expected.
The gold bloc currencies all show a tendency towards over­
valuation in the 1930's. This is particularly true of France with 
the COL adjusted version suggesting that a peak of 70% overvaluation 
was reached in 193*+» The path of the French real EER is very clear 
since, despite differences in levels, the WP and COL adjusted versions 
(both wide and narrow) exhibit the same trend: the franc gradually 
became progressively overvalued in the early 1930's reaching a peak 
in the first half of 193*+» it became less overvalued for a short while 
after this but the degree of overvaluation resumed its upward trend 
in autumn 1935 until the September, 1936 devaluation, after which, 
the degree of overvaluation was reduced (and in fact almost dis­
appeared in the WP version); howevever, the upward movement still 
continued until the trend reversed itself and the overvaluation 
eventually became an undervaluation.
This tendency towards persistent (and large) overvaluation and 
the short period of undervaluation in the late 1930's (with very little 
equilibrium in between) clearly indicates that a simple PPP approach 
is inappropriate in the case of the French franc. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to argue that, after allowing for a number of fairly 
obvious explanations of this undervaluation, the remaining deviation 
from PPP would be much less pronounced, especially in the WP version. 
These explanations include the apparent undervaluations of the pound 
and the dollar in much of the 1930's (due, in part to the influence
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of the EEA in the former case), the continued recession in France 
leading to a lower level of demand for foreign goods and currency 
(a relative income effect) and also the fact that 1929 may be an in­
appropriate base year for the franc in that it was widely believed 
that it had returned to gold at an undervalued level in 1928; hence 
much of the franc's apparent overvaluation in the 1930's may actually 
represent a movement towards PPP equilibrium.
In addition to these general arguments, some of the changes 
in the degree of overvaluation in specific sub-periods can be explained 
by speculative influences as represented by the French dummy variables 
and the residuals in bilateral regressions. The peaking of French 
overvaluation in early 193  ^coincides with residuals in both the
(26 )pound-franc and dollar-franc estimates (for January-February, 193*0 V 
which indicated franc strength and were tentatively attributed to 
official intervention. Subsequently, although all the real EER's 
drop back immediately after this, they still remain at their highest 
levels in the 1930's and this, in part, could well be due to speculative 
influences causing the franc to appreciate in 193*+ and represented by F3.
Obviously speculative influences cannot explain all the deviations 
and dummies which were significant in the bilateral regressions do not 
always find their counterpart in the paths of multilateral exchange 
rates (as will be made even clearer by the regression results presented 
in the next section). Nevertheless, it does seem that some of the 
movement of real EER's in general, and that the French franc in 
particular, can be attributed to the influences represented by the 
speculative dummies. In the latter case, it is also possible to 
suggest that the apparent overvaluation of the franc for much of the 
1930's can be accounted for and that an underlying relative price
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influence still exists, even though it is not dominant.
The Belgian real EER also tends to be overvalued for much 
of the 1930*6 although to a much lesser degree than that of France.
Another similarity is that the COL-adjusted version is consistently 
higher. Furthermore, each of the four EER's indicates the same 
pattern: the belga gradually became increasingly overvalued until 
its devaluation in March, 1935» after which it became undervalued 
until the French franc devaluation in Autumn, 1936, when the over­
valuation resumed. In accounting for this, all the explanations 
used for the pre-devaluation overvaluation of the French franc - initial under­
valuation in 1929» British and American undervaluations and relative 
income effects - can also be used in the Belgian case, whilst the 
middle period of belga undervaluation may well support the contention 
(expressed in Chapter 6 ) that the belga was undervalued against the 
franc for the April, 1935 - September, 1936 period; indeed this may 
be extended to other currencies of the gold bloc (and, effectively, 
amounts to saying that they were all overvalued).
Similarly, the return to an overvalued position in the latter 
part of the decade may also reflect French franc disequilibrium (in 
this case, undervaluation). Finally, despite the fairly good showing 
of the Belgian speculative dummies in the bilateral regressions, there 
is no obvious period during which the real EER was influenced by the 
speculative factors which they represent. In conclusion, it is perhaps 
worth noting that, in spite of the general tendency towards overvaluation 
the WP adjusted EER's suggest that the belga was rarely more than 10% 
above or below its PPP level.
The Dutch real EER indicates overvaluation for most of the 1930's
although it was approximately at equilibrium until Britain left 
gold in 193^  and for a brief period immediately after the Dutch 
followed in 1936. It should be remembered, of course, that a 
combination of protection and extreme gold standard orthodoxy was 
expected to undermine relative price effects in Holland and this did 
indeed turn out to be the case for the guilder-pound exchange rate. 
Consequently, a close correspondence of the Dutch EER to its PPP 
value would have been rather surprising. The Swiss franc is notable 
in that all four versions of the real EER are not only in agreement 
in terms of trends, but also levels. The Swiss franc, like the guilder 
became increasingly overvalued as the 1930's progressed, although the 
devaluations in autumn, 1936 seems to have restored equilibrium at 
least until mid-1938.
To a great extent the reasons suggested for the French and 
Belgian overvaluations in the first half of the decade clearly apply 
to all the gold bloc currencies, including the guilder and the Swiss 
franc; moreover, the overvaluation in the late 1930's could be attributed 
to the French undervaluation at that time. Specific reference to Dutch 
and Swiss speculative dummies, however, is not useful (as in the Belgian 
case) but, since they were of limited importance in the bilateral re­
gressions, their inability to "explain" movements in the (real) multi­
lateral EER is unsurprising. In general, it must be conceded that, 
in PPP terms, the gold bloc currencies were certainly overvalued to 
some extent in the 1930's (although the real EER's presented here may 
overstate it for the reasons outlined above). Nevertheless, this does 
not preclude a role for relative prices in effective exchange rate 
determination in the 1930's but, rather, it could be interpreted as 
indicating that relative prices were not the only determinant and other
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variables were important; indeed, the results of the regressions 
involving bilateral exchange rates would support this view.
Consequently, a simple test of the "pure" PPP hypothesis was 
unlikely to be successful. However, it has been indicated that relative 
prices have some role and more precise (statistical) support for this 
contention is provided by Table 11.3 which compares the standard deviations
TABLE 11.3: STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF NOMINAL AND REAL EERS
U.K. U.S. Canada Frein ce Belgium Holland Switzerland
29C: Nominal 6.1+2 12.15 1+.60 25.71 14.30 15.91 15.46
29C: Real (WP) 5-76 7.07 3.86 12.05 5.80 10.10 9.63
29C: Real (COL) 5.71 9.67 5.89 24.92 11.63 14.72 13.21
7C: Nominal 9.29 10.75 1+.09 29.O6 13.91 17.53 15.19
7C: Real (WP) 7.38 7.O8 4.02 12.42 6.20 12.09 IO.85
7C: Real (COL) 8.1+1 8.15 5.55 25.23 11.41 16.17 13.44
Key: 29C =
7C = 
(WP) = 
(COL) =
29 country model 
7 country model 
WP adjusted 
COL adjusted
of nominal and real EERS. If relative prices influence exchange rates 
then real EER's should be less variable and hence have
smaller standard deviations). This is clearly the case for all countries, 
whether 29 or 7 country EER's are used, with the exception of the COL- 
adjusted Canadian real EER, although even here the increase in variation 
of the real EER is relatively small.
In many ways these simple tests, involving calculating real EER's, 
indicate more about the role of non-price variables in multilateral
exchange rate determination than relative price effects. It is 
likely that relative prices had some effect (since realEER's are less 
variable than nominal EER's and also some countries' real EER's do 
stay quite close to their PPP equilibrium levels for sustained periods) 
but it is equally obvious that PPP did not hold even approximately 
for much of the time and other variables were important; in particular, 
the occasions on which official intervention (especially that of the 
EEA), relative income levels and speculative factors (as represented 
by the speculative dummies) probably had some effect have been illustrated. 
More generally, expectations about deviations from PPP were usually 
realised: the pound did become undervalued because of the EEA's 
activities, the dollar was deliberately undervalued in 1933-3  ^and 
the gold bloc currencies did become increasingly overvalued (until 
they were devalued in 1936).
However, the highlighting of the importance of non-price variables 
does point to the general unsatisfactory nature of these tests and the 
exclusion of such variables constitutes a major aspect of this. The 
extent to which the base year represented equilibrium (in simple PPP 
terms) might also be questioned and the lack of reliability of some
(27)of the price data used in the wide version of the real EER criticised.
More fundamentally, the inclusion of countries which practiced wide­
spread exchange controls (such as Germany) and, indeed, were excluded 
from the examination of bilateral exchange rates for precisely this 
reason, must surely reduce the likelihood of the EER following its 
PPP path. Fortunately, these two latter problems are minimised by 
also calculating a 7 country version of the real EER but this still 
does not adequately deal with the exclusion of non-price variables. 
Consequently, in an attempt to remedy this, a second series of tests
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was undertaken involving regression analysis, thereby allowing 
such variables to be incorporated. This exercise is described in 
the next section.
(Ill)
An initial problem of the regression analysis was to decide 
which of the variables used in the bilateral regressions could be 
"converted" into multilateral versions. Clearly multilateral price 
variables are available because they have already been calculated and 
it is not difficult to extend this calculation to income (although 
there are problems with data availability, discussed below). In 
addition, seasonal and trend variables can be easily incorporated 
along with the speculative dummies of the country whose EER is being 
examined. However, it is not really possible to construct acceptable 
"ROW speculative dummies" or a "ROW interest rate", since these variables 
are already proxies and to extend them further would be an extremely 
tenuous exercise. This latter argument also applies to official 
intervention and there are, in addition, less obvious reasons why an 
appropriate variable to represent this cannot be included. The inter­
vention dummies used in the bilateral regressions reflect intervention 
to influence bilateral exchange rates not the activities of individual 
exchange funds and the construction of a multilateral ID for an 
individual currency would be difficult for two major reasons: firstly, 
subjective judgement would be required to decide whether, for example, 
British intervention to support the pound against the dollar merited 
the same weight as intervention to support the pound against the 
minor gold bloc currencies; secondly, to the extent that different 
exchange funds operated on each other's behalf, then incorporating
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all a given country's intervention would not capture all inter-
(?8 )vention aimed at influencing its exchange rate anyway. J
Having decided on which variables to include in the multilateral
regressions, a further problem relates to the selection of the countries
to be included in the calculation of multilateral variables. Obviously,
any country which did not have a relatively "free" exchange rate should
be excluded as the model of exchange rate determination developed here
would not apply to such countries. (This was a problem in the PPP
tests using the 29 country model in the previous section). Moreover,
a balance has to be struck between the availability and reliability
of data, on the one hand, and maximising country coverage, on the other.
A high country coverage is desirable but there is no income data and it
is difficult to find suitable proxies for some countries. Consequently,
it was decided to include only the countries whose exchange rates had
(29)been examined bilaterally thereby producing a 7 country model. This
is a relatively small number but, nevertheless, it does include the 
three most important countries - the U.K., U.S. and France^^-
(31)certainly in terms of the size of weights in the 29 country EER's.
In the first instance, then, OLSQ estimates for each country's 
EER were produced with relative prices, relative incomes, the country 
concerned^ speculative dummies, seasonal variables and a linear trend 
as the independent variables. Unfortunately, with the possible exception 
of the WP version of the U.S. dollar (where the Durbin-Watson statistic 
was in the indeterminate range) all these estimates were serially correlated. 
Consequently, although, by and large, relative price and income variables 
were significant and correctly signed,the OLSQ regressions had to be 
discounted and the equations were re-estimated using the Cochrane- 
Orcutt (CORC) technique. It is the CORC estimates that are presented in 
Tables 11.*4-11.10; all variables that were not significant (at the 20% level 
at least) have been excluded.
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i 1 2 )TABLE 11.4: ESTIMATES FOR THE MULTILATERAL POUNDv ’
EXPECTED
SIGN WP COL
Constant ? 58.2 (3.14) 91.8 (3.66)
World prices/U.K. prices + 3.01 (0.20) -31.7 (1.39)
Trend ? 0.36 (5.90) 0.39 (6.91)
Seasonal variables: A1 ? -0.62 (1.34) -0.84 (1.74)
B1 ? 0.56 (1.19) 0.60 (1.31)
Speculative dummies: K1 - -4.35 (4.06) -4.36 (4.11)
K4 - -2.28 (2.18) -2.35 (2.26)
Rho 0.89 (18.5) 0.89 (18.0)
R-SQUARED 0.98 0.98
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.55 1.49
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 1.39 1.37
F-STATISTIC 319.4 327.4
Notes: 1. T-statistics in brackets
2. Omitted (insignificant) variables: relative incomes, 
A2, B2, K2, K3.
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TABLE 11.5: ESTIMATES FOR THE MULTILATERAL U.S. DOLLAR (1)
EXPECTED WP COLSIGN
World prices/U.S. prices + 86.8 (9.48) 12.0 (0.38)
World income/U.S. income + 27.1 (4.82) 20.4 (2.25)
Seasonal variables: A1 ? 1.27 (2.34) 0.09 (0.14)
B1 9 -0.52 (0.92) -1.56 (2.21)
B2 9 -1.00 (2.27) -0.32 (0.88)
Speculative dummies: S2 - -2.88 (1.40) -1.66 (1.09)
S3 - 1.20 (0.71) 4.25 (2.20)
S4 - -11.1 (7-54) 1.75 (0.73)
S5 - -13.9 (12.0) -4.07 (1.66)
s6 + -3.73 (2.08) -1.34 (0.70)
S7 + 1.47 (0.74) 2.89 (1.90)
S9 - -2.53 (1.52) -0.75 (O.49)
S10 + 3-05 (1.40) 1.09 (O.50)
Rho 0.33 (3.20) 0.97 (34.4)
R-SQUARED 0.97 0.98
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.99 1.99
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 2.33 2.05
F-STATISTIC 134.5 173.1
Notes : 1. Omitted (insignificant) variables: constant, trend, 
A2, S1, S8.
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TABLE 11.6: ESTIMATES FOR THE MULTILATERAL CANADIAN DOLLAR (1)
EXPECTED
SIGN WP COL
Constant 7 76.7 (**.21) 90.8 (3.73)
Trend ? 0.16 (1.21) 0.20 (1.36)
Seasonal variables: A1 7 0.78 (1.78) O.90 (2.08)
A2 7 0.37 (1.89) 0.3*t (1.71)
Speculative dummies: DC8 + 1.87 (2.15) 1.85 (2.13)
Rho 0.96 (3^ .1) 0.97 (3^ .8)
R-SQUARED 0.92 0.92
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.92 1.90
STANDARD ERROR OF THE 1 16REGRESSION
F-STATISTIC i+9.1 i+9.0
Notes: 1. Omitted (insignificant) variables: relative prices,
relative incomes, B1, B2, DC1, DC2, DC3» DC4, DC5, DC6 , 
DC7, DC9, DC10.
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TABLE 11.7: ESTIMATES FOR THE MULTILATERAL FRENCH FRANC (1)
EXPECTED-
SIGN WP COL
Constant ? 196.4 (4.20) 21.4 (0.39)
World prices/French prices + 26.7 (1.70) 179.6 (4.29)
Trend ? -1.76 (3.83) -0.95 (2.43)
Seasonal variables: A1 7 O.O6 (O.O6) -2.52 (2.30)
Speculative dummies: F4 - 4.63 0 .62) 5.56 (2.15)
F8 - 8.51 (2.96) 8.13 (3.O8)
F9 - -18.O (4.95) -17.5 (5.30)
F10 - -10.0 (2.61) -8.85 (2.53)
F12 - -9.39 (3.24) -8.78 (3.30)
Rho 0.97 (37.7) 0.97 (34.5)
R-SQUARED 0.99 0.99
DURBIN-WATS ON STATISTIC 2.15 2.14
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ■z ni ? 76REGRESSION
F-STATISTIC 396.7 473.2
. Quitted 
A2, B1,
(insignificant) variables: 
B2, F1, F2, F3, F5, F6, F7,
relative incomes, 
F11.
Notes : 1
TABUE 11.8: ESTIMATES FOR THE MULTILATERAL BELGA (1)
EXPECTED WP COLSIGN
Constant ? 90.4 (1.74) 91.5 (1.55)
Speculative dummies: BG3 - 12.4 (4.72) 12.6 (4.66)
BG4 - 24.9 (9.66) 25.0 (9.39)
bg6 - 5.60 (2.47) 5.60 (2.47)
Rho 0.97 (39.8) 0.98 (41.4)
R-SQUARED 0.96 0.96
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.97 1.89
STANDARD ERROR OF THE 
REGRESSION
F-STATISTIC
3.02
94.6
3.04
94.0
Notes: 1. Omitted (insignificant) variables: relative prices, relative
income, trend, A1, A2, B1, BG1, BG2, BG5, BG7, BG8, BG9.
(1 )TABLE 11.9: ESTIMATES FOR THE MULTILATERAL GUILDER^  y
EXPECTED
SIGN WP COL
Constant ? 187.0 (4.44) 166.5 (2.37)
Rho 0.96 (30.6) 0.95 (28.7)
R-SQUARED 0.95 0.95
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.73 1.87
STANDARD ERROR OF THE X  18 7 3 1REGRESSION ¿ • c .  1
F-STATISTIC 88.4 86.7
relative prices, relative 
HJ, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8.
Notes : 1 emitted (insignificant) variables: 
incomes, trend, A1, A2, B1, B2, H2,
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(1)TABLE 11.10: ESTIMATES FOR THE MULTILATERAL SWISS FRANC' '
EXPECTED
SIGN WP COL
Constant ? 69.6 (1.32) 239.1 (2.68)
World prices/Swiss prices + 9^.2 (2.3*0 -93.2 (1.16)
Seasonal variables: B2 o 1.05 (1.51) 1.05 d.*+6)
Rho 0.96 (29.9) 0.96 (30.9)
R-SQUARED 0.9^ 0.9*+
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC 1.89 1.70
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION 3.60 3.70
F-STATISTIC 62.1 58.
Notes: 1. Omitted (insignificant) variables: relative incomes, trend,
A1, A2, B1, SW1, SW2, SW3, SWU, SW5,SW6, SW7, SW8, SW9, SW10.
It is clear that the regression results are rather poor and, in 
some cases, the EER seems to have been principally determined by some 
combination of the constant term, the trend variable, speculative effects 
(as represented by the dummy variables) and seasonal factors. Ch the 
other hand, relative price effects are apparent in three cases (the 
U.S., FYance and Switzerland) and in two others - Canada and Holland - 
were expected to be weak anyway. Moreover, if it is accepted that the 
model is less applicable to the minor gold bloc currencies (since their 
exchange rates were heavily influenced by the pound-dollar-franc triangle) 
then the only major surprise is the failure of any correctly signed 
relative price effects to show up in the case of the pound. The "wrong" 
sign in the COL version is particularly puzzling since the pound was 
only once associated with perverse bilateral price effects (in its
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relationship with the guilder). However, these problems may well 
be due to the exclusion of any variable to represent the activities 
of the EEA which probably "distorted" the path of the pound's EEjR and, 
on occasion, pushed it in the opposite direction to that indicated by 
"economic fundamentals". (In any case the "wrongly" signed COL ratio 
is only significant at the 2 0 % level).
Nevertheless, to the extent that it was usually relative prices 
based on WP's, not COL indices, that were important - on two out of 
the three occasions when the relative price variable was significant, 
in fact - and relative income was only significant in one case (the 
U.S. dollar), the results could be construed as being supportive of 
the Nurkse hypothesis, at least in the negative sense of not supporting 
the alternative hypothesis put forward here. However, the speculative 
dummies do not perform especially well either (and where they do it is 
usually in the regressions in which relative prices actually are 
significant) and so the regression results might be interpreted as 
providing strong support for neither hypothesis. This view is supported 
by the fact that the generally poor performance of the relative income 
variables can probably be explained in terms of data inadequacies. 
Indeed, this variable performed only tolerably well in the bilateral 
regressions since, though usually significant, it was "wrongly" signed 
for a third of the time; consequently, this could be expected to lead 
to a cancelling out effect in the multilateral relative income variable.
Despite the generally poor quality of the results, it might be 
useful to consider the variables that are significant to see if they 
perform as expected and also whether their performance is consistent 
with that in the bilateral regressions. In the case of the pound the 
trend variable indicates a gradual appreciation (as indeed it did in
- 397 -
the bilateral regressions) and the "traditional" seasonal pattern 
of autumnal weakness and spring strength was very much apparent in 
the shape of the significance and sign of A1. The importance of B1 
is less certain but, in any case, taken in conjunction with A1 it 
modifies the seasonal pattern rather than changes it. Two speculative 
dummies are significant: K1's appearance was expected but that of K*+ 
is surprising as it was never significant in any bilateral regressions, 
although it is correctly signed. K2 and KJ> might have been expected 
to show up, given their performance in the bilateral regressions, and 
their lack of significance rather supports the contention (made earlier) 
that the speculative dummies did not perform especially well.
The model seems to work tolerably well for the U.S. dollar and 
the estimates for U.S. EER are probably the "best" of the seven, in 
terms of supporting the hypotheses embodied in the model. The signifi­
cance and correct signs of the relative price and income variables have 
already been referred to and it is clear from Table 11.5 that the 
speculative dummies' performance is almost entirely consistent with 
a priori expectations and the results of the bilateral regressions: 
where variables were "wrongly" signed in the latter (SJ and S6), they 
were "wrongly" signed here, where they were insignificant, they are 
also insignificant here (S1 ) - the exception is S8, which was significant 
in most of the bilateral regressions - and the performance of the 
variables tends even to match up in terms of degree of significance, 
in that those which were only significant in some of the bilateral 
regressions are significant at at low levels or in only one version 
of the multilateral regressions (S2 and S7, for example). Finally, 
the sign of the trend variable is the same as in the bilateral regressions 
and, since no clear seasonal pattern emerged in the latter, the slight
difference in seasonal variations indicated in the WP and COL 
versions is not surprising. In fact, the former version displays 
a seasonal pattern for the dollar exactly in keeping with expectations, 
that is strong in the autumn, weak in the spring; the pattern in the 
COL version is similar, but from the point of view of expectations, 
mistimed since it suggests that the dollar remained weak until as 
late as October and then became strong until April.
Whilst the model performs rather less well for the Canadian 
dollar, the actual results produce few surprises. Doubts were 
expressed (in Chapter 7) about the likelihood of relative price and 
income effects showing up in the Canadian case (due to trade controls) 
and, to some extent, these were borne out in the bilateral regressions. 
In addition, the uncertain performance of the trend variable here - it 
is only significant in one version at the 20% level - is not unexpected 
as it carried opposite signs in the bilateral regressions against the 
pound and the U.S. dollar. Also the expectation that the Canadian 
dollar would be influenced by seasonal factors - particularly because 
of the importance of wheat exports to the economy - is strongly 
confirmed. Only the speculative dummies perform unexpectedly as 
they are mainly insignificant and the only exception (DC8) was in­
significant in the bilateral regressions. However, it is correctly 
signed here and the examination of the bilateral Canadian dollar 
residuals indicated that its insignificance was due to mistiming.
The French franc regressions are, on balance, encouraging. A
clear relative price effect emerges and the insignificance of the
relative income variable is not unsurprising given the difficulties
(32 )encountered with this variable in the bilateral regressions. The
tendency for the franc to weaken over time, as indicated by the trend
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in the bilateral regressions, is confirmed here and the limited 
(COL version only) evidence of a seasonal effect is consistent with 
the hypothesis that European currencies weakened in the autumn and 
strengthened in the spring (although no particular seasonal pattern 
had been apparent in French bilateral exchange rates).
The performance of the speculative dummies is a little erratic: 
the insignificance of F1 and F2 is expected, as they had been in­
significant in the bilateral regressions, but since all the other 
dummies were significant (to varying degrees) in the latter, the 
insignificance of some of these others in the multilateral regressions 
is surprising. This is particularly true of F3 and F5 but less so of 
F6, F7 and F11 since their sign varied across the different bilateral 
exchange rates and a cancelling out effect may have occurred. Of the 
variables that did show up here, F8 and F12 were mainly significant 
in the bilateral regressions (and F8 is consistently "wrongly" signed) 
although this was only true of F4 in the belga-franc estimates. F9 
and F10 are most interesting: they were mostly significant but usually 
"wrongly" signed in the bilateral regressions but are correctly signed 
in Table 11.7 suggesting that multilaterally the franc was indeed weak 
in the October, 1936 - February, 1937 period.
With the partial exception of Switzerland (for which the WP 
ratio is significant) the results for the rest of the gold bloc EER's 
are rather poor, although not actually inconsistent with the bilateral 
results. Indeed, only the constant term is significant in the Dutch 
regressions. However, it should be recalled that both speculative 
and "economic fundamental" variables tended to fare relatively badly 
in the Dutch bilateral regressions, particularly in the guilder-pound 
estimates. This raised some questions about the applicability of the
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model to the guilder and the multilateral guilder regressions would 
seem to do much the same.
The Swiss regressions, as already indicated, are the "best" 
of the three: not only is one of the relative price variables 
significant, but the only other significant variable (B2) indicates 
the expected seasonal strength in the Swiss franc in the early part 
of the year at the height of the winter tourist season. Moreover, the 
failure of potential speculative influences to show up is not unexpected, 
as Switzerland is a small country, although the insignificance of the 
trend variable is perhaps surprising in view of the bilateral regression 
results. This latter point can also be made in connection with the 
other two minor gold bloc currencies.In fact, in the case of 
the belga, the only significant variables are the constant term and 
the three speculative dummies which are all "wrongly" signed. BG3 
and BG4 were similarly signed in the bilateral regressions but BG6 
had been insignificant (except in earlier regressions of the belga- 
dollar) and its presence in Table 11.8 is rather surprising. The 
overall impression from the regressions involving the minor gold bloc 
currencies is that there is little evidence that their multilateral 
exchange rates were determined by either the "economic" or the 
"speculative" variables included in the model.
On balance the poor quality of the results is perhaps not 
surprising. Clearly there are problems in calculating the multi­
lateral variables and questions might be raised about the adequacy 
of their construction. In addition, there are a number of omitted 
influences including official intervention, interest rate differentials, 
ROW speculative effects and also, as in the bilateral regressions, the 
effects of protection. Consequently, whilst these regression results
cannot be said to indicate general support for the hypothesis that 
multilateral exchange rates were determined by "economic fundamentals", 
it is too harsh an interpretation to suggest that they show that they 
were not. Moreover, in at least one case (the French franc), there 
is firm evidence that relative prices were an important determinant 
of the multilateral exchange rate and more limited evidence to suggest 
the same for the U.S. dollar and the Swiss franc. Indeed, of the 
three major currencies of the 1930's, only the multilateral pound 
shows no signs of being determined by the "economic fundamentals" 
that were included in the regressions.
(IV)
In general, testing the hypotheses developed in chapter four 
for EER's has not been very successful in terms of providing support 
for these hypotheses; the results have tended to be ambiguous and 
difficult to interpret. To a large extent, this may be due to the 
crudity and inadequacies of the tests actually performed (although some 
of these are probably unavoidable). For example, the calculation of 
real EER's is essentially an examination of a simple PPP hypothesis 
which effectively tests directly for the importance of only one 
"economic fundamental". It was also subject to the criticism that 
too many countries which did not have exchange rate regimes that even 
approximated the "free" exchange rate system, to which the model is 
applicable,were included. Furthermore, whilst the second test, using 
regression analysis, incorporated more variables, the criticism of 
not including all important explanatory variables is valid here also, 
if to a lesser degree. The construction and country coverage of the
EER'b might also be questioned. Therefore, there are a number of 
good reasons for the rather inconclusive results.
However, on the positive side, further evidence to support 
the contention that the explanatory variables included in the model 
were important determinants of exchange rates was provided in some 
cases, in particular for seasonal effects, some of the speculative 
effects and indirectly (and more tenuously) for the role of official 
intervention. In fact the consistency of performance of variables 
that were significant in both bilateral and multilateral regressions 
is a notable feature of the results. The contention that some of the 
exchange rates were distorted by various factors, especially protection, 
which is not the same as arguing that they were subject to destabilising 
speculation, is also supported. Moreover, the conclusions concerning 
"economic fundamentals" were far from wholly negative: interest rate 
differentials unfortunately had to be excluded and the problems of 
finding suitable income proxies appeared to continue but positive 
evidence of a relative price effect was provided by the calculation 
of the pound's real EER, the comparison of the standard deviations of 
nominal and real EER's (Table 11.3), the French franc regressions and, 
to a lesser extent, by those for the U.S. dollar and Swiss franc.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 11
1. Long run PPP tests are carried out by Officer (1980) for the 
periods 1938, 1963-66 and 1975 using a variety of base periods (to maximise country coverage) going back up to a hundred years 
(1879-88, 1905-1913* 1910 and 1913)» Similar tests were carried out by Genberg (1978) and by the OPTICA Reports, as described
in Thygesen (1978), for the 1960's and 1970's. It is also becoming 
increasingly common to calculate "real" EER's (that is, EER's 
adjusted to allow for inflation differentials). See Dimsdale (1981) 
for 1921-38 and World Financial Markets (1978, 1979) for the 1970's.
2. Thygesen (1978), p. 301 (Summary).
3. Ibid, p. 306.
*+. Genberg (1978), p. 268.
5. Ibid, p. 273.
6. World Financial Markets (1978), p. 10.
7* World Financial Markets (1979)* p. 11.
8. See World Financial Markets (1978), pp. 12-13, for a comparison of 
real EER's adjusted by different price indices.
9. The standard deviations are 5*57 (real EER) and 8.58 (nominal EER).
10. Officer (1980), p. 218.
11. Ibid, p. 226.
12. There is one other feature of Table 11.2 of interest in the 
shape of the (approximately) 10% overvaluation of the (effective) 
pound in 1938. This conflicts with Dimsdale's real EER (Table 11.1) which apparently suggests that the pound was undervalued by 10% in 
1938. However, since different base periods were used this may 
indicate more about the choice of base period than the level of
the pound. Nevertheless, given the use of 1929 as a base period 
in the present study, this divergence is disturbing and, if 1929 
were a poor choice of base year and Officer's calculations were correct, then Dimsdale's index could be construed as suggesting 
that the pound was overvalued by about 20% in 1929» Of course, Officer's choice of base may be equally unreliable and, in any case, this undervaluation is in relative price terms and if allowance 
is made for other determinants of exchange rates then it is possible 
to take the view that in 1929 the pound was at equilibrium in a 
wider sense. (This issue was discussed at length in Chapter 2,
Section IV).
13» The excluded country in the WP version was Mexico. In fact, in the U.K. case, since Mexico was not included in the original calculation 
(a 28 country model was used), the nominal EER used is the same as that discussed in Chapter 10. In the COL version the excluded countries 
were Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Russia and Spain. (The exclusion of the 
latter is probably no great loss since Spanish exchange rate data 
was unavailable during most of the Civil War period and had had to be interpolated).
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1*4. This was done by multiplying the weights of the remaining
countries by 100/(100 - combined weights in the 29 country EER 
of the excluded countries) to make the remaining weights sum to one hundred.
15. These were extensively discussed in Chapter 9» Section II.
16. In fact a comparison between scaled up versions of the 29 
country model weights and those actually used in the 7 country 
model (and properly calculated) revealed that this latter problem 
is fairly trivial. There are, of course, differences but the only 
significant one was that the "properly calculated" weighting system 
tended to give a greater weight to Canada mainly at the expense
of the D.K. (In the U.K. case it was at the expense of the U.S.)
17« It would have been possible to simply compare the nominal EER with its PPP value but use of a real EER allows the results to be 
presented as a single figure (and, furthermore, one which clearly 
shows the degree of over- or undervaluation).
18. Indeed Balassa (196*0 and Yeager (1958) did dispute this point.
The figure in question was ± 2 3 % (for long run tests of PPP).
19« The trend of the (comparable) Dimsdale index (given in Table 11.1) is also similar. The main difference is that it suggests the real 
effective pound had not regained its 1929 value even by 1958. Never theless, the arguments concerning the reasons for the pound's under 
valuation in the next paragraph are still applicable.
20. See Chapter 5* Section II.
21. This variable was never significant in the bilateral exchange rate regressions but it was significant in those using the multi­
lateral pound (presented in the next section) in both WP and COL 
versions.
22. To some extent this must reflect the apparent undervaluation of 
the pound in the corresponding period.
25. It was, in fact, "wrongly" signed. This is discussed in Chapter 5, 
Section III.
2k. The figure is slightly higher (80 )^ for the wide version than for 
the narrow version.
25. See Table 7-6, Chapter 7, Section V.
26. Chapter 3% Section IV, Table 5*9»
27. Price indices for some countries were based on one city or region; 
for others they were only available on a quarterly basis and the 
gaps had to be filled by interpolation.
28. Of course, all the problems of constructing intervention dummies 
discussed in the appendix to Chapter *4, are equally applicable here
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29. It would have been possible to construct an 11 country modelby including the four Scandinavian countries but their combined 
weights (in the 29 country model) is small.
30. In fact, there are four major countries (in terms of importance 
in world trade) but the fourth - Germany - must obviously be 
excluded because of its use of trade and exchange controls.
31. The combined weights of the other six countries in the composite 
weights of the EER's (29 country model) of the seven countries 
were as follows:
32. For some French exchange rates the relative income variables using 
the original proxy (employment), which is used in the multilateral 
regressions, were insignificant and an alternative proxy (production) 
had to be used. The relative income variables involving French 
"income" were then always significant, to varying degrees, although 
often "wrongly" signed. This may suggest that a cancelling out 
process has occurred in the multilateral variable.
33» However, the appreciating trend was against the pound, dollar 
and franc, not each other, and there may be a cancelling out process taking place in these multilateral regressions.
Canada
U.K.
U.S.
kk.1% France 1+5-3% Holland 1+8.1% 
1+9.5% Belgium ^ k . 6 % Switzerland 1+7*7% 
69.6%
SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER 12
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
( I )
The purpose of the present chapter (and effectively the final 
section) is to summarize the findings of the earlier chapters and 
bring together the results (for both bilateral and multilateral 
exchange rates) in order to draw some general conclusions relating 
to the main themes of the study. A detailed analysis of the results 
of the tests involving bilateral exchange rates - particularly the 
technical aspects such as consistency of performance of variables 
across different exchange rates - has already been provided (in 
Chapter 8) and some preliminary conclusions about multilateral 
exchange rates were suggested in the previous chapter. These have 
now to be related to the wider issues.
The basic objective of the thesis has been to test what might 
be called an "anti-Nurkse" hypothesis for the 1930's: specifically, 
that exchange rates were generally "stable", determined by "economic 
fundamentals" and not subject to excessive variation due to destabilising 
speculation. This has involved examining various aspects of exchange 
rates; for example, the concepts of stability and of speculation, the 
role of expectations and the extension of the concept of multilateral 
or effective exchange rates to the 1930's. It has also generated 
evidence relating to a number of other issues, particularly the role 
of official intervention in the 1930's, the PPP hypothesis and some 
of the implications of using multilateral as opposed to bilateral 
exchange rates for this period.
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The study begins by examining the relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature with a view to identifying the major variables 
that determine exchange rates. On the basis of these surveys, a 
model of exchange rate determination was developed which could be 
viewed either as an extended PPP hypothesis - that is, the PPP 
hypothesis is accepted but it is realised that deviations from PPP 
can occur for non-speculative (or "economic") reasons and the relevant 
variables should be identified and added - or as being based on the 
premise that the variables that determine the balance of payments also 
determine the exchange rate (since in determining the flow of goods 
and services they implicitly determine the flow of currencies). It 
was also recognised that, realistically, some allowance should be 
made for speculative effects and that they ought to be explicitly 
modelled, and this was done by including dummy variables to represent 
anything that may have caused speculative capital flows.
This model was then tested, with varying degrees of success, 
for the bilateral exchange rates of seven countries whose currencies 
were relatively "free" in the 1930's, in terms of not being subject 
to extensive exchange controls. Attention was then turned towards 
multilateral exchange rates. These had never been calculated for 
the inter-war period and so, after an examination of the relevant 
methodology, EER's were calculated for all seven currencies. Given 
that they had never been calculated before, it was felt necessary to 
draw some general inferences from the EER's before using them to 
provide a more limited test (because of data deficiencies and method­
ological problems)of the model for multilateral exchange rates.
The central hypothesis - that exchange rates were principally 
determined by "economic fundamentals" in the 1930's - receives a fair 
measure of support, although this is rather less true of the tests 
involving EER's. The most important explanatory variable was relative 
prices but it was noticeable (in both the bilateral and multilateral 
tests) that WP's performed "better" and this confirmed, to some extent, 
the suspicion that verification of this extended PPP hypothesis by an 
index of mainly traded goods might be spurious. However, whilst their 
performance was clearly "worse", the COL indices did show up reasonably 
well in the bilateral tests; in particular, in two legs of the pound- 
dollar-franc exchange rate triangle they were significant (at the 1% 
level) and in the other (pound-dollar) a relative "price" variable 
based on indices of wages, therefore containing even less traded 
goods, was significant. Furthermore, despite the poor results when 
multilateral exchange rates were examined, the inflation differential- 
adjusted (real) EER's were less variable than the nominal EER's with 
only one exception.
Ch obtaining similar results for a similar model, Hodgson (1971)
and Hudgins (1973) suggested that this indicated support for the PPP
(1)hypothesis. In a sense, this is true but in another, in taking
the significance of relative prices in isolation and ignoring the rest 
of the model, it is not, since the rest of the model suggests that the 
PPP hypothesis did not hold because numerous other variables obviously 
did partially determine exchange rates. Moreover, the single explicit 
test of the "pure" PPP hypothesis, carried out multilaterally (in 
Chapter 11) when real EER's were calculated, clearly demonstrated that
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in most cases "pure" PPP did not hold. However, if the PPP hypothesis 
is interpreted as simply arguing that exchange rates were primarily, 
but not solely, determined by relative prices then support is provided 
for this version. Nevertheless, to the extent that some would interpret 
the PPP hypothesis more rigidly, the results here do not really support 
it but rather suggest that relative prices were one of several important 
determinants of exchange rates.
Other "economic fundamentals" of importance were relative
incomes, interest rate differentials, seasonal effects and probably
(2)the influences represented by the trend. It must be conceded, how­
ever, that in the case of the first two (and most important) variables 
the bulk of the positive evidence was contained in the section on 
bilateral exchange r a t e s , a l t h o u g h  the multilateral tests did 
confirm the importance of seasonal effects and the trend variable in 
some cases. Furthermore, on the basis of the performance of the more 
comprehensive version of the model in the bilateral tests, it could 
be argued that some of the unexplained variation in EER's was probably 
due to the (excluded) "economic fundamentals". Nevertheless, the 
performance of the one variable of this group included in the multi­
lateral tests - relative income - was disappointing although it was 
significant in the U.S. dollar regressions and the construction of the 
variable was beset by methodological difficulties.
A final set of "economic" variables - ROW effects (only applicable 
to bilateral rates) - were also generally significant. In retrospect, 
it might have been advisable to test for ROW speculative effects. 
Logically, ROW ("third country") speculative dummies should have been 
included along with ROW "economic fundamentals". However, given the 
subjective nature of such variables, then whilst it is acceptable to
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use them directly (in regressions involving their country of origin), 
to use them indirectly (in regressions involving exchange rates between 
two other countries) is probably rather tenuous, although third country 
speculative effects may have provided rational explanations for some 
of the residuals.
The second major purpose of the thesis or, perhaps better, 
another way of approaching the first, was to consider the Nurkse 
charge that:
"If currencies are left free to fluctuate, 'speculation'...
...is likely to play havoc with exchange rates...." (4)
Of course, to the extent that it has been demonstrated that "economic 
fundamentals" determined exchange rates, this has already been refuted. 
However, more specific and positive evidence was also provided in the 
shape of the inclusion of speculative dummies and the examination of 
the residuals and their explanation in terms of non-speculative 
influences. The general impression of such tests was that, on 
balance, exchange rates were not subject to destabilising speculation. 
The issue is mainly examined in relation to bilateral exchange rates 
but, since speculators operated on the basis of expectations about 
bilateral not multilateral rates, then this is where the tests for 
destabilising speculation should be concentrated.^^
It is true that numerous speculative dummies were significant, 
particularly those of Britain, France and the U.S.A. and, in some 
cases,the exchange rate was clearly overshooting due to genuinely 
destabilising speculation; for example, the contentions that de­
stabilising speculation caused excessive weakening of the pound at the 
turn of 1931 and the gold and dollar "scares" affected the dollar in
1937-8 receive both bilateral and multilateral support. However, 
such dummies tend to be in the minority since many variables are 
either insignificant (implying no speculative effect) or are probably 
picking up something else, such as official intervention, and are 
consequently often "wrongly" signed. In addition, a few of the 
variables are not really testing for destabilising speculation in 
that the influences they represent are not of this type or, alternatively, 
the speculation being modelled is not destabilising in the sense that 
speculators were correct.
Of course, it can be suggested that these dummies provide 
inadequate tests for destabilising speculation but it is difficult 
to devise alternative and superior tests - a "speculative variable" 
based on forward market data was also tried with limited success - and 
the inclusion of no speculative variables and their replacement by an 
examination of the residuals is inadequate in that it makes the implicit 
(and demonstrably incorrect) assumption that all the residuals are 
due to speculation. At least dummy variables are based on attempts 
to identify and model destabilising speculation a priori.
Furthermore, some of the dummies (particularly Sk and S5) and 
some of the residuals (especially those relating to the belga in 1935-6 
and the French franc in 1936-7) indicated periods of under- or over­
valuation (in the sense of the exchange rate not being at the level 
indicated by "economic fundamentals"). Whilst this indicates that 
the influence of the latter was being undermined, it does not suggest 
that this was due to destabilising speculation but rather to official 
intervention. The exchange rate was not at its "extended PPP level" 
because of government interference^^ but it was not "unstable" in 
the Nurkse sense of the deviations being due to destabilising speculation;
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indeed, speculation was being thwarted by the authorities as 
indicated by the frequent "wrong" signs of speculative dummies 
representing speculation in these periods (such as the French dummies 
in 1935-6). When large movements ultimately took place - for example, 
the deviations of the gold bloc currencies in 1935-6 - these were 
not due to destabilising speculation but, in a sense, quite the 
opposite: the pressure of "economic fundamentals" became irresistable.
The actual devaluation may have been accompanied by a brief bout of 
speculation but it was not destabilising because the speculators were 
correct and it was the government that had made the mistakes.
This argument would imply that official intervention played 
an important role in the 1930's and testing specifically for the 
presence of intervention was one of the main secondary objectives of 
the study. Evidence of the importance of the exchange funds' activities 
had been provided by Hudgins (1973) and Ozmun (1976) who were specifically 
concerned with this issue. The results presented here would seem to bear 
their conclusions out. No tests were carried out for EER's although 
it was suggested that the path of the pound's real EER did indicate 
the presence of intervention. In the bilateral tests, the ID's of 
the minor currencies were insignificant but this was not entirely 
surprising given the limited "data" on which they were based. Cta 
the other hand, the ID's for the pound-dollar-franc triangle were 
more complete and were clearly important. On the basis of this, the 
misvaluation (already discussed) of some currencies and the inter­
pretation of some of the residuals, two main conclusions can be drawn: 
firstly, that the major exchange rates were influenced by official 
intervention and secondly, that the evidence does tend to support 
the widely held view that the pound was deliberately held down in 
the early 1930»s.(?)
- *413 -
Another possible interpretation of large residuals is that 
they are caused by the (unmodelled) effects of protection. This was 
widespread in the 1930's and, just as it affected the flow of goods, 
it would also have affected the flow of currencies. Trade controls 
are important because they are widely acknowledged to cause deviations 
from PPP. No positive evidence relating to the significance of this 
influence was presented: a rather crude attempt to model the effects 
of protection in the Canadian case was unsuccessful and it was not 
possible to derive even a crude indicator for protection in any other 
cases. To the extent that relative prices did show up and residuals 
could be satisfactorily explained, it might be argued that trade 
controls did not influence exchange rates (with the exception of 
the guilder-pound exchange rate where the poor showing of "economic 
fundamentals" was attributed in part to the effects of protection).
In the face of no direct evidence though, a more cautious conclusion 
may be appropriate: namely, that the effects of the widespread trade 
controls on exchange rates seem to have been rather weaker than expected.
The aspect of the study that is most innovative is the calculation 
of EER's for the 1930's. The use of EER's to test the central hypothesis 
of the study was probably the least successful part of the thesis although 
the contention that "economic fundamentals" were important did receive 
some support in the shape of the lesser variability of real EER's and 
the regression results for two of the three major currencies in the 
1930's (the dollar and the franc); moreover, there was no positive 
evidence that destabilising speculation was dominant. In any case, 
the most important contribution of the section on multilateral exchange 
rates probably lies in the examination of the methodology, its application 
to the 1930's (especially) and the drawing of a few general inferences 
concerning the course of multilateral as opposed to bilateral exchange 
rates.
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(III)
Ultimately, the study is principally concerned with whether 
or not the 1930's can justifiably be portrayed as a period of exchange 
rate near-anarchy, more specifically whether or not exchange rates 
were determined primarily by "economic fundamentals" or were determined 
by the activities of speculators. The results here would give qualified 
support to the former interpretation. Exchange rates do seem to have 
been largely determined by "economic fundamentals" and were relatively 
"stable" in that sense. Speculation, sometimes destabilising, did play 
a minor role but such "instability" that did occur was due, in a large 
part, to government interference. Indeed, it might be argued that 
this latter observation provides the most important conclusion of 
the study. The central hypothesis has been that exchange rates were 
determined by economic fundamentals and much effort has gone into 
examining the traditional counter-argument (put forward by Nurkse 
for the 1930's) that this was not so because of private destabilising 
speculation. However, the results are consistent with the view that 
such instability as occurred had government rather than private origins 
and that the real threat to exchange rate stability in the 1930's was 
provided by the activities of governments rather than private indi­
viduals. This is an interpretation that might usefully be applied 
to other periods of allegedly "unstable" floating exchange rates.
continued over/
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 12
1. See Hodgson (1971\ pp. 268-9 and Hudgins (1973)» P» 222.
2. These latter two variables Eire not obviously "economic 
fundamentals" but they are included in that group for two 
reasons: firstly, they almost certainly do not reflect 
speculative influences and secondly, and most important, they 
represent genuinely "economic" effects to the extent that seasonal 
variation takes place because of the unevenness of crop movements 
and tourism during the year and the trend variable represents 
changes in tastes and/or productivity.
3. Interest rate differentials were not even included in the multi­
lateral tests of the model because of the difficulties involved 
in constructing a suitable variable.
*+. Nurkse (19Mt), P* 138.
5. Indeed, it is probably inappropriate to look at multilaterEil 
exchange rates in this context in some cases. For example, a 
feeling during the 1933-36 period that the French franc was going to leave the gold standard and depreciate could have led to an 
outflow of funds, but almost certainly not to other members of the 
gold bloc or to a small country like Canada. Consequently, speculative 
capital flows would only affect some of the bilateral components of 
the multilateral exchange rate and there may even be offsetting forces 
at work within the latter if the "minor" gold bloc currencies weakened 
in sympathy (due to a capital, outflow).
6. This is not an uncommon phenomenon. Similar situations where 
government interference caused such problems were described in 
Chapter 2. Examples are the French franc in 192^ -26 and the 
Canadian dollar in 1960-1.
7. Two other important issues - whether intervention was competitive and whether it had a stabilising or destabilising effect on exchange 
rates - have not been properly addressed and no specific conclusions 
are offered.
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APPENDIX I
DETAILS OF CONSTRUCTED VARIABLES 
(1) Seasonal Variables (Sine and Cosine Waves)
A1 A2 h i h i
J 0.5 -0.866025 1 -0.866025
F 0 0 0 0
M -0.5 0.866025 -1 0.866025
A -0.866025 0.866025 0 -0.866025
M -1.0 0 1 0
J -0.866025 -0.866025 0 0.866025
J -0.5 -0.866025 -1 -0.866025
A 0 0 0 0
S 0.5 0.866025 1 0.866025
0 0.866025 0.866025 0 -0.866025
N 1.0 0 -1 0
D 0.866025 -0.866025 0 0.866025
h i 11 B2 11
J 0.5 -0.866025 0.5 0
F 0 -1.0 1.0 -1
M -0.5 -0.866025 0.5 0
A 0.866025 -0.5 -0.5 1
M -1.0 0 -1.0 0
J 0.866025 0.5 -0.5 -1
J -0.5 0.866025 0.5 0
A 0 1.0 1.0 1
S 0.5 0.866025 0.5 0
0 -0.866025 0.5 -0.5 -1
N 1.0 0 -1.0 0
D -0.866025 -0.5 -0.5 1
cont/
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B4 i l B6 A6
J -0.5 0.866025 -1 1
F 1.0 -1.0 1 -1
M -0.5 0.866025 -1 1
A -0.5 -0.5 1 -1
M 1.0 0 -1 1
J -0.5 0.5 1 -1
J -0.5 -0.866025 -1 1
A 1.0 1.0 1 -1
S -0.5 -0.866025 -1 1
0 -0.5 0.5 1 -1
N 1.0 0 -1 1
D -0.5 -0.5 1 -1
(2) Speculative Dummies
British Speculative Dummies are given in Table 5-1» p. 144.
American • 1 I I I I I t  I I I I 5.2, p. 150.
French I f II I I I l  I I I I 5.3, P. 157.
Belgian I I I t I t I l  I I I I 6.1, p. 220.
Dutch II II II I l  I I I t 6.2, p. 226.
Swiss I t • 1 I t I l  I I I t 6.3, p. 231.
Canadian I I I I II I l  I I II 7.3, p. 289.
- lu 8 -
(5) Official Intervention Dummies
POUND-■DOLLAR POUND-FRANC
Narrow Wide Narrow Wide
1931 s
0
N
D
1932 J
F
M -1 -1 -1 -1
A
M
J
J -1
A -1
S +1 +1 +1 +1
0 +1
N -1
D -1
1933 J -1 -1 -1 -1
F -1 -1 -1 -1
M -1 -1 -1 -1
A -1
M -1 +1
J + 1 -1
J + 1 +1 +1
A -1 -1 -1 -1
S -1 -1 -1 -1
0 -1 -1
N + 1 -1
D + 1
193  ^ J -1
F + 1
M +1 +1
A + 1
M +1 +1 +1
DOLLAR.
Narrow
•FRANC
Wide
cont/
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POUND-DOLLAR POUND-FRANC DOLLAR-FRANC
Narrow Wide Narrow Wide Narrow Wide
J +1 +1 +1
J + 1 +1 +1
A -1 +1 +1 -1
S +1 +1
0
N
D +1
1935 J + 1 +1 +1 +1
F +1 + 1 +1 +1 +1
M -1 + 1
A
M -1 -1 -1
J
J + 1
A -1 -1
S + 1 +1 +1
0 +1 +1 +1
N -1 -1
D -1
1936 J -1 -1 +1
F -1
M +1 -1
A -1 -1 -1
M -1 -1
J +1 -1 -1
J -1 +1
A -1
S +1 -1
0 +1
N +1 -1 -1
D -1 -1
1937 J -1 -1
F -1 -1
M
A +1 +1
M +1 +1
-  1*20
POUND-DOLLAR POUND-FRANC DOLLAR-FRANC
Narrow Wide Narrow Wide Narrow Wide
J -1 -1 -1
J -1 +1 +1 -1
A -1 -1 +1
S +1 +1
0 +1 -1
N -1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1
D
1938 J
F -1 -1
M
A
M +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1
J +1
J +1 -1 +1
A +1
S +1
0 +1 -1 +1
N +1 -1 +1
D +1 +1 +1 +1 -1
Belgian ID Dutch ID Swiss ID
Feb., 1938 -1 Nov., 1936 +1 March, 1933 +1
March,1938 -1 Dec., 1936 +1 April, 1935 +1
July, 1938 +1 Jan., 1937 +1 Nov., 1936 -1
March, 1938 +1
April, 1938 +1
May, 1938 +1
Sept., 1938 -1
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APPENDIX II
DATA SOURCES
(1) Spot Exchange Rates
These were taken from several sources in order to obtain direct 
quotations as far as possible. (Any exchange rate used in the study 
but not listed below has been based on cross-rates). For some exchange 
rates two sources had to be used and the respective dates are given in 
these cases; where no dates are given the source gave the exchange rate 
for the entire 1929-38 period.
(i) Sterling exchange rates
L.C.E.S. (London and Cambridge Economic Service) Bulletin: U.S.A.,
Brazil, Argentina, India, Japan, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland.
Bank of England Statistical Summary (all 1932-8 only): S. Africa,
Canada, China, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Australia,
New Zealand.
Economist: Egypt, Canada (1929-31), China (1929-31), Russia, Austria, 
Belgium (1929-31), Denmark (1929-31), Finland (1929-31), Norway (1929-31), 
Poland, Spain (1929-31).
League of Nations Monthly Bulletin (all 1929-31) : S. Africa, Australia, 
New Zealand.
League of Nations, The Network of World Trade (1942): British Malaya.
(ii) U.S. Dollar exchange rates
Federal Reserve Bulletin: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
(page 421A follows)
42 IA
(iii) Canadian Dollar Exchange Rates
The Canadian Yearbook (all 1930-38): Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden.
(iv) French Franc Exchange Rates
Bulletin de la Statistique Générale de la France: Norway (1933-8),
Spain (1931-8).
Ministère de 1'Economie Nationale, Annuaire Statistique: Czechoslovakia, 
Finland (1935-8), Germany, Italy, Poland (1933-8), Netherlands, Spain
I
(1929-30), Sweden.
(v) Belga Exchange Rates
Ministère de L'Intérieur, Office Centrale de la Statistique, Annuaire 
Statistique de la Belgique et du Congo Belge: Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland.
(vi) Swiss Franc Exchange Rates
Annuaire Statistique de la Swisse: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden.
(vii) Dutch Guilder Exchange Rates 
These were all based on cross-rates.
(2) Forward Exchange Rates
1931-6: Einzig (1937), Appendix I. 
1937-8: Economist.
(page 421B follows)
421B
(3) Prices
Bulletin de la Statistique de la France: French cost-of-living 
index.
Economist, Statist, Board of Trade: U.K. wholsale price index is 
an average of three completely separate indices calculated by these 
sources.
League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics: all other price 
indices.
(4) Wages
U.K.: L.C.E.S. Bulletin.
U.S.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business.
(5) Income Variables (Employment, Unemployment and Production Indices)
International Labour Review: S. Africa (1932-8), Czechoslovakia (1933-8), 
Germany (1931-8), Italy (1931-8), Japan (1931-8), Poland (1931-8).
League of Nations Monthly Bulletin: all other "income" indices.
(6) Interest Rates
1931-6: Einzig (1937), Appendix III.
1937-8: League of Nations Monthly Bulletin.
APPENDIX III
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES; 
METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION AND DATA
Twelve indices were calculated for each of the six countries 
based on trade flows in 1928, 1935 and 1938: four indices were based 
on bilateral trade flows, one for each year and one (the average 
bilateral) averaging the weights of each year; four were based on 
shares of total world trade ("global" weights), one for each year and 
one (the average global) averaging the weights for each year; and four 
were based on averaging the bilateral and global weights, one for each 
year and the "composite index" which averaged the average bilateral and 
average global weights. All the averages were geometric in the case of 
the pound and arithmetic for the other six countries. The indices were 
calculated according to the simple formula:
1
Index in time period i = Iw B
n
where n = the number of countries
R = the index of the value of a bilateral exchange 
rate (R° = 1.00)
R1 = the index for an exchange rate in time period i 
w = a weight
The data presented in the following pages is based on the following 
key: K = U.K. S = U.S. C = Canada
F = France H = Holland
B = Belgium W = Switzerland
The following indices are 1929 based using a 29 country model 
except for the pound (1929-30 based, 28 countries). The weights 
follow the indices.
1 = 1928 weights, bilateral
2 = 1935 " "
3 = 1938 " "
4 = average bilateral
5 = 1928 weights, global
6 = 1935 " "
7 = 1938 " "
8 = average global
9 = average of bilateral and global weightsf 1928
10 = If II It I I 11 1935
11 s II II II II I 11 1938
12 = Composite index
The following data is also presented:
13 = (WP)28 country EER
14 = RCW 28 country WP index (used to calculate WP adjusted EER)
15 = (COL) 24 country EER
16 = ROW 24 country COL index (used to calculate COL adjusted real EER)
17 = 7 country EER
18 = ROW 7 country WP index
19 = " " " COL index
20 = " " " "income" index
21 = 7 country real EER (WP adjusted), quarterly.
22 = " " " " (COL adjusted), "
23 = Weights used for all 7 country variables
In addition one further index is presented for the pound only:
24 = 1929 based composite EER (i.e. 1929 based version of K12).
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££ 6 * £ 0  l ¡ 9 2 9 * 9 0 1 1 1 5 * 1 0 1 0 6 3 * 1 0 1 0 0 9 * 9 0 1 2 1
5 1 1 * 5 0 1 8 0  0 *  9 0 1 ¡ 5 6 6 * 2 0 1 . 0 1 1 * 1 0 1 0 0 2 * 5 0 1 9 1
t q 1 * 5 0 1 1 2 1 6 - 1 0 1 1 5 2 6 * 2 0  l 5 8 2 * 1 0 1 0 5 5 * 5 0 1 51
5 9 9 * 5 0 1 _ ! 6 8  2 *  9 0 1 5 2 1 * 1 0 1 1 5 5 * 1 0  I 3 3 1 * 1 0 11 9 1
9 1 6 * 9 0 1 ¡ 1 0 9 * 1 0 1 1 2 9 2 * 2 0 1 9 9  1 * 1 0 1 1 6 9 * 5 0 1 1 1
£ £ M
I £bl
loss-
9 1 0 * 2 0 1  21I’ZOI 
0 6 3 * 1 0 1  
S 0 6 * 101  
1 9 2 *  101 
0 9  9 * IO I 
6 1 6 * 0 0 1  uroot
2 9 2 * 0 0 1
5 1 2 * 0 0 1
5 9 9 * 0 0 1
S J i l ' l l TJ
O C  M
47
48
fl n /3 H t rs
131.220
130.214
124.030
123.515
125 .422 
174.866
126.8 92 
126.365
1 C6.&8Z 
U  5.519
*9 132.121 124.225 176.124 1 27 .b90 147 .7 10
50 136.865 128.429 130.155 131.816 154.408
51 132.2 30 129.144 130.941 132.b05 j 155.794
52 132.801 129.1 38 130.916 132.619 155-768
138.254 •129-266 131-558 133.359 156.92b1 “ Î T  5* 139.081 1 30.090 ! l 31.877 133.683 157.450
55 139.606 ! 1 30-524 132.418 134.1 83 157.904
56 139.129 130.252 132.169 133.850 US7.683 !
5 7 1 39.624 130.224 132.715 134.371 158.606
56 139.951 130.932 I l  32.912 •134.600 1159.1 64 1
5? 1 39.2 38 130.228 132.1 87 133.901 1157.820
60 139.992 1 3C.912 i J 37.877 134.594 15B.918
b l 140.103 131.104 133.089 134.765 159.268
62 14C.318 131.351 ! 133.357 ‘1 35-009 159.674*
63 141.2 30 132.553 134.646 136.310 161.818
64 145.4931 135.656 138.184 139.778 161.570
1 « - / -  bS 1 4 4 . B 38 <135.1 88 137-715 139.247 160.513H3r “ 144.699 •135.039 137.580 •1 39.106! '1160.227;
6 r 144.899 <1 35.1 39 137.660 1 39-2 33 j 160.371
bft 145.025 1 35.1 20 137 .666 139.2 87j -•160.4 16
b 9 144.616 135.064 137.533 139.1 38 1 60 .388
ro 145.054 3 35.191 137.623' 11 39-2 89j 160.799
21 145.202 •135.369 137.695 139-589 161.520
22 146.025 1 35.673 1 37 .953' 1 39.867! 161.832
23 146.262 <135.660 137.967 139.963 161.972
24 146.109; ¿1 35.682 138.038 U35.943 : 161.940
25 145.222 •135.423 137.735 139.645 161.4 98
26 145.529 :1 35.2 36 137.515 1139.427 161.171
10« */  " 145-145 1 34 .929 137.181 1 39.0 85 160.595i“3w f t 144.242 ’ 1 34.616 136.850 I l  38.738 159.922
2? 145-312 '1 35.046 137-322 :l 39 -229 160 .6 81
80 144.835 134.671 136.929 138.812 155.929
81 143.020 <1 33.340 135.452 137.287 157.404
82 113.550 109.526 U 0 9 . 8 0 5 1 —110.9 77I 119.467
83 113.309 109.384 109-561 110.751 119.131
84 11 3.282 109.412 109.569 110.756! 119.220
65 112.903 109-083 109.185 110.390 118.740
86 112.289 106.990 109.084 110. 2 ee i l  18.615
82 111.699 108.0 96 108.1 50 109-315 117.211
8 8 109.420 106.216 106.174 107.270 114.362
8» 108.256 105.629 105.609 106.682, 113.554
i q V 7  50 108.234 105.247 105.1 391 106.207; 112.842
1 1 ^ 2  91 95.6995 94.8624 94 .2840 94.94 87 97.2001
»2 94.3298 93.6929 93.  12 84 93.7354 95.5886
93 90.01 18 90.0511 89.3548 R9.8059 90.1263
96 86.9960 82.5158 86.7207 87.0775; 86.3598
95 82.54 38 B 2. 95 85 87 .1799 B 7.5607 ; 87.0564
9b 88.5966 88.2588 8 7 . »630 88.4461 88.1001
92 B 6.2669 8 2 . 2 b 11 86 .5030 86.3503 B5.9241
9 B 85.6910 86.3554 85.5430 85.8631 84.6313
FC F 7 Fl n FIO FU F  (Z
147 .4 31 1 4 5 .1  97 146 .5 70 139.051 1 35.7 30 135.412 136.731
145.689 14 1.666 1 Ci., fi 9? 1 38 .0 17 134.602 135.628
148.144 146.140 147.331 139.940 1 3b .4 35 136.157 1 37.5 11
154.6 79 152 .557 1 5 3 .88Z 145.637 141.554 141.356 142 .849
155.995 153.829 155.206 146.762 142.569 142.385 143.905
155 .378 153.628 155.092 146.785 142.508 142.2 72 143.855
156.948 154 .6 36 156 .1 70 147.840 143.357 143.0 97 144 .765
157.542 1554335 156 .776 148.266 : 1 4 3 • 8 16 143.606 1 45 .229
158 .0 34 155.922 157.2 87 148.755 144.279 144.170 145.735
157.948 155.853 157.161 148.406 144.100 14 4.011 145.506
159.004 156.941 158 .1 84 149.140 144 .864 144.828 146.277
159.600 157.469 158.744* 149.557 145.269 145.190 146.672
158 .0 98 155.907 157.275 148 .529 144.188 144.047 , 145.588
159.251 157.1 06 1 5 fi _ 4 75 149.455 145.082 -144 .991 146.509
159.71/ 157 .6 32 158.372 149.685 145.410 145.360 146.8 19
1 60.223 158.206 159.568 149.996 145.787 145.782 147.188
162.5 37 160.601 161-652 151.774 147.545 147 .623 ,148 .981
162 .508 1 60.816 161.631 ,153.531 149-082' 1149.500 150.705
161.455 159-929 160.599 152.676 148.322 148.772 149.923
161.108 159.463 160 .266 152.463 14 8.073 -146 .5 21 -i l  49 - 6 86
161.181 159.482 160-345 152:635 148.160 148 .571 - 149.789
161.140 159.390 160.316 152 .721 148.155 148.528 149-801
161.168 159-449 160.335 152.602 148 .1 16 148.491 149.736
161.550 159.755 160.701 152.926 148.370 148.689 149.995
16 1 .925 159.362 161.102 153.611 1 48.647 148 .7 78 150.345
162.226 160.157 161.405 153.928 148.924 149.055 150 .6 36
162.225 160 .0 38 161.4 12 154.1 17 148 .9 43 149.002 150.687
162-292 160.206 161.479 154.024 148.987 149.122 150.711
16 1 .8 79 159.786 161.054 153.6 37 148.651 141.761 150.350
161.5 69 159.496 160.745 153.350 148.403 148.505 150.086
160.966 ¡158 .3 80 160.1 47 1 5 2 . B70 147.947 148.0 30 149.616
160.250 *158.165-: 159.448 152.337 147.433 -  147.508 I 4 9 .0  93
160.976 158.867 160.175 152 .9 99 148.011 148.095 ,149 . 702
160.246 158.186 159.454 152.3 82 147.459 147.557 149.133
157.896 155.915 157.072 150.2 37 145 .6 ta 145.6 84 147.180
120.044 117.852 119.121 116 .509 114.810 113.828 ; 115.0 4 9
1 19 .726 117.522 118.793 116 .220 114.555 1 13.342 114.772
119.826 117.623 l i e . 8  9Q__ 116 .254 114.619 113.596 114.823
119.138 1 17 .1 20 118.399 115.821 114.210 113.153 < H 4 . 3  95
119.220 117.002: 118.279 115.702 114.105 113.043 I l  14.283
1 17 .8 39 1 15.626 116.892 114.455 112.967 111.888 ¡1 13 .103
114 .974 112-752 114.029 111.391 110.595 109.463 1 10.650
114.152 1 11.923 113.210 111.155 109.9 15 108.766 109.946
113.455 111.220 112.505 110.538 109.351 108.179 109.356
9 7 - 8 1 5 0 95.57 99 96.8650 96.6698 1 96. 3387 94.9320 95.9068
96.1731 93.9573 95.2397 94.9842 94.9355 93.5429 94 .48 75
90.7707 33.5480 89.8150 90.0690 90.4109 88.  95 14 89.8104
86.9660 84.7807 86.0355 86.6779 87.2409 85.7507 ,8 6 .5565
37.6299 85.4289 86.7051 8 7.30 01 87.7942 B6.30 44 87.1329
31.5949 86.45 72 87.7174 31. 34 84 81.6768 87.2201 85.0818
86.4913 34.31 15 85.5756 36.  34 55 86.3862 85.4073 86.21 JO
85.1494 82.9548 34.24 52 35.1611 85.7524 84,2489 85 .0541
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